

WITTGENSTEIN ON THE CRITIQUE OF LANGUAGE

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D E C L A R A T I O N

I, Bhaskaran. M., do hereby declare that this thesis entitled **'WITTGENSTEIN ON THE CRITIQUE OF LANGUAGE'** is an original work carried out in the Department of Philosophy, University of Calicut under the supervision and guidance of Prof. (Dr.) A. Kanthamani. Also I declare that the work has not been submitted previously for the award of any Degree, Diploma, Title, or Recognition.

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
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Dr. A. KANTHAMANI
Supervising Teacher

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Bhaskaran. M.

Dedicated to My Parents

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Preface

One may claim that this is a thesis about the single remark ('All Philosophy is a Critique of Language') Wittgenstein has made in the *Tractatus* (TLP 4.0031) even while trying to subsume all philosophy under this rubric. One may equally claim that this thesis lends credence to the idea of complete account of Wittgenstein's *two* revolutions. So we start with the former and end up with the latter. In short, we claim that the celebrated phrase is a sure entry point to the whole gamut of the alleged doctrines. The remark which occurs early in the early work facilitates entry into the network of doctrines such as logical symbolism, limits of the symbolism, tautology and contradiction, sense/senselessness, saying and showing, logical constants, picture theory, independence of elementary proposition, *gegenstand*, logic, solipsism, mathematics, ethics, life, microcosm in all comprise what he calls the philosophical questions in logic. We expound a *five-layered* approach (Ontological Atomism, Picture Theory, Logic of Truth-functions, Critique of Language, Solipsism; Saying and Showing) but we will have focus on all aspects of Wittgenstein's thought. This feat is made possible by the way we inquire into the main sources of influence. Apart from Frege and Russell, Wittgenstein is equally affiliated to Mauthner, whom he has just glance through. Mauthner was not one who lived in a different age. He was nearly

his contemporary. But interpreters missed much of the influence of Mauthner. As seen here through the only work of Weiler (1970), Weiler presents a very balanced account of Mauthner but with little tilt towards an image that takes us far away from Wittgenstein, as far as the celebrated phrase is concerned. So we have to comb through this work to advance certain key hypotheses for a comparative estimate. The comparative estimate is centering around the central doctrine of critical attention to language, which remains as a positive contribution in spite of the purely negative image caused by his open espousal of scepticism. We select a master concept *Zuffallssinne* that is opposed to Necessity and use this as launching pad for bringing out serious correspondence with Wittgenstein's account of linguistic necessity.

So we create the nuances of *Kritik an der Sprache*, *Sprachkritik*, *Sprachkraft*, to mention these strands of reasoning among the many other raised approaches to language. Other approaches are none of our concern as much as the very rationale of analytical philosophy of language.

Mauthner's *Kritik* embodies a certain doctrine of the tyranny of language, a doctrine that has its focus on how one bewitched by our language. This is a doctrine that has not rivetted the attention of thoroughgoing inquiry. To some extent, Engel fulfills this to but his book is not a very successful one, as it is one that leaves the psychological roots which alone would have brought into the open the richer doctrinal content of the phrase. We come

across the richer doctrine in Pears' most recent readings of Wittgenstein in his two-volumed *The False Prison*, but not without its own counterfoil in Mauthner, though it is not openly acknowledged to be so. So we have to erect a totally new edifice on the doctrinal content, taking into consideration his reading of linguistic solipsism. Reading in conjunction with Schopenhauer's own influences as Engel concedes, the emerging picture is a complete Wittgenstein, a picture that is couched in great sympathy but in deference to most of the interpretative expositions. Thus we present a perspective by cutting through the major entry point in five chapters. After general exploration of modernity and post-modernity, we try to situate Wittgenstein at the cross section of realism and anti-realism, Platonism and Constructivism, in the subsequent chapters. Our summary in the *second* chapter is making a slow access to the myriad contradictions in the doctrines even while ironing out many of them. The *third* chapter explores the relation between *Sprachkritik* (Brentano) and Wittgenstein's *Kritik an der Sprache* as seen through Mauthner's lens and we found that it needs supplementary account of the doctrine of the tyranny of language. Thus the *fourth* chapter is to focus on the so-called doctrine of tyranny of language as understood by Engel, in his major work. After this climax, we introduce the doctrinal content in *chapter 5*, and end up with a table of findings in the end. The whole endeavour is not without some sort of empirical support as this perspective can be illumined in the light of recent Cognitive Science.

CHAPTER 1

'The verbal world is approximately the world of becoming'

- Fritz Mauthner

**TRACTATUS: ORIGIN, COMPOSITION AND
THE ANCESTRY**

CHAPTER 1

TRACTATUS : ORIGIN, COMPOSITION AND THE ANCESTRY

1.1 The Manuscript and Manuscripts : The Troubled Episode

Wittgenstein brought about two revolutions in philosophy. One was the revolution in the *Tractatus* and another was in the *Philosophical Investigations*. Both were executed as the duty of the genius. The first was embodied in the slogan "All philosophy is a critique of language" (TLP 4.0031)¹ which is derived both from Mauthner's *Kritik der Sprache* and fused with Russell's own 'theory of definite descriptions'. It fuses Mauthner's critical attention to language with the analysis of the deceptive forms of language (Brentano's *sprachkritik*).

The *second* was due to the influence of Brouwer, and his version of in the intuitionist philosophy of mathematics (Brouwer)², but was fused with Fregean conditions of assertability.

1. The *Tractatus* is identified with Realism.
2. The *Philosophical Investigations* is identified with Anti-realism.

1 and 2 are considered to be rival paradigms. The following are enjoined as rivals in yet another sense.

3. The *Tractatus* belongs to modernity (Bolton)³
4. The *Philosophic Investigations* belongs to anti-modernity (Staten, Pears).⁴

Again, these works display a mediating dialectic between 'rules' and their 'extension' (command/prescriptives and their execution) as stated below:

1. The *Tractatus* pursues a sort of Aristotelianism (searching for the universals in the concrete), yielding a sort of Anti-Platonism (no fixed rules or no fixed template).
2. The *Philosophical Investigations* pursues a rival paradigm of Anti-Aristotelianism (or even Anti-Platonism) (no fixed rules).

The above standpoint is adopted by David Pears in one of the most interesting interpretations which strongly support continuity. (1) and (2) warrant a benign interface, given a particular reading of critique of language the interface is proved to be a real advance. It is the phrase critique of language is a real bind.

On other occasions, the *Tractatus* is identified with the metaphysics of *essentialism* (language/meaning has an essence, the world has an essence) and *Philosophical Investigations'* anti-essentialism is counterposed to the above. On these occasions, the *Tractatus* theory of meaning is distilled into a *chess* theory of meaning which reduces language to a set of rules governing it (their

extension), and *Philosophical Investigations* is identified to endorse a 'mosaic' theory of meaning', where language is defined in terms of the celebrated notion of language - games which carries rich pragmatic implications.

The objective of the thesis is to locate Wittgenstein in the intersection of the above rival theses or mediating dialectic *vis-a-vis* to his thematic phrase called the critique of language. If our efforts succeed, it gradually builds on the doctrinal content of this key concept as seen from the many interpretations that are to be discussed below. It will be our endeavour to show that rivalry invites systems that are alternative to one another. Thus there is an ubiquity of alternative systems in both works. We shall conclude in the end that the critique of language stands much more for the interface than the mere continuity. No rivalry, but an interface.

So, the 'coiled spring' stretches so as to provide continuity and uniformity of approach but also the interface between rival system. There is a curious intersection between these above sorts of parallelism. My objective is to locate Wittgenstein, especially of the Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* in the confluence of these tendencies even while endorsing a view about continuity. The understanding here is that both the critique, limits, tautology, necessary propositions of the *Tractatus* and the therapeutic, private language argument, rule-following in the *Philosophical Investigations* concern the connecting threads of interface.

Wittgenstein's philosophy of logic and language deals especially 'the ontological character of logical/mathematical propositions and it has far-reaching consequences. I think that his critique provides the entry point into the whole of *Tractatus*. We can combine this with later thesis which states that the logic of the language is misunderstood, to get the therapeutical conception of philosophy. In a sense, we aim to neutralize the above four options with an 'interface'

The manuscript of the *Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung* consists of two parts and a preface. The first part is the early version of the *Tractatus* which is labelled as '*Prototractatus*'. The second part has the character of additions to and further elucidations of the thoughts contained in the *Prototractatus*. Remarks in this part have the same number as the corresponding remarks in the *Tractatus*. The preface contains an additional paragraph at the very end thanking his uncle Paul Wittgenstein and Bertrand Russell for the encouragement. The preface was written after the second part, and it cannot be regarded as a preface specifically for the *Prototractatus*. "There are in the *Prototractatus* 30 remarks and '6' loose or unnumbered paragraphs which do not occur in the *Tractatus*". In approximately 400 places, the actual wording of the texts of the *Prototractatus* differs from the corresponding place in the text of the *Tractatus*. Often however, the difference is insignificant".⁵ The most important interesting differences between the two works is its arrangements of thoughts.

Three different typescripts of the *Tractatus* are known to exist. These typescripts are referred as (1) Engelmann TS., (2) the Vienna TS., and the (3) Gmunden TS⁶.

1) *Engelmann Typescript*: The printing of the work in Ostwald's *Annalen* is based on this Typescript. It was subsequently printed by Kegan Paul. Wittgenstein had given the typescript as a gift to Engelmann. G.H. von Wright writes: "on the grounds of partly of annotations on the typescript and partly of correspondence which took place between Wittgenstein and C.K. Ogden in 1922, it seems certain that the printing of the book in Ostwald's *Annalen* (1921) was from this typescript. But the subsequent printing of the book by Kegan Paul in London (1922) evidently was from (an offprint of) the publication with Ostwald".⁷

2) *The Vienna Typescript*: The Vienna Typescript is not a carbon copy of the Engelmann TS. It does not contain the remarks 6.1203 which is added in Engelmann TS. The remarks 6.241 in Engelmann TS. proof of the proposition that $2 \times 2 = 4$ is differently proved in Vienna TS. as that $2+2 = 4$.

3) *The Gmunden Typescript*: The Gmunden TS. contains number of corrections and marks in Pencil. It cannot be said that Gmunden TS. is a second copy of either Engelmann TS. or Vienna TS.

Wittgenstein offered his book for publication to the Viennese publisher, *Jahoda and Siegel* but he could not publish the treatise for

technical reasons. Then with his friend Engelmann, Karl Kraus, the satirist and Adolf Loos, the architect was able to find a publisher for Wittgenstein's book. The publication of the *Tractatus* was a troubled episode. Wittgenstein approached Braumuller for the publication of the book. Braumuller had received a letter of recommendation from Russell to publish the book on Wittgenstein's letter to Russell: Braumuller made the publication on condition of providing author's paying for the paper and the printing. For this was a humiliation, Wittgenstein wrote to Ficker: "My job was to write the book: its acceptance by the world might proceed in the normal fashion".⁸ Then he communicated the Professor in Germany who must have been Frege who had himself publishing the periodical '*Beitrage zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealisms.*'

In a letter to Ficker, Wittgenstein writes: "My book draws limits to the sphere of the ethical from the inside as it were, and I am convinced that this is the ONLY *rigorous* way of drawing those limits." . . .⁹ It was at the meeting in the Hague during the third week of December 1919 that the plan came up that Russell should write an introduction to the book.

Wittgenstein received the introduction to the book from Russell. Wittgenstein saw the English version of this in May 1920, and he refused to allow it to be printed with his book.¹⁰ Wittgenstein was 'unsatisfied' and wrote. "All the refinement of your English style was, obviously, lost in the translation and what remained was superficiality and misunderstanding... It is

now highly probable that Reclam will not accept my work".¹¹ Reclam did not accept the book to publish. Wittgenstein wrote to Russell: "But if you feel like getting it printed it is entirely at your disposition and *you can do what you like with it.*"¹²

Wittgenstein's efforts to find a publisher for his book had thus come to an end. He withdrew from Vienna and became a school master in the country. We do not know how he disposed of the typescripts and manuscripts at that time. At least one typescript must have been in the hands of Bertrand Russell. This was the only 'corrected copy'.

Russell gave the typescript to Miss Dorothy Wrinch and she offered the book to the Cambridge University Press but the Syndics of the press declined the offer. In 1921, she sent copies of the MS to *three* German Periodicals to publish. F. Schumann of the *Zeitschrift fur Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane* offered to publish unless it were psychological rather than philosophical in content. Ludwig Stein of the *Archiv fur systematische Philosophie* was another publisher. Wilhelm Ostwald offered to publish the book in his *Annalen der Naturphilosophie*. Miss Wrinch sent off the manuscripts to Ostwald. *Tractatus* appears in the final issue of *Annalen der Naturphilosophie*.¹³ When Russell returned from China in August 1921, he arranged for an English translation by C.K. Ogden and Frank

Ramsey to be published by Routledge and Kegan Paul under the title *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (This name was suggested by Moore).¹⁴

Russell was unaware of these developments and he discussed C.K. Ogden to publish the book. Ogden, the editor of the International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method was interested in the matter. Ogden's letter to Russell pointed that in Russell's Autobiography reveals that Ogden studied an offprint of Ostwald's printing '*Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung*'.

The translation of the *Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung* into English was completed by March 1922 and it seems the draft translation was produced by F.P. Ramsey alone. The typescript was sent to Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein had taken great pains with the double task of correcting the English translation and the offprint of the Ostwald text. Wright refers this as follows: "A detailed comparison of the German Ostwald edition and of the (first) Kegan Paul edition shows, besides the alternations to the symbols and the correction of numerous misprints also several changes of a more substantial nature."¹⁵ "The most important changes are in 4.003, the last paragraph of which does not occur in the Ostwald text and in 6.2341 which in the *Annalen* has nearly the same formulation as 6.211 of the *Prototractatus*. At 4.0141 in the Ostwald text stand only the words'. '(Siehe Ergänzung Nr.72)' The remark itself is missing. It did not appear in the *Prototractatus*

or in the second part of the manuscript'.¹⁶ Wittgenstein declined to print the many 'supplements' he had written. G.H. von Wright assumes that this was a 'carelessness' to print the supplements with its translation. Besides Ogden and Ramsey, Russell also had been active in the translation. But we have no contemporary evidence that Wittgenstein had discussed directly with Russell on details of the translation.

Ogden sent Wittgenstein a questionnaire relating to specific points in the translation. Wittgenstein sent back the questionnaire with his annotations and comments. Wittgenstein finally sent Ogden a declaration whereby he gave to the publisher Kegan Paul all the publication rights in his book. The proof of the book corrected and he added a number of comments written on special sheets. But the final printing was but from special set of proofs Ogden himself prepared for the printer. Russell also had corrected the proofs of his introduction. The book was published in November, 1922.

Wittgenstein submitted the *Tractatus* as Ph.D. Thesis in 1929. "Ramsey's copy of the *Tractatus* has been preserved and contains a number of corrections in Wittgenstein's hand".¹⁷ These corrections not many were incorporated into the second edition of the book which appeared in 1933. The four extra proposition added in Ramsey's copy by Wittgenstein were not incorporated however in the second edition.

1.2. Situating the *Tractatus* in the Tradition: Forebears of Realism and Anti-realism

Let us begin with an argument which is purported to establish that the *Tractatus* belongs to modernity and not to post-modernity. (i.e., it puts an end to the tradition of rationalism and empiricism in a remarkable way). Modern philosophy starts from Descartes. The Cartesian method in philosophy is called the mathematical method which culminated later in Newtonian Physics. The most important feature of this method is the rational deduction from *a priori* principles. Descartes proposed a mathematical model in describing the nature of the world. The world can be described in a mathematical model which is an important enlightenment idea after Descartes. In the same vein, Henrich Hertz also developed a mechanical model of universe based on logical principles of mechanics. The Hertzian model gives a particular model of pure spatial atomism. Derek Bolton relates this idea to the 'Tractarian model of logical atomism'.

According to him "*Tractatus* philosophy belongs squarely within the modern tradition."¹⁸ So *Tractatus* belongs to the true philosophy of physics. This is proved by equivocating the 'nature of physical space' with the corresponding 'the notion of logical space'. The logical space in Wittgenstein contains both thought and states of affairs.

Newton's physics asserted that the absolute space was a privileged frame of reference, uninfluenced by bodies and their motion: it was pure geometrical space. Absolute space was thus distinguished from any physical frame of reference which we could use to measure it. Absolute space was independent of our methods of measurement. Time is not needed in the description of the spatial position. It is merely a duration, in which one spatial state of affairs may or may not give way to another. The concept of change in modern physics is only an alteration in motion that is positive or negative acceleration.

From this, Bolton concludes his thesis saying that there is a great harmony between *Tractatus* and the seventeenth century physics. Though this way of situating *Tractatus* has its supporters (Nicholas Griffin), there are equally interesting ways of situating the *Tractatus*. But not all ways of situating warrants realism as it is in the above case. In what follows, I shall relate this to David Pears way of looking at the *basic realism* in the *Tractatus*. I do not however attempt to build a bridge between them, because we cannot know whether the forebears clearly represent the metaphysical opposites, realism and anti-realism or better put, physical atomism or phenomenological atomism. (Henry Staten proves that Wittgenstein belongs to anti-realism or more legitimately, to deconstructivism).

Bolton explores the above thesis by enumerating the several points of comparison. They are given in terms of (1) absolute space, (2) role of time (space is homogenous), (3) change, (4) casual laws (change in the context of science).

These conceptions of space-time and change which is characteristics of modern philosophy of nature also characterise the *Tractatus'* philosophy. Newton presupposes the absolute space. 1) *Absolute Space*: In the *Tractatus*, logical space is absolute in the same sense as physical space is absolute. The relation between them are independent of methods of measurement. In the *Tractatus* also, there is no contrast between the absolute space with relative space. Logical space is not measured by a *method* at all. The measuring instrument may either agree or fail to agree (cf: TLP 2.21). *Tractatus* is the purest expression that reality is given absolutely. 2) *Space: homogenous*: Modern physics postulated the uniformity or homogeneity of space. All parts of logical space, and all objects in it are qualitatively indistinguishable. This idea is reflected in the statement that "all propositions are of equal value" (TLP 6.4). This is meant that all possible state of affairs stands at the same qualitative level. As world is not hierarchically ordered, no one state of affairs can justify or give sense to any other. (cf: TLP 6.41). 3) *Concept of time*: Like Modern Physics, *Tractatus* makes no essential use of the concept of time in its description of the world. The world is *already given* which implies that time brings nothing new. This is seen in that 'the

possibility of occurring in states of affairs is in objects from the beginning, a new possibility cannot be discovered later etc. (TLP 2.01's); 'the totality of objects itself does not change through time'. (TLP 2.027's). So far as concerns the judgement, the propositions is a picture, not a method, and so it is not extended through time. Also, compound propositions are already given with the elementary one. (TLP 3.42, 4.51, 5.442). Time is insignificant in the central doctrine of the *Tractatus*. The definition of the general propositional form presupposes the world as a given, a limited whole. 4) *Change*: Change is accidental. Wittgenstein wrote: "there is no possible way of making an inference from existence of one situation to the existence of another, entirely different situation. There is no casual nexus to justify such an inference. . . . Superstition is the belief in the causal nexus". (TLP 5.138, 5.136, 6.37's).

According to Bolton, it is problematic to include the non-geometrical spaces (colour space) under the generic concept of logical space. But it is true that the logical space *is* the geometrical space of modern physics. Logic comprises the possibility of a complete description of reality; it is the great mirror of world. (cf: TLP 5.511). And the status of physics relative to logic is explained as: '*Physics is a particular form of description of the world*'. (TLP 6.3). Wittgenstein writes in the *Tractatus* 6.341: "Newtonian mechanics . . . imposes a unified form on the description of the world. . . Mechanics determines one form of description of the world by saying that all

propositions used in the description of world must be obtained in a given way from a given set of propositions – the axioms of mechanics."

From the above discussion, it can be concluded that there exists a great harmony between the *Tractatus* and seventeenth century physics. Now let us try to trace these ideas to the modern tradition of philosophy. This is yet another way of situating the *Tractatus* in the tradition of modernity.

It is necessary to find out the status of dualism (of mind and matter), primary and secondary qualities (Locke, which were abolished by Berkeley), the notion of Cogito, the Self or Solipsism (Hume) and Kant's *a priori* notion of space and time, and above all, how language is introduced into the whole schema as the notion of representation. Even so, the opposition between rationalistic and empiricistic theory of knowledge requires a fresh interpretation. This is what Bolton undertakes before moving on to trace the influence of Kant and Schopenhauer. This is equally true of Pears' own interpretation as it will be shown later.

Cartesian dualism belongs to the foundations of modern philosophy. Descartes draws a distinction of two substances: the first, is material substance in space and time, the second is mind. It reflects the difference between what is spatial and quantifiable and what is non-spatial and unquantifiable or what exists by itself in nature and what exists as a result of interaction between nature and man. In the *Tractatus*, dualism is absent. It

does not make a distinction between what is spatial and quantifiable, and what is not; the whole world is spatial and quantifiable no matter whether it is a 'matter' or 'mind'. In the Cartesian philosophy, some ideas are innate; the ideas of mathematics, the ideas of substance and the ideas of God, are such. Locke, on the otherhand, explains the term *idea* which 'serves best to stand for whatsoever is the *Objects* of the Understanding when a Man thinks.'¹⁹ There are some particular material states of affairs represented in perception. This is what is called the 'representative theory of perception'. According to Locke, primary qualities are inherent in the Bodies themselves and the secondary qualities are produced in us by sense – experience. But this creates problems how can thought, which is mental, non-spatial and relative, represent, the like or unlike reality, which is material, spatial and absolute. So Berkeley was forced to abolish the distinction between primary qualities and other sensible qualities. Both qualities are found in the ideas of perception. This idea is in direct conflict with the Newtonian philosophy. According to him, the existence of a material substance, beyond or beneath ideas in perception, is superfluous.

A different kind of representation is the representation of *classes* of thing, in thought. Plato's theory of universals is called *universalia ante rem* and Aristotle's theory is called *universalia in rebus*. We are looking at it in the sense that *universals were not spatial objects*.²⁰ Locke explains that the general terms are the signs of general *Ideas* by separating it from the

conception of time and place. This is called an abstract idea. According to Bolton, Locke's theory of abstraction has no essential connection with the representative theory of perception. It has nothing to do with dualism. Two kinds of thought are found in the Enlightenment philosophy: the first is representation of objects in space and the second is the representation of classes of particulars. *Tractatus* contains the conception of thought that correspond to the ideas of the first. The *Tractatus* ontology is a pure spatial atomism, and there is therefore no place in it for the concept of non-spatial universals. There are no general terms in the *Tractatus* theory of proposition.: there are no subject-predicate propositions, all are relational.

In the above tradition, language has no fundamental role in the theory of representation. But Wittgenstein introduced this into his *Tractatus*. This is comparable to the views expressed by Hacking and Pears. Hacking compares the 'heyday of ideas' to the 'heyday of meanings'²¹. And Pears compares this psychological atomism *a la* Locke to the logical atomism *a la* Russell. Within *Tractatus*, there is three-layered metaphysical picture composed of self, ideas of mind, matter in space. It is clear that language either describes the mental realm or the physical world. The former which may be called 'phenomenalist' language and the latter may be called 'physicalist' language. Thus the introduction of language in 'philosophy' struck a great blow to the old assumptions.²²

The medium of representation is now taken to be language itself. This avoids the mind as a distinct thinking substance. Dualism is irrelevant to the theory of representation. *Tractatus* metaphysics is to be approached in this way. Here the status of the subject requires elucidations. This language does not include materials objects and geometrical relations alone. The signs which are perceptible to the senses belong to language. A thought is a spatial picture in the same space and composed of the same kind of elements as the reality that is pictured.²³ In the *Tractatus'* account, thought and state of affairs represented both belong in the same absolute space. This account solves the earlier problems encountered by Descartes, Locke and Berkeley. This suggests the real sense in which *Tractatus* belongs to modern physics. In Newtonian mechanics, isomorphism clearly expressed in Hertz's dynamical model²⁴ which is truly represented in the 'picture theory' of Wittgenstein. The ontology of modern science and the *Tractatus* possess an essential relativity. This is similar to the way the conception of truth or falsity is in agreement or disagreement with reality.

Locke's focus is on the materials of thought while Descartes supports on the knowledge gained by intuition. Locke's empiricism reveals two difficulties inherent in empiricism. One being the 'solipistic predicament' and the other being the 'problem of knowledge'. Knowledge of things that we gained by perception is the same as postulated by modern science. Perception is dependent upon the observer but what we know by perception is

independent of us. What is given in perception is wholly irrelevant to mechanics. The nature was conceived absolute and independent. Mental perceptions are different from material reality. Perception should exist even without a corresponding world. But the empiricists argued that the subject is acquainted only with sense-experience. So the existence of the external world is problematic for them.

According to rationalism, knowledge of the world is founded on mathematical intuition and reason. Mathematical truths were *a priori*. But it is also problematic how we could by experience prove that a natural world corresponds to mathematics. Descartes postulated that God's goodness ensured the existence of nature. The implication of this argument is that for corporeal matter in absolute mathematical space was truly unknowable by man. Human knowledge is limited relative to a particular position inside space and it depends upon the medium which distorts what is known. God knows things as they really are. Knowledge was founded in the divine. This epistemology of revelation became less credible in the modern metaphysics. Berkeley's spiritual idealism has shown that physical reality is given in sense-experience. The Vienna Circle philosophers were concerned with language and meaning to propose the solution to the problems of knowledge.

The priority of the phenomenalist language over the physicalist language is proved by Bolton in the following way. (1) The signs of

language must stand for things that are known to the speaker. (2) He knows about them in his sense-experience. (3) The signs of language must signify the content of experience and the content that can be given in terms of descriptions of sense-experience (phenomenal experience). Hence the language must be the phenomenal language. The role of physical language is minimized because we do not know physical objects directly. If the physicalist language is to have content, then it must be related to some form of verification. This is why Positivists attempted to give a fillip to reductionism. Logical Positivists stand closer to *Tractatus* except in the two features. (1) notion of elementary proposition.(2) The notion of evidence. But Wittgenstein is *not* really to accept both (1) and (2). So the *Tractatus'* solution is summarised as below: (1) The world is manifest (2) The Cogito, (3) Solipsism is related to pure realism. These ideas were not fully explained by many an interpreter. Unless this is properly explained, we cannot derive a correct picture of Wittgenstein.

The empiricists' premise is that we are acquainted with sense-experience and not with physical objects. This proves that the priority of the phenomenalist language over the physicalist language. Phenomenalism claims that propositions about physical objects can be analysed into the proposition of sense-experience. Inner experience, past events and the postulates of theoretical science all would be translated into the phenomenalist language.

According to Logical Positivists, the meaning of a statement is given by the method of its verification in sense-experience. A statement which is not verifiable in sense-experience has no meaning. Hence it provides the scope for analysis of language. Thus it has solved the problem of knowledge by limiting meaning to the narrow bounds of immediately given sense-experience. Bolton says that both meaning and knowledge seem to reach beyond the narrow limits of sense-experience. The culprit for both problems is the whole of metaphysics.

Logical Positivism stands close to the *Tractatus*' metaphysics. Both prove *a priori* that language must consist of elementary propositions together with all their possible truth-functions. Elementary propositions of Logical Positivists, are descriptions of sense experience. For Wittgenstein, elementary propositions are pictures of particles in space which truly or falsely describes the world. The Positivists with the help of language describes the Cartesian mental realm while the *Tractatus* language describes the objects in space, that is the world of modern physics. Logical Positivists emphasise on evidence or verification. This concept was central to the *meaning* of a proposition.

The introduction of language into modern metaphysics solves the problem of knowledge. Linguistic signs must be conventionally correlated with the objects in the world. This argument is centralised in the *Tractatus*. The meaning of a proposition is to know what state of affairs it represents.

This knowledge does not imply acquaintance with state of affairs. But it implies acquaintance with the objects in the state of affairs. Physical things in space are represented by language which means that they are objects of acquaintance. The words in ordinary language are general descriptions of complexes which do not mean particular objects. The language describes physical objects at least as complexes. The *a priori* logic of the *Tractatus* requires no means of perception. Language can express nothing about the world as a whole or about the logic of language. The world is *manifest*. Its existence is shown also in meaningful propositions, in language itself. To doubt whether thought and language are meaningful is absurd. The judgement about physical objects in space can be right or wrong. According to the *Tractatus*, thought and reality have the same form they exist as in the same space. Judgement and reality exist together and we are acquainted with both. Physical objects lie beyond what we are acquainted with. According to Bolton "what a man is acquainted with is relative to his means of perception, and cannot be identified with the absolute physical world."²⁵ As language is used and understood by man, they must have acquaintance with what it describes, including physical reality. This is the key solution of the problem of knowledge in the *Tractatus*. Any reality described by language must be known. The empiricists inferred from this that language must describe sense-experience. In the *Tractatus'* view, 'we must have knowledge of objects in

absolute space'. Both make a great demand on the *a priori* nature of language.

Descartes affirmed the existence of the *Cogito*. It postulated a thinking subject. But in the *Tractatus*, there appears no need for a thinking subject. The subject is not an object of perception. This is stated in the *Tractatus* 5.631: "there is no subject that thinks or entertains ideas. If I wrote a book called *The World as I found it*, I should have to include a report on my body, and should have to say which parts were subordinate to my will, and which were not, etc., this being a method of isolating the subject, or rather of showing that in an important sense, there is no subject; for it alone could *not* be mentioned in that book". The Cartesian distinction between mind and body is offered as a solution to the problem of knowledge. But it cannot reconcile the distinction between the two. The distinction fades away when everything that is described by language is immediately known. Dualism collapses as there is no distinction between thought and reality, mediately known and immediately known. Sense-experience is 'neutral' and both mind and matter is constructed out of it. The Cartesian criterion is that subject is defined by thought. But in *Tractatus*, it is seen that the subject is defined by language. This line of thought leads Wittgenstein into the conception of solipsism. It is reflected that "language is *my* language, the limits of my language mean the limits of *my* world: the world is my world. I am my

world" (TLP 5.6's). This account of solipsism is related to pure realism. Later, the enigma of this will be brought into coherence.

1.3. Language, Sense and Non-sense: An Anti-conventionalistic Critique

Baker and Hacker²⁶ offer a critique of philosophy of language, especially against *all* theories of meaning that has been advanced by the recent 'linguistic' revolution. They direct their attack against Saussure, Boole, Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Davidson and Dummett. They criticize also the speech act philosophy of language advanced by J.L. Austin, within the ordinary language movement.

In the middle of the nineteenth century, Boole conceived of logic as the algebra of thought. His new calculus of logic is a step towards a new logically more perspicuous language. Ordinary language in effect conceal the abstract mathematical forms of human thought according to his new logic. Boole takes logic as part of mathematics. It is a logical algebra.

Later, in the twentieth century, philosophy of language was conceived to be the foundation of the whole of philosophy. Frege demonstrated that the whole of arithmetic is reducible to logic. His function - theoretic calculus, as an analysis of a logically perfect language that avoids the natural language. It is called a conceptual notation for the purpose of expressing scientific knowledge. 'The *first* principle of his analysis states a word has a meaning or

content only in the context of a sentence'.²⁷ It is an important constituent in the semantic analysis of language. His *second* principle is that there is a distinction between *sense* and *force*. A sentence or formula may be uttered with assertoric force, but the sense it expresses (viz., that such and such) remains constant even if it is not asserted but occurs as the antecedent of a conditional. *Thirdly*, he analysed the forms of correspondence between language, thought and reality. The invention of powerful formal calculi gave impetus to the 'bipolar' (logic and reality are the two planes) or Augustinian conception of language. It demonstrates that 1) Language refers to reality (2) We can make statements about reality (3) We can evaluate their truth values (4) We can evaluate the truth with reference to some state of affairs. The 'Augustinian picture of language' and Frege's invention of the predicate-calculus inspired the creation of logical semantics. The *Tractatus* provided as the pivotal influence on the growth of theories of meaning. Wittgenstein used "Frege's new logic to use in vindicating a particularly stark version of the Augustinian picture of language".²⁸ The *Tractatus* exemplified Frege's thinking on 1) logic evolved into part of all general theories. 2) The flexibility of function-theoretic categories facilitated the logical analysis of aspects of expressions traditionally accorded no explicit attention. 3) Logical analysis of sentences into *function* and *argument* became infused with the notion of conceptual analysis prominent in classical empiricism. 4) Russell's theory of definite descriptions entrenched a modified conception of analysis.

5) Predicate calculus was held to embrace the logical structures of all fully analysed sentences.

Russell developed the function-theoretic calculus in new directions. His 'theory of descriptions' preserved the insight of the model of correlation enshrined in the Augustinian picture. This logical calculus *plus* semantics added further reflections in philosophy. The possibility of representing the forms of thought and inference in the notation of formal function - theoretic calculus was explored by Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus*.

J.L. Austin's speech act theory of language takes ordinary language as the guide to understand philosophy. Ryle's *Concepts of Mind* is a study of 'the logical geography' of ordinary mental concepts. Dummett explains that a need for a systematic theory of meaning is essential for clarifying the philosophical problems.²⁹ Saussure distinguished between the historical or *diachronic* study of language and *synchronic* study of language. The latter is the domain of the science of language. According to him, language as an abstract structure of relations (*la langue*) which governs the overt manifestations of speech (*la parole*) in the activities of language users. Chomsky and his followers are also concerned with linguistics as essentially synchronic. They distinguish between speakers' *competence* and his *performance*. According to Baker and Hacker, "Their primary innovations lay in the development of the distinction between surface and deep structures

of sentences, in the construction of syntax on the basis of transformations, and in the priority assigned to the sentence over sub-sentential expressions for purposes of grammatical theory. All of these features of modern linguistics have close parallels in the reflections of modern philosophers".³⁰ The *positive* nature of investigating language is worthy of philosophical investigation as it guides to the nature and structure of the ideas or thoughts it represents, and hence, proximately to the nature and structure of what *they* represent. This is *insight*. The *negative* aspect is that language obscures thought, misrepresents the ideas which constitute the gold-backing of the paper-currency of words and sentences. This is called *illusion*.

According to Baker and Hacker, "The *Tractatus* recapitulates in microcosm the phylogeny of truth-conditional semantics".³¹ Wittgenstein diagnosed the nature and the source of the underlying philosophical illusions in his *Philosophical Investigations* as he thought *Tractatus* contains a distorted thought. Philosophers are impressed by the method of comparisons this makes generalization. There is a danger *projecting* a form of representation onto the phenomena represented. "This diagnosis of philosophical illusion contains not only a negative view about misuses of forms of representation, but also positive suggestions about their proper use in philosophy".³²

Wittgenstein represents the watershed with his *bipolar* conception of truth-functional character of language. Baker and Hacker parody all those developments by affixing the following distorted summary, as before.³³

- i) Ordinary language is in good logical order.
- ii) The essential function of a language is depiction(description): the representation of a state of affairs, which may or may not be realized.
- iii) Assertions, questions, commands, optations contain a descriptive component(the unasserted proposition, later called 'the propositional – radical). It alone, the differences being relegated to psychology, is of concern to logic.
- iv) Every proposition has a unique analysis. The surface grammar of a sentence concedes its logical form; logical analysis reveals its underlying structure.
- v) All elementary propositions are logically independent of each other work. They are the last (propositional) products of analysis.
- vi) The elementary proposition is isomorphic with the state of affairs it depicts, and is internally related to it.
- vii) The sense of an elementary proposition is a function of (the meanings of) its constituent names and its mode of composition.

- viii) Knowledge of the meanings of constituents of propositions (names and forms) suffices for understanding the sense of any proposition. This is how it is possible to understand without fresh explanation sentences never encountered before.
- ix) Every compound proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions (thesis of extensionality). Hence every meaningful proposition is constructible by a series of operations on elementary propositions.
- x) The sense of a compound proposition is given by its truth-conditions, i.e. , the expression of agreement and disagreement with the truth-possibilities of its constituent elementary propositions.
- xi) All entailments are consequences of inner complexity of propositions. One proposition entails another if the truth-grounds of the first include those of the second. Logical analysis will lay bare the logical powers of propositions.
- xii) A language is, *au fond*, a calculus of signs. A correct function-theoretic logical calculus reveals the essential structure of any possible language.
- xiii) Speakers of a language possess tacit knowledge of the underlying forms and elements of a language which are concealed by surface

grammar. Enormously complicated tacit conventions are presupposed by every day speech.

- xiv) All necessity is logical necessity; logical necessity is a consequence of syntactical rules for the use of signs requisite for any system of representation by a symbolism.
- xv) Philosophy is the activity of clarification of a language by logical analysis.

Wittgenstein and Vienna Circle emphasised the study of logical syntax in understanding philosophical propositions. Wittgenstein conceived of logic as the investigation of the fundamental forms of any system of symbolic representation whatever. It is not the study of abstract entities or laws of thought. 'Elementary proposition will give the essence of all description and that in turn will capture the essence of the world'. He wrote: "My work, has extended from the laws of logic to the essence of the world" (NB 79).³⁴ Contrary to Frege, he denied that sentences had references. Names in a proposition are arbitrary conventions. "Wittgenstein's philosophy from that of his predecessors only emerges clearly in his account of molecular propositions, of the nature of their mode of combination, and of his consequent radical conception of logic, logical truth, and necessity".³⁵ Unlike Frege, Wittgenstein said that one can draw inference from false, unasserted propositions. He objected Frege's logic as an axiomatic system rests on self-

evident axioms. Wittgenstein gave us a model for a zero-axiomatic system. Baker and Hacker also attack Wittgenstein's declaration that all philosophy is a critique of language that paved a way for original convention also. According to these authors, Wittgenstein's major flaw is to take the bipolarity of proposition to its logical completion that excluded the belief proposition (A believes that p) either as a pseudo-proposition or exclusional as the manner in which Wittgenstein puts it. Tautologies leave open the logical space. Contradiction close the logical space. This conventionalism was due to Vienna Circle.

Both philosophers and linguists found deep structure of language embodied in the predicate calculus. Baker and Hacker think that the *Tractatus* should have extensive parallels among them inspired by Saussure. The philosophers conceive theory of meanings is a 'theoretical representation of a practical ability'. For a linguist 'the goal of theory of a particular language must be the exploitation of the abilities and skills involved in the linguistic performance of a fluent native speaker'. Transformational generative grammarians argue that 'Grammar is a system of rules and principles that determine the formal and semantic properties of sentences'.³⁶

Direct lineage of truth-conditional semantics certainly includes Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. The truth-table is the very paradigm of the

formulation of the truth-conditions of a logical formula. Truth-table is the only possible form for 'giving the truth-condition' of a proposition.

There are at least *three* transformations in the concept of truth-conditions into formal logic to develop theories of meaning. The *first* is the direct application of 'truth conditions' to expressions (sentences) in natural languages. Frege's concept of a well-formed formula of *concept script* is much more restrictive than what is countenanced in modern logic. The analysis came to fruition in the logical atomism of Russell and Wittgenstein. *Tractatus'* analysis of sentence could be transformed into truth-functions of elementary propositions. This makes it possible to expose the hidden structures of natural language. But Baker criticized that these matters are altogether different with respect to singular sentences of a natural language to derive the truth-conditions from a truth-table.

A *second* transformation in the notion of truth-condition is the concept of logical semantics. This is proposed by Tarski by introducing the theory of truth for a formalized language. Tarski's paradigm 'Snow is white is true if and only if snow is white' can be taken to the truth-table explanations of sentence connectives and can be recast in this form eg '¬' is true if and only if it is false that *p*.³⁷ He set out a recursive definitions of the expression 'true sentence' in the logical calculus as elaborated in *Principia Mathematica*.³⁸ The core of this enterprise is the stipulation in a metalanguage of the truth-

conditions for every well-formed sentence of the object language. The metamorphosis of logical syntax into logical semantics rests on a novel extension of the term '*truth-conditions*'. Baker criticized it as a mythology about normative phenomena that it is a pre-condition of extending truth-conditional semantics to sentences of a natural language. Tarski's theory is attracted as a model theory 'about the study of the relations between language and world'.

A *third* transformation of the concept of truth-condition is in relation to the invention of 'intensional logic'. Carnap's reflections on semantics made a tie between the logical truth in the *Tractatus* and Tarski's definition of truth for a formalized language. Carnap claimed 'that logic is a special branch of semantics, that logical deducibility and logical truth are semantical concepts'.³⁹ He sharply differentiates between the *intension* and *extension* of an expression in every case and hence its sense from its reference.

Backer and Haker were against both truth-conditional as well as verification-condition semantics. The *sense-force* distinction is widely held to be a *sine qua non* of truth-conditional semantics and hence indirectly of the analysis of the logical structure of language and the essential nature of human understanding. Moods and basic sentence-forms provide a gateway into a theory of force. Indirect speech is another feature to distinguish *sense* from *force*. The distinction of *sense* from *force* can be used to explain the thesis

that the meaning of a sentence is its truth-conditions. Frege's representation of *sense* and *force* do not satisfy the modern *sense/force* distinction. Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein suggest that a general correspondence holds between grammatical distinction and different uses of sentences. They follow tradition in relating the different uses of sentence to differences in mental acts, states, or attitudes.

Russell and Wittgenstein's distinction of *sense/force* is closer to modern theories. "Russell envisaged that a common 'proposition' could be filtered out of appropriately related declarative, interrogative, imperative and optative sentences".⁴⁰ 'Wittgenstein banished the distinction between assertions, commands and questions from the domain of logic in order to focus exclusively on the unasserted propositions. He had neither a theory of force. Force is irrelevant to logic. Frege held the view that *sense/force* distinction openly apply not to type-sentences but to particular utterances. Backer and Hacker argued that theorists of force disagree about the facts of language and speech and even about the *very concepts* they are describing. They are unclear and liable to fall into inconsistency and nonsense. According to Baker and Hacker "truisms are subtly and swiftly inflated into propositions which are far from platitudes, often into propositions which do not obviously even make sense"⁴¹. The claim that any sentence is or can be regarded as a description of a state of affairs is either false or empty. Truth-conditional semantics is built up on the thesis that truth-conditions are ascribed to

symbols. Baker and Hacker argues that 'it is impossible to justify a *sense/force* distinction by appeal to possibilities of paraphrase'. The force of an utterance is the actual speech act performed by a speaker on a particular occasion, while its sense is the specific content of this speech-act. This is also doubtful to a point for a *sense/force* distinction.

Based on realistic interpretation of truth-condition, *sense-force* distinction is criticized. Dummett's explanation is based on the verification condition, that gave rise to the anti-realistic interpretation of meaning. Logical positivists transformed the truth-conditional semantics into the principle of verifiability. The meaning of a sentence is the method of verification. Baker and Hacker argued that truth-conditional semantics is capable of clarifying only those statements of descriptive contents. It failed to analyses the meaning of all 'utterances'. The parody ends.

1.4. The Legacy of Frege and Russell:

Wittgenstein expresses his indebtedness to Frege and Russell. As far as Frege is concerned, the following legacy is included:

- 1) Kenny mentions *three* features of logic.
 - (i) The Structure of proposition: Propositions are structured in the subject - predicate form. Wittgenstein used Frege's notion of function and argument (TLP 3.333).

- (ii) Truth-values: Propositions are true or false (for positivists they are true or false in relation to the world). Frege called them truth-values, which Wittgenstein also used.
 - (iii) Inferential relation: Positivists enter into inferential relations. To these we add Wittgenstein's idea of *Satz* which means *sentences* (not propositions). Wittgenstein used it in the sense of one proposition is related to other. Proposition are the meaning of sentences. Sentences express propositions. Put it in the Fregean way, sentences expresses thought. The aim of the *Tractatus* is to set a limit to thought, or rather, not to thought, but to the expression of thought (TLP preface).
2. Wittgenstein was not endorsing the axiomatic system of logic. (Frege used half-a-dozen axioms; Russell used five axioms). Together with the rule of *Modus Ponens*, we can draw an 'unlimited number of logical truths'.⁴² Russell and Whitehead used, 'or' or 'not' as primitives instead of 'if' and 'not'.
 3. Frege's use of quantifiers: If some men are mortal, 'then there will be some *argument* for which the function 'x is a man' and 'x is mortal' will take the truth-value *true*. So we may translate 'some men are mortal' as 'For some x, x is a man and x is mortal.'

4. Frege's so-called 'paradox' of identity ($=$) is used to derive the distinction between *Sinn* and *Bedeutung* which are translated into sense and reference. $A = B$ will be a truism if A and B have the same sense, but not necessary the same reference. Frege's logical connectives include '='.

5. All formulae of the propositional calculus which are tautologies in the sense $(p \vee \sim p)$ are either axioms or theorems of the system of Frege's *Begriffsschrift*. So Wittgenstein's *truth-tabular* method and Frege's axiomatic system (hierarchical conception of logic) are two different formal methods of handling the same materials. Wittgenstein thought that his method is far superior in several ways.⁴³ Frege's axioms are arbitrary as evidenced in a system like Russell and Whitehead. So, for Wittgenstein, all logical truth are seems to be of equal rank, with none essentially primitive and underivable (TLP 6.127). The primitive propositions in Frege's system are presented without justification as self-evident, with which Wittgenstein expressed distrust. Wittgenstein offered instead a method of calculation which was mechanical in a liberal sense that it could be carried out by a machine (NB 3; TLP 6.1271). So we can settle anything as a tautology or not. No similar method exists in Frege's system.

6. Wittgenstein recognized that 'is' is ambiguous between 'identity' ($=$), existence ($\exists x$), verbal link (copula) (function argument).

From Russell, he took how the 'theory of definite descriptions' shows the correct logical form. Likewise he argues for the importance of distinguishing the copula from the sign of identity and further argues that the confusion 'of the copula' with the sign of existence can be lead to an equally nonsensical conclusion.


Thus "the philosopher may be struck by the fact that whatever exists can be said to *be*; and taking this verb as a copula, or predicate-marker he may seek to investigate the nature of the attribute corresponding to this predicate which is applicable to everything in the world. He may be struck by the mystery of this *be-ing* which is not *being red* or *being a man*, but just pure *be-ing*. He may even deify this muddle by defining God as pure Being".⁴⁴

Such errors may be avoided by logical syntax which does not use the same sign with different modes of signification (TLP 3.325). As Kenny notes, Frege's conceptual notation, was only a preliminary attempt at such a language and it failed to exclude all mistakes.

From Russell, he learnt that the 'theory of definite descriptions' showed the deception of the language but yet different from Mauthner's psychological accompaniment. Russell's idea is in direct derivation from Brentano's explanation of non-existence of being in terms of an intentional

object. (Meinong's excessive ontology is just a variant of this). Mauthner characterizes Brantano's analysis as *Sprachkritik* and developed his own brand of *Kritik an der Sprache*, which has influenced Wittgenstein, but not without its psychological roots. Wittgenstein refused to recognize its psychological roots but assuming that he accepts Brentano, he develops a fusion between Brantano and Mauthner but not the latter's psychological method, which provided all the cognitive resources for his critique. This is to anticipate much that come out of this thesis.

1) Nothing in the world corresponds to the negation sign. To both



In *Notebooks*, both had the same reference (to use Frege's terminology) (NB 100). By this, he meant that it is one and the same fact that verifies or falsifies each of them.

- 1) "If it is the case that p then the *positive* fact that p makes p true and not- p 'false'.
- 2) If it is not the case that p , then p is made false and 'not- p ' is made true by one and the same *negative fact*" (NB 94; TLP 2.06).

No new element enters into the fact, which corresponds to ' $not - p$ ' for it is the very same fact as corresponds to ' p '. If we are tempted to think otherwise, we tend to confuse.

(i) The *negative* fact that the rose is not red with (ii) the *positive* fact that rose is white. If 'not' introduces something new into the proposition, then 'not-not- p ' would be something different from ' p '. This means that from a single fact p , we can get infinitely many distinct facts-namely: not-not- p , that not-not-not- p and so on (TLP 5.43). In fact, p and 'not-not- p ' say the exactly the same by virtue of double negation.

Secondly, binary connectives ('or' 'and') denote relations. Two arguments go against this move. (i) Unlike real relations, they need brackets to express their scope. We distinguish (a) and (b) : (a) (either p or q) and r (b) either p or (q and r) by means of scope (2) they are interdefinable. If ... then \equiv either not ... q (NB 115; TLP 5.461; NB 103; TLP 5.42) Likewise, quantifiers are also interdefinable. For all $x =$ not for some x not . So in the ideal symbolism, they too vanish.

Thirdly the identity is not a relation but objects: to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing at all (TLP 5,53, 5.5303). Compare this to Frege's paradox of identify. It would be possible to exclude the sign of identity. It should be a principle of the ideal notation that there should not be signs which belonged to more than one symbol. A proposition like (1) $A = B$ would

always be incorrect and (2) $A = A$ is always pointless. (TLP 5.303) From this, Wittgenstein proceeded to slowly dismantle the logical system of *Principia*.

Frege failed to make distinction between names and descriptions. He treated this as the same kind of symbol. Before Wittgenstein, Russell makes this clear in his 'theory of definite descriptions'. This had a considerable influence on Wittgenstein's thoughts. Both Frege and Russell constructing a language more precise for purposes of logic and mathematics by which they meant that all sentence in which expressions could occur should have a truth value though it was different. Wittgenstein accepted Frege's requirement of definition of sense (TLP 2.0211, 4.063, 5.4733) and Russell's method of securing this definiteness. 'He was interested in particular in applying and modifying Russell's theory to fit descriptions which described complex objects by enumerating their parts.' 'Every statement about complexes' he wrote 'can be resolved into a statement about their constituents and into the propositions that describe the complexes completely' (TLP 2.0201). Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus* built a great deal of metaphysics on the possibility of this kind of analysis. Wittgenstein much admired Russell's Theory of Definite Descriptions which gave the logical structure or logical form, as the 'paradigm of philosophical analysis' (Ramsey, Ayer). He comments on the *Tractatus*' dictum which states that all philosophy is a "critique of language". . . It was Russell who performed the service of

showing that apparent logical form of a proposition need not be its real one' (TLP 4.0031).⁴⁵

Russell's and Frege's main intention to device a language for mathematics on a logical basis without a primary interest in metaphysics. For them, mathematics was in fact a branch or extension of logic involving no special subject matter of its own and it is derivable from purely logical axioms. Frege's *Die Grundgesetze der Arithmetik* and of Russell's and Whitehead's *Principia Mathematica* define 'numbers as classes of classes with the same number of members.' The series of natural number can be built up out of the merely logical notions of identity, class, class-membership, and class equivalence however it contains Russell's paradox that something must be wrong with the permissive procedure of forming classes of classes *ad lib*. In his 'theory of types', Russell remedied this error by treating classes and individuals are of different logical types. Russell uses the 'axiom of infinity' ie. the hypothesis that the number of objects in the universe is not finite. The need to postulate such a hypothesis is a consequence of treating as it a case of logical derivation. Wittgenstein was dissatisfied with the theory of types and the 'axioms of infinity'.

'All theories of types' must be done away with by a theory of symbolism showing that what seem to be *different kinds of things* are symbolized by different kinds of symbols which *cannot* possibly be

substituted in one another's place' (NB 121). Wittgenstein was working at such a theory of symbolism. Theory of types is trying to say something which was unsayable. It says certain types of symbols cannot be sensibly combined. They say 'the class of men is a man' is a piece of nonsense. But this itself is a nonsense. Wittgenstein gets out of this difficulty that 'we cannot formulate semantical rules, rules about the meaning of symbols, nor can we give a justification of syntactical rules based on the meaning of the symbols'.⁴⁶ 'In order to say what the logical properties of language, we need a language without logical proposition.' 'But a language lacking these properties, as illogical language, is impossible' (TLP 3.031, 5.4731).

Wittgenstein rejects the possibility of a philosophy of logic as Frege and Russell had conceived. 'Everything which is possible in logic is also permitted' (TLP 5.473). The only proposition which belongs to logic are tautologies. They say nothing about the world. They reveal the structure of the symbolism which make them up. Philosophical logic is an attempt to say what was *shown* by the tautologies. 'What can be said cannot be shown, and what can be shown cannot be said' (TLP 4.1212). In order to specify the symbol we do not have to say anything about *semantics*. The theory of types drawing up syntactic rules, forced to speak about the things that the sign means. This is wrong. 'We cannot speak of types we can speak only of symbols; but what the theory of types tried to say, the symbols can show' (TLP 3.332, 3.333; NB 108). There is type difference between objects,

relations and properties being composed of the same symbols in a proposition. 'It is to distinguish between accidental and essential features of the symbol and to try show the distinction between essence and accident within the realm of syntax' (NB 109; TLP 3.334 - 3.341). The ordinary language and formalized language of Frege and Russell contains the sign which look different but signify the same way and have the same meaning. According to Wittgenstein, 'there are no logical constants' (NB119). Logical constants do not denote. Nothing in the world corresponds to the negation sign. Binary connectives 'or' 'and' do not denote relations. 'Since the propositional connectives are definable in terms of each other, they would not appear in an ideal notation, as they do in Frege's and Russell's, as primitive signs' (TLP 5.42). 'Like the propositional connectives, the quantification too are interdefinable . . . , so in the ideal symbolism they too must vanish' (NB 103; TLP 5.441). (Identity is not a relation between objects. In an ideal notation, there should not be signs which belonged to more than one symbol.

According to Kenny, Wittgenstein has three main targets : (i) the extralogical apparatus that has to be added to the formal system, such as the theory of types (ii) the axiomatic method which disguise the fact that no propositions of logic are more primitive than others, as shown by the truth-table method; (iii) the use of logical constants - the propositional connectives, the quantifiers, the identity sign-as undefined primitives.'⁴⁷

Wittgenstein show the superfluity, the accidental nature, of the logical constants of the Russellian symbolism. The one real logical constant would be the element which is the 'general form of the proposition; to describe it would be to describe the one and only primitive sign logic. (TLP 5.472, NB 45). This is what he described as the 'pictorial nature of proposition'.

1.5. The Significance of the *Tractatus*:

We shall present one of the most recent readings of the significance of the *Tractatus* with a view to assess the impact it has on philosophy in general, and the logical positivists in particular. Shanker begins his introduction with these words: *Tractatus* has been firmly ensconced in the pantheon of philosophical masterpieces. "The magic of the *Tractatus* - both as a literary and as a philosophical *tour de force* - has captured the imagination of a wide spectrum of both societies and disciplines in a manner seldom achieved by an abstract treatise, let alone one in philosophical logic".⁴⁸ It is a source of countless important themes in modern thought. It was greeted by a group which was elevating scientific rigour into a governing principle in philosophy. Vienna Circle recognized that it contains a robust streak of mysticism. It condemns all other attempts at philosophy in the background as nonsense. Logical Positivists considered the *Tractatus* as having 'clarified among other things, the position of logic and mathematics'. According to Schlick, 'the inestimate significance of Wittgenstein's work lies precisely in

this, that in it (the) nature of logical is completely elucidated and established for all time to come'.⁴⁹ Carnap wrote 'Wittgenstein was perhaps the philosopher who besides Russell and Frege, had the greatest influence on my thinking'.⁵⁰

Tractatus is a classic and a great part of it is difficult to understand. It contains a series of difficult solutions to arcane problems that occur in philosophical logic. It exerted a great deal of impact on "one of the guiding influences of the scientific world-conception of philosophy".⁵¹ "Wittgenstein may be credited for articulating in the *Tractatus* a number of the major issues which concern us today (such as for putting the problem of the harmony between language and reality onto the philosophical map, or for recognizing the need for an explanation of the fact that language speakers are able, equipped as they are with finite minds and vocabularies, to understand an infinity of sentences), but the actual solutions which he proposed have long since been consigned to the archives of the history of philosophical ideas".⁵²

Wittgenstein's arguments in the *Tractatus* are all concerned with which are now widely perceived as the key issues in the philosophy of language and logic. This is a significant step towards understanding the nature of logic and language which dominated the twentieth-century analytic philosophy. "The *Tractatus* was in Wittgenstein's own eyes, an example of philosophical purity; for it was by developing the premises of analytical

philosophy to their fully logical conclusions that Wittgenstein reached such recondite results".⁵³

Wittgenstein's attitude alone constitutes compelling grounds for studying *Tractatus'* conception of logical atomism and subsequently his later Augustinian conception of language which were meant to expose conceptual confusions buried deep in the psyche of analytical philosophy. It is a disservice to consider the *Tractatus'* importance in the history of philosophy as lying in its role as a complicated *reductio ad absurdum* of the premises which underpin analytic philosophy.

Vienna Circle appreciated the logical core of the *Tractatus* disregarding the extraneous side affair to the real logical importance of the *Tractatus*. This raises question of the significance of the *Tractatus* afresh in the contemporary philosophy.

"Karl Menger recalls Hans Hahn having once remembered to him that, 'To me the *Tractatus* has explained the role of logic. 'This is an extraordinary statement for a leading logician to have made. Yet, as we have already seen, a similar sentiment can be found throughout the memories of the other members. In 'The Scientific World View', Hahn attempts to expound the basis of this fulsome praise, explaining that 'It was Wittgenstein who recognized the tautological character of logic and emphasized that there was nothing in the world corresponding to the so-called logical constants (like

"and" "or" etc). Carnap turned to the same theme in his *Autobiography*, recalling that 'The most important insight I gained from (the *Tractatus*) was the conception that the truth of logical statements is based only on their logical structure and on the meaning of the terms. Logical statements are true under all conceivable circumstances; thus, their truth is independent of the contingent-facts of the world. On the other hand, it follows that these statements do not say anything about the world and thus have no factual content'. This last statement holds the key as to why the Vienna Circle greeted the *Tractatus* with such excitement, and why they went to such lengths to encourage their philosophical peers to make the great effort needed to penetrate the *Tractatus*' secrets".⁵⁴

Vienna Circle made a distinction between analytic *a priori*/synthetic *a posteriori* judgements. They do not tolerate synthetic *a priori* judgements. Synthetic *a priori* judgements is the basic vehicle of metaphysical speculation, in the guise of significant propositions created solely by the powers of the mind and not subject to the basic canon of logical empiricism: the verifiability principle. The *Tractatus* has descended into the midst of this battle like a *deus ex machina* to satisfy the urge to cement the boundary between analytic *a priori* (logical/mathematical) and synthetic *a posteriori* statements (science).

Tractatus' treatment of propositions of logic and contingent propositions provided the logical positivists an argument in favour of the demarcation between analytic *a priori* and synthetic *a posteriori* truths. "They regarded the *Tractatus* as vital to the cause of the 'scientific world conception', therefore, because in their eyes, it had established 'the fundamental truth on which all empiricism is founded, since it demonstrates the impossibility of synthetic *a priori* judgements'. Furthermore, the *Tractatus* had clarified that 'the propositions of logic and of pure mathematics are *a priori*, but not on that account 'synthetic'. *Tractatus* had provided the logical positivists with the double-edged weapon which they need in order to assault on the bastions of metaphysics" .⁵⁵

Schlick argued that the *Tractatus* has solved the problem in metaphysics. "The *Tractatus* was thus credited with having demonstrated the logical incoherence of all Platonist metaphysical doctrines by establishing that all so-called metaphysical 'propositions' about an ineffable reality are unintelligible , and thus that all metaphysical theories rest on nonsense."⁵⁶

The most important reading of the *Tractatus* was justified because it directly follows from the principle of Bipolarity, which is one of the important theme in the picture theory. According to this view, there are no truth-value gaps amongst the propositions of ordinary language. The assertions in *Tractatus* 6.53 makes clear that Wittgenstein consciously

aligned himself with the battle against metaphysics whatever Wittgenstein's original intentions might be.

This interpretation of the *Tractatus* takes them to move forward towards a verification theory. Shanker is of the opinion that no such verificationism is found in the *Tractatus*. It is more towards anti-verificationism or realism. Shanker might be wrong in this. There was no such emphasis on the analytic *a priori* synthetic *a posteriori* distinction present in the *Tractatus*. In *Philosophical Remarks*, he repudiates the dogmatic logical positivist claim that the concept of a synthetic *a priori* truth is utterly unintelligible. Synthetic *a priori* truths as analytic *a priori* was misleading, according to Wittgenstein. They are rules of grammar freely constructed norms of representation. Logical positivists' anti-metaphysical principles derived mainly in the theory of meaning.

The empiricists frustration towards the efforts to eliminate metaphysics was their utter failure to explain the nature of logical and mathematical truths. "What was particularly important about the *Tractatus*' revolutionary accounts of the meaning of the logical connectives was the manner in which it carved out a role for tautologies and contradictions as the limiting cases of propositions" .⁵⁷

Synthetic *a priori* knowledge such as $5+7=12$ are again as proof of the limitation of modern empiricism. Mill's strategy of accepting mathematical

propositions as synthetic but they are known *a posteriori* failed to account for the actual employment of mathematical concept and propositions. It is a problem why can't give an equal considerations to the mathematical and metaphysical truth. No empiricist had been able to overturn the conception of mathematics of *a priori* reasoning. They accept such truths are known *a priori*. This demanded an account of analyticity which would satisfactorily account for the widespread feeling that mathematics tell us something about the world, and that mathematical knowledge is constantly developing. Does Wittgenstein say anything about the empirical status of mathematical truths? Shanker claims that he has pointed at this later in his writings, especially on mathematics.

Tractatus' accounts opened a purely logical explanation of the logical truth what the empiricist struggled to resolve it epistemologically. *Tractatus* says 'logical constants are not representatives' (TLP 4.0312). They are truth-tabular explanations of the logical constants and they belong to the rules of logical syntax. "Logical syntax alone determines whether or not a molecular proposition is a tautology or a contradiction. This in turn radically altered the Vienna Circle's understanding of what constitutes a logical truth. A logical truth is, not *about* anything. A logical truth is purely and solely the consequence of combining atomic proposition according to the rules of logical syntax in such a way that all content in the resulting molecular proposition is cancelled out. Thus, that a certain molecular proposition is a

tautology or a contradiction represents something about the world (TLP 6.124) in so far as it manifest something about our symbolism; i.e., it demonstrates how to apply the rules of logical syntax".⁵⁸

Vienna Circle recognized this conception of logical truth. This explains all necessity as logical necessity (TLP 6.375). But at the same time, categorical necessity *remains ineffable*. We cannot actually say why a given object should be in one state of affairs but not another. "For *necessity*, properly so-called, is not a manifestation of the metaphysical structure of the world; rather it is a consequence of the rules of logical syntax, which determine the meaning of the logical constants".⁵⁹ Wittgenstein's conception of tautologousness enabled logical positivists to explain the nature of mathematical and logical truths in empirical terms. Logical positivists wanted to classify *all* necessary truths as tautologies. According to Wittgenstein, the colour exclusion statement is a contradiction (TLP 6.3751). Logical Positivists depart from Wittgenstein's conception of mathematical propositions and colour- exclusion statement. Wittgenstein did not regard mathematical propositions as tautologies. They do not understand the significance of Wittgenstein's remarks that mathematical propositions as equations. Armed with the principle of logical analysis, logical positivists now confront that propositions of logic and mathematics exemplify synthetic *a priori* knowledge with the *Tractatus* line which holds that they are tautologies. "Logical analysis will ultimately demonstrate, however, that all

the 'necessary truths' which had hitherto sustained metaphysics are in fact tautologies".⁶⁰

The empiricists attempt to treat mathematical and logical truths as definitions. Logical positivists treat the tautologies and definitions as interchangeable. This creates the problem when logical analysis would ultimately establish that the so-called definitions in question are in fact tautologies. This is due to the thoroughly confused accounts of the various grammatical types of propositions involved in the class of necessary truths. "What the Vienna Circle ultimately failed to recognize, therefore, is that while the explanation of all necessity as logical necessity is one thing, the explanation of *all* necessary truths as tautologies is quite another."⁶¹

The logical positivists had a compelling answer to the primary stumbling block to classical empiricism. Schlick announced 'arithmetical propositions' are certainly *a priori*, but their validity is that of mere tautologies, they are true because they assert nothing of any fact, they are purely analytic.⁶² His accounts of arithmetical and empirical is confused. Here the contents is not between two different versions of the same operation but rather, between two completely different types of activity: an arithmetical and empirical" Logical positivists escaped from this issue whereas Wittgenstein takes seriously on this issue cautiously emphasizing that 'there are no gaps in mathematics' represents a solution, not merely to this particular

problem, but more importantly, to the question of the status of mathematical propositions, the grammatical nature of mathematical proofs, and the relation in which mathematical systems stand to one another'. As far as the *Tractatus* is concerned, Wittgenstein deliberately chose to downplay the philosophy of mathematics for reasons that are yet to be uncovered. This principal issue with which Shanker was concerned was to drive a wedge between Wittgenstein's and Vienna Circle's approaches to philosophy during 1930's.

Logical positivists are blind to explain how mathematics can be an inventive and constantly growing discipline. But the *Tractatus* has a highly constructivist remarks that in 6's suggests the Poincarean criticism of logicism. Logical positivists see that 'a being whose intellect is infinitely powerful at one pick everything in the 'definition'. But this does not account for the synthetic character of mathematical knowledge. Logical positivists could move from these conceptions of mathematical propositions as tautologies to rule of grammar whereas Wittgenstein's new argument that mathematical propositions are rules of grammar is opposed to tautologies. "Thus the Vienna Circle found in the *Tractatus* a strictly structural account of necessary truth, and they applied the argument with a gusto that far surpassed Wittgenstein's own severe attitude to necessary truths in the *Tractatus*. But the latent source of the strain in the Vienna Circle's handling of the *Tractatus* lay in the fact that their first allegiance was to empiricism, despite the overriding emphasis which they resolutely placed on logical syntax".⁶³

Tractatus undermine the empiricist and idealistic attitude towards the problem of necessity from a logical point of view.

The *Tractatus* offered a purely logical explanation which resisted all epistemological and ontological attempts at a solution. Wittgenstein approaches the problem in classical philosophy, the issues in traditional epistemology, with a logical point of view. Logical Positivists are aware of this significance of the *Tractatus*. But they fused with Wittgenstein's ideas and the philosophical antecedents made into a new hybrid the so-called 'logical empiricism'. They think that Wittgenstein's conception of logical syntax is the immediate concern. But Wittgenstein's treatment is against the empiricist as well as idealist attitudes towards the problem of necessity. Tautologies however antedates Wittgenstein. They occur in some form in Mauthner, where necessity is counterposed with contingency. This requires more investigation. Shanker makes no effort to study the relationship between Mauthner and Wittgenstein. He is critical of logical positivists for not being able to distinguish between 'logical' and 'empirical' accounts of necessity. What light Mauthner can throw is none of the concern for Shanker or for anyone else, for that matter.

Logical positivists accepted the substance of Wittgenstein's conception of logic but the spirit eluded them. They applied Wittgenstein's argument onto the analytic *a priori* synthetic *a posteriori* distinction. By focusing on

logical syntax, Wittgenstein clarified these concepts. "*Tractatus* offered a way of completely reducing the problem of necessity to the province of logical syntax".⁶⁴ It is a question of logical syntax what makes it a proposition to be necessary. Epistemological or ontological questions of necessity are spurious. Wittgenstein realized that it is a problem of clarifying the logical grammar of propositions. Vienna Circle sees that Wittgenstein undermined the attempt to 'base metaphysics on pure logic'.⁶⁵ This argument makes them yoked to their importance of epistemological priorities. They over-simplified the nature of logical grammar which Wittgenstein argued for the solution of the problem. They removed the metaphysical confusions under the brute force of tautologousness whereas Wittgenstein moves to explore the theme that 'metaphysics is the shadow of grammar' which is an illuminated idea (much of it later).

Logical Positivists, on the other hand, failed to absorb the converse side of the *Tractatus'* attack on metaphysics. "It is crucial to see that the *philosophical problems* which have invariably inspired these statements (metaphysical) are themselves nonsensical"⁶⁶

With the logical tools provided by the *Tractatus*, logical positivists refuted the various sceptical problems. In that way, they penetrate and see the importance of the 'logical conceptions' of the *Tractatus* in the development of twentieth century logic. *But they misconstrued the Tractatus.* It is not the

Tractatus conception of logical truth that enables us to refute sceptical doubts but rather the conception of logic - by clarifying the confusions from a purely grammatical point-of-view-that they are unintelligible and thus dissolves the sceptical doubts.

Wittgenstein never questioned the fundamental conception of the nature of philosophical scepticism. Grasping this idea in all its subtlety and complexity, will truly revolutionize our understanding of philosophy as critique of language. In fact this is what is required to understand, as we shall explain later, that Mauthner's own scepticism about the language of psychology. We shall return to this issue of critique of language, after cataloguing the major themes in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*.

Notes:

1. The abbreviation 'TLP' used in brackets here and after frequently in the thesis refers to Ludwig Wittgenstein's Work *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (trans.) D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961) followed by sentence number.
2. Brouwer the intuitionist mathematician whose Lectures on the philosophy of mathematics much influenced Wittgenstein's later thought in *Philosophical investigations*.
3. Derek Bolton, *An Approach to Wittgenstein's Philosophy* (London: Macmillan, 1979) p.61.
4. See Henry Staten, *Wittgenstein and Derrida* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985) and David Pears, *The False Prison : A study of the Development of Wittgenstein's Philosophy*, 2 Vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).
5. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Prototractatus - An early version of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (ed.) B.F. McGuinness, T. Nyberg, G.H. von Wright, (trans.) D.F. Pears, B.F. McGuinness, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971) p.2.
6. *Ibid.*, p.9.
7. *Ibid.*, p.10.
8. See G.H.Von Wright, *Wittgenstein* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982) p.79.
9. *Ibid.*, p.83.
10. *Ludwlg Wittgenstein: Critical Assessments* (ed.) Stuart Shanker (London: Croom Helm, 1986, Vol. I) p.10.
11. See G.H.von Wright, *Wittgenstein* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1982) p.94.
12. *Ibid.* p.94.
13. *Tractatus* appears in the final issue of *Annalen der Naturphilosophie*, Verlag Unesma G.m.b.H., Leipzig(ed.) by Wilhelm Ostwald. Band 14, Heft 3-4(1921, 184-262) under the title 'Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung.' Moore suggested the Latin title *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* for the English Edition published by Routledge & Kegan Paul, London in 1922. .
14. *Ludwlg Wittgenstein: Critical Assessments* (ed.) Stuart Shanker (London: Croom Helm, 1986, Vol. I) p.10.
15. G.H.von Wright, *Wittgenstein* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982) p.103.
16. *Ibid.*,p.104.
17. For detailed study of this copy of the *Tractatus* has been made by Dr. Casimir Lewy,' A note on the Text of the *Tractatus* (*Mind* 76, 1967) pp.416-423.
18. Derek Bolton, *An Approach to Wittgenstein's Philosophy* (London: Macmillan, 1979) p.46.

19. See *Ibid.*, p.54.
20. See *Ibid.*, p.58.
21. See Ian Hacking, *Why does Language matter to Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1975).
22. Derek Bolton, *An Approach to Wittgenstein's Philosophy* (London: Macmillan, 1979) p.61.
23. *Ibid.*, p.63.
24. See Heinrich Hertz, *Principles of Mathematics, presented in a new form.*
25. Derek Bolton, *An Approach to Wittgenstein's Philosophy* (London: Macmillan, 1979) p.78.
26. See G.P. Baker and P.M.S. Hacker, *Language, Sense & Non-sense* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).
27. *Ibid.*, p.35.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 380.
29. See M.A.E. Dummett, 'Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic and Ought it to be?' in *Truth and Other Enigmas* (London: Duckworth, 1978) p. 454.
30. G.P. Baker and P.M.S. Hacker, *Language, Sense & Non-sense* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986) p.8.
31. *Ibid.*, p.380.
32. *Ibid.*, p.383.
33. *Ibid.*, pp.45-46.
34. The abbreviation 'NB' used in brackets here and after frequently in the thesis refers to Ludwig Wittgenstein's work *Notebooks-1914-16*, 1st edn. (ed.) G.H.von Wright and G.E.M Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1961) followed by page number.
35. G.P. Baker and P.M.S. Hacker, *Language, Sense & Non-sense* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986) p.41.
36. N. Chomsky, *Reflections on Language* (London: Fontana, 1976) p.28.
37. G.P.Baker and P.M.S.Hacker, *Language, Sense & Non-sense* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986) p.123.
38. *Ibid.*, p.142.
39. Rudolf Carnap, *Introduction to Semantics* (Cambridge: Harward University Press, Mass, 1961) p.56.
40. G.P.Baker and P.M.S. Hacker, *Language, Sense & Non-sense* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986) p.59.
41. *Ibid.*, p.77.
42. Anthony Kenny, *Wittgenstein* (London: Penguin, 1973) p.26.

43. *Ibid.*, p.33.
44. *Ibid.*, p.35.
45. A.C. Grayling, *Wittgenstein* (Oxford, 1988) p.20.
46. Anthony Kenny, *Wittgenstein* (London: Penguin, 1973) p.44.
47. *Ibid.*, p.51.
48. *Ludwlg Wittgenstein: Critical Assessments* (ed.) Stuart Shanker (London: Croom Helm, 1986, Vol. I) p.16.
49. Schlick, *Preface to Waismann* p.136.
50. Rudolf Carnap, 'Autobiography' in *The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap* (ed.) P.Schilpp (Illinois, open court, 1964) p.25.
51. Otto Neurath, 'Sociology and Physicalism' in *Philosophical Papers*, p.59.
52. *Ludwlg Wittgenstein: Critical Assessments* (ed.) Stuart Shanker (London: Croom Helm, 1986, Vol. I) p.17.
53. *Ibid.*, p.18.
54. See *Ibid.*, 18-19.
55. *Ibid.*, p.19.
56. *Ibid.*, p.20.
57. *Ibid.*, p.21.
58. *Ibid.*, p.23.
59. *Ibid.* p.23.
60. *Ibid.*, p.24.
61. *Ibid.*, p.25.
62. Schlick, 'An Introduction to Philosophical Thinking' in *Philosophical Papers* Vol. II, pp.344-5.
63. *Ludwlg Wittgenstein: Critical Assessments* (ed.) Stuart Shanker (London: Croom Helm, 1986, Vol. I) p.28.
64. *Ibid.*, p.29.
65. Rudolf Carnap, 'The Old and New Logic' in *Logical Positivism* (ed.) A.J. Ayer (New York: The Free Press) p.143.
66. *Ludwlg Wittgenstein: Critical Assessments* (ed.) Stuart Shanker (London: Croom Helm, 1986, Vol. I) p.30.

CHAPTER 2

'Philosophy is nothing else but a Critical attention to Language'

- Fritz Mauthner

**THE DOMINANT THEMES IN
EARLY WITTGENSTEIN**

CHAPTER 2

THE DOMINANT THEMES IN EARLY WITTGENSTEIN

2.1. Ontological Atomism: (Theme 1)

Many interpreters agree that Wittgenstein's early work contains a metaphysical doctrine of atomism. Earlier, Russell defined atomism as a 'metaphysics based upon a logical analysis of language'¹. It is metaphysics based upon logical analysis of propositions into their atomic constituents and to see how these atomic propositions represent certain basic features of the world. As Fogelin tells us, Wittgenstein's doctrine must be differently characterized as an 'ontological atomism' by virtue of the way he splits propositions into certain ultimate elementary proposition, further divided into a kind of objects.² Such a metaphysics embodies the idea that the world is complex (Principle of Complexity) and it could be divided into its ultimate simples (Principle of Simplicity). We try to underscore atomism as a model theory based on modal theory.

Anthony Kenny³ sums up Wittgenstein's metaphysics as follows:

1. To each pair of contradictory propositions, there corresponds only and only fact: the fact which makes one of them true and the other false. The totality of such facts is the world (TLP 1.1).

2. Thus the totality of such elementary facts = the totality of elementary proposition constitutes an isomorphic identity.
3. *Facts* may be positive or negative: a positive fact is the existence of state of affairs, a negative fact is the non-existence of a state of affairs. (TLP 2.06) *A state of affairs* (Sachverhalt) is a *combination of objects* or things. An object is essentially a *possible* constituent of a state of affairs (TLP 2.011) and its *possibility* of occurring in combination with the objects in state of affairs is its nature (TLP 2.0123), its internal properties (TLP 2.01231) and its form (TLP 2.0141). Since every object contains within its nature all the possibilities for its combination with other objects, if any object is given, then all objects are given (TLP 5.520), and if all objects are given then *all possible state of affairs* are given (TLP 2.0124).

The above account requires not an atomism of a Russellian type.

4. Objects are simple, without parts, but they can contain into complexes (TLP 2.02-2.0201). They are ungenerable and indestructible, because any possible world must combine the same objects as this one; *change* is only an alteration in the configuration of objects. (TLP 2.022-2.0231,2.0271) Objects may differ from each other in logical form (i.e. they can enter into different possible state of affairs).

5. Objects combine into state of affairs, in which they stand in a determinate relation to one another, 'like the links of a chain' (TLP 2.03).
6. State of affairs are independent of one another (TLP 2.061); from the existence or non-existence of one of them, it is impossible to infer the existence and non-existence of another. Given facts are the existence or non-existence of state of affairs, it follows that facts too are independent of each other (TLP 1.21). The totality of facts, of reality, is its world.

Kenny comments : 'These first pages of the *Tractatus* are extremely obscure'.⁴ What kind of atomism is this?

According to George Pitcher, *Tractatus* represents a the 'purer form' of logical atomism⁵. 'Purer' sounds naive because, it takes analysis to the terminal point. It is a form of pluralism because it reduces the world, not to particulars, but some kind of Wittgensteinean objects. According to David Pears 'it is an extreme form of pluralism of Russell'.⁶ Both of the above remarks suggest a break away or as what Pears later calls 'separatism' which begets 'a sliding-peg' phenomenology separates the peg on which phenomenism moves.⁷

7. Wittgenstein begins with the remarks: 'The world is all that is the case' (TLP 1). It serves as the axiom for whole of *Tractatus*

philosophy. The world is a totality which is represented by propositions of language as truly. A proposition truly or falsely represents the world. The understanding of the nature of world and the nature of the proposition is *a priori*. It does not presuppose acquaintance with the facts and the knowledge which is asserted in proposition. This *a priori* study of the world and the proposition is called logic in one sense of the term used in the *Tractatus*. He passes on to a 'phenomenal' quick-fix, in Pears' sense of the term.

Propositions which are not about complexes, but simples. If it is not, the sense of every proposition would require truth of another, which must itself have sense; and so on in a regress. If there were no end to this regress, there would be no meaningful proposition and so there would be no true or false representation of the world. But there are. Hence propositions whose meaning does not depend upon the truth of any other propositions. They are referring objects not complex objects. Hence there *must be* simple objects. The ontology is 'what must be ?' and not 'what is.'

Simple objects are the substance of the world. Change is the re-arrangement of the configuration of objects, the facts in the world. The meaning of a statements about the world would depend upon the truth of other statements. It presupposes that objects persists in the world.⁸

Russell's logical atomism is a form of *reductionism* which reduce the world into the logical atoms of experience, almost in the way the classical empiricists (Locke, Berkeley, and Hume) did in their approach to philosophical psychology. So, Russell analyses all molecular (compound) proposition into their atomic propositions. An atomic proposition, according to this view, is having a simple name with the simple predicate. Sometimes, it is identified with '*a*' is white, where '*a*' being a simple logically proper name (which has no parts) and a simple predicate (colour predicate).

Wittgenstein took both p and $\sim p$ corresponds for one fact, here the fact which makes it true, and the fact that makes it false. So facts may signify a positive state of affairs or a negative state of affairs (TLP 2.06). A state of affair is a combination of objects (TLP 2.001). Objects are simple and have no parts (TLP 2.02). These are the mysterious Wittgensteinian type of objects. Likewise, names stand for simple signs for these objects.

According to Russell, universal propositions are not reducible to any other kind of proposition. Irreducible general facts exist for the universal propositions which denote something. They are not made up of atomic facts. Russell also insists for the existence of negative facts as a type of fact irreducible to atomic facts.


Wittgenstein says that universal proposition are all ultimately analyzable into elementary propositions. He did not postulate irreducible

general facts. All propositions are truth-functional molecules of elementary proposition. All non-atomic situation and facts are molecules of states of affairs and atomic facts. Wittgenstein denies that the logical constants stands for anything "My fundamental idea is that the logical constants are not representatives" (TLP 4.0312). Logical constants are necessary for the construction of non-elementary proposition. They are syntactical devices and not names or represent the logical cements.

Wittgenstein's atomism can be best described an ontological atomism as it deals with nature of propositions and metaphysical theory. Molecular propositions are constructed out of elementary propositions. All situations are made up of state of affairs. Elementary propositions are atomic. There is nothing which finds states of affairs together to form of complex situation. States of affairs are independent of one another (TLP 2.061). From one state of affairs we cannot validly infer another states of affairs. This is called *axiom of independence of elementary propositions*. Together with the *axiom of extensionality* (truth-function) and picture theory, Wittgenstein's system is brought into the open. Induction has no validity. 'The only necessity that exists is logical necessity'. This again echoes Mauthner.

We can compare the atomistic metaphysics of Russell and Wittgenstein. Russell's logical atomism is a kind of metaphysics based upon logical analysis of language. It reduced the world to the logical atoms of

non-elementary propositions emerged. The structure of language and the structure of world are isomorphic. Facts in the world and names in language are correlated. Such an account of Wittgenstein's ontological atomism rejected the logical atomism put forward by Russell. The prospect for logistic (axiomatic) account of mathematics is also thereby sealed. This moves logic into the orbit of constructionalism.



Wittgenstein thus aims at the structural identity between facts and propositions, at the level where there is one-to-one relation. There are *four* ontological levels in the *Tractatus* substance, reality, essence, world. Substance is related to form and content. All the other *three* relate to form and structure. Content cannot be said. The possible structure is form and existing structure is essence. We can describe form and contents as follows:

8. The content is private and inexpressible. Language cannot be private. Metaphysics fails to say when they say what content is. The content does not get into language. The sameness and difference get into language. 'Experience comes before logic and language' (TLP 5.552). Language fills the structure and not the content. Language is not able to say the content and there is no need of describing it. Wittgenstein attacks the behaviourist notion which holds that there is no private

experience. The word 'illusion' is misused by the behaviourists. "A proposition contains the known but not the content of its senses' (TLP 3.13). Names have no relation to content. 'An expression is the mark of a form and a content' (TLP 3.310). They are named-like objects and described-like facts. They are simple when they are named and complex when they are complex. Substance is form and content. It is the configuration of substance which forms both material properties and states of affairs. Material properties is the external properties and states of affairs is the internal properties. Material properties as content cannot be named or described.

9. Form and Essence: 'Form' means all possibilities while essence means possibilities found to exist. Form is what is known and given as what logic has to deal with while essence is what is discovered or disclosed (TLP 3.3421). Commonness is not a form. Essence is connected with sense. The place where essence and form coincide is in the case of the general form of a proposition which is also the essence of a proposition (TLP 5.471). What is essential to all proposition is not what is essential to all possible senses but what is essential to the expression of all possible senses (TLP 4.5). We do not know the composition of elementary proposition in advance as we do not know the 'the number of names with different meanings (TLP 5.55). All senses comes from elementary propositions (TLP 5.234). Every proposition has a form of

the world and say the complete essence of the world. It is logical form which links possibility of structures into their possibilities of existence and non-existence. Meaning and senses are provided by 'all' which are immanent at every point. We have all objects and all elementary propositions. The possibilities are disclosed by essence and given by the forms of the world and the form of reality.

10. Relation between language and the world: Reality is the existing and non-existing states of affairs (TLP 2.06). The totality of existing states of affairs is the world (TLP 2.04). The logical form of reality states that always one state of affairs is present and all other states of affairs of the same form is absent whatever one state of affairs may be. There is nothing in reality corresponding to absence or nothingness. eg. '*p*' and not '*p*' are the same. Reality excludes all other possibility of the same form. This is the logical form of both pictures and proposition. The existence of a single state of affairs is a positive fact and the non-existence of a single state of affairs is a negative fact. A fact is a combination of state of affairs which correspond to truth-function. In a picture, we picture facts and also picture reality. But in proposition it is not so. It pictures reality which is independent of facts. This is because the truth or falsity of the proposition is settled by the world.

Reality gives all possibilities of different form in the logical form of one possibility – excluding all-other-possibilities-from any one logical place while world contains both positive and negative facts with the possibility of true and false proposition. Reality is the 'representative' world. Reality as the objective status of the world as pictured and spoken about. Logic is prior to substance but not to 'prior' to 'sayable'. Wittgenstein says that 'logic is transcendental.' The underlying strain is Schopenhauerian, as it will be clear from what follows. The Mauthnerian-Schopenhauerian angle is obvious. The picture theory centralises the idea of model.

2.2. Picture Theory: (Theme 2)

Picture theory of proposition is supposed to be the nerve centre of the *Tractatus*. It also provides a continuity with later Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein's theory is perhaps best be regarded as a theory of representation in general. There are two features of a representation: a) what it is a representation of (b) whether it represents what it represents accurately or inaccurately. This distinction corresponds to the distinction concerning a proposition between what the proposition *means* and whether what it means is true or false-between sense and truth-value. 'The relationship between the elements of a picture – the fact that the elements are related in the way they are-is itself a fact, and this led Wittgenstein to say that a picture is a fact. He called the connection of the elements in a picture as the structure of the picture (TLP

2.15). Every picture has a structure, but it is not identical with its structure. A picture consists of structure *plus* pictorial relationship; the picture is the relation between the elements considered as elements having pictorial relationships to objects outside'.⁹ The possibilities of structure is the 'pictorial form' (*Form der Abbildung*). This makes the things represented are related in the same way as the representing elements in the picture (TLP 2.151). Pictorial form is the spatiality of the picture in a paper, and the representational form is the black and white miniature. There is a minimum common element between reality and picture is what is called the 'logical form'. Logical form is part of the pictorial form of every picture. Every picture represents a possible state of affairs which is its sense. Whether this is true or false depends upon with reality.

'A logical picture of facts is a thought' (TLP. 3). A thought is a proposition with a sense (TLP. 4). A thought is expressed in a proposition perceptible to the senses. The picture is a combination of elements. But the elements of thought is mysterious.

We cannot make a spatial representation of something contravening the Laws of Geometry (TLP. 3.03 – 3.0321). Thought cannot represent logic. No picture can depict its pictured form, and logic is the pictorial form of thoughts (TLP 2.172; cf: 4.0312). Logic is thought in pictured form. Its representational form is mysterious. It cannot be thought about, since no

picture can place itself outside its representational form (TLP 2.174). 'Only possible states of affairs can be thought of' (TLP 3.02). The totality of true thoughts is a picture of the world (TLP 3.01). Since any picture needs to be compared with reality to tell whether it is true or false, there cannot be a thought whose truth is recognizable from the thought itself: hence no thoughts can be *a priori* truth (TLP 3.04 –3.05). Thought appears mainly as the link between proposition and states of affairs. Proposition as actually being a thought (TLP 3.54). The projection lines run from the sentence to the state of affairs *via* the thoughts in the mind. It is as complicated as the human organism. Philosophical analysis is needed to make the elements of proposition correspond to the elements of thoughts which reveal the real logical form of the ordinary sentence (TLP 4.0031).

Frege treated names and proposition alike they have both sense and reference. Wittgenstein, on the otherhand, takes propositions as having reference but is distinct from names. 'We can understand a proposition without knowing whether it is true or false. A name can have only one relationship to reality; it either names something or it is not a significant symbol at all. 'Names are points, proposition arrows' (NB 97; TLP 3.144). The true or false nature of the propositions constitutes the relationship of the proposition to reality (NB 112). To understand a name is to understand its reference, to understand a proposition is to understand its sense. To understand the reference of a name, it has to be explained (TLP 4.026). But

there is no need of explanation to have the sense of the proposition (TLP 4.02). We understand a proposition before knowing the truth-value proves that a proposition is a picture, and depicts the facts that it describes (TLP 4.016-4.021, 4.03). The picture theory of proposition is summed up in the following eight themes¹⁰ by Kenny:

Theme 1: *A proposition is essentially composite*

A proposition must consist of parts which can occur in other propositions. A proposition, unlike a name must have parts. The words must be put together in the appropriate way. A propositional sign is precisely due to the fact that its elements are put together in a determinate way (TLP 3.14 ff). A proposition is fact, not a complex object. 'Symbols are not what they seem to be' 'In "aRb" "R" looks like a substantive but it is not one. What symbolizes in "aRb" is that "R" occurs between "a" and "b" (NB 99). 'So facts are symbolized by facts, or rather : that a certain thing is the case in the world symbol says that a certain thing is the case in the world (NB 105). In this way, the picture theory connects with the earlier criticism of the 'theory of types.' Russell's theory of types attempts to cross the limits of language. This finds an echo of Mauthnerian critique of language.

Theme 2: *The correlation of the elements*

The correlation between the elements of a picture and the elements of what has to be pictured constitutes the pictorial relationship of the picture.

Elements of the proposition are the simple analysable signs, the names (TLP 3.202, 3.26). A name has as its reference an object. The connection between a name and what it names is a matter of *arbitrary* convention (TLP 3.315, 3.22). The combination of signs makes sense when we have a correlation between sign and reality. 'A proposition, however, is not just a set of names, and in addition to correlating the names with objects we have to correlate relationship between the names in a proposition with relationship between objects in facts.' The names really will be representative only if they have the appropriate syntactical form.

Theme 3: *The combination of such correlated elements into proposition presents- without further human intervention-a possible state of affairs-(Non-arbitrary representation)*

Once the conventions between names and a certain relationship between objects have been made, there is no need of further convention to say that these names in this relationship signifying those objects in that relationship. This makes us to understand a new proposition. But a new name needs an explanation (TLP 4.026). This has bearings on Mauthner's contingency thesis.

Theme 4: *A proposition stands in an internal relation to the possible state of affairs which it presents (Internal relation between proposition and situation)*

'A proposition communicates a situation to us, and so it must be *essentially* connected with the situation. And the connection is precisely that it is its logical picture (TLP 4.03). Accidental features are arbitrary, essential features are the logical form which it must have in common with the situation it presents. The relationship between proposition and situation is not causal or contingent but internal. The logical structure of a proposition is an internal property of it.

Theme 5: *This internal relationship can only be shown it cannot be informatively stated* (Internal relation 'shown' not 'said').

The possession of an internal relation is not something that can be said. 'Logical form is mirrored in proposition, not represented by them; that is to say, it is shown by them and shared by them' (TLP 4.121).

Theme 6: *A proposition is true or false in virtue of agreement or disagreement with reality* (Comparison with reality).

Wittgenstein says that a proposition can only be verified by a comparison with reality. So a proposition is a picture which says 'Yes' or 'No' by comparing with reality.

Theme 7: *A proposition must be independent of the actual states of affairs which makes it true or makes it false* (Independence of reality)

A proposition does not actually contain its sense; if it did, it could not be false, since the actuality of its sense is what makes the proposition true (TLP 3.13).

Theme 8: *No proposition is 'a priori' true* (No *a priori* truth)

All genuine propositions are contingent propositions. So it must be capable of being true or false and there is no *a priori* truth. In the *Prototractatus*, Wittgenstein wrote that 'all analytic propositions are tautologies' (PTLP 4.44602), and in the *Tractatus* 'The propositions of logic are tautologies. Therefore the propositions of logic say nothing (They are analytic propositions)' (TLP 6.1 – 6.11). A tautology is not a picture and hence not a proposition.

A proposition is not only related to a picture, but also to a ruler. A picture 'is laid against reality like a ruler' (TLP 2.1512). Even a 'A theme in music is a proposition' (PTLP. 3.16021).

Wittgenstein is aware of the limitation of the picture. The essence of the pictorial relation between phonetic signs and sounds is the existence of rules for deriving one from the other (TLP 4.014, 4.0141). In an ideal language, each elements of the propositional sign would correspond a single object in the world (TLP 3.2).

'Propositions picture facts' Thought and language are the ways of representing the world. The 'representable' side of sense-experience belongs to the forms of the world, the non-representable side is the unsayable content which is outside language. Representations are possible in *seven* ways.

1) Pictures 2) Thoughts 3) Propositions 4) Completely analysed propositions 5) Elementary propositions 6) Truth-functional propositions 7) logical proposition. Every kind of representation involve substance or objects that involves determinate structure except ordinary propositions in which the structure is hidden. *Tractatus'* epistemology tells us that representation is based on the principle of determinate structure and thus the structure corresponds to simple objects.


Both pictures and ordinary propositions represent things-in-situations by representing them in objects-in-states-of affairs. Names in an elementary proposition contain object of thought. In a completely analysed proposition, words of all types function semantically merely as names, the differences of types being expressed now only syntactically. In elementary propositions, there are no more type differences and the signs stand on the same level both semantically and syntactically. When a thing like house and a property like red are renamed in a 'completely analysed proposition', they are named as objects of thought and that differences is conveyed by the arrangement of the names. This way a situation is represented by being represented as a state of

affairs. As a logical picture of a situation, a proposition treats things, properties and relation as 'namable samples' conveying their type difference by syntax. In the case of elementary proposition, any arrangements of the terms will continue to give sense. Whereas in the case of completely analysed proposition, it yields no sense. This is the difference between logical syntax and combinatorial syntax (all possible combination are of equal significance – in elementary proposition). An ordinary proposition has been reduced to the forms by the use of variables, it is a class of propositions which correspond to a logical form. Proposition of the subject-predicate forms or of the relational form are the examples of this logic; the combinatorial logic is a class by itself. Model becomes a complicated affair.

A picture is distinguished from a thought or a proposition. A picture has *three* different forms. 1) Picture form 2) Its representational form 3) Its logical form. The possible situation is projected into a propositional sign by 'thinking the sense of proposition'¹¹ (TLP 7) which separates the form of a sense. An elementary proposition is the simplest kind of proposition of the simplest signs with determinate sense which requires objects. The world has a determinate character. The definite character involves in the nature of meaning. The indefiniteness becomes definite when it is meant. Here to distinguish between ambiguity or indefiniteness which is not meant which is clarified by philosophical clarification. 'What we mean must always be sharp.'¹² The term 'objects' stand for a unit of meaning. Sense is the *sheer*

combination of such meanings. A name, though it means an object, fails to mean the correct relation to other objects, and thereby becomes ineffable.

Language is defined as the whole set of propositions. All propositions can be analysed into elementary propositions. Elementary propositions are concatenation of names which refer to objects. Elementary propositions are logical pictures of atomic facts which are the combination of objects. Atomic facts constitute the world. The language is truth-functionally structured and its essential function is to describe the world. The limit of the language and the limit of the world coincide at this point. So 'language is the mirror image of the world'. This can be represented in the following diagram used by K.T. Fann.¹³



We can encircle the whole picture to show the underlying Schopenhauerian strain in Wittgenstein's thinking. This is 'phenomenalism' that excludes self : Self constitutes the limit. The limit is broached *via* truth-function, which is presented as Theme 3.


2.3. Logic of Truth-Functions: (Theme 3)

Both Russell and Frege made their analysis on the basis of the principle of extensionality. According to one form of this principle, it is stated as:

" . . the truth of all molecular proposition are determinable on the basis of truth or falsity of their atomic constituents." This is what is called the idea of truth-function. Both Russell and Frege were responsible for axiomatizing the whole of logic (both propositional, predicate and set theory) taking a set of axioms as basic, and deducing other propositions as theorems (logical consequences of axioms). Such a conception of logic, as Mounce tells us,¹⁴ hierarchizes the whole set of logical proposition (necessary proposition) and hence it may be called the *hierarchical conception of logic*. Wittgenstein was a strong critic of Russell-Frege's logic of language. He believed that both Frege and Russell misunderstood the logic of our (natural) language. Wittgenstein on the other hand, theorized that all propositions are of equal status and hence no hierarchy. He followed up a purely 'truth-tabular conception of logic'. It is sometimes called *zero-axiomatic logic* (no axioms).

Russell-Frege logic is called the *axiomatic or hierarchical conception of logic*. The axioms are defined as postulates, assumptions, sentences which do not need proof truth can be taken for granted. Logical deduction is possible from an axiom which results in theorem. Russell formulated *five*

axioms and Frege, *six* axioms for the construction of logic. Theory of inference is possible in such a logic. Hierarchical notions of logic divides statements into two types namely more privileged and less privileged (theorem). The above idea can be represented in the diagram.



Wittgenstein's main conception of logic is decidability. Every proposition is determinate which either true or false. Every (non-elementary) proposition is a truth-function of elementary proposition (TLP 4). According to Wittgenstein, the undefinable primitives, which are logical connectives – say, Conjunction, Disjunction, Implication, Negation are ultimately derived from the more fundamental connective, namely concept of 'Neither-nor'. It has determinate sense that is true or false. So every proposition has equal merit. Every sentence is a truth-function of elementary proposition. Logic must be based on truth-functional analysis as opposed to the entire sets of sentences found in Russell-Frege logic. Wittgenstein's logic hence is called the *Truth-Tabular conception of logic*. Truth-Tabular analysis of proposition is based upon the truth-table prepared in accordance with the Rules for Conjunction, Negation, Disjunction and Implication. Arrangement of the

proposition in any of the logical connectives will give definite results which are either true or false. A statement form that has only true substitution instances is called “tautologous statement form”, or a “tautology”. A statement form that has only false substitution instances is said to be “self-contradictory” or a “contradiction”. Statement forms that have both true and false statements among their substitution instances are called “contingent statement form.” The following diagram enable to show the truth-functional analysis. The contrast is shown below :

Negation ~	And .	Or v	If. Then ⊃	Co-Implication (≡)	Russell-Frege indefinables
Neither. . . . Nor					Wittgenstein's Sole constant

Truth-Tables

Negation

p	~p
T	F
F	T

Conjunction

P	Q	p.q
T	T	T
T	F	F
F	T	F
F	F	F

Disjunction

P	Q	p∨q
T	T	T
T	F	T
F	T	T
F	F	F

Implication (If.....then)

P	Q	p⊃q
T	T	T
T	F	F
F	T	T
F	F	T

P	or	~	p
T	T	F	T
F	T	T	F

is called tautology

p	.	~	p
T	F	F	T
F	F	T	F

is called contradiction

Tautologies and Contradictions are the *two* limiting case of truth-functions.

Thus Wittgenstein evolved a mechanical way of determining the truth of falsity of each and every proposition. The mechanical way is adumbrated in his account of *Truth-Tabular conception of logic*. Truth-tables provide the mechanical method here. (discovered independently of the American mathematician Emile Post). From this, Wittgenstein went on to formulate his crucial passage in the *Tractatus* 4 : 'Every non-elementary proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions.' Thus Wittgenstein gives, while Frege does not, a mechanical decision-procedure for logic. According to this, every proposition can be determined as true or false in a mechanical way.

A proposition either assert a state of affairs or it does not. If it does not assert, then the proposition is called negative. A negative proposition is true when the situation does not exist and false when the situation exists. In both cases, the sense of the proposition can be understood. The sense of positive proposition would determine the condition of reality, which makes the proposition true. This conception of meaning is also applied to negative proposition in terms of its truth-conditions.

The negative proposition is a function (sense of) an elementary proposition. Negation is a propositional function, since its arguments and values are propositions. But since the truth-value of the value of the function is always determined solely by the truth-values of the arguments, it is also called a *truth-function*. A negative proposition is a truth-function of the corresponding elementary proposition. When the elementary proposition is true, the negation of the proposition is false and *vice versa*. A single elementary proposition yield a function and its negation. Two elementary proposition form compounds such as conjunction, disjunction etc. and it yields 16 different possible truth-functions by using the negation. This is the simple interdefinability of the proposition which represents the existence and non-existence of state of affairs. Truth-function theory is only a corollary to it.

The sense of compound propositions is also defined in terms of the truth-condition of elementary proposition. The question of how an account of

elementary proposition represents the situation in reality is answered by : the proposition must be logical picture of a state of affairs.

The compound proposition which is always true is called a tautology and the one which is always false is called a contradiction (TLP 4.46). The tautologies are the logically necessary truths. There are two traditional definitions of tautology. The *first* asserts that necessary truth is a proposition whose denial is self-contradiction and the *second* asserts that necessary truth is a proposition which is true in all possible worlds.

Tractatus says that '*logical constants*' are not representatives' (TLP 4.0312). They are not names of function or logical syntax or logical objects. Thus a truth-tabular explanation of the logical constants belong to the rules of logical syntax which determine the combination of atomic proposition into molecular proposition. Logical syntax, determines whether a molecular proposition, is a tautology a contradiction. A logical truth is not about anything. There are no self-evident primitive logical proposition. A logical truth is purely the consequence of combining atomic proposition in accordance with the rules of logical syntax. Molecular proposition is a tautology, or a contradiction, that does not represent something about the world. (TLP 6.124). All necessity is logical necessity. Categorical necessity remains ineffable in the *Tractatus* because we cannot say why a given object should be in one state of affairs but not in another (TLP 2.0131). For eg. we

cannot say why a musical note have some colour. Necessity is not the manifestation of the world but it is the result of the applicability of the rules of logical syntax.

The sense of any proposition is determined ultimately by elementary propositions. Elementary proposition and logical connectives together marks the totality of proposition and fixes their limits. Molecular propositions are the result of combining elementary proposition by truth-functional connectives. "And" is a truth-functional connective. All propositions are truth-functions of elementary ones. Given all elementary propositions, it is possible to construct propositions out of them by using truth-function operators "Every proposition is the result of truth-operation on elementary proposition" (TLP 5.3).

Kenny explains the truth-operations as follows:¹⁵

"Suppose that we write 'N(*p*)' for the negation of '*P*', 'N(*p*.*q*)' for the negation of '*p*' and '*q*', 'N(*p*, *q*, *r*)' for the negation of '*p*', of '*q*' and of '*r*', and so for any number of propositions in the brackets (TLP 5.502-5.52). This will represents an operation which consists in constructing truth-table with 'F's in every line but the last. We can see this if we constructs the truth tables in the normal way.

P	N(p)	p	q	N(p, q)	p	q	r	N(p, q, r)
T	F	T	T	F	T	T	T	F
F	T	F	T	F	F	T	T	F
		T	F	F	T	F	T	F
		F	F	T	F	F	T	F
					T	T	F	F
					F	T	F	F
					T	F	F	F
					F	F	F	T

This shows an operation which can be applied to any number of propositions. But it does not make it at all clear how *every* proposition is a result of successive applications of the operation $N(. . .)$ to elementary propositions, or how the use of this operation gives us the most general form of transition from one proposition to another (TLP 6.001 ff).

We can see this better if we consider Wittgenstein that all possible truth-functions of a given number of elementary proposition can be set out in a simple schema (TLP 5.101). There are, for instance, *sixteen possible truth-functions* of two propositions, as can be seen from the following table.

P	Q	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
T	T	T	F	T	T	T	F	F	F	T	T	T	F	F	F	T	F
F	T	T	T	F	T	T	F	T	T	F	F	T	F	F	T	F	F
T	F	T	T	T	F	T	T	F	T	F	T	F	F	T	F	F	F
F	F	T	T	T	T	F	T	T	F	T	F	F	T	F	F	F	F

Some of these are familiar No.5, for instance, is ' p or q ' and No. 15 is ' p and q '. No.1 and No.16 are the 'degenerate' truth functions, tautology and contradiction- the truth-functions which are true for all, and no, values of their arguments respectively. But for our present purpose, the most interesting ones are 10 and 11, for these columns, as will be seen, are the same as that for p and for q ; so that the symbol constructed by this truth- table presents the proposition q as a truth-function of the two arguments ' p ' and ' q '. This shows that we do not need to have truth-tables of different sizes to represent propositions of different complexity. Indeed, if these are n elementary propositions, then a truth-table with 2^n lines will contain in it 2^n propositions whether elementary or composite, just as in the table above the four lines give room for all the sixteen possible truth-functions of the arguments. The model becomes perfect.

Let us now imagine that we have a universe-as Wittgenstein would say, a logical space-with n possible states of affairs. Then our truth-table with 2^n lines will contain every possible proposition about the universe (it will also, of course, contain tautologies and contradictions, which are not strictly speaking about the universe, but this does not matter). Among the propositions as the right-hand side will be the elementary propositions, each now expressed as truth functions of all the elementary propositions there are. Two things will be true of the elementary proposition thus expressed (1) Each

elementary proposition will contain the name of all the objects there are in the universe, for if we are given all the elementary propositions. We are given all the names, and each elementary proposition is expressed as a function of all the elementary propositions. (2) Each elementary proposition will appear as a conjunction of itself and a tautology for instance, in the table above, ' p ' as a truth-function of ' p ' and ' q ' is equivalent to ' p and (q or not- q)' (cf: TLP 4.465).

It remains to show how every proposition which appears in the table can be reached by the repeated application of the operation N to the elementary propositions. Let us consider the simple case of the table with only four lines and two elementary propositions. To apply the operation to a single proposition, one writes 'T' for 'F' and 'F' for 'T'. To apply it to two propositions one writes 'T' whenever two 'F's occurs and otherwise 'F'. To apply it to three propositions one writes 'T' whenever three 'F's occur, otherwise 'F'. So we start with the two elementary propositions 10 (' p ') and 11 (' q ').

Applying the operation N to 10 we get 7 ('not- p ') and applying it to 11 we get 6 ('not- q ').

If we apply it to 10 and 11; we get 12 ('neither p nor q ')

If we apply it to 12, we get 5 (' p or q ')

If we apply it to 6 and 7 we get 15 (' p and q ')

If we apply it to 15, we get 2 ('not both p and q ')

If we apply N to 2 and 15 (or, for that matter to 10 and 7) or to 11 and 6, or to 5 and 12) we get 16 (contradiction).

If we apply it to 16, we get 1 (tautology)

If we apply it to 12 and 15 we get 8 (' p or q but not both'), and then applying it to 8 we get 9 (' p if and only if q ').

We are now left with just four to get 3, 4, 13 and 14. One may to get 13 would be to apply N to the trio 9, 11 and 12, 13 is ' p and not q '; the negation of 13, reached by one application of N to it, is 4 ('if p then q '). 14 (' q and not p ') can be reached by applying N to 9 and 10, and from it by one application of N we can reach its negation 3('if q then p ').

Thus our task is complete, and each of the sixteen propositions can be shown as a result of successive application of N to the elementary propositions 10 and 11 or to the results of previous applications of N to them. Thus, if we write an 'N' for each application of the operation, 7 is N(10).

6 is N(11)

15 is N(N(10), N(11))

2 is NN(N(10), N(11))

and 16 is $N((N(10), N(11)), NN(N(10), N(11)))$

16 is also, more simply, $N((10), N(10))$. As this last example shows, the same proposition may be reached in more than one way and expressed in more than one way by the N notation; in a case like double negation, for instance, operations may vanish, in the sense that the iterated application of an operation will bring one back to where one started, to the base of the operation".

Every proposition was a truth-function of elementary proposition, so that the formula for constructing truth-functional propositions out of elementary proposition was the form of proposition in general. (TLP 5.3) . 'In the general propositional form, propositions occur in other propositions only as a basis of truth operations'. (TLP 5.54) 'Wittgenstein has thus introduced quantified propositions as truth-functions of elementary proposition in accordance with his general principle'.¹⁶ 'Wittgenstein's method amount to is this: universally quantified statements are taken as long conjunctions, and existentially quantified statements are taken as long disjuncts'.¹⁷ All types of propositions are in one way or another belongs to truth-function theory. Some are not genuine propositions. Some are trying to say which cannot be said. They are degenerative propositions. Tautologies and contradictions are degenerate propositions. They provide the *limit* of language. No logic without limit. It plays a crucial role in his account of logic.

2.4. Critique of Language: (Theme 4)

1. *The Scaffolding: General Form of Proposition:* Wittgenstein sets limits to the expression of thought in language. Expression beyond the limits is non-sense. These limits are determined by the nature of language, by the essence of the proposition. This essence is expressed in several propositional forms. The general form of proposition is represented in words. 'This is how things stand' (TLP 4.5). 'This' shows picture of a possible state of affairs. The value of the general propositional form includes each and every elementary proposition and all possible truth-functions of them. 'Suppose that I am given *all* elementary propositions; then I can simply ask what propositions I can construct out of them. And there I have *all* propositions, and *that* fixes their limits' (TLP 4.51). Every proposition represents the existence and non-existence of states of affairs; the totality of true or false elementary propositions contains to express every sense.

Wittgenstein uses the concept 'operation' to define the general form of propositions in symbolic way in proposition No. 6 (TLP 6). The general form of a truth function is $(\bar{p} \cdot \xi, N(\xi))$. This is the *general form of proposition*. Negation, Conjunction etc., are operations. The function like negation 'does not produce a new object. 'Material functions' are completed by an argument to form a new object as value, so that the value contains the argument. Operations, only mark differences between forms of propositions already

given, one is called the base of the operation and the other its result for that base.

'The general form of proposition sets the limits of language. Proposition can assert or deny the existence of states of affairs. The extent of propositions is bounded by the number of elementary propositions.'¹⁸ These two limitations are inherent by the nature of the world. The world determines the nature and extent of propositions which can truly or falsely represent the world. The totality of objects determines the possibility of expressing of each and every sense. This possibility is represented in the general propositional form. Wittgenstein has thus evolved the limits of language through general propositional form and has given the corollary to arrive at a number theory which in the words of Steven Savitt:

"Wittgenstein has already claimed that all propositions can be generated by applying the operation 'N' to the elementary propositions. This is what all propositions have in common; hence the general form of a proposition can be represented in the notation introduced in the last section as $(\bar{p}, \xi, N(\xi))$

where P must be the set of all elementary propositions (6; 3.341. 5.471-5.472).

Once we are given the general form of a propositions, then also we are given 'the general form according to which one proposition can be generated out of another by means of an operation' (6.002), and so Wittgenstein introduced 'the general form of an operation '0'()' as follows.

$$[\xi, N(\xi)]' (\eta) (= [\eta, \xi, N(\xi)])$$

It is difficult, however, to see just what is being generalised here. 0 seems to be no more than N, the operation of joint negation. But *this*, claims Wittgenstein, is how we arrive at numbers.

An operation may be applied to its own results, which Wittgenstein termed 'successive applications' of that operation (5.2521). In 6.02, he considered the formal series generated by applying the general form of an operation successively, starting from an arbitrary base. That would be written:

$$(1) x, 0'x, 0'0'x, 0'0'0'x, \dots$$

He presented the following definitions:

$$(2) \quad x = 0^0x \quad \text{Def.,}$$

$$0'0^n x = 0^{n+1}x \quad \text{Def.,}$$

and then re-wrote (1) as:

$$(1) \quad 0^0x, 0^{0+1}x, 0^{0+1+1}x, 0^{0+1+1+1}x, \dots$$

Then he presented a final set of definitions:

(3)	$0 + 1 = 1$	Def.,
	$0 + 1 + 1 = 2$	Def.,
	$0 + 1 + 1 + 1 = 3$	Def., (and so on).

Presumably, then, (1') could be re-written as:

$$(1) \quad 0^0x, 0^1x, 0^2x, 0^3x, \dots,$$

but Wittgenstein did not explicitly draw this conclusion. From these definitions, Wittgenstein did conclude, 'A number is the exponent of an operation' (6.021)".¹⁹ Thus Wittgenstein reduce mathematics to logic, which it is a collision point for the doctrine of logicism.

The idea that the world and hence language is limited belongs with the *Tractatus* conception of objects in space, time, and subject. The idea of totality is present in the 'The world is all that is the case' (TLP 1). Its other features are objects in the world do not change through time (TLP 2.02715). The implication of this idea is that the form of reality and logical form are given a temporally. This provides a condition of the existence of a general propositional form. The subjects is not inside logical space but outside. It can be outside only what is limited. The conception of space, time, subject ensure that language is a bounded totality. It is the same as what limits language to pictorial representation of a static world.

2. *The inexpressible*: The general form of the proposition contains the possibility that everything can be expressed by language. But there are certain

things that cannot be expressed. They are the nature of logic or logical form and the concepts of totality which is the world. Propositions can neither represent logical form nor does it represent the world as a whole. General propositions refer to all objects but they do not say 'that is *all*' They do not prescribe the limits of reality. The generality sign is not defined by a truth-functional conjunction. The generality sign appears as an argument not as a function (TLP 5.52's). All objects in them can be represented in language but it cannot be represented that they are all. Proposition can only say that such and such is the case in the world or not. "No representation of the world as a whole can be a value of the general propositional form; propositions are limited to saying that such and such is the case in the world, or it is not the case, and so on".²⁰

Language cannot represent the world as a limited whole. The concept of subject, value and the will all are independent of the world. They are outside the limits of the world. So they cannot be represented in language. The inexpressible limits language. The limits are given by logical form which corresponds to the totality of the world. These limits are transgressed. The limits of language presupposes what lies beyond its limits.

In the *Tractatus*, thought and language are not fundamentally different. Propositions of language are thoughts expressed in a way perceptible to the senses (TLP 3.1). Thoughts, like propositions are logical pictures of facts.

Thought is limited in the same way as language. In his *preface* to the *Tractatus*, he remarks: we cannot say what cannot be said ie. what cannot be expressed in language can nevertheless be thought. That the inexpressible is not that we think it but rather the inexpressible is shown, or shows itself. 'What can be shown, cannot be said' (TLP 4.1212).

3. *Limits*: No proposition can represent the logic of language and reality but meaningful symbolism shows that logic.²¹ The whole of reality and its limits would apply in the case of ethical and aesthetic truths and truths about the will. These truths presuppose that the world is a limited whole. These are mystical. 'There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They *make themselves manifest*. They are what is mystical' (TLP 6.552). There are limits to language which must be grasped immediately as language cannot draw the limits of language. The subject which knows reality from the outside does indeed view the world as a whole. What is understood in language is shown in language; what is viewed as a limited *whole*, *shows* itself. That the inexpressible is *shown* hangs together with the *Tractatus* metaphysics.

Wittgenstein's metaphysical constructions point to the unsayable. This is a kind of *negative* metaphysics. What cannot be said are the contents of the world, the subject, the ethical, metaphysical. They do lie outside can only be

shown by showing that the world has limits and that they do not lie within these limits. This is the limits of the logic of language.

1) The limits of the world is the limits of logic. More than one possibility of the same form is impossible to think. The world cannot contain them. This is the reason why contradiction appears in physics. Contradiction is the 'outer limits' of proposition. Logic is involved in every object and every proposition.

2) Limits of language means both the limits of my world and of the world. My world (experienced content) and the world (logically pictured form and structure) coincide, and this is shown by the limits of language as form and structure.

3) The subject sets the limits of language. The subject has no nature and is not related to the world as part to whole. The subject sets the limits of the world as being 'my world'.

4) The world as a whole has an 'outside'. This outside cannot be said.


The world is *all* and *totality* is evident in Wittgenstein's ontology. Logic deals with all possibilities and the world is the totality of the existing possibilities. 'All' and 'totality' are different. Two senses resemble reality and look at only positive senses, this resembles world, Truth possibility of every elementary proposition are all taken altogether. That is why the world is a

totality. 'All that is the case' and the 'totality of facts' are two different ways of describing the world. The totality of logical parts is the same as the totality of existing states of affairs.

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Tractatus is not to fix the limit of thought but only to set a limit to the expression of thoughts. Proposition depends upon thinking (TLP 3.11) while a thought depends upon facts (TLP 3). A thought is never illogical. There is more in a thought than in logic. But there is no more in language than which is in thought. In a logical picture, the content is thought. In a proposition, thoughts are simply the possibility of expressing them. The possibility of expression of thoughts which can be limited while the content of the sense of a proposition cannot be limited. Once a meaning is given to signs, then it works in its own course. This is the immanence of the rules of language within language. Language in use provides its own possibilities of use and there is no further court of appeal. *Tractatus* elucidates the limits which are in language and in the world and not by prescribing the limits of the world. There is no possibility of 'improving language as a whole.' So Frege-Russell's logic is struck down with fiat.

On analysis, of Wittgenstein's proposition in the *Tractatus* itself is metaphysically non-sensical. According to Wittgenstein, both Frege and Russell failed to understand the logic of our language. They used the same sign as different symbols. They failed to give a meaning to certain signs in



their propositions. But Wittgenstein himself failed to give a word for 'objects' in the *Tractatus*. The ultimate basis of all 'talking about' cannot itself be 'talked about'. The understanding of the *Tractatus* is an indication of the truth. The *Tractatus* is not constructing a metaphysical picture of the world or the relation of language and world. Discovering that we cannot talk about *object* would mean that we finally understood what objects are. A thought is true but it cannot be meaningfully expressed in propositions.

4. *The Bubble: Kant and Wittgenstein:* The investigation of the foundation of logic based on the essential nature of proposition marked a general connection of critical philosophy of Kant and Wittgenstein. The specific character of *Tractatus* with Kantian philosophy is described as follows. 1) Kant talks about the limits of thought whereas Wittgenstein sets to limits language. The investigation of the foundation of logic includes an inquiry into the limits of language. (2) Kant maintained that factual knowledge is possible in the boundary of thought. According to Wittgenstein, factual discourse is limited to the boundary of language. Wittgenstein maintained that all necessity is logical necessity. There are no necessary truths about matters of substance ie. any synthetic *a priori* truths. Kant on the other hand, held that substantial necessary truths reign in the realm of factual knowledge. Kant's view is that the philosopher's task is to establish the substantial necessary truths. Wittgenstein lays stress on how to

clarify propositions. According to Wittgenstein, absolute necessity comes from the essential nature of language. Elementary proposition is the starting point to determine the limits of language by using logical formula. Within the structure of language, he sets limits of any possible language.

According to Wittgenstein, philosophical problems can be solved by a critique of language which fixes the limit of factual discourse. Elementary propositions are the centre from which the limits expands like a bubble. Limit= maximum expansion of any possible *bubble*. The general theory of meaning is based on two axioms 'X' and 'Y' which gives the essence of language. *Axiom X* (Determinacy of Sense) says that every factual proposition has a precise sense.

Axiom Y (Picture Axiom) says that the way in which every factual proposition gets its sense is pictorial.

Axiom X + Axiom Y → essence of language

Axiom Z (Independence of Axioms): whenever the propositions are logically related to one another, there will be within one of the two (or within both), some logical *complexity* which analysis could reveal. *Axiom Z* leads him to his theory of elementary proposition. *Axiom X* is explained as follows:

Suppose *p* is a non-elementary proposition that is analysed as *q* and *r*. Then, *p shuts out* (excludes) the possibility either not *q* or not *r* or both. So *q*

and r Not (either not- q or not $-r$ or both). The entire *sense* of p is given by saying which of the four compound possibilities it shuts out. First possibility = not q and r second possibility = q and not $-r$. Third possibility = both not q and not $-r$.

Thus, the entire sense of any factual proposition is given by saying which of the Z ' possibilities it shuts out. Z considers a pair of propositions that are incompatible, say p and not- p .


Prima facie, at least one of the two must contain some logical complexity which would explain the incompatible. Wittgenstein's point is that if they are incomplete, they cannot both be elementary. Now consider another pair: 'This train is Dartmouth.' 'This train is Exmouth.' The words at the end of the proposition is logically complex. They seem to break down. When we consider colour-words, as in 'This thing is blue,' 'This thing is yellow'. They are incompatible, but it is different to explain their logical relationship. The incompatibility is logical, it does not depend on their internal complexity because, though-colour words form a system, their systematic connection cannot be packed into definitions of the individual word.

Wittgenstein abandoned Z before X and Y , and when he abandoned it, he moved off in this new direction.

Pears concludes that *logical atomism* is an *extreme development of logical pluralism*. That is, analysis cannot go any more further. Language

disguises thought. Elementary propositions give the real meaning of the proposition. Elementary propositions are a class of factual proposition which are logically independent of one another. His theory of meaning gives the answer how factual proposition get their senses. Logical complexity is involved when two propositions are related to one another, which explains the incompatibility. Logical atomism gives a uniform explanation of all necessary truth except the truth of philosophical proposition. Non-elementary propositions which are related to one another has internal complexity which makes the 'Y' axiom into argument that a factual proposition has sense when the world that represents complex thing. A definite limit to the assertion and relation of a proposition or a picture. Wittgenstein's *theory of meaning* is general. Objects, in his view, combined to any side of the theory of knowledge. So elementary propositions look mysterious.

"Elementary propositions lie at the centre of the system of factual discourse and constitutes its inner limit."²² Firstly, he fixes the inner limit and then calculated its outer limit. Secondly, he calculates the outer limit which is the reverse process. This can be represented by the following Bubble Analogy Diagram :



Solipsism: Saying and Showing (Theme 5)

1. *Subject: Mind and Body*: The subject whose nature is given *a priori* may be called 'metaphysical subject'. This subject alone is what is given to logic, and is of interest to metaphysics. The metaphysical subject is not a human body. The human body has no special place in ontology. It is a kind of object like any other object in the world. Also the metaphysical subject is not to be identified with a human mind. It is also parts of the world though it is not related to physical world. But logic considered both mental and physical are alike fact in logical space. Mind or body cannot be singled out *a priori* as having the special status of being the parts of the metaphysical subject. The ontological uniformity is to be found in the *Tractatus* metaphysics. There is one world, the totality of facts in logical space. 'The philosophical *I* is not the human being, not the human body or the human soul with the psychological properties, but the metaphysical subject, the boundary (not a part of) of the world. The human body, however, *my* body in particular, is a part of the world

among others, among animals, plants, stones etc.’ (cf: TLP 5.641). The foundations of the *Tractatus* metaphysics. ontology, theory of judgement and epistemology – have a uniform pattern, which asserts that the subject is not related to the world as part to whole. It does not belong in the world. Later we shall show how solipsism is more appropriately read as ‘linguistic solipsism’(Pears).

2. *Thinking : Tractatus'* accounts of thinking requires no Subject which does the thinking. No knowing subject is required. In a thinking process the subject must turn complex facts into a thought and also turn the thoughts into judgements. A complex object is a thought only when its elements have been correlated with objects in the world. It requires an act of correlation. But the *Tractatus'* accounts is that a complex object is a thought which is independent of any subject. It is problematic how the act of correlation work. Theory of judgement also affirm that 'affirmation by the subject' is not necessary. Affirmation is at best psychological, and plays no role in the accounts of thought, meaning and truth (cf:TLP 4.06's). Wittgenstein writes: "It is clear, however, that 'A believes that P', 'A has the thought P' and 'A says P' are of the form "P" says *p*': and this does not involve a correlation of a fact with an object, but rather the correlation of facts by means of the correlation of their objects” (TLP 5.542).

No subject is required to bring about the correlation of facts and therefore there is no thinking subject. All is static and self-contained. A thought is an object which corresponds or fails to correspond to another object.

3 *Knowing*: Knowledge, in the *Tractatus*, is acquaintance with the world. Its nature cannot be determined *a priori* clearly. The strong analogy is that knowing and seeing. The knowing 'I' is like the seeing eye. The 'I' which is acquainted with the world is not inside or outside. It observes the world. The world is already given, knowledge is passive. It cannot be created or altered. A subject which is active require *a priori* concept. But this is not required in *Tractatus*' metaphysics as nothing in the world is *a priori* but only the form of the world. So there is no knowing subject lie outside the world be inferred.

4 *Solipsism*: *Tractatus*' metaphysics does not include any concept of subject as the metaphysical subject is not the parts of the world. Neither the thinking nor knowing requires that there is anything outside the world which thinks or knows. Wittgenstein writes: 'Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self in a non-psychological way. What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that 'the world is my world' (TLP 5.6's). This concept of self is related to solipsism which states the view that self is the only object of knowledge. Wittgenstein brought this idea into philosophy.

'The limits of my language mean the limits of my world'. (TLP 5.6). 'This remark provides the key to the problem, how much truth there is in solipsism. For what the solipsist *means* is quite correct; only it cannot be said, but makes itself manifest. The world is *my* word: This is manifest in the fact that the limits of *language* (of that language which alone I understand) mean the limits of *my* world'. (TLP 5.62). 'I am my world' '(The microcosm)' (TLP 5.63). These ideas have not received as much attention as they deserve. The whole of metaphysics of the *Tractatus* is in fact deeply antithetical to any coherent and valid concept of self. The *first* proposition 'The world is all that is the case' entails that the 'self is nothing,' everything or the limits of the world. But somehow they are incompatible with one another. Self is nothing is consistent with the *Tractatus* logic. The limits of the world is significant in the *Tractatus*' metaphysics. But why this limit should be called the 'self' as there is no self be postulated. The subject matter of *Tractatus* 'the world which is all that is the case is not the world that is said to be 'my world'. The world which is all that is the case is the Macrocosm and the world which is my world is the Microcosm. Bolton thus suggest that "it is more plausible to regard Microcosm referred to in TLP 5.63 as the 'point without extension' referred to in 5.64 and the Macrocosm would then be the reality co-ordinated with this point."²³

Tractatus' logic forbids a concept of subject. But Wittgenstein thought it necessary to have one.

Wittgenstein's conception of solipsism contains the idea that the self is not a thinking being. According to Wittgenstein, solipsism is not correct in the sense that 'I alone exist'. Another idea is that the world is my world and I determine nothing about my world or the world. Wittgenstein draws a distinction between object and subject in order to see what the doctrine of solipsism says is correct. These two are connected with what can be expressed in language (form) and what can be expressed (content). This is the reason for the distinction between *the world* and *my world*. 'Experienced' is the world. If we cannot say the 'experience' then it belongs to my world. Solipsism means that the world of form and structure is the world which is directly experienced. Ontologically, substance is both form and content. It is the philosophical 'I' which expresses the word being 'my world'. Wittgenstein quotes the Lichtenberg's saying "instead of I think we ought to say it thinks".²⁴

The limits of language shows that both the world and my world coincide. We cannot talk my world except as the world. My world is limited by the language on actual use. My language is the language which is expressed in terms of logic. Language is logically limited which shows that the world is my world. The 'I' involved in solipsism can only be shown by language.

The *second* idea of solipsism is 'I am my world' (TLP 5.63).

The *third* idea of solipsism is pure realism (TLP 5.64). According to this, the content and form and structure coincide is called the limit of language.

Wittgenstein reduced psychological self into psychological states. It is parts of the world. Metaphysical subject is not the parts of the world. Thinking, representing, believing, saying are not the activities of the metaphysical subject. But there are certain activities which are transcendental. They are naming and meaning, existence and non-existence, viewing and feeling the world as a limited whole and sense of life.

Naming with sense is the work of language. Language does not presuppose a user of language. The existence and non-existence of the world is mystical, and this cannot be distinguished as logical, factual, picturable, thinkable, showable or sayable. The world as a limited whole that can be felt at the outside of the world. But no status is given to metaphysical subject to see in this way.

5. *Will and Value*: The concept of 'willing' has no place in the *Tractatus* as the subject has no body to act. The coincidence of acting and wishing is of no place in logic. The metaphysical subject is not needed. Also the subject contribute nothing to thought. The activity of the subject can only be accidental; so there is no logical necessity exists between acts of will and what happens in the world. *Tractatus'* logic in general avoids activity thereby


makes no place of the concepts of will. Knowledge is passive as there is no connection between subject and object. Action and will would themselves have to be passive making no effect on the world. “Action is the adoption of an *attitude* to the world; the attitude is 'happy' or 'unhappy'; happiness is being in agreement with the world (NB. pp. 72ff)”.²⁵ This makes a harmony between the theory of knowledge and the account of will: “to know is to perceive and to Will is to possess a way of perceiving, with a happy or unhappy eye.”²⁶ Wittgenstein finds *value* as the quality of the relation between subject and the world. The will alters the subject itself, that unity of the limits of the world and the whole world. But it cannot change the world. *Tractatus* resists the self which is changing. As there is no subject, there is no will. If there is no will, there is no value. So it is not the logic that requires a place for the subject but ethics of the *Tractatus* demands. Wittgenstein wrote in his Notebooks: “The thinking subject is surely mere illusion. But the willing subject exists.” The tension between logic and ethics is this: logic struggles to define a subject which cannot be in the world. But ethics is concerned with man.

The logic of the *Tractatus* provides no place for the subject but the ethical demands a subject. So the willing subjects exist which is identified as a metaphysical subject having an ethical will. Metaphysical subjects are limiting the world, whereas ethical will changes the limits of the world. 'I' is


the bearer of ethics and not the world. Logic and ethics differ in defining the term 'subject'. This is due to the human and non-human character of *Tractatus* logic. The same tension exists at the heart of logic itself. Logic defines language without reference to its use by human beings.

Wittgenstein's conception of Solipsism is just like a general theory of language, both are deep tautologies. So that they are not substantial necessary truths. The doctrine of showing is the semantic aspect of Wittgenstein's mysticism. Religion, morality are outside of factual discourse are deep tautologies and have no substantial truth. Wittgenstein transcends ethics and does not insist any necessity of them as Kant gave to them.

What can be said is identified as propositions of natural science. Propositions of logic, mathematics, ethics, aesthetics, metaphysics do not say anything. So they are senseless. Logical propositions show the formal logical properties of (limits) language and world. The relation between what can be said and what cannot be said is represented in the following diagram.²⁷



II



Many of the propositions are only pseudo-propositions. Propositions of logic (TLP 6.15), mathematics (TLP 6.25) the *a priori* part of natural science (TLP 6.35), ethics (TLP 6.45), philosophy (TLP 6.55) are all in different ways of making pseudo-propositions. 'One cannot, however, lay out or say what is the formal properties of a proposition are. This is shown by the propositions itself' (TLP 6.12). One cannot determine by rules what a valid inference is, for this is already shown in the inference itself (TLP 5.132). One cannot stipulate or define that signs are propositions having a sense, for that something is a proposition is shown by the proposition itself (TLP 5.5351). This is Wittgenstein's well-known doctrine that what is shown in language cannot be said'.²⁸ All logical propositions are tautologies. Whether a proposition is a tautology cannot be determined by rules or definitions. 'Every tautology itself shows that it is a tautology' (TLP 6.127). Logical propositions are senseless, for they are true or false in every or any possible world. A tautology requires no empirical axioms to support it. The axiom of

infinity tries to say what can only be shown that the number of integers are infinite by the number series itself. "Since the concept of number is a formal concept it can only be shown through the various operations of integers that compose arithmetic".²⁹ The propositions of logic and the equations in mathematics are two *different* ways of showing the logical structure of the world. Wittgenstein wrote "the logic of the world, which is shown in tautologies by the propositions of logic, is shown in equations by mathematics" (TLP 6.22). The notion of showing in the *Tractatus* is a general critique of all theories of meaning. Any theory of meaning is redundant in establishing the meaningfulness of a proposition.³⁰

A sign is a symbol is shown by its use. The use shows the sign to be the kind of symbol it is. The doctrine of showing indicates that a proposition shows its sense and its sense is not dependent on semantical reference. "That logical form is shown, is a kind of corollary of the fact that it is the sense of a proposition that is shown, for it is the sense which renders signs into propositions and connects propositions with the world".³¹ The distinction between formal and proper concepts in the *Tractatus* is one of the primary spinoffs of the doctrine of showing.³² We can talk about language only through language and it is whole and unique which is the essence of the doctrine that what is shown in language cannot be said.

The totality of true propositions is identical with the corpus of natural science. General laws of an *a priori* kind, like the law of causation, the law of least efforts, the axioms of Newtonian mechanics are not really propositions, but *a priori* insights into the forms in which the genuine propositions of science can be cast (TLP 6.32-6.343).³³ 'There are impossibilities which look like non-logical impossibilities, for instance, the impossibilities of a things being red and green all over'.³⁴

In ethics and aesthetics, there are no genuine propositions. 'The problem, "Is life worth living", vanishing when the urge to ask the question is dispelled' (TLP 6.52).³⁵

'Among the propositions which involve attempts to say the unsayable are, surprisingly, statements about people's knowledge, beliefs, and perceptions'.³⁶ 'The propositions of philosophy and of the *Tractatus* itself fall under the axe which cuts off pseudo proposition'.³⁷

Tractatus is not anti-metaphysical as logical positivists supposed. According to Wittgenstein, man has the urge to thrust against the limits of language. Thus metaphysics, ethics, religion, art all belong in the realm of transcendental which can only be shown.

6. *Philosophy*: "Philosophy sets limits to what can be said by describing the nature of language and of the world as a whole."³⁸ Surely these

things are inexpressible. Philosophy describes the essence of language for setting limits to language. But this descriptions are lying outside the limits. So the propositions of philosophy must themselves be nonsense. Such a conception of the philosophy of the *Tractatus* consumes its own discourse. Setting limit to language causes this problem. But surely this cannot be dropped. The limitation of language *belongs to* the logic of the *Tractatus*, and so, there can be no philosophical propositions. Language describes the world, but it cannot represent its own means of description – its relation to the world. The relation is shown in language, but cannot be said. Language describe the world as a whole. This is grasped only from outside. But language describes only what is inside the world. This imposes limits on language.

Wittgenstein wrote in the *Tractatus*: 'Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity. Philosophy does not result in "philosophical propositions", but rather in the clarification of propositions' (TLP 4.112). Hence 'all philosophy is a critique of language'. Philosophy points to the nonsense arising out of the misunderstanding of the logic of language and its limits.

Tractatus' metaphysics offers no activity—the world and language are static. Only the metaphysical subject grasp the limits of language and does philosophy. Wittgenstein admits this paradox. He wrote: My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me

eventually recognize them as non-sensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them (He must so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it). He must transcend these propositions and then he will see the world aright (TLP 6.54). 'What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence' (TLP 7).

In the subsequent chapter, we shall single out one major theme namely the critique of language for further analysis from Brentano through Mauthner, by developing a set of new 'fusion' theses. And then partitioning Mauthner into many spaces and sub-spaces.

Notes:

1. Bertrand Russell, 'Philosophy of Logical Atomism' in *Bertrand Russell: Logic and Knowledge*, (ed.) R.C. Marsh (New York: MacMillan, 1956).
2. See R.J. Fogelin, *Wittgenstein* (Routledge: 1987, Second edition).
3. Anthony Kenny, *Wittgenstein* (London: Penguin, 1973) p.72.
4. *Ibid.*, p.73.
5. George Pitcher, *The Philosophy of Wittgenstein*(New Prentice Hall of India, 1972) p.70.
6. David Pears, *Wittgenstein* (Fontana, 1971) p.64.
7. David Pears, *The False Prison: A Study of the Development of Wittgenstein's Philosophy* (Oxford :Clarendon Press,1987) p.82.
8. Derek Bolton, *An Approach to Wittgenstein's Philosophy* (London: Macmillan, 1979) p.10.
9. Anthony Kenny, *Wittgenstein* (London: Penguin, 1973) p.55.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 62.
11. Henry Finch, *Wittgenstein-The Early Philosophy: An Exposition of the Tractatus*(Atlantic High lands: N.J.Humanities Press, 1982) p.207.
12. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Wittgenstein's Notebooks* , (ed.) G.H.V on Wright and G.E.M Anscombe, (trans.) by G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford:Basil Blackwell, 1961) p.68.
13. K.T. Fann, *Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy* (Berkeley & Los Angels, University of California Press, 1969) p. 20.
14. See Mounce, *Wittgenstein's Tractatus : An Introduction* (Basil Blackwell, 1981).
15. Anthony Kenny, *Wittgenstein* (London: Penguin, 1973) pp. 86-89.
16. *Ibid.*, 91.
17. *libid.*, 91.
18. Derek Bolton, *An Approach to Wittgenstein's Philosophy* (London: Macmillan, 1979) p.39.
19. Stephen Savitt, 'Wittgenstein's Early Philosophy of Mathametics' in *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Critical Assessments* (ed.) Stuart Shanker (London: Croom Helm,1986, vol. III) p. 27-28.
20. Derek Bolton, *An Approach to Wittgenstein's Philosophy* (London: Macmillan, 1979) p.40.
21. *Ibid .* , p 42.
22. David Pears, *Wittgenstein* (Fontana, 1971) p.67.

23. Derek Bolton, *An Approach to Wittgenstein's Philosophy* (London: Macmillan, 1979) p.34.
24. Henry Finch, *Wittgenstein-The Early Philosophy: An Exposition of the Tractatus* (Atlantic High lands: N.J. Humanities Press,1982) p.154.
25. Derek Bolton, *An Approach to Wittgenstein's Philosophy* (London: Macmillan, 1979) p.36.
26. *Ibid.*, p.36.
27. K.T. Fann, *Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy* (Berkeley & Los Angels, University of California Press, 1969). p. 24.
28. Irving Block, "Showing" in the Tractatus: The root of Wittgenstein and Russell's Basic Incompatibility' in *Ludwig Wittgenstein : Critical Assessments* (ed.) Stuart Shanker (London: Croom Helm, 1986, vol I) p. 136
29. *Ibid.*, p. 142.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 143.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 146.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 147.
33. Anthony Kenny, *Wittgenstein* (London: Penguin, 1973) p.99.
34. *Ibid.*, pp. 99-100.
35. *Ibid.*, p.100.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 100.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 101.
38. Derek Bolton, *An Approach to Wittgenstein's Philosophy* (London: Macmillan, 1979) p.43.

CHAPTER 3

'I cannot get out of language by means of language'

- Ludwig Wittgenstein

**FROM *SPRACHKRITIK* (BRENTANO) TO
WITTGENSTEIN'S CRITIQUE OF
LANGUAGE (VIA MAUTHNER)**

CHAPTER 3

FROM *SPRACHKRITIK* (BRENTANO) TO WITTGENSTEIN'S CRITIQUE OF LANGUAGE (VIA MAUTHNER)

3.1. Mauthner on Language and Logic:

In this Chapter, we shall begin with the one of the most important antecedents of Wittgenstein's critique of language. As Wittgenstein acknowledges in the *Tractatus*, Mauthner provides the necessary ancestry to his critique of language. For both Wittgenstein as well as Mauthner, Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* served as a model. But both are unKantian. First, in this chapter, we shall give an account of Mauthner's critique of language, as it is interpreted by Weiler.¹ We shall bring out the interface between Mauthner's way of the term critique of language and Wittgenstein's use of the term, both of which share an implicit doctrine of the tyranny of language. The doctrinal or non- doctrinal content needs to be treated differently. Mauthner has a allegedly different doctrinal content than Wittgenstein: In a sense, Wittgenstein's doctrinal content is closely allied to Schopenhauer than to Kant or Mauthner. Later, we shall try to examine to what extent Wittgenstein himself can be called more a Schopenhauerian than a Kantian from the point of view that has been discussed by Morris Engel. Engel talks about *two* variants of the thesis called 'the critique of language, which are located in

early Wittgenstein (limit) and later Wittgenstein (bewitchment) respectively. Thus there is turning away from Kant that is evidenced both in Mauthner as well as in Wittgenstein. This is particularly reinforced by recent reading of Wittgenstein which exploits the difference between Kant and Wittgenstein to prove the Schopenhauerian ancestry. If what Pears says is right, Mauthner is mainspring much of Wittgenstein's reflection. This is what we try to substantiate in this chapter.

Mauthner was not a major figure in the history of European philosophy. But he was the earliest to obtain insights into two theses: 1) philosophy of language sheds a critical light on all major philosophical problems; and 2) a systematically worked out empiricism (phenomenalism in the case of Wittgenstein) leads to a critique of language. Accordingly, we shall explore the broad features of Mauthner's critique of language, that is to be followed by his account *against* Kantianism. Similarly, we shall demonstrate that if Wittgenstein's critique is not Kantian, then it must be Mauthnerian so much so that there is a sort of *fusion* between Mauthner and analytical philosophy in Wittgenstein. This is what is revealed in his remark about Mauthner in the *Tractatus*. Thus both warrant a weakening of Kantianism, so as to make a natural transit point to the final evaluation of the doctrinal content of the critique of language. We shall conclude our inquiry by saying that Wittgenstein and Kant may have divergent standpoints on the point of critique of language. But we have to assess the similarities and

dissimilarities of their respective projects of Mauthner and Wittgenstein which requires a more thorough investigation than the one undertaken here.

Mauthner's Critique starts with an exploration into the affinity between language and logic. This has another interesting starting point in thinking and speaking. According to the latter, thinking and speaking are the 'same' movement but seen from two different points of view. This is foreshadowed by an account of knowledge and language. The whole aim of the critique is conceived to be a project that aims to answer the question: whether language is a useful tool for knowledge. It is here that Mauthner was led to scepticism.

All the above three standpoints, namely relation between thinking and speaking, and hence the relation between logic and language, along with the relation between knowledge and language, and hence the relation between knowledge and cognition work together in Mauthner to produce a critique of language. The theme of critique of language itself shows the relation between philosophy of language as a grounding subject for all philosophical problems.

Language as Logic in plural: While logic is the way we think, cognition is the way we know, the critique of language moves in the direction of scepticism or what has come to be called as mysticism. All the above themes are interwoven in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. Wittgenstein claims in the *Preface* to the *Tractatus* that he finally solved all the philosophical problems and thus laying the foundation for a critique of language, in exactly the sense

Mauthner does. But he does not want to follow his *method*, even though he talks about the relation between logic and language. Let us have an account of this below. To what extent Wittgenstein would have been influenced in his sense of tautologies, negation (for Wittgenstein, negation is an operation) identity, and in general, language is still an open question.

Aristotle's logic held that there is a correspondence between the basic units of reality and those of discourse. A well-formed sentence is always predicative. Aristotle's categories are categories both of discourse and of reality. Kant's categories are restricted to mere knowledge. Mauthner's categories are those of *language-in-use*. Epistemological mistakes inherently arise when analysing the properties of a thing. This means that correct classification is impossible. It depends upon our aims and points of view.

Solomon Maimon developed a perfect language in which certain predicates could be attached only to certain subject terms. This kind of treatment makes all true propositions as analytic. That perfect language would then be a true picture of the world (Maimon). The perfect language provides an ancestry to ideal language programme.

Logic of reality is doomed to failure from Mauthner's point of view. Logic is involved in language. According to him, the most fundamental category is the word. The linguistic conception of category of Mauthner resembles Maimon's doctrine of proposition. Maimon argues that analytic

statements are independent of anyone making them. Mauthner's view is that analyticity is for someone or other. He says that 'Judgement precedes words in logical order'.² This gives the scope for making proposition as a unit of meaning. Wittgenstein chooses Fregean 'sense' to play this role.

According to Mauthner, propositions of logic are made in language by using vocabulary obeying grammar. Logic uses only parts of ordinary language. Formal logic is valid but it is useless outside its limit. The meaning of words is related to individual meaning of things. This gives the fillip to explore the limits of logic (truth-functional logic) in early Wittgenstein.

Mauthner is concerned with logic-the interpreted values of variables. Thus logic belongs to the contingent nature of language. There is not 'only' one logic. Both logic and grammar are historical products. That summarises how people actually thought through generations. Different structure of language constitutes different logic. (there is no *eine* logic). Humboldt suggests a special logic of a particular language. But we cannot talk logic in plural. "It is against logic, against the feel of language to construct a plural for the word logic"³. Mauthner cannot accept this. The feeling of language is so strong that we have to accept its implications which are true or false. Chomsky's conception of universal grammar is just a byproduct of the above view held by Humboldt.

Logic as language-use: Misleading consequences of the language are generated from the subject- predicate form of the proposition. The copula should be analysed not in terms of existence but in terms of pure-linguistic construction. It is therefore the word 'to be called' instead of 'to be' that is really involved in all judgements. Formal inference are useless outside formal contexts. A hypothetical analysis is formally correct but it remains useless in actual discourse. This leads him further to analyse the category of names that occur in ordinary language.

Formal logic is correct only when the concepts are clear for all users of these terms, having an identical associative content. Ordinary words do not satisfy this condition. In other words, those words *satisfy* this condition is only in an abstract way. So they are not concepts at all. 'Numerals' are the best examples which are not concepts but only counters in a formal game. On the other hand, words of ordinary language exposed to new experience. Truth or falsity is not a matter of logic but of what is the case. The argument in the syllogism is nothing but an explanation of the terms. Our choice of terms is limited by means of copula that reveals our point of view and interests. 'It is not the concept which move when we infer; we move our attention over the concepts.'⁴ A new experience change our concepts. Such is the initial exploration into the structure of logic as given by Mauthner.

The above doctrine culminates in Mauthner's *three* notions of tautology, which are stated below:

1) Purely Formal Tautologies : $A = A$ or $A \neq B$ are always true but it is applicable only to itself. The words are substituted for the variables, and the decision is depended upon various considerations. If we say (1) brandy is brandy; (2) a word is word. Then this is not at all a special case of $A = A$. So, (1) and (2) may be called pseudo-identity statements because the hearer can object by saying 'Not every brandy is brandy.' So he is forced to call them as '*applied* tautologies' and classified under (2). Wittgenstein also holds this point $A = A$ is not an example of the law of identity. However, Mauthner has not developed a theory of informal logic. He did not pay attention to the idea which holds that 'logical constants' have a wider meaning than it occurs in formal logic. His concern is restricted to epistemology. He argued that all propositions are tautologies.

2) Applied tautologies: Informal Sense: But substitution instances of formulae cease to be tautologies, because some of the substitution instances cannot be valid in the above formula. It is these pseudo-identity statements, Mauthner was interested in.

3) Psychological (empirical) tautologies: The third variety of tautology include all empirical statements, or what is called as synthetic statements. It gives new information to someone. The identity of the

proposition lies in particular connectives which are used in the proposition. The relation of analytic-synthetic distinction of proposition proves this. The proposition 'water is wet' is a psychological tautology which gives no new information to the hearer. If so, they serve as merely 'verbal notes'.

Again, Mauthner's exploration of the idea of contradiction is understood as follows: According to Mauthner, the principle of non-contradiction can be analysed in the contexts of ordinary language and the activity of the users. There is no distinction between psychological necessity and logical necessity. Logical necessity originates in psychological necessity. Logical impossibility is a consequence of our developing a language of such a kind. The general formula $\sim (p.\sim p)$ is empty and forms no parts in discourse.

Mauthner points out that with regard to truth and falsity, the possibility of denying arises only when there is a possibility of assertion. In a discourse, we are using actual possibility which depends upon our stock of knowledge. So it is not assertion and denial but the question that we ask in the advancements of knowledge. Mauthner's thesis is that contradiction is itself a linguistic notion. Contradiction exists only in language. Things are not contradictory to each other. The principle of non-contradiction is like a formula of tautology. Mauthner sees no difference between the formula for law of identity and the formula for the law of contradiction. When the propositions which are actually present, the person should reply *Yes* or *No*.

But not with 'Yes and No'. This is because we do not know which is the correct answer. So the principle of non-contradiction is useless in deciding truth and falsity. The open texture of empirical terms is another kind of block in deciding the case of truth or falsity. These remarks of Mauthner are not the result of three-valued logic. Language is a tool of stating and acquiring knowledge. The principle of non-contradiction is useless in such a context. He proves this by familiar tautology 'a = a' which is true to itself and anything else. The law of non-contradiction is applicable to the form of proposition only. But our language is not consistent. Ordinary language is useful for a given proposition and hence it is contradictory. This leaves the formal truth of $\sim (p.\sim p)$ unaffected.

Intellectual activity of Language as Weltanschauung: Mauthner's view that the *Weltanschauung* of a group is contained in or is identical with its language. He may have influenced by Humboldt "..... thus in every language there lies a specific view (*weltansicht*) of the world."⁵ "By the same act through which man spins language out of himself, he also spins himself into it and (thus) every language draws around the nation, to which it belongs, a circle out of which it is possible to move only to the extent that one steps simultaneously into the circle of another language"⁶.

For Mauthner, language is a conceptual prison from which there is escape only into another prison, this is stated as a central thesis of his critique.

It does not mean that language is static. 'Mauthner's theory of language is a theory of language in constant change'.⁷ Language is in constant change and thus the *Weltanschauung* which is co-extensive with it must also be a changing one.

Mauthner analyses the concepts *Weltanschauung* in terms of the four senses of the world. The *world-axis*, *world history* and *man of the world as the first three*. The *fourth* is the totality of thinking which is included the *world spirit*, *world wisdom*, and *weltanschauung*. There is no reason to think that Wittgenstein's use of world-soul is not a blend of Schopenhauer as well as Mauthner.

Mauthner interprets the term *Weltanschauung* in individualistic terms. Each person has an individual language which is different in some degree and to each person's *Weltanschauung* may be different within the same language group, individual differences notwithstanding, there is mutual understanding which increases with an increase in intimacy and decreases with geographic distance and so on. The shared state of mind is both a reflection of a shared situation'.⁸ "For Mauthner, a *Weltanschauung* is the sum-total of the characteristic modes of thinking, speaking and of acting of an individual and, to the extent to which individuals are discernibly similar in these respects, of a group".⁹ Even language = *Weltanschauung* is as vague as language = metaphysics (Whorf) or language = cognition (Bhartrahari), or language =

reasoning or consciousness (Carruthers). Because Mauthner admits religion or a scientific theory as a *Weltanschauung*. Since the *Weltanschauung* is individual, the same applies to scientific truth. Religion have a common *Weltanschauung*. "From the sceptical standpoint of the critique of language, it is indeed difficult to assign to religion a status lower than that given to science".¹⁰

Ethics is another shared *Weltanschauung*. Mauthner rejects the doctrine that values or rules of behaviour can be known. It is a mistake of failing to recognise these notions as linguistic fiction. In reality, there is only the action behaviour of the people. Ethics transcends experience. Wittgenstein remarks: 'ethics is transcendental' Religion or moral aspects of a person's *Weltanschauung* can be identified from his employment of certain characteristic modes of speech.

Language as Grammar: The most general ways of judging a thing in our language is his theory of the three picture of the world. They are substantival, the adjectival and the verbal. These are the most fundamental categories of language. Mauthner does not accepts grammatical categories at their face value. This doctrine does not assert there are three worlds. There is only one world when we are articulating from three different points of view. "Thus we have *three* different and conflicting points of view from which we pass judgement upon the same world".¹¹ "There is an *adjectival world*, the

only world, which we experience immediately through our senses; all our sensations, all our sense-data are adjectival; beyond that all our mental perceptions, our value judgements, all that we call right, good, beautiful, etc are adjectival too. This adjectival world falls apart into individual impressions and does not pattern itself into units; one could call it *punctiform*"¹². This picture of the world is not a genuine one. It is the lowest form of articulation but it has the highest reality-content. Mauthner shows that the adjectival picture of the world already presupposes that we have transcended it.... Even a single predicate points beyond the adjectival picture of the world.

"The *verbal world* is, approximately, the world of becoming, the conditions of which is time; the verbal world does not believe in the substantival world and is not satisfied with the adjectival world; it sees in everything only change (for which alone it cares), relations, relations of the so-called things to us and relations of these things to one another; it transcends in *science* the adjectival and substantival world".¹³ This world belongs the concepts of the will, and causality and all others signifying relations between things or experiences. The picture we make ourselves by means of verbs is of a world in movement, in change. It is the subject matter of natural science. Language forces upon us a third picture of the world,; the substantival one.

"The *substantival world* is approximately the same as the world of being, the condition of which is space. The oldest superstition of man, indeed of animals, is a belief in the reality of things in space; and as naive realism is superstitious so the belief in the reality and efficacy of abstract substantives is mythological".¹⁴ Mauthner introduces the test of reality by asking whether substantives have a basis in experience – a word is identical with a concept. The main objects of the critique is to investigate language as a tool of knowledge to establish what grasp language has on reality. Here he distinguishes between concepts and pseudo-concepts. Abstract concepts are not pseudo-concepts. "Pseudo-concepts are thus substantival concepts from which no adjectival effects whatever originate. Our conceptual critique will have to show that many of our philosophical concepts are such pseudo-concepts, that is substantival concepts to which nothing in reality corresponds, or (to express it better) from which no adjectival effect originates; for this is the danger in pseudo-concepts: that they are not abstracted from such any reality".¹⁵ Pseudo-concepts, according to Wittgenstein, are products of language when in idle rotation... These concept could be eliminated from our language. Substantives never name anything immediately experienced. According to Mauthner, even Ego is a collection of adjectival and verbal experiences. This has correspondence with Wittgenstein's doctrine of solipsism.

The three pictures of the world are three intimately interrelated points of view implicit in language. We can adopt one of these languages to avoid others. "Art corresponds to the adjectival point of view, science to the verbal and mysticism to the substantival".¹⁶ Each language has its own world. The unification of these language is not possible except in ordinary language. Truth is not found in these languages. That language help us to know this one world.

The three pictures of the world can be contrasted with Spinoza's three degrees of knowledge. Spinoza's argument is that when we reach the concept, we attained certainty about what is real. For Mauthner, all immediate experience is adjectival which do not reveal the true nature of reality. Here Mauthner's committment is towards scepticism.

3.2. Mauthner's Kantianism:

Language as Hominism: Kant justified the objectivity of knowledge. Mauthner holds that there is no objectivity in knowledge as 'phenomenal can be known' implies that our knowledge is subjective. The concepts and senses determines the phenomena. The whole objective-subjective distinction is subjective. It falls within the limits of language. No extra-linguistic criterion is necessary. Kant was mistaken to apply the categories of thinking to the unthinkable. 'We cannot step outside language; we cannot be on both sides of articulation at the same time' (cf:TLP 5.61).¹⁷ Both reality and its picture are

linguistically formed. All philosophies in human language are hoministic picture of the world. So hominism = *df* all language is an embodiment of human points of view. That is, philosophies in human language are hoministic picture of the world. It follows that critique is also hoministic. It is merely from another point of view. (another *spielregel*).

Mauthner's slogan 'everything is subjective' can be analysed in terms of his analysis of language. Mauthner's critical scepticism is concerned with the meaning of words and their roots in experience. This way he criticised the old scepticism. "The critique is not a programme of reforming language but an activity which leads to a critical-sceptical attitude to language".¹⁸ A critic argues that his and the dogmatic claim are framed in language as such the truth or falsity of the language would be determined precisely. It means that Mauthner's Scepticism is linguistic. Language endorses certain points of view. He never really grasps the extent of anthropomorphism in language. This is because the concept of *Man* cannot be detached from language. "There is a dialectic link between *Man* and his language that can never be further analysed into constituent parts".¹⁹

Language as logocracy: All philosophy is critique of language (in Mauthner's sense); the argument is stated as follows:

1. Critique: *df.* liberation from word-superstition (from the tyranny of words);

2. Critique of language = to liberate from logocracy;
3. Critique is self-liberation of philosophy;
4. One cannot transcend (step outside) the limits of language;
5. One gets the feeling of incommunicability of content;
6. This leads to *Das Mystische*.

For Mauthner, philosophy is a kind of liberation from word-superstition. He claims to complete the project which Kant has initiated on the one hand, and to provide an alternative to Kant. Mauthner makes *two* departures from Kant. It is not related to metaphysics *and* second: it is related to critique of reason (i.e., epistemology). This aim is to liberate from the tyranny of words. In the subsequent chapter 4, we shall address ourselves to the question about the doctrinal content that this project engenders, from the point of view of Engel, as well as Pears. Mauthner is said to have invented a new form of 'logocracy' to designate what the critique of language to mean it to liberate us from. Thus once philosophy becomes a critique of language, the critique becomes a self-liberation of philosophy. It develops a hierarchy: lowest form of knowledge: language; highest form: laughter/(silence), and the last one is the critique of language.

Thus, the critique of language not only brings out a relation between *Weltanschauung* (world-outlook) and language but also pave way to Mysticism.

One of the main tasks of philosophy, according to Mauthner, is the liberation from the word-superstition, called 'Logocracy'. Each philosophical system claimed the immutable truth about reality. Mauthner does not agree with the system of philosophy and the possibility of timeless truth. There is a minimum condition required between language and reality where words are the living symbols of things. As the knowledge changes, the whole pattern also changes. Philosophy is a never-ending activity. Philosophy summarises and surveys the leading ideas of various sciences. This is a process of not to record them but to 'criticise'. For Hegel, the essence of reality is 'self-knowledge of human spirit'. According to Mauthner, human spirit is embedded in language which is constantly changing. *'Philosophy is nothing else but a critical attention to language'*. (*Kritik* = Critical attention to language: (*Kritische Aufmerksamkeit auf die Sprache*)²⁰. Every closed philosophical system is a self-delusion. All systems of philosophy are engaged to uncover the secrets of reality. The critique of language is also engaging in the same task. Such is the tenour of the introductory remarks on philosophy and language put forward by Mauthner. It is the critical attention to language that approximates to the critique of language.

Philosophy is not a body of doctrine. The way we frame our mind sets the frontiers of knowledge. This frontiers are always changing and so there is no timeless truth. System builders in philosophy in this sense failed to understand what is truth. Complete knowledge is impossible. British empiricists lack insights on truth but German philosophy looks on higher truth which is impossible. This is in perfect agreement with what Wittgenstein asserted: philosophy is no theory, but only an activity.

The question about the essence of things is remedied by asking the right question. We have to know what something is called. Then the *philosophical problem would be reduced to questions about linguistic usage*. Soon after the advent of Wittgenstein's two revolutions, it has come to be understood that all philosophical problems are (*au fond*) at the bottom problems of language. This idea is different from German philosophy and the linguistic philosophy of the past. Mauthner's original contribution to the critique of language is that the impossibility of expressing truth in language with the analysis of ordinary language. This idea of 'critique' as an independent field of inquiry is stemming from Mauthner's idea. Mauthner is concerned not merely with a description of linguistic facts but how language influences the possibility of knowledge. 'The whole aim of the critique is to answer the question whether language is a useful tool for knowledge'.²¹ Vaihinger, the Kant-commentator, saw the origins of Mauthner's critique in

Kant. Kant plotted the limits of reason while Mauthner plots the limits of language.

Language as plotting the Limit: According to Mauthner, the aim of philosophy is the liberation from the tyranny of words, from word-superstition. 'Philosophy becomes a critique of language, the critique becomes self-liberation of philosophy.'²² This can be achieved by destroying the fundamental superstition of philosophy. The following are mentioned as superstitions: (1) logic is in any sense independent of the contingent language; (2) there are innate ideas which are independent of language; and (3) the terms of language is not precisely referring to the things of the world. How exactly reference then works. Wittgenstein was thus led to the structural identity between language and reality.

The formation of critique of language enables us to define the tasks of epistemology. Mauthner was aware that his own epistemological discourse does not establish the points of his critique. He introduced the *rules of game* in philosophy as well as in other disciplines. This critique is never complete. Thoroughgoing critique in all disciplines would amount to a total revision of all domains of science. Mauthner compared the relation of the critique of language to Kant's critique of pure reason. His critique of language is a critique exercised upon language. The 'critique' analyses in general the misleading character of language and the particular instances of it.

Mauthner is aware of the fact that the critique of language itself a linguistic activity. So the critique must not itself be misleading. This argument require meta-language. But there is no privileged language. The critique of language is itself as another kind of using language. So the critique of language purifies and at the same time faces criticism from within. So he was led to this conclusion: 'Pure critique is basically but an articulated laughter'.²³ This idea leads to the ultimate ideal of the critique, that is, silence. The critique is, used here both as a doctrine and as a method. Generally, its doctrinal content is not very obvious.

Mauthner described religion as nothing but antiquated science. Pure method contains no doctrine. The doctrinal function is a tenet of critique of language. Therefore, the critique is not a super-science or unified science. What is called the critical practice would lead to more and more critical habits of mind. The '*spielregel*' (game of rules) make us aware of new possibilities and to change our point of view in our language. Both Wittgenstein and Mauthner was in complete agreement that philosophy is useful. Mauthner says that critique would liberate people from superstitious words and empty symbols. The later Wittgenstein asserts: 'philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence 'by means of language'. This is comparable interest to what Engel characterizes as the 'doctrine of tyranny of language'. This comparison will be taken up later. The clarification of philosophy is the subject matter of Mauthner's critique, just as for Wittgenstein all philosophy

is clarification of thought. His firm belief is that educational practices should be promoted by using such critiques. Instead of teaching that 'God exists', we should give exact meaning to 'God' and 'exist' separately. This gives a new meaning.

The critique thus becomes both as an explanation of the genesis of concepts and their criticisms.

Mauthner believes that critique of language in due course, changes our attitude to language. This enables us to think more clearly. But it has no final aim. He states his aim thus: 'critique of language was my first word and it is my last. Looking backwards, critique of language is scepticism which crushes everything and looking forward, playing with illusions, it is a desire for unity, it is mysticism'.²⁴ It is a sort of Wittgensteinean Mysticism (*Das Mystische*).

Language as Epistemology: Mauthner is very cautious in using the term 'theory of knowledge'. According to him, neither is there one specific problem of knowledge nor a set of systematically linked problems which forms the problems of knowledge when he uses the English term epistemology, it means that there is a pluralism of epistemologies but no one unique theory of knowledge.²⁵

In contrasting between logicism and psychologism, he holds that the 'epistemology is but the most important *chapter* of psychology',²⁶ This remark echoes Quine and shows Mauthner's preference to psychology. "Once

psychologists realize that their main task is to investigate the problems of language formation out of experience, the lines which now separate psychology, epistemology and critique of language from one another will have disappeared. The results of this enterprise will not be a body of true propositions but a method of critique. It is in this sense that Mauthner claimed that his critique of language is meant to be a completion of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*"²⁷ 'Epistemology is essentially critical, negative'.²⁸ Mauthner conceived critique of language as the queen of sciences in that it is a method of clarification of language on the one side history, logic, psychology and other disciplines are on the other side. "The critique of language is explicitly measured to take account of scientific progress".²⁹ Such is the nature of language that needs to be supported by the developing scientific results. It means that critical method will remain ineffable and will be useful for interpreting any future scientific theory.

Mauthner was influenced by Kant stronger than that any other philosopher. But there are disagreements. Kant held that the status of categories are clear concepts. For Mauthner, categories were not something special but mere words of ordinary language. Kant had no doubt the ability of language to describe the phenomenal world. Mauthner, on the other hand, holds that phenomenal world is identified with the description in language. Phenomenal world is not independent of the description in language. Kant took it for granted that there is a natural science which contains the truth of

the physical universe. Mauthner asserted that we have no true natural science. His whole critique of language is an answer to whether language is a suitable tool for gaining and expressing knowledge. Mauthner's conclusions are extremely sceptical. This is due to his criticism on Kant's distinction between phenomenal and the noumenal. Kant held that truth would have to be of the noumenal and not merely of the phenomenal. Hence Kant's thesis that knowledge of the noumenal is impossible. Mauthner expounds a stronger sceptical thesis which holds that knowledge as such is impossible. The ultimate issue between Kant and Mauthner is thus whether the phenomenal is real. *'The Critique of Pure Reason'* was aimed at showing that it is, while it is the purpose of the critique of language to show that it is not.³⁰

Language as Phenomenalism: Mauthner's thesis that knowledge is dependent upon language. This thesis is inconsistent with his thesis of the identity of speech and language, thought and language. Mauthner talks about knowledge in terms of the permanent store of language.

According to him, things in the world are constituted out of sensations. The mechanism of this construction is linguistic. It is not of things but of sensations and our thing words makes unwarranted constructions. "The world itself is simple (*einfach*), that is, it occurs only once: It is only language which makes us split and double the world into adjectival and substantival world, which makes us speak of things apart from their properties."³¹

Mauthner rejects the idea of Kant's phenomena hereby making a distinction between verbalized and un verbalized experience. It is to find the adequacy of articulation in relation to the available sensory-raw-material. Also he rejects the concepts of the distinction between subjective and objective in terms of the inner and outer experiences. 'The whole distinction between subjective and objective *is* subjective'.³² We cannot transcend experiences independent of us. The whole distinction is within the sphere of experience itself. Here Kant makes a distinction between transcendental ideality and empirical reality.

'Experience' means primarily one's own experiences. Once we mean by experience more than an isolated sensation, then we postulated an order. "We believe with Mach that all our knowledge is but economically ordered experience; we believe with Kant that experience gives us only facts but not concepts and laws; we believe with the Darwinists that the innate conditions of experience are inherited memories of mankind. We sum up these thoughts in the proposition that memory or experience is only language".³³ Mauthner accepted the Machian notion of knowledge *qua* ordered experience. Here Mauthner disagrees with Kant that concepts do not arise out of experience. Concepts are formed out of experience. All concepts including categories are produced in more or less in the same way out of raw materials of experience. Mauthner agrees with Kant in opposing Aristotle's conception of categories *qua* categories of being. But he departs from Kant in the understanding of the

categories. Mauthner sees it in a psychological way whereas Kant, on the other hand, in a logical way.

Mauthner's notion of order brings sharp differences with Kant's. "Kant regarded order as objective while for Mauthner it is merely an expression of human desire".³⁴ Mauthner agrees with Spinoza that order was a moral concept. Order is subjective. The notion of order in nature arises from language. Language with its conventional regularities is our only means of ordering our experience. Without language, experience would be chaotic. Sensations in a non-linguistic state would not be registered as a sensation of a certain kind. "Without apperception there is no experience, and apperception is articulation."³⁵ Mauthner's sceptical thesis is that our knowledge is a subjective construction it relies on our *Zufallssinne* (contingencies). There are no privileged notions in language. Mauthner was against Kant's account of the *a priori* and turns into an empirical concept. He calls our reason (*vernunft*) as *Zufallsvernunft*. (*Zufallsvernunft* = *Zufallssinne* + *Vernunft*). That is all our reason is contingent, not necessary. There is enough reason to think that this concept is a mainspring of Wittgenstein's notion of necessity.

Language as Transcendence: Kant makes *a priori* concepts which play a central role in making *a priori* judgements. He postulated "a special source of knowledge namely a faculty of *a priori* knowledge".³⁶ Kant makes synthetic judgements possible *a priori* and hence *a priori* concepts. They

were *a priori* since they are independent of experience. Mauthner rejects this notion and he argues that such judgements are not possible. A concept whose origin is not in ordinary experience cannot be applicable to a particular experience. Mauthner interprets the *a priori* and *a posteriori* concepts. He rejects the Kantian notion of *a priori* and its historical ancestor namely, the doctrine of innate ideas. He was against listing the concepts either as *a priori* or *a posteriori* on the one hand and innate or acquired ideas on the other. Mauthner argues that no such sorting is possible and all sorting will bear the marks of the historical epistemic situation in which it has been evolved. Kant's *a priori* concept could be vindicated as part of the analysis of the presuppositions of Newtonian mechanics but not as part of the analysis of all possible experience. There is no distinction between *a priori* and *a posteriori* concepts. *A priori* concepts become *a priori* in a specific historical time, in a particular sorts of discourse. The genuinely new experience which is not classified assigned a conventional description is *a posteriori* what is new now and thus *a posteriori* will become *a priori* 'when the novelty wears off and, conversely all *a priori* concepts have then originated in *a posteriori* concepts- in an experience which was new at some time.' "Kant was right in holding that it is possible to talk *about* reason and language but wrong in thinking that it is also possible to go *beyond* language."³⁷ This thesis is the foundation of Mauthner's scepticism.

Mauthner's other thesis is that language is self-enclosing. We are moving within the limits of language by the prevailing linguistic conventions. We cannot transcend the limitations of language. The relation between mind and body cannot be truly asserted. "We cannot be, with our language, on both sides at the same time."³⁸ This remark is echoed in Wittgenstein 'I cannot get out of language by means of language' (cf: TLP 5.61). What cannot be said cannot be thought either. The limits of possible knowledge are determined by two factors; by the extreme selectivity of our *Zufallssinne* and by the nature of language. Mauthner's scepticism is summed up: "knowledge of the world through language is impossiblethere is no science of the world.....language is an unfit tool for knowledge."³⁹ Mauthner regarded that there is no certainty in knowledge. The so-called knowledge is largely illusory. These observations will ultimately become part of an existing convention. We observe something now we get either a new word or an extension of the range of application of an old word. Definition is only to summarize our linguistic conventions. "Either there is a new observation in the suspended and not yet articulated state or else, there is articulation within the convention."⁴⁰ Mauthner's observations about language, necessity, conventions need fresh investigations in relation to Wittgenstein.

Mauthner thinks that the distinction between subject and predicate is psychological rather than logical in character. New observations or new information appears as a predicate but it becomes part of the psychological

subject. Mauthner calls proposition of the form '*S* is *P*' as tautologies; *we think* of *S* as *P* and this is more important. We can relate to Wittgenstein's conception of analysis as terminating only in names.

Development of knowledge is the continuous refinement or psychological redefinition of the terms. Language is tied to experience. He rejected the deductive metaphysics which claims to add knowledge by reasoning and logic and to predict empirical knowledge. Traditional metaphysical doctrine of knowledge that is derived from sensual to the rational, is to be rejected. Mauthner's stratification of knowledge is that "the lowest form of knowledge is in language; the higher in laughter, the last one in the critique of language, in the heavenly stillness and gaiety of resignation and renunciation."⁴¹

3.3. The End of Critique: *Das Mystische*

Language as Geist (Spirit): Mauthner points out that knowledge as contained in language gives us no truth by pointing out the metaphorical nature of all modes of expression. A language which is used only for describing what is real does not contain the word 'not'. We can see the trace here about Wittgenstein's account of logical constants. "That language is metaphorical is a consequence of the fact that it is formed out of individual experiences but within a given social framework."⁴² All our language is metaphorical through and through according to George Lakoff. "Language is

both individual and communal, something between people,"⁴³ the observer revolving round the observation but not yet sure of what is the case.

However "our whole language witnesses *a functional* consensus based on the fact that we have the same kinds of inherited sense organs."⁴⁴ But this does not guarantee the truth. Mauthner doubts whether the speaker and the hearer have the same kinds of associations or not. Locke also faced this problem and his assumption was that language is private. Mauthner also held that words stand for ideas. But in a communication, the sign and signified stands differently in different people. He held that 'communication is *always* a doubtful enterprise.'⁴⁵ "Through language men made it impossible to get to know each other."⁴⁶ 'And hence the uncertainty whether the same sentence means the same for different people.'⁴⁷ As Humboldt said: "All understanding is at the same time a misunderstanding, all agreement in thought and feeling is also a parting of the ways."⁴⁸

There is little sense in reality or a knowledge of reality. The phenomenal is identical with the linguistically articulated world. It follows that language is the object of knowledge. By 'knowledge proper', we mean knowledge of reality, then the phenomenal-linguistic knowledge is pseudo-knowledge. Mauthner talked of the 'self-knowledge of language' in contrast to the Hegalian 'Self-knowledge of the Spirit'. Here Mauthner is one step ahead of Wittgenstein.

There are two strands in Mauthner's analysis of the meaning of the concept of reality. *One* is with the ordinary language implication of reality as we are referring the things in the world. The *second* is a philosophical analysis of it. "There is something outside us, something which is beyond language, for our sense-impressions bring us into contact with something alien and physical."⁴⁹ "It is one of the important points of the Critique of Language that we recognise the coherence, or much better, the lack of coherence between the world of reality and the sounds of language. There has never been anything in the sounds which have had a direct or an indirect relation to a thing in reality."⁵⁰ From language, we cannot get neither a correct nor an incorrect description of reality. Wittgenstein is always interpreted to introduce the ineffability of language and the world (Pears).

"Language enables us to articulate individual expectations about the world within the context of established linguistic regularities."⁵¹ It does not give correctness as it is only a linguistic usage and therefore contingent. Mauthner agrees with Aquinas that "words follow not the mode of *being* but the secondary mode of our *thinking*."⁵²

Mauthner's "reality turns out to be merely an attitude according to which we act *as if* our statements about the world had something real corresponding to them."⁵³ For Mauthner, reality is the postulated correlate of language. Therefore all reality is contingent as language is contingent.

Reality is regular as language is regular. But it is impossible to see them separately. We infer reality from language. A similar point was made by Wittgenstein in *Philosophische Bemerkungen*.⁵⁴

According to Weiler, Mauthner's "reality is the postulated correlate of language seems to be in harmony with the whole spirit of the critique of language."⁵⁵ Mauthner is against Kant's view that phenomenal only can be known and the thing-in-itself which is not phenomenal. Mauthner accepts "the Machian analysis of *thing* or *object* as a regular complex of sensations."⁵⁶ As there are no isolated things truly asserted, there are no isolated egos. Mauthner speaks of an object as always as an internal object. Mauthner makes no distinction between internal and external object. By internal, it is meant to be analytic. So to speak external object is to contradict oneself.

"It is language which splits the world into an observed and this object into things in and for themselves and into things for me. But the world does not occur twice. The world occurs only once. I am nothing if I *am not* an object. But I *have* no object. The object is nothing if it is not in me. The object is not outside me.....the object is subjective."⁵⁷ Language suggests that objects are outside the observer but turn to the linguistic situation it shows they cannot be. Kant asserts that everything known is phenomenal and also adds that there exists something not phenomenal. Kant held that both the knowledge of the pre-conditions of knowledge, and these pre-conditions

themselves were transcendental. These conditions are logical. Some regard Kant's forms of knowledge as forms of human knowledge and the forms of intuition and the categories as psychological-anthropological data. This interpretation of Kant views that science and experience are based on other facts of experience reduces the world to a sort of illusion. Mauthner treats this argument as that it make no more disastrous than that the world is what our language tells us it is. The world is not chaos. World is in an order as language orders it but not perfect as language is not perfect. The imperfection is due to the duality of the observer and observed. It is unable to transcend the observer-speaker and advance to the observed inarticulate. The object is always internal. We speak *as if* there were external object internalised. This is the Mauthner's hypothesis of reality.

'The epistemological thesis of Mauthner, namely that all our knowledge is co-extensive with our language and that language is an unfit tool to obtain true knowledge, is, of course, taken in the sense of an extremely sceptical thesis.'⁵⁸ His alleged scepticism is based on empirical grounds rather than on philosophical ground. But his scepticism is based on factual considerations about the nature of language.

Mauthner's peculiar Scepticism does not rest on empirical foundation alone. Empirical evidence brutally interpreted philosophically. Some theory may be inconsistent with the empirical evidence. "He would have accepted

that some future physiological theory of sensations or of language-formation might necessitate revisions in the fundamentals of the critique of language."⁵⁹

"Mauthner is a philosophical sceptic who uses empiricist evidence."⁶⁰

Language as Mysticism: Mysticism brings in its wake the conceptualization of the unsayable. In other words, this introduces the distinction between sayable and the unsayable. This has direct link with *Das Mystische* which also embodies Wittgenstein's doctrine of *saying* and *showing*. It also tells us how we cannot transcend our own language. We can also compare Wittgenstein's doctrine of 'the mystical' (*Das Mystische*) with Mauthner. Wittgenstein asserts in 7 of the *Tractatus*: 'whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent'.

The critique of language is the road to mysticism and mysticism lies at the end of the road. Mauthner advocated mysticism as '*Godless*' which is different from the mysticism of mystics. He did not agree with any pretension of super-knowledge of the mystics. Their assertions are dogmatic, unscientific and ludicrous. Mystics have not forwarded any theory of the world. Mysticism must be resisted when in engaging with philosophy or science. Mauthner criticises Nietzsche for not having distinguished between language *qua* tool of knowledge and language *qua* '*Kunstmittel*'. "He (Nietzsche) gave us no critique of language because he let himself be far too much seduced by his own poetic language."⁶¹ "He (Nietzsche)mistook poetry

for theory and could not resist the temptation to give answers where discursive thinking has failed."⁶² The occultism on *theosophy* are dismissed as dogmatic, unscientific and ludicrous. They are but variations on the old theme of magic.

According to Mauthner, those who have travelled to the path of the critique of language can become a pure *Godless mystics* (Mauthner's book on *Gottlose Mystik* was published in 1925) (His critique of atheism appeared in 1921-23 in four volumes). Wittgenstein was destined to be one such mystic. Mauthner sees true mystics in Meister Eckhart and Goethe and also in Sponzoza. "Nevertheless, Eckhart has the merit of using consistently the negative mode of speech by denying that God and his nature can in any way be determined."⁶³ He offers no theory but gropes helplessly only in the darkness of his ignorance.

Mauthner's mysticism is a logical conclusion to the whole critique. Kant distinguished between what can be known and what can be thought. The objects of thought is 'unknowable'. Mauthner criticises that this conceptualization of the unknowable is fundamentally wrong. Kantian objects of thoughts is of any kind. On Wittgenstein's view, when we speak of them at all, language is in idle rotation. Accordingly, each mode of 'conceptualization is the death of true mysticism'.⁶⁴ Kant thinks of things-in-themselves, of God, of freedom, of immortality and of the world as a totality.

He transcends the limits of possible knowledge into objects of knowledge. Kant himself went a long way towards making statements about what, his own showing, cannot be known. Kantian objects of thought mark the ineffable beyond of both knowledge and thought which can only be felt but not articulated. The mystic should be ready to "abandon his representation of God and the monist his alleged *Weltanschauung*. For one point, monism and mysticism agrees; in a feeling of yearning for unification, for becoming one. Of what? Of one's own Ego. With what? With the non-Ego. Such a monism, such a feeling of unity would have nothing to do with the trivialities of a materialist explanation of the world and would quite adequately coincide with what I call, just in order to have a word-symbol, *godless mysticism*.¹⁶⁵

True mystics use substantives to indicate the objects of his desire. For them, the substantive world is the world of mysticism. Mauthner's golden mysticism is described as an inarticulate feeling of unity. The mystic finds the sense of the world is incommunicable language. This is actually a medium to manipulate our environment in a practical way. Using of words to unrelated experience is the misuse of words. Only in silence, we become one with nature for nature is silent. If anything is not articulated it can be represented in negative terms. "You search for Tao and see it not; it is colourless. You listen and hear it not; it is soundless. You wish to touch it and reach it not; it has no bodyIt cannot be said. What can be said is not Tao. What gives figure to figures is itself figureless; this Tao is nameless. He

who answers someone who is asking about Tao does not know Tao."⁶⁶ Only silence is not misleading. The mystic is torn between silence and a desire to communicate his silence. "I shall attempt again to say the unsayable, to express with poor words what I have to give devout infidels in nominalistic mysticism, in sceptical mysticism"⁶⁷

There is no distinction between truth and falsity. 'Pure critique is but an articulated laughter'⁶⁸. The limitations of language cannot be transcended. There is only stuttering expression of a feeling and of an experience. Words cannot carry usual connotation and so it misleads us. It leads us to only laugh. "A physiologist cannot simultaneously dissect his own brain and get his experimental results."⁶⁹

In the final analysis, the critique of language becomes mysticism itself. It teaches that liberation from language as the highest aim of self-liberation. It destroys language and simultaneously aims at its own destruction. Mauthner is brought through a mistrust of language to silence. The silence makes it essentially possible. "If I wish to ascend in the critique of language, which is most important business of thinking mankind, then I must destroy language behind me, before me and in me from step to step, then I must destroy every rung of the ladder once I step upon it."⁷⁰ This image also occurs in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* 6.54 (My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually

recognizes them as non-sensical, when he has used them - as steps - to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it). He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright) and its origin is in Sextus Empiricus. It is a silence in which nothing is possible and thus everything possible. This doctrine rejects all standards of clarity and truth. If no expression is legitimate, then every expression becomes legitimate. Every expression is legitimate. Language is unfit for the expression of thoughts. Extravagant use of language makes possible to say what cannot be said. Wittgenstein's doctrine, that distinguishes between 'saying' and 'showing' has its roots here. Wittgenstein asserts that propositions only show and not say anything about the world, by virtue of the innumerable logical forms.

3.4. Wittgenstein's Kantianism: From Brentano's *Sprachkritik* to Mauthner's critique:

Language as Non-existence: Brentano, argues that the category of non-existence which asserts that something is non-existent, is something that can be expressed only in a proposition. This is because the names of real things occur as subjects. Otherwise the non-existent existence is to suppose some sort of existence. This resembles Russell's 'theory of definite descriptions.' Russell's theory holds that proposition 'The Queen of India is beautiful' contains within it another sub-proposition namely that 'There is a

Queen of India' whereas for Strawson, his staunch critic, it will only *presuppose*, and hence it will never *imply*. Abstract words should be changed into the real name of things. The former is a *synsemantic* parts of a sentence. The general aim of Brentano is to purge language of fictitious entities. Genuine entities are the proper subjects of proposition. His *sprachkritik* proposes a logical reform of language. This provides the real ancestry both to Mauthner as well as to Wittgenstein. "Only superficiality is a word like 'impossibility' a name, in reality, like 'is' and 'is not' it is, but synsemantic parts of a sentence, a fragment of a sentence, which, however, due to its exterior linguistic form as a substantive is held to be a name with a meaning of its own. Through the insight that everything which can be the subject matter of representation, judgement and interest falls under a highest class-concept, ie., that of *essence, thing, or real*. Epistemology and philosophy in general will be liberated from a two thousand years old fiction of Platonic ideas, Aristotelian Forms, ideal essence, etc, that is, of a phantom, which has been conjured up through the irresistible power of ordinary language which has its roots in the earliest times, and about the critique of which especially Vaihinger and Mauthner have laboured."⁷¹ Abstract concepts according to Brentano are misleading and therefore do not qualify names. Not all language is misleading but some parts. Bolzano, Marty, Meinong and Husserl all held that if anything is the subject of the propositions, it must exist. Brentano clears this argument how the non-existent is not taken to exist by

restating the statement that contains only the names of real things occurring as subject of propositions.

Mauthner and Brentano agree that abstract entities are the products of a misleading language. But this is only a matter of degree. Brentano accepts that some forms of language will be adequate to eliminate certain 'names' which do not refer anything. According to Mauthner, linguistic surgery is impossible. We can eliminate certain pseudo-conceptions. We cannot make language capable of expressing truth. Mauthner's aim is not to reform language but towards an epistemological purpose, so as to serve as a ground against the misleading implications of language. Mauthner rejects Brentano's idea of eliminating implications in language by proper analysis. "Abstract nouns may be more misleading than adjectives or verbs – but these latter are misleading too."⁷²

Language as Rules: The similarity in the idea of Wittgenstein and Mauthner is found in the following three view points. 1) The ladder-image about the self-destructive nature of the critique of language. 2) Comparison between the growth of language and the growth of a city. 3) The concept of *Spielregel* of Mauthner and the idea contained in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*. Of the three parallel wordings, two occur in the *Philosophical Investigations* and only one in the *Tractatus* (4.0031). Mauthner regarded 'any logicist legislation for language such as Wittgenstein's theory of simple

objects as absurd'.⁷³ Though his subject is ordinary language and not any logical construction, yet according to Pears, there is no *gegenstand* in the *Tractatus* and this probably confirms Mauthner's early impression. This itself looks like a strong criticism against Wittgenstein's notion of objects. "All three ideas occur within the first thirty pages of Mauthner's *Beitrag*. I therefore conjecture that Wittgenstein has read the opening pages of the *Beitrag* with some attention. The first part of the conjecture is borne out, it seems, by the proximity of the passages quoted. The second part can be supported by pointing out that the issue in 4.0031 ie., the relation between thought and language, does not occur in the first page of the *Beitrag* but only much later, though frequently."⁷⁴ The difference of approach between the *Tractatus* and Mauthner is highlighted in the words of Norman Malcolm "I asked Wittgenstein whether, when he wrote the *Tractatus*, he had ever decided upon anything as an example of a 'simple objects'. His reply was that at that time his thought had been that he was a *logician* and that it was not his business, as a *logician*, to try to decide whether this thing or that was a simple thing or a complex thing, that being a purely *empirical* matter! It was clear that he regarded his former opinion as absurd."⁷⁵ As we know, Wittgenstein made a transition to a contrary view in the later work.

Wittgenstein's brief reference to Mauthner is found in the *Tractatus* proposition which asserts that 'All Philosophy is a Critique of Language', but at the same time, Wittgenstein refused to grant any credit to what he calls

Mauthner's method (TLP 4.0031). It is no surprise Wittgenstein's query was not directed to know the relation between either language and knowledge, or between language and cognition. Wittgenstein however never failed to acknowledge that Russell's merit to have shown that the apparent logical form of a proposition need not be its real one. The first sentence is the summary of the nature of philosophy. Wittgenstein's interpretation is clear from the next sentence of Russell's distinction between the logical and the linguistic form of a proposition. The former is true and the latter is not. The former used symbols of logic and the latter uses an imprecise form of language. Wittgenstein noted in the *Tractatus* 4.002: "Everyday language is part of the human organism and is no less complicated than it. It is not humanly possible to gather immediately from it what the logic of language is. Language disguises thought. So much so that, from the outward form of the clothing, it is impossible to infer the form of thought beneath it, because the outward form of the clothing is not designed to reveal the form of the body, but for entirely different purposes. The tacit conventions on which the understanding of everyday language depends are enormously complicated." (TLP 4.002)

Language as Interface for Thought: Wittgenstein dismissed the conventions of language to reveal the structure of thoughts. Thought and language are different. The structure of thought can be expressed by means of artificial logical language. The structure of language is isomorphic with the structure of reality. These two assumptions were not accepted by Mauthner.

The identity of thought and language is central to Mauthner's Philosophy. 'A proposition is a picture of reality' (TLP 4.01). This is according to Mauthner is precisely what a proposition is not. This model conception is not in the good book of Mauthner. So Weiler restates Wittgenstein's critique of language as 'All Philosophy is a critique of language in Mauthner's sense but not a following of Mauthner's method'. Mauthner starts with the question whether knowledge is possible. He analyses language for this purpose. Wittgenstein shares this aim to some extent. Wittgenstein holds that propositions of natural science alone are true. Metaphysics is not true. According to Mauthner, propositions of natural science cannot be certainly true and so also the language of science. Both Wittgenstein and Mauthner agreed that critique of language is an inquiry into the limits of what can be and what cannot be said. Wittgenstein says that propositions of natural science are which can be said truly. Mauthner says nothing can be truly said. Though they differ in the assessment of natural science, they agree that what natural science does not fulfill. Wittgenstein writes in the *Tractatus* 6.53: 'The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be said, ie. propositions of natural science.....' Wittgenstein writes in the *Tractatus* 5.552: The "experience" that we need in order to understand logic is not that something or other is the state of things, but that something is: that, however, is *not* an experience. Logic is prior to every experience- that something is so. It is prior to the question "How?" not

prior to the question "What?" (TLP 5.552) 'it is not *how* things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists' (TLP 6.44).⁷⁶ The same idea is expressed by Mauthner by saying that what is mystical is substantival and the appearances is either adjectival or verbal. What appears can be described by science but appearances are appearances of what cannot be described.⁷⁷ Mauthner and Wittgenstein shares a mysticism of the kind as limits between life and intellectual activity. They know fully well that intellectual activity cannot result in complete description of the concept of life.

Mauthner and Wittgenstein are said to disagree with each other as the role of logic and its relation to both reality and ordinary language. Linguistic conventionalism can be avoided by accepting the doctrine of isomorphism between logic and the structure of reality. "Mauthner, the resolute conventionalist would have rejected unconditionally the claim of the *Tractatus* (4.03) that a proposition is *essentially* connected with the state of affairs it describes."⁷⁸ The connection is not essential but conventional. This is consistent with the reading of Pears. But there exists a consensus between the postulates of logical simples and atomic facts. The limits of analysis are determined by language. This is not the result of ineradicable element of arbitrariness and convention of contingent or arbitrary nature of *Zufallssinne* which lays its emphasis on the contingent character of language as well as knowledge. We know the limits of language but unable to transcend them. *Zufallssinne* is a master concept. Weiler underplays it.

Language as Therapy: Wittgenstein says 'I cannot get out of language by means of language.'⁷⁹ It follows therefore, that ordinary language is logically perfect. *Tractatus* says in 5.5563: 'In fact all the propositions of our everyday language, just as they are logically perfectly ordered.' Ordinary language has an unexceptionable sense. Ordinary language has determinate sense even whether it is true or false. But truth is more important. It is well-known that the doctrine of isomorphism is clearly abandoned in the *Philosophical Investigations*. It is 'sense', not 'truth' that is important. In this sense, Wittgenstein recognizes Mauthner in the usefulness of language even though it is misleading.

Much can be gathered from Weiler's remark which says that the therapeutic conception of philosophy is central in the thought of both philosophers.⁸⁰ Just as the physician cures the ailment, a correct diagnosis is a pre-condition of a cure. Philosophy is an activity to cure the ailments of language. According to Mauthner, the ailment is caused by taking language at its face value. According to Wittgenstein, 'the philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illusion.'⁸¹ Wittgenstein's therapeutic conception of philosophy which marks the second revolution, is resting on this view. This gives us a unity of method for understanding the core of Wittgenstein's thought. According to Mauthner, it was a superstition to suppose that a word stands for a thing to name. "This approach will cure us of the temptation to think that the meanings are entities."⁸² Wittgenstein

suggests that we should pay attention to the words we are actually using in the language-games. The transition to later work appears quite natural. It is a natural consequence of the early work. Hence, the continuity of early and later Wittgenstein is strongly evidenced by the above.

Wittgenstein became more concerned with ordinary language. Wittgenstein's awareness of mysticism reflects this: "Wittgenstein was, I think, so acutely aware of the otherness of other things that he never fully reconciled himself to the fact that words can have anything to do with them. I suspect that his tense concentration on the analysis and construction of languages arose largely from some profound feeling that for him at least all languages must remain almost totally inadequate for anything he felt it important to say."⁸³ Then there was less talk about mysticism. It is because he knew that we are able to use language at all as part of our mode of life. This is the later conception of Forms of Life in the *Philosophical Investigations*.

Wittgenstein and Mauthner agreed on the part that there is nothing 'hidden'. Everything is open. What is hidden is always hidden. We search for an order in the use of language and *not the order*. Order is in ourselves which is introduced into various spheres of experience. "We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of language; an order with a particular end in view, one out of the many possible orders; not *the order*."⁸⁴ "If knowledge of things is a knowledge of *the order* which *is* in things then

Mauthner's scepticism" and later Wittgenstein's philosophy are not very different.⁸⁵ Both reminisce that analysis and understanding of language is the chief task of philosophy, and this view is shared by both Mauthner and Wittgenstein. It is in this sense that they both practiced the critique of language even though they differ in particular issues about it. It is not an exaggeration to say that Weiler underplays much of this.

3.5. The Significance of Mauthner for Wittgenstein's Revolution:

Language, Not a Custodian of Reality but a Divider: Earlier, Mauthner's work was not able to get any reputation. His work was studied by a small circle including Gustav Landauer Kappstein, Krieg, Kuhlmann, Eisen. Eisen's work does some justice to the concepts of the critique of language of Mauthner. It follows that we cannot adequately describe even our own experience. There is no point of contact between reality and what symbolizes it. According to Cassirer, "the last resemblance of any mediate or immediate identity between reality and symbol must be *effaced*, the *tension* between the two must be enhanced to the extreme, for it is precisely in this *tension* that the specific achievement of symbolic expression and the content of the particular symbolic forms are made evident. For this content which cannot be revealed as long as we hold fast to the belief that we possess 'reality' as a given, self-sufficient being, prior to all spiritual formation. If this were true, the forms would indeed have no other purpose than mere

reproduction, and such reproduction would inevitably be inferior to the original. In truth, however, the meaning of each form cannot be sought in what it expresses, but only in the manner and modality, the inner law of expression itself."⁸⁶ Mauthner's philosophy is criticised by Cassirer. Language is not an adequate tool for expressing knowledge. Cassirer calls Mauthner's theory as a copy theory of knowledge. According to Cassirer, there is no point of relation between reality and the symbol we use it. Mauthner tried to make reality as prelinguistic before language imposed its form upon it. This is false. The sceptical critique of language makes a gap between the world of language and the world of perception.

According to Mauthner, pre-linguistic reality is essential condition for establishing whether language is suitable for the description of reality. There is a gap between language and reality that led Mauthner to a sceptical conclusion. It is the same reason Cassirer holds for rejecting scepticism. Cassirer assumes that meaning lies in the inner law of expression itself.⁸⁷

Mauthner fails to give an objective sense to truth. Cassirer rejects the kind of any question on discourse and satisfies himself with what is articulated. The linguistic immanence of truth and knowledge is thus a ground for Mauthner's scepticism but also a ground for Cassirer's rejection of it.

Mauthner says that the inadequacy of our cognitive structure is due to language. Cassirer admits that the way they are structured can only be called knowledge. Mauthner says that pre-linguistic given is there. There is no question of the nature of the pre-linguistic given, according to Cassirer.

Wittgenstein argues that there are no theses in philosophy. Philosophy is a method which leaves you to choose any method. Thus different doctrinal commitments influenced the philosophy of language of Mauthner, Cassirer including Wittgenstein. According to Wittgenstein, facts of ordinary usage are assembled for a particular purpose or to specify a philosophical point. The fact of ordinary language is merely an evidence of this phenomenon. "Instead of saying that Moore's statement 'I know that this is a tree' is a misuse of language, it is better to say that it has no clear meaning, and that Moore himself doesn't know how he is using it. We can *suspect* that he is using it to make some philosophical point eg. some physical-object statements function-like mathematical statements; or the point that it is misuse of language to say 'Perhaps it is not a tree'. But Moore himself isn't clear what he means by it. It isn't even clear to him that he is not giving it an ordinary usage. He is confused by the difference between using it in some ordinary sense and using it to make a philosophical point."⁸⁸ It is the matter of philosophy and arguments to find out the mistakes in the models of language where linguistic facts are one of the factors. We are not using a sentence in a way in philosophical argument. Hence, he rejected the general form of a

proposition. 'Wittgenstein is quite close here to Mauthner's doctrine about the misleading character of language.'⁸⁹ The nature of language and the nature of reality should be considered for deciding on this misleading influence.

Language as Truth-Functions: Tractatus contains no explicit theory of truth. So it is not true to say that a proposition is true if it corresponds to a fact. In *Philosophical Investigations*, there is no theory of truth. Ordinary language makes a weak kind of coherence theory of truth. The correctness of a proposition is determined by linguistic usage. Ordinary usage or linguistic custom does not offer the correct description of the fact. That theory of truth implied is a coherence theory of truth within the limitation of ordinary language. Wittgenstein shifts between the two works based on his change of the concepts of truth. Ordinary language cannot be treated as if it were a system of truth-functions. Truth can be extracted from ordinary usage.

Ordinary usage of various types and the way we are attending to language in general as a standard of correctness itself embodies a philosophical doctrine. The customs or institutions reflected in ordinary language can also be looked upon from different philosophical standpoints. This idea can be cited by an example which holds that Wittgenstein's analysis of language supports a philosophical psychology of a type called 'logical behaviourism'. Wittgenstein is not a behaviourist through and through. Weiler commends thus: "Whether this is or is not a true representation of

Wittgenstein's doctrinal position, it is clear enough that Wittgenstein has some doctrinal commitments and thus it is not true that he advocates no philosophical theses."⁹⁰ But he exaggerates this as revealed in the following discussion.

Both Mauthner and Wittgenstein analyse ordinary language. "They did not begin with arbitrarily chosen and differing methods, which led them to differing doctrinal conclusions, but rather they took their departure from *different doctrinal positions* and it was this which informed their principles of method and finally their explicit conclusions."⁹¹ Mauthner was an empiricist and a sensualist. Wittgenstein was a logician and his later position is described as logical behaviourism. This need not be agreed upon. What is agreed is that those who undertake the analysis of language has some kind of *doctrine* in mind. Philosophers are attached to some kind of doctrinal positions. Contemporary linguistic philosophers were also pre-occupied with a position in epistemology and metaphysics. So it is not presumptuous to think that linguistic analysis itself embodies a kind of doctrinal method. But it is not clear how this particular form, it is so. Mauthner shows that the status and reference of nouns and noun-like phrases has been interpreted by philosophers in various ways. That can be supported from ordinary usage as easily as the doctrine. For eg: contradictory philosophical doctrines can be supported by the same linguistic facts. This doctrine assumes brute linguistic facts are given an interpretation.

Language as Philosophy: Varieties of doctrines explain the existence of varieties of linguistic methods in philosophy. Philosophers adopt either one of them. This philosophical attitude rests on some general view of reality and language. Mauthner pioneered this attitude. Mauthner realized that there is only one ordinary language but it consists of innumerable *alternatives*. There are alternative *satzsysteme* (systems of propositions) The ordinary language is always stretched in some direction or other. "Mauthner and early logical positivists have declared that certain notions are devoid of meaning."⁹² The way a farmer and a scientist speaks are different. The doctrinal position arises when that situation gets a tag of conceptual order. That the many metaphysical concepts have no meaning is also an example of doctrinal position. The verification principle also of the similar type. Artificial languages are mostly prescriptive in nature. This bespeaks of the language that is used in Russell-Whitehead's *Principia Mathematica*. "In the language of the *Principia Mathematica*, the ontological arguments cannot be stated and so it is not even a candidate for validity in that language."⁹³ 'Syntactical rules do not exclude non-sense from ordinary language.'⁹⁴ According to Mauthner, artificial language gets their meaning from their connection with ordinary language. The distinction between ordinary and formal language looks thin with which Wittgenstein is in general agreement.

The meaning is dependent upon our points of view. Artificial languages do not limit the range of the meaningful expressions, but extend it

in various directions. "What is profitable and what is not, what is important and what is not, is not and cannot be decided according to generally valid criteria..... At most, the language we speak suggests the answer."⁹⁵ Our presuppositions, doctrines, conceptual expectation play in determining the core of meaning.

Philosophy contains rules or presuppositions about formulating questions and theories. Mauthner says that language is a useless tool for knowledge. Philosophy should take possession of this idea. According to Wittgenstein, talking about philosophy does not imply a second-order philosophy. It is not metaphilosophical in a sense. Neutrality cannot be achieved through accepting rules of method. The same linguistic facts could constitute evidence for a different and even contradictory doctrine. Facts of language as evidence is differently used by both Cassirer and Mauthner who used to support their critique of language. "Mauthner's insistence on the primacy of ordinary language is of great contemporary significance."⁹⁶ There are varieties of linguistic approaches to philosophy. Mauthner's theory of language emerges from a Sensualist-Sceptic position. Mauthner has not appreciated the value of formalised languages. Mauthner's view is correct in holding that language is unsuitable for the expression of truth in the light of symbols used in scientific activity. Weiler comments that "Mauthner seems to have been ignorant of the developments taking place in Cambridge at the beginning of this century just as he has ignorant of the work of his compatriot Frege. On the other hand, he anticipated, more than any other philosopher,

the general notion of philosophy *qua* analysis of ordinary language, even though his analysis is so very different from ours. At a time when Moore was still inspecting Platonic concepts and Russell was arguing for the existence of propositions, Mauthner was already publishing a work calling on philosophers to adopt an attitude of critical attention to language. This, he thought, with the justifiable exaggeration of every innovator, was the only true philosophical posture."⁹⁷ Mauthner came to the critique of language straight from empiricist tradition making a call to the philosophers to a critical attention to language.

It is still a living issue to the possibility of accounting for the whole of our language and for whatever is expressed by means of language in completely conventionalist terms. Mauthner's message is that analysis of language on a conventionalist assumption is self-destructive. In the following chapter, we shall explore how this pivotal doctrine provides an important backdrop both to the *Tractatus* as well as to the *Philosophical Investigations*. This provides a succinct method of understanding the core of Wittgenstein's thought.

In conclusion, we can say that reading the significance of Mauthner's *Kritik der Sprache* puts us on the alert that Wittgenstein had read and drawn from Mauthner's even though this point is not conceded by him. He often underplays it. It is hypothesized that Wittgenstein's critique of logical symbolism is seen as a counterfoil in Mauthner's sceptical critique of language. This is what we intend to establish in the thesis.

Notes :

1. See Gershon Weiler, *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p.229.
2. Fritz Mauthner, 'Beitrage zu einer Kritik der Sprache' referred in Gershon Weiler's *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p. 230.
3. Fritz Mauthner, 'Beitrage zu einer Kritik der Sprache' referred in Gershon Weiler's *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p. 231.
4. Fritz Mauthner, 'Beitrage zu einer Kritik der Sprache' referred in Gershon Weiler's *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p. 234.
5. See Gershon Weiler, *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p.277.
6. See *Ibid.* p. 277.
7. *Ibid* p. 277.
8. *Ibid.* p. 278.
9. *Ibid.* p. 279.
10. *Ibid.* p. 280.
11. Fritz Mauthner, 'Die drei Bilder der Welt '(ed) (M. Jacobs) referred in Gershon Weiler's *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p. 282.
12. Fritz Mauthner, 'Worterbuch der Philosophie' quoted in Gershon Weiler's *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p. 282.
13. *Ibid.*, p 283.
14. *Ibid.*, p 284.
15. *Ibid.*, p 286.
16. Fritz Mauthner, 'Beitrage zu einer Kritik der Sprache' and , 'Worterbuch der Philosophie' referred in Gershon Weiler's *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p. 287.
17. See Gershon Weiler, *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p.288.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 290.
19. Fritz Mauthner, 'Beitrage zu einer Kritik der Sprache' referred in Gershon Weiler's *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p. 291.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 270.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 272.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 272.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 274.

24. Fritz Mauthner, 'Der Atheismus und seine Geschichte im Abendlande' referred in Gershon Weiler's *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p. 276.
25. Fritz Mauthner, 'Wörterbuch der Philosophie' referred in Gershon Weiler's *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p. 165.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 165.
27. Fritz Mauthner, 'Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache' referred in Gershon Weiler's *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p. 165.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 165.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 166.
30. Gershon Weiler, *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p.168.
31. Fritz Mauthner, 'Wörterbuch der Philosophie' referred in Gershon Weiler's *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p. 169.
32. Fritz Mauthner, 'Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache' referred in Gershon Weiler's *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p. 170.
33. Fritz Mauthner, 'Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache' quoted in Gershon Weiler's *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p. 171.
34. Fritz Mauthner, 'Wörterbuch der Philosophie' referred in Gershon Weiler's *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p. 172.
35. Gershon Weiler, *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p.172.
36. *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (trans.) Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1953) B 4.
37. Fritz Mauthner, 'Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache' referred in Gershon Weiler's *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p. 175.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 175.
39. *Ibid.* p. 175.
40. Gershon Weiler, *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p.176.
41. Fritz Mauthner, 'Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache' referred in Gershon Weiler's *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p. 177.
42. Gershon Weiler, *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p.177.
43. Fritz Mauthner, 'Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache' referred in Gershon Weiler's *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p. 178.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 178.
45. Gershon Weiler, *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p.179.
46. Fritz Mauthner, 'Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache' referred in Gershon Weiler's *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p. 179.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 179.

48. See Gershon Weiler, *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p.179.
49. *Ibid* ., p. 180.
50. Fritz Mauthner, 'Beitrage zu einer Kritik der Sprache' quoted in Gershon Weiler's *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p. 180.
51. Fritz Mauthner, 'Beitrage zu einer Kritik der Sprache' referred in Gershon Weiler's *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p. 180.
52. *Ibid* ., p. 180.
53. Fritz Mauthner, 'Worterbuch der Philosophie' referred in Gershon Weiler's *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p. 180.
54. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophische Bemerkungen* (ed.) R. Rhees (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1965) pp. 54-55.
55. Gershon Weiler, *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p.181.
56. Fritz Mauthner, 'Worterbuch der Philosophie' referred in Gershon Weiler's *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p. 181.
57. Fritz Mauthner, 'Worterbuch der Philosophie' quoted in Gershon Weiler's *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p. 182.
58. Gershon Weiler, *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p.183.
59. *Ibid* ., p. 184.
60. *Ibid* . p. 184.
61. Fritz Mauthner, 'Beitrage zu einer Kritik der Sprache' referred in Gershon Weiler's *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p. 293.
62. *Ibid* . p. 293.
63. Fritz Mauthner, 'Der Atheismus und seine Geschichte im Abendlande' referred in Gershon Weiler's *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p. 293.
64. Gershon Weiler, *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p.294.
65. Fritz Mauthner, 'Der Atheismus und seine Geschichte im Abendlande ' quoted in Gershon Weiler's *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p. 294.
66. *Ibid* . p. 294.
67. Fritz Mauthner, 'Worterbuch der Philosophie' quoted in Gershon Weiler's *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p. 295.
68. Fritz Mauthner, 'Beitrage zu einer Kritik der Sprache' referred in Gershon Weiler's *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p. 295.
69. *Ibid* . p. 295.
70. *Ibid* ., p. 296.
71. See Gershon Weiler, *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p.297.

72. *Ibid.*, p. 298.
73. *Ibid.*, p. 299.
74. *Ibid.* p. 299.
75. Norman Malcolm, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir* (London: 1958) p. 86.
76. Cf : Schopenhauer, *World as Will and Idea* (trans.) E.F.J. Payne (Indiana Hills , 1958) I, 121-122.
77. Gershon Weiler, *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p.302.
78. *Ibid.* , p. 303.
79. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophische Bemerkungen* (ed.) R. Rhees (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1965) p. 54.
80. Gershon Weiler, *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p.305.
81. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (ed.) G.E.M. Anscombe and R. Rhees, (trans.) G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953) I – 255.
82. Gershon Weiler, *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) pp.304,305.
83. C.H. Waddington, *The Ethical Animal* (London : 1960) p. 42.
84. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (ed.) G.E.M. Anscombe and R. Rhees, (trans.) G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953) I – 132.
85. Gershon Weiler, *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p.306.
86. E. Cassirer, *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms* (New Haven : 1953) pp. 188-189.
87. Gershon Weiler, *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p.321.
88. Norman Malcolm, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir* (London: 1958) p. 89.
89. Gershon Weiler, *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p.323
90. *Ibid.* , p. 325.
91. *Ibid.* p. 325.
92. *Ibid.* , p. 327.
93. *Ibid.* , p. 328.
94. Bertrand Russell, *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth* (London : 1940) p. 179.
95. Gershon Weiler, *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p.329
96. *Ibid.* , p. 330.
97. *Ibid.*, p. 331.

CHAPTER 4

*'Mauthner's Critique of Language is a completion of
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason'*

- Gershon Weiler

**FROM THE CRITIQUE OF REASON TO
THE CRITIQUE OF LANGUAGE**

CHAPTER 4

FROM THE CRITIQUE OF REASON TO THE CRITIQUE OF LANGUAGE

4.1. The Kantian Backcloth:

Morris Engel¹ first enters into a useful survey of Kantian influences on Wittgenstein, by exploring reference points that are ordinarily located by numerous writers such as Pitcher, Fann, Quinton, Cavell, Black, Maslow, Stenius. The general purpose is to show how the nature and extent of the relation of Kant's and Wittgenstein's philosophy is very illuminating for an understanding of Wittgenstein himself. In Hartnack's² *Wittgenstein and Modern Philosophy* there is no reference to Kant. But in Malcolm's *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir* there is only a single reference to Kant. von Wright just reports that 'from Spinoza, Hume, and Kant', he (Wittgenstein) said that he could get only occasional glimpses of understanding³ as reflected in early work but not in the later work, which has no ancestors in philosophy. George Pitcher, in his book, *The Philosophy of Wittgenstein* made only one direct reference to Kant with *Tractatus* (5.633, 5.6331) which mentions that it is impossible to see the eye which sees it, so it is the case of experiencing subject or self⁴. Pitcher concedes that these remarks are traceable *more to* Schopenhauer than to Hume or Kant, thus denying the affiliation. Another reference is located on Kant's antinomies. Wittgenstein's philosophical

puzzles are like Zeno's *Paradoxes* and Kant's, Antinomies; Pitcher also reports on a remark made by Wittgenstein to Karl Britton concerning his (Wittgenstein's) lack of philosophical reading. "As for Hume and Kant, it was all very well for me to read them because I was not yet as experienced in philosophical thinking as he was: but he could not sit down and read Hume" - "he knew far too much about the subject of Hume's writings to find this anything but a torture."⁵ (Pitcher quotes from Karl Britton's paper *Portrait of a Philosopher* which first appeared in the *Listener* (June, 10, 1955). It is the only reference to Kant in Britton's paper. In the third reference, Pitcher mentions Kant and Wittgenstein as sharing a common goal to set the limits of sense-what can be said and what cannot be said. Thus Pitcher comes close, to the 'limit' interpretation but makes no elaboration. Pitcher concedes that Wittgenstein's puzzles have their 'structural' counterparts in Kant's philosophy. From this, he concludes that that the above task has begun by Locke, Hume, and Kant. He had however no patience with Hume.

K.T. Fann's⁶ book (edited) consists of thirty papers. Of these, twenty six papers have only general and passing references to Kant. Mays' in his paper '*Recollections of Wittgenstein*' states that 'he had read St. Augustine, Pascal and Kant' and he uses this to emphasize that philosophy was an activity rather than a subject. Heller, in his paper on *Wittgenstein's Unphilosophical Notes* says that man's greatness lies in terms of his *works* that cost him. This is Kantian ethics applied to the realm of thought. True moral goodness was

for Kant a victory over natural inclination, the costlier the better. Another interesting reference is made by Alice Ambrose, in his paper, on *Wittgenstein on Some Question in Foundations of Mathematics* where he says that 'Kant's question about pure mathematics: How is applied mathematics possible?' is related to Wittgenstein's own question about language. This is another instance of limit-interpretation in the context of mathematics. Again, Pitcher in his *Wittgenstein, Non-sense, and Lewis Carroll*, remarks that Wittgenstein's 'acting in *accordance with a rule* (emphasis in the original) and *obeying or following a rule* (emphasis in the original) resembles Kant's notions of ethics'. O'Brien's paper on *The Unity of Wittgenstein's Thought* points out that the *Tractatus*' logic is not meant simply a formal study of inference but more broadly, it might mean that there are certain subject matters which determines a logic. This is stated in Kantian language which is identified more with his 'transcendental logic' than with the 'formal logic'. All these papers show that it is very illuminating to look into Wittgenstein's philosophy through Kantian spectacles. With perhaps the exception of Alice Abrose's paper, however, the others are much too sketchy and undeveloped to succeed in either establishing this influence or providing the illumination sought. Wittgenstein learned more from Kant that philosophy is not a subject but an activity, the activity of clarifying the limits of our language.

In a book on *Wittgenstein: The Philosophical Investigations* edited by Pitcher⁷, A.M. Quinton makes a 'bolder' suggestion with reference to

Wittgenstein's early work. Taking the *Tractatus* as setting general theory of language in relation to the world, it gives an answer to the Kantian- looking question: How is language, and so thinking possible? Here again, we find a return to the above 'limit' question. Wittgenstein was not, as Russell supposed in his introduction to the book, projecting an ideal language in conformity with the most stringent standards of logical perfection which he characterized as 'logically perfect language'. He was attempting, rather, to reveal the essential structure that must be possessed by any language capable of being significantly used and which must, therefore, be hidden behind the familiar surface of our actual language. However, the answers must depend on the differences that require highlighting in the sequel.

Stanley Cavell, in his paper, says that Wittgenstein's concept of 'the limitations of knowledge' bears an obvious resemblance to Kant. The concept of 'grammatical' knowledge of Wittgenstein is the same as that of knowledge called by Kant as 'transcendental'. Kant says that intuition or concepts are possible purely *a priori*: The term 'transcendental' refers such *a priori* possibility of knowledge. "Not every kind of knowledge *a priori* should be called transcendental, but that only by which we know that-and how-certain representation (intuitions or concept) can be employed or are possible purely *a priori*. The term "transcendental", that is to say, signifies such knowledge as concerns the *a priori* possibility of knowledge, or its *a priori* employment."⁸ Wittgenstein has a parallel passage in the *Philosophical Investigations*, which

holds that our investigations are directed towards the 'possibility' of phenomena. Quinton says that he has not made any attempt to define a perfect language in the *Tractatus*, while Cavell says that Wittgenstein has not attempted to define knowledge. Instead, he remarks that our investigation is grammatical one, which transcends the conditions of possible knowledge, that is comparable to Kant's 'transcendental illusion.' Illusion is produced by employing the words in the absence of any language-game. "The result of philosophy are the uncovering of one or another piece of plain non-sense and of bumps that the understanding has got by running its head up against the limits of language."⁹

Quinton's and Cavell's comments are complementary since they point at the continuum of the early and later Wittgenstein. Quinton looked at the *Tractatus* as a whole to tell us that that it deals with a Kantian-looking question. Cavells' comments are restricted to *Philosophical Investigations* however. It appears as though that Kantian influence can be read from various angles. Engel however, not only departs from the above, but also deviates from Wittgenstein's own reading of Mauthner.

Griffin makes no reference to Kant in his *Wittgenstein's Logical Atomism*¹⁰ But, like Hacker, Griffin also makes the Hertzian model to subsume the *Tractatus* view. G.E.M. Anscombe refers to only one¹¹. The reprinted collection of 30 papers edited by Copi and Beard¹² contains only

three references to Kant. One is no interest at all. One paper of Richard J. Bernstein's on *Wittgenstein's Three Languages*, which points out that Wittgenstein's ladder language is comparable to Plato's dialectic, (not to Mauthner) and also mentions the language of Kant's critique and Carnap's meta-language'. Gustav Bergman's paper, on *The Glory and Misery of Ludwig Wittgenstein* argues that Wittgenstein derived his psychologism and a *priorism* from Kant. Favrholt finds great similarity between Wittgenstein's conception of 'I' and Kant's conception of 'Transcendental Unity of Apperception' but disclaims saying that it is questionable whether Wittgenstein was inspired by Kant.¹³ On the other hand, Favrholt believes that Wittgenstein's conception of metaphysical subject has been inspired by Schopenhauer.¹⁴

Max Black touches on the 'limit' question by pointing out that the state of the philosophy of logic and mathematics inspired Wittgenstein to restate the Kantian question 'How is pure mathematics possible'. He writes: "Wittgenstein himself saw the analogy when he wrote "Light on Kant's question 'How is pure mathematics possible?', through the theory of tautologies" (Note books 15, (3))." Thus Max Black concurs with Pitcher's reading in the context of mathematics as seen above. Stenius is much more explicit but not anywhere near to relate to Mauthner's ancestry of critique language. Again he continues: "Kant in the *Kritik* held our undoubted knowledge of "universal and necessary connections" in logic and

mathematics to be incomprehensible either from the standpoint of Hume's empiricism or from that of Leibnitz's rationalism. Wittgenstein would have agreed that if experience is the source of all knowledge, mathematical conclusions ought to be tentative and approximate: while if reason supplies only analytical truth, it remains mysterious how mathematics escapes triviality. Pure mathematics cannot be "about" the world in the way that physics is; yet if grounded in thought alone, how can it *apply* to the world? Wittgenstein was absorbed by this ancient *puzzle* of the connection between thought and reality: "The great problem round which everything that I write turns is : Is there an order in the world *a priori*, and if so what does it consists in?" (*Notebooks*, 53(11). That there must be "*an order in the world*" was a conviction he never abandoned while composing the *Tractatus* though he came to see that *a priori* propositions "say nothing", he still maintained that in them "the logical form of reality" manifests itself."¹⁵ His thought in the *Tractatus* was dominated by Kantian problems. Wittgenstein approached the problem of 'How is pure mathematics possible' through the theory of tautologies. Kant maintained that the universal and necessary connections, cannot be stated either in the empiricistic or in the rationalistic way. Wittgenstein's stand is that pure mathematics cannot be dealt in the way physics has been dealt with. Wittgenstein sees an *a priori* order in the world but *a priori* proposition say nothing since it reflects the logical form of reality. Proposition in the *Tractatus* (2.013) has direct connection to Kant's space

conception of space (of possibilities). 'I cannot imagine the thing without the space'. 'We cannot represent the absence of space'. The analogy between geometrical space and logical space can still be exploited more, as shown by later readings (Pears).

In the first full-scale attempt to unlock the secrets by way of a Kantian interpretation, Maslow relates *Tractatus*' basic philosophy to a kind of Kantian phenomenalism, a term that is usurped by David Pears but for a different purpose. Wittgenstein's forms of language play the similar role as in Kant's transcendental apparatus. Language is not merely an instrument of thought and communication but an all-pervading factor in organising our cognitive experience¹⁶. Stenius finds the *Tractatus*-style logical analysis of language is a kind of 'Transcendental Deduction in Kant's sense. The *a priori* form of experience can be 'shown' by meaningful language and therefore cannot be said. This reading of the *Tractatus* could be called a 'critique of pure language'¹⁷. The identity or correspondence between critique of pure reason and critique of pure language is not the type of interface one seeks here. On the question of dogmatic rationalism, Maslow's reply is that: "The answer to this very serious objection is that we are not making any significant statements about the world, but are discussing the fundamental conditions of all significant symbolism applicable to any world. However, on one hand, the formal requirements of symbolism cannot dictate the nature of reality, but on the other hand - and this is of the utmost importance in Wittgenstein's view -

we cannot discuss a reality which does not conform to the necessary prerequisite of all symbolism, because we cannot have any discussion (and therefore knowledge) without the medium of symbolism. There is no sense in discussing reality unless it is describable in a language, and it cannot be describable unless its features conform to the formal requirements of all symbolism. We have here a sort of Kantian phenomenalism in Wittgenstein "Logic is transcendental" (6.13), and the similarity is, I believe, more than merely verbal."¹⁸

Reality cannot be describable in language unless its features conform to the formal requirements of all symbolism. That Kantian phenomenalism requires further study like the way of Stenius' thinking on the limit question is found in his remark which states that both Wittgenstein and Kant indicate the limits of theoretical discourse. According to him "we have to realize that what is 'imaginable' and 'intelligible' is what is 'thinkable' and that 'thought' is the 'logical picture of reality,' which means that what is 'thinkable' is that which we can present by a logical picture, or in other words, that which can be *described* in a depicting language Thus to be possible to theoretical reason corresponds, in Wittgenstein's philosophy to possibility in terms of what is describable in meaningful language. This is the essential modification of the Kantian view which gives rise to all differences between Wittgenstein and Kant. The *task* of (theoretical) philosophy is for Wittgenstein as for Kant to indicate the limits of theoretical discourse. But since what belongs to

theoretical discourse is what can be 'said' at all in language, the investigation of this limit is the investigation of the 'logic' of language, which shows the 'logic of the world.' 'Logic is not a theory but a reflexion of the world', Wittgenstein says in 6.13 and adds: 'Logic is transcendental, which can be interpreted in this way: *What Kant's transcendental deductions are intended to perform : this is performed by the logical analysis of language.*"¹⁹ In recent years, David Pears explored the *difference* between the interface, even while highlighting the influence of Schopenhauer, in a close reading of Wittgenstein. Pears' reading has traces that lie close to Mauthner and in a sense 'richer' than the 'austere' readings by Morris Engel.

A good many commentators believe that Wittgenstein was not directly influenced by Kant but his works were more influenced by Schopenhauer. The existing literature was silent about Kant's influence on his works. Scaling down may require that we have to extend Kant's influence to his later works. So one has to support the above with a continuum thesis, which asserts that *Tractatus* and *Philosophical Investigations* are in a continuum. More specifically, the continuum hypothesis supports the passage from *Tractatus* to *Philosophical Investigations* viz. *Blue Book*, *Some Remarks on Logical Form* and *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*. This is exactly where one can locate the tyranny-doctrine. Morris Engel makes the *Blue Book* as the *locus classicus* for this purpose of elucidating the so-called doctrine.

4.2. Morris Engel's *Austere* Approach to Wittgenstein's Limit Thesis:

What distinguishes Engels's approach to the Kant-Schopenhauer's ancestry are the following sub-theses: (a) the continuum (b) the emphasis on the 'clinical' (Lazerowitz) rather than the 'linguistic' strain (Ayer) (c) the doctrine of the tyranny of language. We have opened up the scope for (a) in the initial section. Now we shall explain (b). Two major wings of analytical movement are often distinguished. They are 1) The linguistic wing and 2) The clinical wing.

Theme.1. The *linguistic* wing is committed to the following major theses (some form of this is associated with Ayer): All philosophical problems are *au fond* problems about language (all philosophy is critique of language). Read: philosophical problems as problems of perception, free will etc. Read: *au fond* means at the foundational level. So the problems of language are the problems of syntax (logical form), of language (or the underlying form of language) (sometimes called depth structures of language).

Theme 2. The *clinical* wing highlights the therapeutic conception of philosophy and asserts that all philosophical problems arise out of linguistic confusion (when the logic of the language is misunderstood). They require no solution, but dissolution (occurs especially in Wittgenstein's *later* work). This is associated with Lazerowitz. If we accept (a), that is, the continuum, then

we shall have to see theme 1 and theme 2 in combination. Engel however resists this idea, though he traces the seeds of such a combination to the *Blue Book*.²⁰ However his emphasis is on theme 2 over and above and thus he misses the bus to Mauthner-Wittgenstein interface.

Linguistic philosophy begins with the death of British idealism. Moore was the first to raise the question what has led philosophers say strange things. Moore did not answer it. Ayer's remarks about Heidegger's metaphysics is the sort of argument in the *linguistic wing* of the analytic school that provides one answer to these problems. They draw inspiration to this idea from Wittgenstein. They argued that the trouble lay in language which confused and misled philosophers or metaphysicians. Others, drawing heavily from Wittgenstein's philosophy, argued that what doomed philosophers to speak nonsense was something *deeply psychological*. It is not simply linguistic but *manifests itself* in language. Lazerowitz's treatment of the problem is an extreme form of this *clinical wing* of the analytical movement.

Engel approaches this doctrine of the tyranny of language remarking that "both wings stem from Wittgenstein and are both connected with his basic thesis regarding the way we have been led into confusion "by means of language". Engel's is a counterpart thesis of Mauthner. Engel however cautions us saying that "there is reason to believe that he has been

misrepresented and his doctrine misunderstood. An examination of its source or sources (as the case may be) may throw light on this. Such an examination is especially important now, for the doctrine of Wittgenstein's regarding the way we have been led into confusion by language seems to be losing ground rapidly and another opportunity to see precisely what it contained or what it was meant to contain may not soon occur again."²¹ It is at this context, Engel introduces Wittgenstein's *Blue book* as the immediate source of the strange flowering of interpretations of the doctrine of language by both *linguistic* and *clinical* within analytical movement.

Ayer and Lazerowitz are not the only or perhaps not even the best representative of this particular movement in recent philosophical history. Still Ayer is the representative of purely *linguistic* strain movement and Lazerowitz a representative of purely *clinical* strain movement. Ayer felt that the writings of metaphysician's "simply been the inherent deception of language-its built-in-ambiguity, its misleading forms (so similar in appearance but yet so fatal to philosophers). Had Heidegger been more attentive, he would not have gone on to posit (of all things) the existence of nothing and to say how its *Nothings* itself!"²² All the confusions in philosophy, according to Ayer, are due to the mistakes in language. A language which is asserted something which is not actually existing in the world, is a deceptive language. It makes confusion without any point. So such confusions arising from language itself and as intimately bound up with

it. These confusions are not regarded as mere accidents, or momentary, inexplicable lapses. Such lapses caused or even inevitable - the confusions - especially where philosophers were concerned. This was an important discovery Ayer has made. For Engel, the sophisticated analysis of the concepts shows that the confusion of "freedom" with "indeterminism" and of "compulsion" with determinism resulted in the drawing of false contrasts and parallels which in turn generated the whole problem. But the main point is that somehow the trouble lay in language itself.

For Lazerowitz, the *clinical* wing of the analytical movement considers metaphysical views are the sorts of things which can be neither proved nor disproved, confirmed nor disconfirmed. They are neither *empirical* nor *a priori*. They are proposals with regard to 'the use of ordinary expressions' which recommend a change regarding "the use of words about things." Philosophers, according to him, "have a certain sub-conscious *uneasiness* about some words and that they try to rid themselves of this uneasiness by either reforming these words or doing entirely away with them."²³ Non-sense is not a function or products of language but the manifestation of a person's pressing psychological needs. Such manifestations are symptoms whose disease is somewhere else and so its cure is not to be found in symptoms but to be seen at a deeper level. The linguistic diagnosis is too simple, too inevitable, too absurd. It lacks depth, necessity and inevitableness. Language which describes something which is not in the

physical world makes philosophers to speak nonsense. Hence this nonsense is something *deeply psychological* because the 'mind' which urges to speak these utterances. So Lazerowitz holds that if language doomed metaphysicians to speak nonsense, it must be sealed at a level deeper than the strictly *linguistic* one, that is, at the *clinical* level.

How those two strains fare? Taking the *Blue Book* is providing the perfect counterfoil to the doctrine, Engel answers by saying that this provides a base for a new way of reading Wittgenstein's critique of language. For this, he coalesces two strains of analytic tradition, namely the 'linguistic' (as represented by Ayer) and the 'clinical' strain (as represented by Lazerowitz) and locates the *Blue Book* as a rallying point for these two themes. He remarks that they 'vie for our attention' in this work. The combinatorial feature is thus evident.

Looking at the grammar of those words which describe mental activities, Wittgenstein diagnoses this as the temptation that there 'must be' something what is called mental process of thinking, hoping, wishing, believing etc., independent of the process of expression. The notion of 'thinking' shows what is characteristic of our mismanagement of this concept is characteristic of our mismanagement of other concepts.²⁴ This leads to the 'dilemma' that is found in the *Blue Book*.

There are two ideas prevalent here: (1) that thinking is a "certain definite mental processes" involved in the use of language; (2) this process which gives life to the signs of language. They are bounded together without which language cannot function. Thus the *Imagist* theory is born, which is supposed to link language with reality.

The *imagist* theory of language claims, that "thinking is a matter of having images which give life and meaning to our words."²⁵ We are so tempted to believe that language involves an occult processes – processes without which, the signs of language are dead and lifeless. Wittgenstein's objection is that we are tempted to believe this because of the mystifying effects on us of our language. We tend to think of the use of signs of our language, as if they were objects co-existing with the signs, and corresponding of such mythical processes as "thinking" as similarly co-existing with such processes as talking etc. "A substantive", he says simply, "makes us look for a thing that corresponds to it."²⁶ According to Wittgenstein, "thinking is essentially the activity of operating with signs" "This activity is performed by the hand, when we think by writing, by the mouth and larynx, when we think by speaking; and if we think by imaging signs of pictures, I can, "give you no agent that thinks."²⁷ However, if you should say "that in such cases the mind thinks, I would, only draw your attention to the fact that you are using a metaphor, that here the mind is an

agent in a different sense from that in which the hand can be said to be the agent in writing."²⁸

Similarly, the existence of the word "mind" leads us to look for a corresponding thing and then to assign to it all sorts of occult powers. This is an error that "recurs again and again in philosophy."²⁹ and is "one of the great sources of philosophical bewilderment."³⁰ On Engel's diagnosis, "on the one hand we feel, in such cases, that we can't point to anything as the referent of these metaphors (which is understandable since there is nothing really to point to) yet we also feel we ought to be capable to do so. It is out of such dilemmas and the "mental cramp" they produce metaphysical theories (which are really psuedo-theories since the problems for which they are designed as "solutions" are psuedo-problems) generally arise."³¹ Wittgenstein points out that we are not yet able to explain casually the process of thinking. Here Engel comments: "our problem was a philosophical one and not a scientific or psychological one. But the existence of the word or metaphor together with the various associations that it has for us traps us into dealing with it as if it were a scientific question."³² We treat the problem in the manner of scientific and so do not succeed which naturally increase our bewilderment.

Wittgenstein turns to consider only this in Saint Augustine's problem regarding 'Time'. The question is raised at the initial step in the *Philosophical Investigations*: 'What is time?' This problem can be solved in a manner as to

solve the problem of the ultimate constituents of matter. We are not looking for a new fact about time. It is the use of the substantive "time" which mystifies. There is no puzzlement if we look into the "grammar" of the word 'time' when it is used. There is no need of a definition of time. We are not puzzled by the lack of a definition of 'chair'. A definition would only lead us to other undefined terms. The puzzlement expresses in a misleading way by means of a question – form "what is. X. . ?" It does not necessarily ask for either a cause or a reason. As there is no correct definition of the words "mind", "time", "knowledge", we suspect that we have no right to use them. But it must be remembered that a word has not got power independent of us. A word has the meaning someone has given to it. Words are used in thousand different ways which gradually merge into one another. We compare language with a calculus which has exact rules. But rarely it conforms to standards of exactness. Therefore we must try to undermine and loosen this rigidity of mind and counteract the effect which these misleading analogies have upon us.³³

Wittgenstein concludes by saying that there are certain *contradictions* in the *grammar* of the words used. He generalised this point claiming that "philosophy", as we use the word, is a fight against the fascination which forms of expression exert upon us."³⁴ It is an attempt "to counteract the misleading effect of certain analogies."³⁵ The analogy is explained in terms of *analogy of rules*. "It is in most cases, impossible to show an exact point

where an analogy begins to mislead us. Every particular notation stresses some particular point of view.³⁶

Consider the Socratic question, 'what is knowledge?' This is not answered by enumerating cases of knowledge. The belief that in order to get clear about the meaning of a general term one has to "find the common element in all its applications", has "shackled philosophical investigations". Not only it led to no result but it has "made the philosopher dismiss as irrelevant the concrete cases, which alone could have helped him to understand the usage of general term."³⁷ Thus 'concepts' have no sharp boundaries but share only a family likeness. The disputes in our language are essentially verbal and are not the facts of the case but simply their descriptions. Grammatical and experiential confusion lead philosophers to say typically metaphysical things. They used words consistently and therefore systematically misleading ways. They forge some new conventions regarding the use of words. It is simply a matter of making new notations. Philosophers are not aware of this.

We find certain parallelisms in Kant's *Critique* and in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* to illuminate the ideas referred to in *Blue Book*.

The main thesis of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* is regarding the way in which we are led astray "by means of language." Engel thinks that this is a revolutionary idea without historical or philosophical

antecedents. Engel has not be able to trace it to Mauthner. On the contrary, Kant's argument in the "Critique" bear directly on Wittgenstein's thesis. It deals with the searching analysis of the limits of knowledge and the reach of science. Then he dealt with the main question of our knowledge of *God* in the hope of achieving some satisfying answer. Looking in that way, his "critique" falls within the stream of philosophic speculation. Kant's thoughts is distinguished by its freedom from dogma and remorseless self-examination. Truth or propositions must have a foundation upon which it rests. "If they cannot be confirmed neither can they be refuted. This is comparable to the words we find in *Philosophical Investigations*. "The logic of language seduces us"38 According to Kant, indifference to metaphysical questions cannot be tolerated. The *four* antimonies which Kant brings found in the "Critique," namely,

(1) The human reason is *fated* to ask the sort of questions like 'whether the world has a beginning in Time and an end in Space; (2) whether the self is indivisible or merely transitory and perishable; (3) whether man is free or is a creature of fate or nature; (4) whether there is a supreme cause of the world, which gives rise to a pair of contradictory propositions, neither one of which could be denied without absurdity. But it is not fit to answer. This exhibits restlessness and self-contradiction of reason.

These disturbances could not be so easily uprooted. It is not the *facts* but the descriptions which in each case that makes the contradictory propositions. Neither of which could be denied without absurdity. The "puzzlement about the grammar of the word "Time" arises from what one might call apparent contradictions in that grammar."³⁹ These antinomies are "symptomatic" of and they represent reason's proud pretensions to a kind of knowledge to which it can never attain. It is not possible to withdraw from the conflict without doing irreparable damage to both our honor and rationality. Rather we must see whether some misunderstanding lies at the root of these conflicts, the resolution of which may provide the way for a "lasting and peaceful reign of reason over understanding and senses."⁴⁰

Reminiscent of William James' agony of controversies, we can cite Empiricism and Rationalism as providing different answers to the question for their pressing needs. The rationalist argument proposes that there are propositions that provide the foundation stones of morals and religion. Empiricism denies that we shall ever achieve final answer to the problems of religion and natural science. The rationalistic position satisfies our deep natural craving for a "finished" universe in which our reason finds comfort and rest. But Kant reminds us that such mistrust and prejudice is based upon an illusion. Such knowledge we desire is no doubt out of our reach. In *Philosophical Investigations*, we come across the remark which says that "It is not a stupid prejudice." "The problems is arising through a mis-interpretation

of our forms of language that have the character of depth. They are deep disquietudes."⁴¹

According to Kant, reason organizes and unifies the categories or concepts and whose ultimate source is logic – syllogism which is Reason's unique tool. The Idea of Supreme Cause must forever remain what it is – simply an Idea, a thought, an illusion. The errors of 'Reason' is not a *personal* one. It is not an *anomaly*. The errors of "Reason" are due to some "fault of its own." Engel sees this is the reason on Kant's point regarding the problem of our will to metaphysics.

Kant's forms of judgement determine the various lines and patterns of our thought, creating in the process our various hopes and illusions. The problems of Kant's *Critique* was why people have thought that they had the kind of knowledge, which in his view they could not possibly obtain or satisfy. As a result, Kant sees that it was Reason's tyranny over the Understanding forced us to complete and a "finished" universe. Wittgenstein's forms of expression runs parallels to this: It is "our craving for generality" for Kant's "completeness" which bewitches our mind, and gives rise to grammatical illusions. The philosophical puzzlement arise from our desire to introduce more consistency and neatness into our language. "The man who is philosophically puzzled sees a law in the way a word is used trying to apply this law comes up against cases where it leads to paradoxical

results." To overcome this we must therefore "fight against the fascination which forms of expression exert upon us."⁴²

Engel sees Kantian formation of the fundamental patterns of our thought carries conviction. This element of universality and inevitability is the convincing part of Kant's doctrine and analysis. It is not the particular syllogism but the *form* of the syllogism which gives rise to illusion and not its matter. Wittgenstein's dialectic lack this kind of built-in guarantee or transcendentalism. Engel believes that this 'gap' threatens Wittgenstein's whole structure of thought. To close the gap, a bridge is needed. The *Blue Book* testifies to his urgent search for making such a bridge. Now we move to (C) in the subsequent section.

4.3. Engel on the Limit of *Vernunft* (Kant) and the Limit of *Vorstellung* (Schopenhauer):

As far as (C), the doctrine of the tyranny of language (mentioned in the previous section) is concerned, it does not attribute a property to language, in which case it would have yielded a variant of linguistic relativity thesis of Sapir and Whorf (so called Sapir-Whorf hypothesis). But looking at from the strictly Kantian point of view, it enjoins an understanding of the nature of the human mind (rather than language). This is what is termed variously as "grammatical illusion", "bewilderment", "craving for generality", "urge to misunderstand", "depth grammar", "bewilderment", "spell", "troubles",

"delusion", and so on. These ideas, according to Engel, are expounded in the *Tractatus*.

Wittgenstein in the preface of the *Tractatus* posed that this is due to the way the logic of our language is misunderstood. "What can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must consign to silence." The aim of the *Tractatus* is to set a limit to thought; or rather - not to thought but to the *expression* of thought; for in order to be able to set a limit to thought, we should have to find both sides of the limits thinkable. (i.e., we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought). This is a potentially significant passage. We find that the very definition of limit lurking here. That is, limit cannot be known unless you *cross* the limit. So how do we draw the boundary? That is, we have to think what cannot be thought. This is impossible. It is therefore, only in language that limit can be set and what lies on the other side of the limit will be nonsense. It is not 'plotting a boundary' but to aware us 'there is a limit'. Thus we define the limit as one that demarcates that which is *sayable* within the language and that which is *unsayable*. Our troubles arise in the 'expression of thought' where language plays. Wittgenstein is translating these troubles into purely linguistic terms.

Toulmin's introduction in the Engel's book *Wittgenstein's Doctrine of the Tyranny of Language* traces on the variations on the 'limit' or 'bounds' of

language in Kant, Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein was preoccupied with the notions intellectual "bounds" or "limits" and with the impulse of the human mind to transcend them. His argument goes on with Kant's fundamental questions about the scope and limits of reason (*Vernunft*) which in the hands of Schopenhauer is transformed into one about the scope and limits of representation (*Vorstellung*). Wittgenstein himself again converted this into the questions about the scope and limits of language (*Sprache*). Engel develops this thematic in terms of a *Unified Theory of Linguistic Deception* which unifies a *Special* and *General Theory of Linguistic Deception* that is identifiable with the doctrine of tyranny of language. However the *ersatz* doctrine goes further than this to achieve a real integration which reflects the underlying doctrine of the *Tractatus*. This has a certain correspondence with Mauthner's version that has been uniformly ignored by all writers.

In private conversation with Waismann, Wittgenstein talked about these limits (*Grenze*) and about the human impulse to over-run them (*an die Grenze der Sprache anzurennen*), in terms which he explicitly compared with Kierkegaard and Heidegger. They have clear affiliation to the whole tradition of 'critical' or 'transcendental' analysis founded by Kant. In *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein evidently believed that the scope and limits of language (*Sprache*). These are comparable to the scope and limits of intellect or of thought and explainable in terms of Russell's symbolism of propositional

calculus. Toulmin also tells us that this is related to the way his own training as physicist (and his best to Heinrich Hertz), to the work of Mauthner's *Sprachkritik* and again to Schopenhauer's *Four-fold Root of the Principles of Sufficient Reason*, to Kierkegaard's ethical position to Lichtenberg—from whom he took the term 'paradigm'.

Logic, according to Kant, is the rules of the operation of the understanding in general—totally independent of objects. Science, which contains universal and necessary laws, is simply a science of the form of thought. The possibility of such a science is like a universal grammar which is a mere form of language. Wittgenstein considered the same point as conveying that 'in logic nothing is accidental' (TLP 2.012). Kant defines the nature of logic: "Some logicians, indeed, presuppose in Logic *psychological* principles. But it is just an inappropriate to bring principles of this kind into Logic as to derive the science of morals from life. If we were to take the principles from psychology, that is, from observations on our understanding, we should merely see *how* thought takes place, and *how* it is affected by the manifold subjective hindrances and conditions; So that this would lead only to the knowledge of *contingent* laws. But in Logic, the question is not of *contingent* but of *necessary* laws; not how we do think, but how we ought to think. The rules of Logic, then, must not be derived from the *contingent* but from the *necessary* use of the understanding, which, without any psychology, a man finds in himself. In Logic, we do not want to know how the

understanding is and thinks, and how it has hitherto proceeded in thinking, but how it ought to proceed in thinking. Its business is to teach us the correct use of reason, that is, the use which is consistent with itself.⁴⁴ Engel's contention is that the sphere of influence must be extended to Wittgenstein's later work as well.

In his most neglected work *Introduction to Logic*, Kant divides logic into *Analytic* and *Dialectic*. '*Analytic Logic*' deals with the formal rule or criteria of truth and *Dialectical Logic* deals with the ways in which the untrue may be given appearance or may be made to appear as true. Dialectic in this aspect would have its use as a *Cathartic* of the understanding. Thus Engel locates Wittgenstein's parallel not only in the *Tractatus*, but in the later works in *Philosophical Investigations*. The emphasis is on the therapeutic conception. "My aim is: to teach you to pass from a piece of disguised nonsense to something that is patent nonsense." "The philosophers treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness."⁴⁵ Engel presented it as the 'seemingly' new and 'revolutionary idea' which has no historical antecedents. Mauthner's name hardly occurs here.

So we pass from philosophy is not a body doctrine but *activity* - thus it is the logical clarification of thought in that it is a kind of *therapy*. Accordingly, logic is understood as a kind of universal grammar. While

analytic is the class of formal truth and *dialectic* is the way in which untrue gives an affirmation of truth (that is, it has a *cathartic* function).

The dilemma is similar to the arguments in Schopenhauer's *Art of Disputation*. Correspondingly Wittgenstein's so-called 'philosophy of logic' is aimed to cure philosophers' of their illness. Disclaiming that logic is an organon of truth, Kant speaks of it as a 'criticism of knowledge', which is equivalent of Wittgenstein's dictum which holds that 'all philosophy is a critique of language' (TLP 4.0031). The theme is continuous with *Blue* and *Brown Books* (we can see that there is a way of dividing the country different from the one used on the ordinary map)⁴⁶ and again in *Philosophical Investigations*. "It is . . . of the essence of our investigation that we do not seek to learn anything *new* by it. We want to *understand* something that is already in plain view."⁴⁷

From this, Kant proceeds to the concept of philosophy within the parameters of two conceptions namely the *cosmic* conception (metaphysical) (which Wittgenstein is supposed to have abandoned after subscribing to it as evidenced in : If I am tried to advance theses in philosophy, it would never be possible to question them, because everyone would agree to them) and the *scholastic* conception of philosophy. The cosmic conception gives dignity to philosophy and it values to all other branches of knowledge. It is the ultimate end of human reason. The scholastic conception includes sufficient stock or

rational knowledge. Philosophy thus aims only at *skill*. The cosmic conception aims at *utility*. On Kant's view, both must be united. No one can call himself a philosopher who cannot philosophize. Wittgenstein unites this in *Tractatus* and *Philosophical Investigations*.

Both must be shown to be united in the so-called doctrine of the tyranny of language. Tyranny: *df.* the tyrinically bewitching power over our minds. (Reasons tyranny over our understanding - Kant), Mauthner calls this as *logocracy* and Derrida calls it as *logocentric*) A method of employment of reason is necessary for this purpose. Philosophy cannot be banned. Likewise, Wittgenstein also refers that 'philosophy is not one of the natural sciences. (The word "philosophy" must mean something whose place is above or below the natural sciences, not beside them).. . Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity. A philosophic work consists essentially of elucidations. Philosophy does not result in "philosophical propositions", but rather in the clarification of propositions' (TLP 4.111 - 4.112). "What we are destroying is nothing but houses of cards and we are clearing up the ground of language on which they stand."⁴⁸ Moore writes: "I was a good deal surprised by some of the things he said about the difference between "philosophy" (he called this "Modern Philosophy"), and what has traditionally been called "philosophy". He said that what he was doing was a "new subject" . . . that a "new method" had been discovered . . . that that it was now

possible for the first time there should be "skilfull" philosophers, though of course there had in the past been "great philosophers" (Moore's Notes).⁴⁹

An example of two diverse systems of philosophy which is in conflict with each other has already been mentioned. Empiricism and Rationalism are two divergent systems of philosophy that are in conflict in many ways. Kant refers to the way the rationalist position satisfies our deep and natural craving for a "finished" universe (in which alone our reason can find comfort and come to rest). This tendency for completeness is the real source of metaphysics, and it leads the philosopher into complete darkness.⁵⁰ Kant warned that we will always be out of our reach for the desired knowledge as it is come out of illusion. We can come to understand why it is we desire it. (There is a tendency rooted in our usual forms of expression)⁵¹; (the logic of language seduces us).⁵²

Logic decides how we shall think and experience it. ('The essence of the proposition describes the essence of the world') (TLP 5.4711) (Grammar tells what kind of object anything is).⁵³ The nature of understanding determines what we know about the world. That is why the principle of causation will always characterize the world of our experience. Our thought is governed by the principle of implication which is fundamental and isomorphic with it. Mind organizes the experience in this way. This gives

rise to the concepts of causation that has objective validity. This is also equally applicable to other scientific concepts.

Similarly, now consider syllogism as the tool of reason which has both objective validity as well as subjective validity. Reason functions to organize and unifies by principles or 'Ideas' by way of syllogism. Syllogism has no objective validity as it is unbounded and incomplete. The nature of its structure leads us to think that an objective correlative does indeed exist. ("We are led into puzzlement by an analogy which irresistibly drags us on")⁵⁴ ("You interpret a grammatical movement made by yourself as a quasi-physical phenomena which you are observing").⁵⁵ This tyranny exercises over the understanding. The infinite series of regression has no end in syllogism. Reason asserts that such an end to think it ("We think it must be in reality; for we think we already see it there").⁵⁶ This has come to apprehend its own requirement. ("We are not able to rid ourselves of the implications of our symbolism)."⁵⁷ 'But such an end remains an illusion always. So the error of reason are the fault of its own'. This outstanding failure can be remedied by the historical plain method. ("The problems arising through a misinterpretation of our forms of language have the character of depth. They are deep disquietudes)."⁵⁸ The source of this lies in our 'craving for generality'.

The 'curious and dark' phrases point to 'clinical' sense of the doctrine. Consider, for example the urge to misunderstand (compare Lyotard's "pagan urge to violate rules") is symptomatic of Wittgenstein's outlook that calls for fresh review.

Wittgenstein arguments are dialectic and they lack transcendentalism in the sense used by Kant. Each argument is a kind of test-case required to be proved. This idea is enormously important. Wittgenstein was aware of the gap which, threatens his structure of thought. Engel finds that these parallels in Wittgenstein's works and the linguistic writings of Schopenhauer. Wittgenstein used purely linguistic terms of Kantian thoughts in his work especially in the *Tractatus* itself. Wittgenstein says that Kant does not lack 'thought' but he fails to the 'expression of thought'. The truth is to be performed at the level of the language, thus completely turning Kant into a linguistic direction. Kant was also aware of these possibilities and he refers to it in his work *Prolegomena*. Kant did not bother to explore *these possibilities*. Wittgenstein tried these other possibilities and gave a system of thoughts an entirely different direction.

Kant throughout the whole of the *Critique* argued that metaphysics is impossible, the kind of knowledge in principle unattainable. In *Transcendental Dialectic* he sees that our *will to attain* is traceable to certain linguistic and psychological causes. For Wittgenstein, as for Kant, the search

of metaphysics is a question of human frailty and not of human folly. Wittgenstein's accounts of this drew him in a conflicting direction. (1) *Critique Thesis*: Metaphysics is impossible. (2) *Transcendental Dialectic Thesis*: The *Will* to do metaphysics is traceable to certain linguistic and psychological causes. Philosophical puzzlement is a product of linguistic confusion (Schopenhauer), (in our depth nature we tried to argue for both of the above theses) or that its source lies deep in our nature (Kant); or that what lies beyond the area amenable to skill is nonsense (Schopenhauer); or yet that it is an important kind of nonsense (Wittgenstein).⁵⁹ Like Kant, he believed that the perplexity of reason is a *logical* not a pathological condition. The clinical strain needs a reconstruction, an *Ersatz* doctrine with which we are concerned in the following section.

4.4. The *Ersatz* Doctrine of the Tyranny of Language:

The aim of this section is to rebuild what Engel terms as the *ersatz* doctrine as the doctrine of the tyranny of language, without bridging under the qualification which holds that it is little obscure as to whether tyranny is the property to be attributed to the mind or to language.

Earlier the question was raised whether the 'clinical strain' as 'deeper' than the strictly 'linguistic one' in that it is 'deeply psychological', is separable as such. Engel is not in full agreement with this. Thus what he also terms it as 'subconscious uneasiness', warrants a mixture of these two strains. Citing

the *Blue Book* as opening the space for these two divergent themes (the analytical and the clinical strain), he calls attention to the way they 'vie with' one another for our attention. At the moment we have no evidence to adjudicate, but the only lesson we learn is that we have to take it further. Engel chooses to finally settle for the psychological.

Wittgenstein generalises this point by saying that "philosophy" as we use the word, 'is a fight against the fascination which forms of expression exert upon us.' This is characterised as the attempts "to counteract the misleading effect of certain analogies."⁶⁰ "It is, in most cases, impossible to show an exact point where an analogy begins to mislead us. Every particular notation stresses some particular point of view."⁶¹ This is also related to mathematics when we think of 'kinds' of number, 'kinds' of propositions, 'kinds' of proofs; and also, of 'kinds' of apples, 'kinds' of paper, etc. In one sense, we are describing the 'kinds' properties and the other is describing 'kinds' of the grammatical structures. This misguides mathematicians to make certain exclusions and division in their discipline. Similarly, they are not aware of the different meanings of the 'word', 'proof.'⁶² They cannot differentiate between different usage of the word 'proof'. Schopenhauer also uses this device in his essay "*Ober Sprache Und Worte.*" Compare here Wittgenstein's remarks that "misunderstandings concerning the use of words" "are caused among the other things, by certain analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of language. . . ."⁶³

Anscombe was struck by the Schopenhauerian tone of many of the passages of the *Notebooks* and *Tractatus*. Wittgenstein was generally impressed by the Schopenhauer's major work *World as Will and Idea*. She also connects Wittgenstein as a latter-day Hume especially with the idea of solipsism, limit and value. Favrholt endorses the above view stating that "the passages on solipsism, will, and ethics in the *Tractatus* are conceived by Wittgenstein with Schopenhauer in mind."⁶⁴ von Wright informs us that Wittgenstein's first philosophy was Schopenhauerian 'epistemological idealism'. It was Frege's conceptual realism which made him to abandon these earlier idealistic views.⁶⁵ Anscombe also noted that it is not the mythical and popular but the actual Schopenhauer who claimed to have that made striking discoveries which have remarkable parallels in Wittgenstein's later work. Schopenhauer's linguistic writings contain remarks on logic, thought and language, concepts, 'deception', stratagems, (tricks and expedients), sophistry etc. which are worthy of mention among these parallels.

Like, Kant before him, Schopenhauer also makes a distinction especially in his small treatise on *The Art of Controversy*⁶⁶ between 'logic' and 'dialectic' defining them as follows:

Logic is the science of the laws of thought (when it is not misled).
Dialectic is the art of disputation between two rational beings (which aim victory over truth).

Engel mentions the treatise with the title *Zur Logik und Dialektik* that was to be written but was briefly mentioned. Engel also mentions the title *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* which ironically resembles Wittgenstein's early work.

While logic is to be identified with logic of the non-deceptive, dialectic is the logic of *appearance* in the sense that it lays with the *art of disputation* or 'intellectual fencing'. Dialectic, in this sense, is the art of proving oneself right irrespective of reason (the Indian counterpart of *Vidandavada*). No wonder, it tabulates and analyse *dishonest* strategem by which debates can be silenced. The dictum here is 'trust and parry is the whole business'.

The contrast between them is that while logic "is the science of the laws of thought, reason follows when it is left to itself and not hindered or mislead", Dialectic is the art of "intercourse between two rational beings who, because they are rational, ought to think in common". It is a means by which "disputants adopt in order to make good against one another their own individual thought."⁶⁷ Its aim is victory and not truth. It would be mistaken to think that "dialectic" has "objective truth in view". It is in this context, Engel gives the list of a number of common fallacies: as given by Schopenhauer: Figure of Speech, Irrelevant Conclusion, Non-Sequitur, Ad Populum, Begging the Questions and so on. It seems that Dialectic, in "one

sense of the word" means learning how to identify and meet the dishonest tricks used in debates by one's opponent.

"Strategems" in yet another sense, are that come naturally to us in disputes for just as we possess a "Natural Logic". So we also possess a "Natural Dialectic". According to him, "Strategems" are not necessarily artificial devices which one may occasionally incorporate into one's speech for purposes of gaining victory; but rather that often they are the sort of things which arise out of language itself and into which we innocently "blunder". These tend to assume forms which *are* extremely deceptive. Just as we have *natural* logic, (science of reasoning), we have 'natural' dialectic (shady tricks of reasoning). There are certain 'sophisms' which are apt to misled because they arise out of language. There is a rough and ready distinction between 'word' and its innumerable application. In his '*World as Will and Idea*, Schopenhauer's discussion is not confining to "sophisms" but to *language* and the way it generally tends to deceive us. This *shift of idea* is to his discovery so as to emphasize on language and not to the common fallacies. Aristotle's definition of *dialectic* may be explained as the art of disputation.

We have Platonic dialectic as providing an ancestry. However, in the specific sense used here, it embodies as Special Theory of Linguistic Deception called *eristics*, which lays down the technical rules of disputation which involves speakers and co-speakers. Engel mentions that it explores a

new territory in which it deals with the way mind falls prey to puzzles and confusions which are *linguistically generated* (emphasis added).⁶⁸ Traditional Aristotelian logic is equally exposed to deception such as limited conversions of *A*-statements, *conversion per accidens*, Syllogism with four terms (Fallacy of Four Terms), inference from consequent to reason, Syllogism in the second figure with merely affirmative premises etc.

Schopenhauer's 'new ground' is now about the misleading character of *concepts* (sophistry, persuasion, a good voice, or an extreme degree of impudence), which ultimately leads him to a theory of deception about concepts.

So the two consequences according to him namely, (1) real source of sophistry is in our natural dialectic (processes natural to reason), (2) concepts as such have certain vagueness are distinguishable as such, because it, together with (1) supports *a unified* theory.

On Wittgenstein's terms here, it refers, to the way the words to do that function. Engel admits that even the "most scientific arguments and especially philosophical demonstrations, are at bottom a trivial one." Engel refers this triviality by referring to the 'tricks' in his (Schopenhauer) essay on the *History of the Doctrine of the Ideal and Real* with an illustration from Hegel. Hegel, according to him, derived his doctrine of God from Schelling, who in turn got it from Spinoza. Schelling had, according to Spinoza's

procedure, entitled the word "God". Hegel took this in its literal sense. Now since this word properly signifies a personal being, embracing, together with other qualities altogether incompatible with the word, that of Omniscience, this was also transferred by him to the world and with obvious absurd results. It was with such "tricks" he adds finally, that Hegel held "the learned world of Germany for thirty years." Thus "one may also puzzle and bewilder your opponent" "by mere bombast; and the trick is possible, because a man generally supposes that there must be some meaning in words". "It is well-known fact," he then leaves off by saying. "that in recent times some philosophers have practiced this trick on the whole of public with the most brilliant "success". If these remarks tend to remind the reader of what some analysis have in our own day been saying about their colleagues, it should not come as a surprise, for that too, of course, was a favourite theme with Schopenhauer, as everyone who has come in contact with his work knows. And the connection is even closer than that, as his comment on "pantheism" (in a short paper by that name), and on Schelling's definition of freedom – to choose two brief examples – plausibly indicate. His "chief objection" to pantheism is, "that it says nothing". As to Schelling's definition of freedom, if it is a definition, he says of it (in his own "Essay on the Freedom of the Will") "which may be of some use" for the catechism, "but in philosophy nothing is said by it and, consequently nothing can be done with it."⁶⁹

Every deduction from concepts is "exposed" to such "deceptions" as their content is often vague and uncertain. Syllogisms are perfect as regards their forces, but they are uncertain on account of their *matter*. The concepts are not sharply defined. They interact each other and contains many other spheres. We may *pass at will* from one sphere to another. This is comparable to Wittgenstein's remarks that "misunderstanding concerning the use of words" are "caused, among other things, by certain analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of language. . . " ⁷⁰ This is the way Wittgenstein refers the way in which words, because of their vague and uncertain boundaries, tend to lead us astray. In his *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, Wittgenstein refers the language of concepts. "We certainly see bits of the concepts, but we don't clearly see the declivities by which one passes into others." ⁷¹ Engel compares and comments: " this account of the way concepts deceive is meant to be real (and Schopenhauer instructs us to do so) in the light of what he says in his *Art of Controversy*. By supporting each other in the way they do, they seem to constitute a unified theory regarding the way in which our minds are deceived and held captive by language which both in outline and execution is remarkably similar to what can be found in the same theme in the later writings of Wittgenstein."⁷² Wittgenstein's treatment of linguistic deception is broadened into one in which the "tricks" metaphorised into curious mental processes which are

"one of the most fertile sources of philosophic puzzlement."⁷³ We get into a new group of confusions; language plays us entirely new tricks.

Engel finally comes to formulate Schopenhauer's *Special Theory of Linguistic Deception* thus: we have "conceptual confusion is something we are almost unavoidably led into; that this is so because of something *either* in our own nature *or* because our concepts, being ambiguous and lacking clear boundaries, give rise to superficial resemblances; then these resemblances have far-reaching consequences not only for ordinary discourse but for both science and philosophy."⁷⁴ The question that stares in our face is about the origin of deception. It is here Wittgenstein settles for reasons which are *deeply psychological*. There is no reason to agree with this reading.

Now the above theory is subsumed under a *General Theory of Deception* of Language. Schopenhauer's notion of language come to grip with the general problem of the nature of concepts. He discusses that *abstractions* or representations are sublimated and not perceptible. They are retained in our minds by arbitrary signs. The signs are words. This is stated in his *Four Fold Root of the Principles of Sufficient Reason*⁷⁵ that it is the man's ability to make '*abstractions*.' Concepts are different from pictures of imagination, these latter being intuitive and complete. Such picture "phantasm" ought to be distinguished from a conception. Reflexion is not possible without imagination. The meaning of a speech is, as a rule,

immediately grasped, accurately and distinctly taken in without the imagination being brought into play. Thought or conception is not to be confused with images, but it must be identified with words. For in the *World as Will and Idea*, he allows occasionally that words are a burden to the process of thought. *Logically* it is possible to distinguish between the conception and the word but *psychologically* it is not possible to carry on thinking without the aid of words. It seems to be difficult to maintain the separation of language from thought. Besides words or language, ideas and theories have a cramping effect on the mind. The scientific theory has had this unfortunate effect. In such instances, we have to confess our ignorance.

In the same parallel way, Wittgenstein in his *Philosophical Investigations* remarks that "an unsuitable type of expression is a sure means of remaining in a state of confusion. It is, as it were, bars the way out."⁷⁶ All our rational talk is composed to *abstract* conceptions which however give nothing new to light. Yet, we are arguing because of the certain indolence of the intellect. There is a striking similarity to Kant's Dove Analogy in the Introduction in the *Critique*. "To think that because we seem to get on so well with concepts formed within the limits of experience (intuition), we might even get on better by freeing ourselves entirely from these limitation, is to be like "the light dove, who cleaving the air in her free flight, and feeling its resistance, might imagine in that its flights would be still easier in empty space."⁷⁷ It is difficult to control thought by perception. Wittgenstein's *Blue*

Book looks at "what makes it difficult for us to take this line of investigation is our craving for generality . . . the contemptuous attitude towards the particular case." ⁷⁸ This is simply resulted from the abuse of words. This is explicitly stated as in Schopenhauer's words: "Locke has already shown at length that most disagreements in philosophy arise from a false use of words. For the sake of illustration, just glance for a moment at the *shameful misuse* which philosophers destitute of thought make at the present day of the words, substance, consciousness, truth and many others." "No conceptions has been more misused in philosophy than that of *Cause*, by means of the favourite trick or blunder of conceiving it too widely, taking it too generally, through abstract thinking. Since Scholasticism, indeed properly since Plato and Aristotle, philosophy has been for the most part a *systematic misuse of general conceptions*." "But everywhere, as here, such unduly wide conceptions, under which, therefore, more was subsumed than their true content would have justified, there has arisen false principles, and from these false systems."⁷⁹ Kant, followed this path and did not see the source of these conceptions and to their true *content*. Wittgenstein asked in *Philosophical Investigations* how we learn the meaning of the word from what sort of examples in a language-game. The word must have a family of meanings. Our agreement as verbal expressions is determined by deeply rooted feeling of the inner nature of things.

Language is however, important. Lichtenberg was quite right: ". . . a good deal of wisdom is" "deposited in language." "It is hardly likely that we have laid it all there ourselves, but rather that a great deal of wisdom really lies there."⁸⁰

Engel looks at Wittgenstein through the eyes of Schopenhauer. On this view, philosophical confusions have its source in language which can be avoided by actual use of words without moving towards the generality of concepts.

Besides parallels in linguistic theories in Wittgenstein and Schopenhauer, Engel sees that both viewed "philosophy" in a similar way, According to Wittgenstein, the business of philosophy is analysis; that it has a status different from that of the sciences, that it solves problems by dissolving them. Engel alleges that Schopenhauer also taken similar views of philosophy. A philosopher by reason seeks to free himself from the perplexity. He has the ability to deal with abstractions that distinguishes the philosopher from the ordinary man. Perceptible knowledge is clear, firm and certain. In abstract knowledge with reason, doubt and error appear. Philosophy is an attempt to resolve these doubts and free ourselves of these errors. It deals with its material from the highest and most universal point of view. Here Engel shifts focus which spells doom for the notion of his doctrine of tyranny. He describes that there are similar points in the *Tractatus*

"philosophy is *not* one of the natural sciences" (TLP 4.111). This cannot be reconciled with another remark which says that "Philosophy settles controversies about the limits of natural sciences." (TLP 4.113). The pre-conceived opinion, prejudice which would not be solved but would have entirely vanished, and these expressions would have no more meaning. In the *Philosophical Investigations*, we see "the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear." Engel believes that Wittgenstein's dimensions of thought associated with and an integral part of Schopenhauer's work.⁸¹

This is seen in the *two themes* of linguistic deception (*general* and *special*) which is what we call the *ersatz* theory of tyranny of language. Whereas the *special* theory supports doctrine with *eristics* (literally means disputation), the *general* theory is unable to decide between *ourselves* and *language*, and finally settling for the former. This also brings out the accompanying limits which is common to Schopenhauer, Wittgenstein *vis-a-vis* Kant.⁸² Engel makes it clear that the whole discussion shows how we reach the limits of language when we use analogy as the main instrument. The bewitchment doctrine itself is suggested by his close reading of Schopenhauer.

There is, however, *three* mistakes one finds in Engel's treatment of the doctrine of the tyranny of language.

- 1) It fails to give *doctrinal content* to the limits of reason (*vernunft*) especially with reference to science, which he disowns in favour of abstractions and a consequent division of labour between science and philosophy.
2. A similar failure is met with the limits of *Vorstellung*.
3. It miserably fails to spotlight Schopenhauer's remarks on self as the limit.

Because (1) fails to impress him with what Wittgenstein has to say on phenomenalism, realism, solipsism, holism etc. (2) gives only two narrow a view which makes overtures to phenomenalism but not completely. The (3) is a major shortcoming that needs a counterfoil. The amendment to (1) to (3) gives the doctrine of limits a *richer content* as opposed to the *austere*, which is discussed below.

4.5 The Limits of the Eminence Grise or Self: The Doctrinal Limits of Language

We shall append to the above, yet another reading of the doctrine of the limits of language which is advanced by David Pears. Pears' book is appropriately titled as the *False Prison* and runs into two volumes.⁸³ What is

called the false prison may be explained by the way we are prisoners of language and that prison is an apparent one and not a real one. It is apparent because it does not deny realism, atomism, phenomenism, solipsism etc. but at the same time, tells us in such a way which are yet to be finessed later towards a better understanding of what is called psychological origin. Thus in comparison to Russell, Wittgenstein follows an 'extreme form of atomism'. The extreme form is clarified to involve a 'seperatism' as well in which the factual discourse is isolated on the one hand and it looks for its sense in its own patch of reality.⁸⁴ The 'form' is justifiable in its own terms. This was forced on him by the way he used the tools of truth-functional account of language. Similarly he does not fully subscribe to realism in his early work as it is commonly believed. His realism is a rather a 'basic' type of realism in which there is no direct relation between language and reality. This is otherwise called *uncritical realism* which focuses on the phenomenal structure of language and without referring to any agency. Thus solipsism requires a peculiar interpretation which coalesces 'my language' and 'my world' as limiting concepts. In comparison to a 'wide-angle' view, this depicts a 'close-up' view.

As Pears acknowledges, it is not only the most fascinating section of the *Tractatus*, but also the most enigmatic one, because solipsism stands at the intersection of many lines of thought.⁸⁵

In other words, it explains the coherence of solipsism with pure realism (what is called basic realism), and both give rise to a sort of Phenomenalism. Thus the underlying hypothesis about phenomenistic language provides a testing ground for tautologies or limits. Pears talks about the 'ambiguity' of phenomenological language which shows how ordinary factual language might be analysed that would perfectly reflect the nature of phenomena (agrees with *Philosophical Remarks*). It is the 'grammar' of phenomena. "Phenomenology penetrates to the essential nature of the world as we experience it and describes the underlying possibilities." ⁸⁶

The perspective developed so far centers around Kant-Schopenhauer-Mauthner's *Vernunft – Vorstellung – limit* conception, but it has not received full doctrinal accommodation in the scheme of interpretation of early and later Wittgenstein. The counterfoil was developed at the expense of Mauthner who was much neglected in the scheme of interpretation. Mauthner developed the psychological roots in his critique project whereas Wittgenstein looks into the philosophical roots (logical) in his critique of language. In contrast to both, Kant made a theoretical architecturing to the limit thesis. But as far as our present contention goes, Wittgenstein was unexpectedly drawing more from Mauthner. (Eg. his hominism, ladder language, *Weltanschauung* incommunicability, *Das Mystische*, along with his account of contingency, logic, innateness, theory-change, casual-nexus etc).

Nevertheless, apart from the broad conspectus with Kant, Wittgenstein was explicitly influenced by Schopenhauer, much more than Kant. He is more 'unkantian' because of the 'uncritical' part of his realism. Realism is metamorphised into pure realism, so to say. This is particularly reinforced by the recent reading of David Pears who has advanced an extremely objective assessment of the sources of influence. Pears is equally against Schopenhauer but finally come to terms with it in his discussion of solipsism. This may be taken as an appropriate conception to the 'limit' thesis, which undoubtedly includes the doctrinal treatment of phenomenological language. This is the reason why it is required for a complete reading of the doctrinal content of the critique of language. Evenwhile acknowledging striking differences with Kant he concedes that Schopenhauer's ideas have also left their mark in the book, especially the latter's contempt for 'scientism', and the sense of mystery as revealed in *NoteBooks*.⁸⁷ This is also connected with the 'limits of the sayable' and the 'unsayable' in Wittgenstein. This is captured in the following lines of interpretation.

Kant's critique of reason aims to provide a metaphysics of experience without giving up any dogmatic metaphysics, whereas Wittgenstein's critique of language is a *critique of the expression of thoughts*. It is this which gets explained in the *bubble metaphor* which lays the limits at the outerstage of the early work.

There are, according to Pears, two marked differences between Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein. This is captured by the following tenets. (1) while for Wittgenstein, the phenomenal language is much warranted by *the world as 'I' found it*, (phenomenal), for Schopenhauer, the world is a manifestation of 'will'. Phenomenalism lends credence to the theory of language only when it is defined as follows. It leads to a theory of language, which ends up with the limits that gave silence. (2) Wittgenstein is only concerned with the world. It has no relation with agency (borrows the figure from Schopenhauer). These *two* aims are achieved by holding that "there is a fixed grid of possible combination of objects to which the structure of our language conforms."⁸⁸

(1) has to do with what is called the 'metaphysics of experience' that has an obvious edge with speculative metaphysics which pays no attention to 'factual language'. This phenomenalism is limited by solipsism. The former sends us to theory of language of the *Tractatus*. The latter sends us to the *bubble metaphor* where *self* is placed at the limit like the eye in the visual field. Just as no eye appears in the visual field, no self appears in the limit and not a reference point. The phenomenalism is limited by the way he refused to accord objectivity to things-in-themselves of the noumenal world. Thus he seems to be in retreat to the mystery glorified by Schopenhauer. Pears says

that the Kantian orientation is conspicuous in the *Tractatus*, but it was not carried to its 'logical conclusion.'⁸⁹

Wittgenstein rejected things-in-themselves beyond the phenomena and it is not a denial that the phenomena possess the objectivity- which Kant and Schopenhauer attributed to them. He is not denying that phenomena are more than sequences of sense data. This exemplified his tradition in Kant and Schopenhauer. The trouble is that there is certain *ambiguity* in the phrase 'phenomenological language' as Wittgenstein uses it.⁹⁰ Its basic meaning is that the 'language concerned with phenomena'. The task of the *Tractatus* is to show how ordinary factual language perfectly reflect the nature of phenomena.

Wittgenstein's phenomealist language is a unique language that mirrors the essential nature of phenomena and it is providing the complete analysis of *ordinary* factual discourse. *Tractatus'* thesis would be as one in which the objects belong to the world *as we find it*. Wittgenstein's phenomenological language was not about physical objects but about sense-data.⁹¹ It is more basic than Russell's. According to David Pears "A phenomenological language, in Wittgenstein's usage, is always a language for describing the world as we find it; or, to put the point in Kantian terms, it is a language for describing phenomena rather than things-in-themselves; or in

Schopenhauersque terminology, it is a language for describing the world as Idea.”⁹² This task is assigned to the logic in the *Tractatus*.

Tractatus presented a criticism of ego-based solipsism. Equally it is against any kind of solipsism that exploits the existence of the subject without giving it a criteria of *identity* that is independent of objects. Wittgenstein introduced it in the *Tractatus* as a failed attempt to impose a personal limit on language. It is true that language is limited, but only in a general, impersonal way. All that we can say is that truth-functions of elementary sentences mirroring arrangement of objects. We cannot get outside language in order to treat the existence of the form of elementary sentences as a fact. Working from inside language, we have no *a priori* reason why these and only these possibilities should exist. This is an another failed attempt to impose unjustifiably narrow limits on language-based on an ego-centric one.⁹⁴

The solipsist supposes that the subject deals only existence and non-existence of everything. This makes a *dilemma*. 1) If the subject is part of the world, the doctrine is self-refuting. (2) If he is not part of the world, the doctrine is empty. This dilemma is equally effective against a Humean solipsist who does not believe in a separate ego.⁹⁵

The *Tratatus* discussion of solipsism is part of an investigation of the way in which empirical reality is limited. ‘Empirical reality is limited by the totality of objects. The limit also makes itself manifest in the totality of

elementary propositions' (TLP 5.5561). The limits of empirical reality is not a line drawn around the totality of facts, but a line drawn around the totality of possibilities. 'The limits of the world is the limit of the range of alternative possible worlds which can be constructed in imagination on the basis of the actual world.'⁹⁶ All expressions as truth-functions of elementary propositions linked to actual objects.

Another restriction on the limits of language is expressed in the following dictum: 'The limits of my language mean the limits of my world' (TLP 5.6). This is not based on the specific types of objects, but on the specification of the person who has encountered with myself. 'Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits. So we cannot say in logic "The world has this in it, and this, but not that"' (TLP 5.61). Wittgenstein says that we are not excluding identifiable possibilities on the far side of the limit. Science can exclude a fact from the actual world by identifying the possibilities. Philosophy can exclude a possibility not in that way. This is connected with his doctrine of saying and showing.

The solipsist insight is that his own experiences form a point of view which is not represented in that experience. This idea can be transformed it into a *linguistic solipsism*. Pears speaks of 'the world' as the range of possible worlds alternative to 'the world as I found it', and the objects in the 'world as I found it' underpin the language covering that range of possible

worlds. This insight shows that any language has to be understood from a point of view which cannot be captured in that language. The controversy that is still talking about a restriction imposed on the range of possible topics for a language and not about a restriction imposed on the range of possible decoders of a language. These sources of the limitation of my language is my point of view. Yet my point of view cannot be identified in my language. The ego is the self-effacing centre of my understanding.⁹⁷ Ego cannot be mentioned in any language. It seems to be the point of view from which the language can be understood. Ego, is not in the same position as a nameable object, which, once it is named, is inside the limits of language although its extreme cannot be asserted.

The proposition in the *Tractatus* 5.62: 'the language that I alone understand' is the language in which I report my own sense-data, which are accessible only to me. Again in the proposition 'the only language that I understand' his point would be that my understanding cannot reach beyond the limits of this language. The *first* interpretation is a restriction imposed on the decoders of 'my language', the *second* is the restriction imposed on my understanding of language. In either situation 'I' is not a figure as an object.⁹⁸ This posed a further restriction imposed on language. At this point, solipsist retreats into his microcosm, limited by the possible reach of his language. My language is my world represented as macrocosm. My soul is related to my

Will represented as microcosm. Wittgenstein asserted in the *Tractatus* 5.63 'I am my world' (the microcosm). *Macrososm is representing the alternative possible worlds*. Tautology is floating on the fabric of each world. Necessity is only in language.

There are two reasons for calling Wittgenstein's doctrine as *uncritical realism* 1) Objects are the only ultimate constituents of the world. Once they acquire and keep their names, it is intended as a general explanation of the attachment of language to the world. It is a clear paradigm of uncritical realism. (2) The meaning to logical words produce a logical system with a fundamental structure that *fixed grid of possible combination of objects*. This is another aspect of his uncritical realism (TLP 6.124).

These ideas are usually called 'Platonism' now-a-days. Platonism destroys the distinction between *obeying a rule* and *disobeying it*. All our operation with language running on fixed rails. Wittgenstein did not believe that simple objects are in principle inaccessible as in Kant's things-in-themselves. We can *manage* to speak about things but not the words. Uncritical realism, applying to language holds that nothing is added and we can remain simply at our standpoint. This is the justification of our factual language in its own terms. It was called uncritical realism "because objects are dominant partners in their relationship with names and nothing is said about any contribution made by our mind at that point."⁹⁹ Objects exist in the

one and only one world. *This concept is Aristotelian rather than Platonic.* Anti-Platonism leads to the breakdown of law and order. But it is uncritical because there is not even a question to be asked to as whether we contribute anything to the constitution of the world. Pears attributed calling it as basic realism. Wittgenstein's contention of solipsism is closer to pure realism is just an echo of in Kant's pure reason. But Wittgenstein is 'unkantian' at least in the sense mentioned above.

Wittgenstein calls logic 'the great mirror'(TLP 5.511). Russell believed that logician's task is to carry out sources of 'logical objects', some of which are forms while others are the real counterparts of logical connectives. Wittgenstein's view was that there no logical objects (TLP 4.441). Wittgenstein puts logic on a realistic basis but *not* in the Russellian sense. In the *Tractatus*, the logical impossibility of attributing two colours, like red and green, to the same physical point has taken to indicate that further analysis was needed (TLP 6.3751). 'This is red' would be analysed as the conjunction of some sentence p and 'This is not green'. This would have the same effect as the slightly less simple assumption attributed to them above, that 'This is red' would be analysed as $(p.q)$, where q entails 'This is not green.' This is the *a priori* deduction of the essential structure of empirical knowledge. Yet the *Tractatus* main thesis would be that objects belong to the world as we find it.

Thus we find that Wittgenstein was much influenced, especially at the later part of the *Tractatus*, by Schopenhauer, but not exactly in the way as Engel understood it. As Engel understands it, it is more symbiotic to *Kant's logic* and the psychological part merges amicably with the existentialist *angst*. This was what deception about as revealed in the critique of language. But Pears explores and adds the doctrinal content to critique, limit, and solipsism. The content of our thesis is that Wittgenstein owes more, or equally to Mauthner. This stands as our conclusion for the present Pears' reading of Wittgenstein. The *richer* content as opposed to the *austere* content of the doctrine, opens up a further vistas about *the exact* doctrinal content of the notion of critique of language which we shall explore in the subsequent chapter.

Notes:

1. S. Morris Engel., *Wittgenstein's Doctrine of the Tyranny of Language* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975).
2. See Hartnack. J , *Wittgenstein and Modern Philosophy*, (tr.) M. Cranston (Garden City New York : Anchor Books, Double day Co. , 1965).
3. See Norman Malcolm, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir* (Oxford and New York : Oxford University Press, 1958).
4. George Pitcher, *The Philosophy of Wittgenstein* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall,1964) p. 147.
5. See S.Morris Engel, *Wittgenstein's Doctrine of the Tyranny of Language* (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1975) p. 45.
6. See *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Man and his Philosophy* (ed.) , K.T., Fann (New York : A Delta Book , Dell Publishing Co., 1967).
7. *Wittgenstein : The Philosophical Investigations* (ed.), George Pitcher, (Garden City , New York : Anchor Books, Double Day & Co. , 1966) p. 3.
8. *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (trans.) Norman Kemp Smith (London : Macmillan & Co. 1953) p. 96.
9. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (ed.) G.E.M. Anscombe and R. Rhees , (trans.) G.E.M Anscombe (Oxford : Basil Blackwell , 1953).
10. See James Griffin, *Wittgenstein's Logical Atomism* (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1964).
11. See G.E.M. Anscombe, *An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus* (London : Hutchinson, 1959).
12. *Essays on Wittgenstein's Tractatus* (ed.) Irving M. Copy and W. Robert Beard (New York : Macmillan , 1966) p. 236.
13. David Favrholt, *An Interpretation and Critique of Wittgenstein's Tractatus* (Copenhagen : Munksgaard, 1964) p. 168.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 169.
15. Black Max , *A Companion to Wittgenstein's "Tractatus"* (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1964) p. 5-6.
16. Alexander Maslow, *A Study in Wittgenstein's "Tractatus"* (Berkeley and Los Angeles : University of California Press, 1961) pp xiii-xiv.
17. Erik Stenius, *Wittgenstein's Tractatus : A Critical Exposition of Its Main Lines of Thought* (Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1960) p. 220.

18. Alexander Maslow, *A Study in Wittgenstein's "Tractatus"* (Berkeley and Los Angeles : University of California Press, 1961) p. 16.
19. Erik Stenius, *Wittgenstein's Tractatus : A Critical Exposition of Its Main Lines of Thought* (Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1960) p. 218.
20. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *The Blue and Brown Books, Preliminary Studies for the Philosophical Investigations* (London: Basil Blackwell, 1958).
21. S. Morris Engel, *Wittgenstein's Doctrine of the Tyranny of Language* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975) p.11.
22. *Ibid.*, p.5.
23. *Ibid.*, p.9.
24. *Ibid.*, p.41.
25. *Ibid.*, p.16.
26. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *The Blue and Brown Books, Preliminary Studies for the Philosophical Investigations* (London: Basil Blackwell, 1958) p.1.
27. *Ibid.*, p.6.
28. *Ibid.*, pp.6-7.
29. *Ibid.*, p.6.
30. *Ibid.*, p.1.
31. S. Morris Engel, *Wittgenstein's Doctrine of the Tyranny of Language* (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1975) pp.17-18.
32. *Ibid.*, p.18.
33. *Ibid.*, p.20.
34. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *The Blue and Brown Books, Preliminary Studies for the Philosophical Investigations* (London: Basil Blackwell, 1958) p.27.
35. *Ibid.*, p.28.
36. *Ibid.*, p.28.
37. *Ibid.*, pp.19-20.
38. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (ed.) G.E.M. Anscombe and R. Rhees , (trans.) G.E.M Anscombe (Oxford : Basil Blackwell , 1953) I-93.
39. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *The Blue and Brown Books, Preliminary Studies for the Philosophical Investigations* (London: Basil Blackwell, 1958) p.26.
40. See S. Morris Engel, *Wittgenstein's Doctrine of the Tyranny of Language* (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1975) p.65.

41. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (ed.) G.E.M. Anscombe and R. Rhees , (trans.) G.E.M Anscombe (Oxford : Basil Blackwell , 1953) I-340; I-111.
42. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *The Blue and Brown Books, Preliminary Studies for the Philosophical Investigations* (London: Basil Blackwell, 1958) p.27.
43. S. Morris Engel, *Wittgenstein's Doctrine of the Tyranny of Language* (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1975) p.71.
44. *Kant's Introduction to Logic* (tr.) T.K.,Abbott(New York: Philosophical Library,1963) p.4.
45. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (ed.) G.E.M. Anscombe and R. Rhees , (trans.) G.E.M Anscombe (Oxford : Basil Blackwell , 1953) I-109 and I-225.
46. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *The Blue and Brown Books, Preliminary Studies for the Philosophical Investigations* (London: Basil Blackwell, 1958) p.57.
47. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (ed.) G.E.M. Anscombe and R. Rhees , (trans.) G.E.M Anscombe (Oxford : Basil Blackwell , 1953) I-89.
48. *Ibid*, I-118.
49. See S. Morris Engel, *Wittgenstein's Doctrine of the Tyranny of Language* (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1975) p.57.
50. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *The Blue and Brown Books, Preliminary Studies for the Philosophical Investigations* (London: Basil Blackwell, 1958) pp.17-19.
51. *Ibid.*, p.17.
52. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (ed.) G.E.M. Anscombe and R. Rhees , (trans.) G.E.M Anscombe (Oxford : Basil Blackwell , 1953) I-93.
53. *Ibid.*, I-373.
54. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *The Blue and Brown Books, Preliminary Studies for the Philosophical Investigations* (London: Basil Blackwell, 1958) p.108.
55. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (ed.) G.E.M. Anscombe and R. Rhees , (trans.) G.E.M Anscombe (Oxford : Basil Blackwell , 1953) I-401.
56. *Ibid.*, I-101.
57. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *The Blue and Brown Books, Preliminary Studies for the Philosophical Investigations* (London: Basil Blackwell, 1958) p.108.

58. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (ed.) G.E.M. Anscombe and R. Rhees , (trans.) G.E.M Anscombe (Oxford : Basil Blackwell , 1953) I-111.
59. S. Morris Engel, *Wittgenstein's Doctrine of the Tyranny of Language* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975) p.97
60. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *The Blue and Brown Books, Preliminary Studies for the Philosophical Investigations* (London: Basil Blackwell, 1958) p.28.
61. *Ibid.*, p.28.
62. *Ibid.*, pp.28-29.
63. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (ed.) G.E.M. Anscombe and R. Rhees , (trans.) G.E.M Anscombe (Oxford : Basil Blackwell , 1953) I- 90.
64. David Favrholdt, *An Interpretation and Critique of Wittgenstein's Tractatus*(New York: Humanities Press,1966) p.220.
65. See S. Morris Engel, *Wittgenstein's Doctrine of the Tyranny of Language* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff : 1975) p.75.
66. See Schopenhauer, *Art of Disputation* (tr.) T.Bailey Saunders (London: George Allen Unwin Ltd, 1896).
67. See S. Morris Engel, *Wittgenstein's Doctrine of the Tyranny of Language* (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff : 1975) pp.77-78.
68. *Ibid.*, p.81.
69. *Ibid.*, pp.83-84.
70. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (ed.) G.E.M. Anscombe and R. Rhees , (trans.) G.E.M Anscombe (Oxford : Basil Blackwell , 1953) I- 90.
71. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* (Oxford : Basil Blackwell,1956) p.157.
72. S. Morris Engel, *Wittgenstein's Doctrine of the Tyranny of Language* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975) p.84..
73. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *The Blue and Brown Books, Preliminary Studies for the Philosophical Investigations* (London: Basil Blackwell, 1958) p.108.
74. S. Morris Engel, *Wittgenstein's Doctrine of the Tyranny of Language* (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1975) p.85.
75. See Schopenhauer, *Four Fold Root of the Principles of Sufficient Reason* (London:George Bell and Sons, 1889).

76. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (ed.) G.E.M. Anscombe and R. Rhees , (trans.) G.E.M Anscombe (Oxford : Basil Blackwell , 1953) I- 339.
77. See S. Morris Engel, *Wittgenstein's Doctrine of the Tyranny of Language* (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1975) p.89.
78. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *The Blue and Brown Books, Preliminary Studies for the Philosophical Investigations* (London: Basil Blackwell, 1958) pp.17-18.
79. Schopenhauer, *World as Will and Idea* (trans.) E.F.J,Payne (Indiana Hills,1958) II-141;II-211 and II-212.
80. See S. Morris Engel, *Wittgenstein's Doctrine of the Tyranny of Language* (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1975) p.91.
81. S. Morris Engel, *Wittgenstein's Doctrine of the Tyranny of Language* (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1975) p.95.
82. *Ibid.*, p.95.
83. See David Pears, *The False Prison : A Study of the Development of Wittgenstein's Philosophy*, 2 Vols. (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1987).
84. See David Pears, *The False Prison : A Study of the Development of Wittgenstein's Philosophy*, 2 Vols. (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1987, Vol. I) p.82.
85. *Ibid.*, p.187.
86. *Ibid.*, pp.96-97.
87. *Ibid.*, p.5.
88. *Ibid.*, p.6.
89. *Ibid.*, p.9.
90. *Ibid.*, p.96.
91. *Ibid.*, p.92.
92. *Ibid.*, p.98.
93. *Ibid.*, p.36.
94. *Ibid.*, p.153.
95. *Ibid.* p153.
96. *Ibid.*, p.162.
97. *Ibid.*, p.166.
98. *Ibid.*, p.172.
99. *Ibid.*, p.29.

CHAPTER 5

'Philosophical concern with language is not doctrinally and methodologically neutral, but it is to embark upon the road to a doctrinal position'


- Gershon Weiler

**EVALUATING THE DOCTRINAL CONTENT
OF THE CRITIQUE OF LANGUAGE**

CHAPTER 5

EVALUATING THE DOCTRINAL CONTENT OF THE CRITIQUE OF LANGUAGE

5.1 Wittgenstein's Two Kinds of Fusion Thesis:



1. Kant's critique of *Vernunft* and his consequent phenomenalism (along with the distinction between phenomena and noumena) is not paving way to the understanding of the doctrinal content as seen from the *ersatz* limiting critique (see the last section of the previous chapter) It has to be completed with enough 'doctrinal' content which is what is provided by Mauthner at least as seen through his interpretation (Weiler).
2. Mauthner's critique of language completes it with a critique of the language of psychology which provides the real source of the *leitmotif* of analytical philosophy. Wittgenstein can be said to be in full agreement with this.
3. Wittgenstein's critique of language goes to the philosophical (grammatical) roots of concept-formation but not very much out of tune with Wittgenstein's own both in his early and later works.

The above figure compares the *three* thinkers in a schematic way so as to impress upon any reader how close Wittgenstein is to Mauthner than to Kant. Mauthner is against Kant. A similar schema is drawn up by Pears in his reading of Wittgenstein in the book on *The False Prison*. What I need is to show in this final evaluation is that:

- 1) Pears' reading renders Mauthner's influence a better-sounding hypothesis.

- 2) It is specifiable as such in the continuum between Aristotelian (actually anti-platonist) and Anti-Aristotelian (anti-platonist) paradigm. Thus the main format of continuity that rules as rails is a fantasy.
- 3) It is exemplified in the limit concept of *Zufallssinne* or better in the opposition between Necessity and Contingency in psychological laws.
- 4) This is what is reflected in Pears' reading of the limit of *Vorstellung*. Pears echoes Mauthner in his close reading.

Wittgenstein's account of philosophy, on analysis can be stated in the following way. It is a kind of fusion thesis that owed much to Mauthner's critique of language. The *first* fusion thesis is in Wittgenstein's own words: 'All philosophy is a critique of language in Mauthner's sense, but not a following of Mauthner's method.' (TLP 4.0031) The *first* half of this thesis clearly states that Wittgenstein does not follow Mauthner's method to the critique. Mauthner's psychological empiricism (called sensualism) is much more reflective in Wittgenstein's philosophy. But this is foreshadowed by Wittgenstein's *second* half of the thesis which is asserted by Wittgenstein in these words. 'Russell has shown that the grammatical form is not the same as logical form'. In a sense Frege-Russell logic (deception of grammatical form) and Mauthner's way of empiricist critique paved the ground for Wittgenstein's critique of language. It may be said that Wittgenstein espouses a more interesting variant of *sprachkritik* which provides the real ancestry to

Russell's analysing out the deceptive grammatical form into a logical form. Frege was explicitly against the psychologism that is inherent in this, holding that the non-existence of the object is intentional. Mauthner rejects this brand of psychologism and favours a more reflective variety that includes the language of psychology. Wittgenstein may be said *not* to go against psychological method. 'Theory of knowledge is the philosophy of psychology' (TLP 4.1121) echoes Mauthner. This remark is quoted by Hacker¹ to which Russell is also no stranger. The point to be borne in mind that Wittgenstein's *first fusion* thesis is an admixture of Brentano and Mauthner with the psychological underpinnings. Wittgenstein downplays this influence because he toes Frege's anti-psychologism in general.

Mauthner's view is sensualistic-sceptic in his philosophy of language. Mauthner come to the critique of language from empiricist tradition making a call to the philosopher's to pay *critical attention to language*. Mauthner's message is that analysis of language on a conventionalist assumption is self-destructive. Mauthner goes to the psychological roots to the accounts of language formation. Mauthner recognised the misleading character of language due to the fact that our mind is constructing such a language. Therefore the language is a useless tool for knowledge. Philosophy should take this idea seriously. So the basic problem of language *via* philosophy is traced in the psychological roots. This attempt is taken by Mauthner in his endeavour. The philosophical problems are at bottom psychological.

Mauthner's empirical orientation finally leads him to sceptical problems of knowledge. This is the natural consequence. Wittgenstein overlooks the aspect of empiricism of Mauthner. That is his first half of the remarks on Mauthner.

The *second* half of the first fusion thesis narrowed down to deception of logical types. This is a view shared by Wittgenstein following Russell's 'Theory of Definite Descriptions'. It is clearly stated that logical form of the language is clear when it is analysed. But the grammatical form of the sentence misleads us in many ways. Wittgenstein acknowledges Russell for spotlighting the difference between the grammatical form and logical form of the sentence. Here the main issue is linguistic confusion is a matter on philosophic confusion proper to our knowledge.

Wittgenstein's philosophy of language can be seen in this light. It is a fusion of both these ideas (ie., *Sprachkritik* + *Kritik an der Sprache*). If he had fully subscribed to Mauthner's roots of critique he would have expressed the idea more in Mauthner's point of view. We can add: Brentano's *sprachkritik* to which Russell's can be said to be a partial response. But the influence of Frege-Russell logic confused him in his doctrinal position. But we can say in a sense (1) and (2) are opposed to each other.

The *first* is roughly corresponds to the 'clinical' strain and the *second* roughly corresponds to 'linguistic' strain. These two aspects of strain is

found in the *Blue Book*, a view shared by Engel in his treatment of the Wittgenstein's so-called doctrine of the tyranny of language. These clinical strain is very perspicuous in Mauthner's critique. Lazerowitz in the recent study of Wittgenstein also found a clinical orientation to the way our minds mislead us. Ayer found that it is not the psychological but the linguistic roots that causes the whole trouble in philosophy. These two strains of arguments, however, reflects two important doctrinal aspect of the critique of language. Wittgenstein is fully aware of these contents.

Avoiding (1), Wittgenstein has made a choice of (2). He believed that Russell's way of looking at it would serve the purpose. But not Russell - Frege's way of constructing an alternative formal language. Wittgenstein remarks that neither of them understood the logic of natural language. Constructing a formalized or idealised alternative world would lead to infinite regresses. So Wittgenstein's advice is to leave ordinary language as it is. This point is succinctly brought out by Hacker in his voluminous writings on Wittgenstein and analytical philosophy. Constructed logic will be as ambiguous as the original. This is what we see in the formalised language of the predicate logic. This is exactly the reason why philosophical problems crop up in logic. So in Mauthner's sense, ordinary language is defective in yet another sense. According to Mauthner, the main task of philosophy is the liberation from the word-superstition called 'logocracy'. And in Wittgenstein's view, predicate logic is also defective. But the reason for the

defectiveness for each of them is different. For (1) basically is Mauthner's scepticism limits the ordinary language in discourse. Therefore communication is blocked and nothing is said. Predicative logic is also defective because it yields alternative ways of relating language with reality. Mauthner takes (1) seriously and direct his enquiry into a programme of critique, looking at the psychological roots. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, looks at the deception at the way *alternative modelling are evident*. This is what he calls hominism. Hominism is not independent of scepticism. Scepticism without hominism is hazardous; it stops short of the denial of possibility of any knowledge. On the other hand, hominism without scepticism will ultimately lead to unconstrained relativism and ruin the whole process of the very project.

Avoiding these *two* extremes, Mauthner strikes at the golden mean : his scepticism admits alternative model, which is an acceptable feature of modern physics and even so, of cognitive science. On Mauthner's view, a *Wettanschauung* is to be characterised as the intellectual activity of language. Language is given a place of honour in the exact sense, it becomes critical on account of knowledge and scepticism lies midway between the unarticulated formation of a theory and a successful articulation of a theory.

Engel sees the deception of language, as he was forced to explore its psychological roots but his account of the way stops short of it as an

'existential' point of view. In that sense, he radically departs from Mauthner's way of psychological roots of inquiry even though Mauthner would not have disagreed with a purely existential point of view. It hardly benefits us to give a blind endorsement to this.

For Mauthner, the primary question here is about the very possibility of psychology. Mauthner's answer to this question is that psychology is impossible and that it is impossible to state the difference between thinking and speaking. Thinking is an inner activity and speaking is an external activity. Wittgenstein might agree. Hacker quotes a remark on Wittgenstein which reads as 'what one cannot think, thereof one can also not speak.'² Wittgenstein merges this with his brand of mysticism. The categorical difference between mind and body precludes the possibility of describing the mental phenomena. So thinking must be equivocated with speaking. 'To speak is the same as to think.'³ Then all thinking is speaking, performed in language.

The ultimate lesson of Mauthner's account of psychology is thus *twofold*. On the one hand, he holds⁴ that neither the relation between mind and body nor the nature of inner events can be given accurate descriptions. This warrants a sort of scepticism. On the other hand, Mauthner maintains that philosophy, and mainly his own critique of language can contribute to the analysis of psychological concepts. All major philosophical enterprises,

including the psychology of associationism, which is the enterprise of epistemology, involve, or, are identical with psychology of language. What follows from this is a critique of *Vorsetzung* according to which language is not an accretion of *Vorstellungen*. He concludes that ‘thinking is speaking when judged for its cash value’. To speak or to think is to act. This yields an act conception of thinking. Thinking and speaking are movements. They are the same movement from two different points of view. Such a conception occupies the front seat in the literature on cognitive science. One may single out Mauthner's *act conception of memory* and the consequent *act-conception of reason* as throwing challenges to cognitive science.

The next step of in the argument is that thinking is not merely the reception of sense-impressions, but the comparison between memory-indices (*Erinnerungszeichen*). Thus memory becomes more fundamental to thinking. ‘Memory is the most fundamental of all mental concepts’. It is not an independent faculty of the soul. The puzzle of language can be solved only by discovering the true nature of memory. Mauthner expounds what is called “act-conception of memory”. The act-conception of memory enjoins that ‘All remembering is action’. What Mauthner tells us can be better articulated in the light of modern cognitive science as follows

(1) I think $p = p$

(2) I remember $q = q$

(1) and (2) are to be modelled on 'I act (verb)'. One can compare Wittgenstein's analysis of belief – propositions 'I believe that *p*'. According to Wittgenstein, this is analysed as "*p*" says *p*.

What the above view entails is that the act of remembering involves a linguistic means. To put it simply, memory is linguistic. This leads to the consequence of the *verbal nature of memory*. Mauthner says that having a memory means being able to describe it, refers to it, or, generally articulate it. Instead of holding that thinking involves language or a more familiar way of putting it is that cognition is related to language. Mauthner's psychological method suggests that we recall the past when we articulate it in language. Thus in a sense, all articulation is articulation of the past. There is no casual relation between language and thought so as to bolster up a thesis saying that speech is the external clothing of the thought. But Mauthner finds that this casual relation between the inner and outer is problematic. This is soluble in his understanding by making use of the distinction between *necessity/contingency*. So he thinks that memory as articulation of the thought of the past. From this, he passes on to assert the psychological foundation of the critique of language is to be found in memory. According to his account, memory lays a crucial part in laying the psychological foundations of the whole critique of language.

Language contains memory, both individual and collective, and in that sense, it *is* memory. Together with memory, Mauthner takes *attention* also as the psychological condition of articulation. That is, the activity of *paying attention* is important for articulated reaction to the external world. Since language is an articulated activity, we need a set of rules. Such rules are said to be rules of games (*spielregel*). This analogy between language activity and rule-following is much exploited in later Wittgenstein. The natural consequence is that the later Wittgenstein is more allied to Mauthner, a thesis that needs more thorough research. The point to be borne in mind here is that such rules are not necessary but contingent. Wittgenstein introduces this in the concept of *Zufallssinne*. The contingent character of *Zufallssinne* determines the contour of the way we describe the world and thus the rules are analysed to games because they are susceptible to change. They are rule-governed but at the same time, they are not prescriptive, they are more or less regular and hence they are conventional.

Mauthner's linguistic conventionalism holds that we cannot prescribe the rules as a matter of necessity. It is not intended to imply that there is an identifiable social contract at the basis of this activity. Weiler comments that even though the contract is open to change, still it is governed by certain conventions.

So now, meaning is a pure psychological concept, in that we cannot separate a meaning apart from the way it is used. Thus meaning-acts show cluster-like characteristics or what Wittgenstein calls family-resemblance. Our concept-formation is solely based on this. From this, he passes on to say that all our language-using to shut through with word-superstition or logocracy. Logocracy is Mauthner's word for word-realism and thus becomes a closer alley for pure realism in Wittgenstein.

For explaining all the features, the term *Zufallssinne* seems crucial. Thus reason itself can be shown to be under the sway of contingency. *Zufallsvernunft* is the term Mauthner uses to refer to the contingent character of reason. Thus he claims to complete Kant's critique in a new way of critique of language. Mauthner claims to take Kant to its logical conclusion.

Logocracy is a variant of tyranny of language. This is the psychological roots. Engel wants to pursue but he could not succeed as his attention was concentrating on deception of language. The most important step in Mauthner's critique is to attack epistemology, where he identifies the phenomenal with the verbal, an endeavour that is quite similar to that of Pears. His aim is to show that phenomenal is not real, whereas Pears shows that it is uncritical or semi-critical. The doctrine of tyranny is limited by the way Engel takes it in a less sanguine direction.

Thus Mauthner's doctrine is language is self-enclosing. The parallel in Wittgenstein reads as : 'I cannot get out of language by means of language.'

The *second* fusion of Wittgenstein's philosophy is inspired by Schopenhauer's remarks on solipsism, self as the limiting cases of the critique. Wittgenstein's conception of solipsism is derived from Schopenhauer after entering into a 'dialogue' with Schopenhauer. '*The limits of my language* mean the limits of my world (TLP 5.6). The world is *my* world'. 'The limits of *language* means the limits of my world' (TLP 5.62) 'I am my world' (TLP 5.63). The 'microcosom' is my world. So my language is my world. Your language is your world. But we do not found a common world. These concepts is related to the 'hoministic' view of Mauthner in which he views that all philosophies in human language are hoministic picture of the world. So 'hominism' means all language is an embodiment of human point of view. This can also be compared with the truth-function of Wittgenstien in which he squeezes the alternative worlds into the mechanism of truth-function itself. All possibilities are open to our view. 'I' is no longer need for describing the world. Language is projected onto the world and the world is phenomenologically reflected in language. Therefore 'I' is disappearing from the scene. 'I' is a vanishing point. 'I' is not related to the world as language is not related to the world. In that sense, logic is transcendental and therefore *a priori*. This is exactly where we have brought in Pear's reading of the link between Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein as

reflected in many of the major works, especially the *Notebooks*, *BlueBook*, *Grammatik*, Cambridge Lectures etc.

5.2 Mauthner's Cognitive Conception of Psychology :

Mauthner's cognitive conception of psychology has never been fully evaluated. Though Weiler gives a systematic account of the psychological method, there is no clue as to how this should be evaluated in the light of contemporary Cognitive Science. This stands in sharp contrast to the evaluation of Wittgenstein's account of the exact relation between thought and language from the view point of contemporary schools of cognitive science (e.g. representationalism).⁵ There is reason why Wittgenstein can be seen in conjunction with Mauthner as the recent *Blog* on Mauthner recommends.

As illustrated in the previous section, Mauthner's psychological method bears the following sub-divisions: on the one hand, one can see

- (i) His scepticism is not to be counterposed to epistemology.
- (ii) His method applies equally to psychology as well as historical sciences (including theology), thus crossing the border between *Naturwissenschaften* and *Geisteswissenschaften*

As far the tangible method is concerned, one can study it from the point of view of the following features:

(a) Mind–body relation (b) speaking and thinking (c) meaning *and* attention (d) will (e) concept–formation (f) meaning and (g) psychological explanation (causation). Let us elaborate on each.

Mauthner's cognitive concept of 'memory' and 'attention' are the key components of his psychological method. In this connection Mauthner uses the word *Zuffalls* which actually refers to limitation, constraints etc. By this concept, Mauthner means that our senses are contingent. This is because we do not know the necessary connection of our five senses with the history of human evolution. This idea came from Plato's *Cave* in the *Republic*. Sense organs select certain things to the mind. This constitutes according to Mauthner a limitation, that our pictures of the world is always partial and distorted. No amount of piecemeal improvements of our organs or an additional organs can surpass the limits of our possible knowledge. This leads to scepticism. More precisely stated, while memory falls a prey to contingency, attention to language has a restorative value. The latter bears an analogy to 'therapeutic' concerns.

Mauthner abolishes the distinction between sensations and thought. Both are part of the natural history of man. Hence concepts would be the products of natural history of man. Wittgenstein, in contrast with Mauthner, ignores the significance of evolution for the concept-formation in his philosophical work. Mauthner believes that 'contingency' rules in all philosophizing of philosophy and natural history. Mauthner criticizes Kant's

notion of ‘understanding’ and the ‘concepts’ have an independent status. Kant failed to realize that reason is *not* pure, hence, no critique of it is possible. Reason and reality are basically the same process. There is no question of an ordering principle ie. *soul*. The fact is that since our senses are contingent naturally our reason too is contingent. “Our reason (it is but language) can only be a *Zufallsvernunft*, because it rests on *Zufallssinne*.. . ”⁶ Senses and reason are contingent because they are part of reality and all reality is contingent.

Memory : Mauthner regarded memory as the most fundamental of all mental concepts. For Mauthner thinking or the ability to have experiences presuppose memory. Memory is a function of organized living matter. He connect memory to language which is our means of expressing what we remember. We arranged the memory in the form of adjectives, nouns with our *aims* in grouping. They are neither qualitative nor substantive. Memory occurs when an individual remembers. It is not an independent faculty of the soul.

The significance of Mauthner’s ‘memory’ discussion is central in his critique as observed: ‘the puzzle of language’ can be solved only by discovering the ‘true nature of memory.’⁷ The language of the person is nothing but the personal memory of his experience. Mauthner’s linking of

language and memory shows the asymmetrical relation between verb and noun. So we cannot talk 'Memory' in a general way that would be misled us.

Remembering and 'having a memory' is not of the same kind. 'Having a memory' is essentially a *linguistic means* to refer to a former experience. Memory is not passive as we assign signs to former experience it is an activity.⁸ So on analysis that 'having a memory' means 'being able to describe it refer to it, generally articulate it.' They are purely verbal and not imagery. There are certain elements which activates our memory. That element is according to Mauthner is 'doing'. To remember something we must specifically draw some acts. It means that 'All remembering is action'⁹. There are invisible 'traces' which are dispositions. This makes us to compare our memory to the previous episodes. There are no passive memories in Mauthner's act-conception of memory.

'The whole activity of classification to account for the connections of the memory, is produced by human language, is nothing but the comparisons of impressions and the equating of impressions through a common word.'¹⁰ Mauthner says further: "all activities of the memory are but a comparison, a mysterious comparison of present nerve-agitations with nerve dispositions...."¹¹ Again 'that every remembering is *an action*, namely a change in consciousness which compares two conditions of nerves.'¹² We

have no *principium comparationis* to executive this. To the extent, we don't have it, we are led by the nose of language.

This *first* scientific hypothesis of linking acts of remembering with nerve-state is not successful as in the case of thinking in terms of brain-states. Mauthner recognizes that we do not know the physiological process which alone is real. The *second* hypothesis is combined with epistemological or *linguistic*. The memory is associated with linguistic sign. He divides acts of memory into two groups.

According to Weiler, Mauthner's physiological hypothesis is no help in comparing the memory. This is true of a disposition. But his approach to memory in terms of the verbal *nature of memory* is very helpful. There could be no recollection without verbalization. However he recognized non-verbal memories. They are 'systems of formulae' like words.¹³

We are aware of the pastness of our memories. This makes a comparison between present and past perceptions which constitutes 'transcending of time'.¹⁴ This requires a time element to consciousness in order to remember. This is also an another linguistic predicament. According to Weiler, Mauthner is dissatisfied with the treatment of memory and time.¹⁵

Concept-formation: Mauthner pioneered the concept-formation in terms of linguistic articulation. According to him, words and concepts are identical. Observations of similarities is the basis of concept-formation. No

abstract word or general *Vorstellung*. Our representation is not an accretion of *Vorstellungen* (no rules-as-rail Platonism). All words exemplifying an activity. He rejects both theories. The connection between mental images and meaningfulness is purely contingent. He suggests that we pay closer attention to the everyday words refer to familiar objects. Mauthner asserts that it is the word or concept which can evoke a representation. His theory of concept-formation is linked to the identification of thinking and speaking. By concepts, we mean the activity of grasping or comprehending something. Apart from that concept is empty. Mauthner holds that concept originates from extensions and not from intensions. The learning of concept *begins* with a learning of extension ie. the particulars which falls under the concepts and the comparison of various particulars. The change in linguistic form always indicates a conceptual change. It is a sign for a different way of grasping. So two people do not share the concepts. All our concepts are vague because of the sensual material available to each individual and this is also the reason for privacy. Mauthner's crucial doctrine is that there are no qualitatively identical mental occurrences which various people can have. There are differences. The question of how concepts and words are identical is based on the logic of a false psychology.¹⁶

There are various ways of grasping or comprehending. *Three* kinds are distinguished: (1) it depends on the degree of attention; (2) it depends on the judgement which assigns a name and (3) it becomes an explanation. There is

no unique criteria of the applicability or non-applicability of adjectives. This is comparable to Wittgenstein's use of 'criteria': It is quite artificial to say that a man progressed from the level of sensations to that of perceptions or judgements. For remembering of past is always a verbal act. Thus this is a question whether this is a memory of sensation or a judgement. Mauthner in this connection rejects the view that concepts are all of one kind. He also rejects psychologically acquisitions of concepts only in one way. Weiler characterises this as his most significant contribution to the philosophy of language.¹⁷ It means that words cannot refer in the same way always. The names assigns to objects have various functions in language depends upon our whole scheme of knowledge. There are various ways we can grasp something. There are no artificial demarcation between sensations, perceptions and judgements. There are sensations which are not yet articulated. The same form of words can express any of these. Words have more than one kind of role in language.

Weiler calls attention to this as *radical functionalism*. Mauthner's point is that one might be look at these matters (sensation, etc.) functionally. We must not ask what is the role of an utterance in language but ask what is its role in the language. We grasped the essential sameness of certain phenomena in the word *gravity*. So words may sums the discovery. It means that all words is truly identified with a sensory backing. Numerals are not hence concept. Mauthner identified word-concept and meaning and not with word and

concept. There is no difference between concept and word in our language. There is no contrast between word-concept and meaning. Words *means* something. Meaning is purely a psychological concept. So words itself becomes concepts in the logical operations. Concepts is nothing but the meaningful word.

Language, according to Humboldt, represents things by way of representing concepts of things.¹⁸ Mauthner does not agree with this. We say everything in a meaningful words. In speech conditions words refer to things. Similarly he expresses his disagreement with him on the notion of inner form. It is a real herring. He is also against Humboldt's conception of *geist* as expressing the spirit of language.

Mauthner's notion of *attention* is the central doctrine in the linguistic psychological centre of all our mental concepts. By this he meant a 'clarifying psychology and critique of language'.¹⁹ We see there is no sharp distinction between sensations, perceptions and judgements. There is only the activity of *paying attention (aufmerken)*²⁰ to the aspects of that experience. What is attended can only be articulated. Articulation is an activity. The psychological conditions of articulations hence is *paying attention*. Mauthner says "attention is the most general way of characterizing our articulated reaction to the outside world."²¹ What is not attended does not become a concept. Attention

may be both active and passive. Attention is the link between our immediate experiences and memory.

So memory and attention are not to be seen as separate activities of the brain. This notion *Aufmerksamkeit* in German, is central to Mauthner's whole doctrine because this is regarded as the linguistic-psychological centre of all our mental concepts. Therefore attention is directed to one object rather than another which depends on previous and present experience. Attention is memory's efforts to adjust to the previous relationship. These arguments are directed against faculty psychology. According to Mauthner, the *activities* are not performed by a *Self* or *Mind* but he explores the identifiable physical conditions when the activities are performed. The physical centre constitutes the mental life. The physical changes and corresponding mental experiences can be revealed in advanced research which may be forced us to abandon the conceptual distinction.²²

Will and *paying attention* is part of the same continuum. There is a continuous adoption of the whole memory to experiences. Memory is the memory of the whole organism and not located in a mental faculty. Adaptation works in our memory states. This begins with an inner accompanying phenomenon occurs in larger groups of muscles what we call as 'will' and it is seen in the nerves, we call it as 'attention'. An element of attention is always present. The correlation between them may be proved

successfully in future. Mauthner's position is that there must always be a gap between what the scientists discovers and articulated experience. Science cannot correlate particular things said or seen with physical events.

This gap between fully worked out physiology and articulated experience cannot be filled. That is, what Mauthner says that forces us to assign a role to language. This underlies the physicalist and language strands in Mauthner's thinking. Only by means of language we become conscious of our experience. Science also uses the same procedure. There are no scientific language which is not related to sense-experience. So it remains a gap what we say and what actually goes on in the nature. To overcome this difficulty is to invent a logically *and* scientifically perfect language making use of the present discovered language. That language requires more *attention* and *selectivity*. Mauthner hoped to the purification of the language of psychology in which psychologists, scientists and philosophers take part. This is the modest task of critique of language.²³

Therefore the task of critique is revival of our means of speaking in the light of true nature. Mauthner noted the ambiguity of the notion of 'pain' and 'pleasure' in our language. The 'word' 'pain' is used for denoting all kinds of discomforts. But there is no general word for describing pleasant feelings. Pain is located in particular part of the body. Science describes it in qualitative terms. So it is the task of the critique of language to inquire into

the scientific accuracy and the accuracy of descriptions of experience.²⁴ Weiler sees a certain ambiguity in his concept of critique of language. Nevertheless, it also enabled him to gain some insights of the importance of Mauthner's philosophy of language.

5.3 Mauthner's Limit Concept of *Zufallsgeschichte* (lawfulness/law-like):

We have seen how Mauthner's Critique of language is at work in the domain of natural science (*Naturwissenschaften*). Now we will see how it is made to work in the domain of humanities (*Geisteswissenschaften*). Weiler describes it as an *application* to the domain of intellectual historiography. It is intellectual in the sense that it applies to the domain of analysis of concepts. In the case of Mauthner, it is applied to the analysis of the concept of *Atheism*. Weiler says that towards the end of his life, Mauthner undertook to apply his method in writing a history of European Atheism. It is coinciding with the publication of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. It runs into four volumes. .

Mauthner turned from philosophy to history by following the path of Hume. He tried to trace the sources of the idea of a critique of language. He noted that the major sources are Otto Ludwig, Ernst Mach, Bismark and also the decisive impact of Nietzschean philosophy. Mauthner joined hands with the anti-Hegelian attitudes with Nietzsche. Like Nietzsche, Mauthner is also an anti-Hegelian. Nietzsche argued that all 'historical laws' are 'nothing but

the commonest knowledge'²⁵ and rejects the idea of 'history is rational'. 'The historical illusion is due to the unreasonable or irrational history of mankind. It is a history of accidents (*zufallsgeschichte*). There are no historical laws.'²⁶ This view is close to Mauthner's empiricists' outlook which is derived partly from Ernst Mach.

In the context of the idea, it is of interest to examine his historiographic procedure with his philosophical ideas especially his concept of *Geistgeschichte* and history of ideas. In order to understand what Mauthner has to say about 'all history is *Zufallsgeschichte*' we have to compare the casual concepts of Mauthner with Hume. Hume was a sceptic about casuality. Casuality is explained by Hume 'it is nothing but a habit of the mind to connect events by means of the concepts of cause and effect'. Nevertheless, the concept has 'something' of a categorical status. On Kant's view, the objectivity of knowledge is gained by applying these concepts. Mauthner holds the view that casuality is categorical because we cannot do without it. According to Mauthner, 'to explain means to search for causes. We cannot simultaneously aims at explanation and then suddenly renounce the concept of cause'²⁷. 'The relation between cause and effect is the basic hypothesis of our whole *Weltanschauung*. Mauthner in this way turned the *habit and customs* of Hume into the customs and habits of the mind. According to Weiler he rejects certain set of concepts on philosophical grounds.

The *second* important concept is with regard to modality. The key - idea of this model concept is *Zufall*. There are two distinct meanings assigned to this concept by examining its history. Put it in another way, it is a mere negative concept that lies in the sense that it has meaning only in contrasted with its opposite. The two opposites of *Zufall* are *necessity* and *law-likeness*. According to Mauthner, historicism confused these terms. All model concepts express our own feeling on certainty more or less based on our knowledge. Thus the concept of *Zufall* if it is the opposite of *necessity* becomes a purely psychological concept. Hence, according to Mauthner, it is ‘*intentional, essential and necessary* are one set of opposites of *Zufall*’.²⁸ The second notion *law-like* is related to the *universal*. We find occasionally regularities in the world and interpret them in terms of the laws of nature .

There are two important differences between the opposites of *Zufall*. The *first* is that model concepts are useless in the description of reality. We are not describing reality but merely expressing our attitudes and beliefs. We are using it in a psychological sense. We ‘find’ necessity in the nature as ‘we ourselves have put it there’. This is true of *Zufall* considering it as opposite to necessity. Mauthner clearly asserted that model concepts cannot be a true description of reality: ‘necessary, that is accident’²⁹. This agrees with Wittgenstein’s dictum in the *Tractatus* 6.3: ‘The exploration of logic means the exploration of everything that is subject to law. And outside logic, everything is accidental’. Mounce comments: ‘this might seem to present

Wittgenstein with a problem: Mounce raises the question: what is he to make of scientific laws, as they appear, say, in physics? And answers it: at first sight, these may fit neither into the category of the *logically necessary* nor into that of the *accidental*. Wittgenstein's account of the law of nature: 'we cannot infer the events of the future from those of the present'. (TLP 5.136) 'Superstition is nothing but belief in the casual nexus'. The whole modern conception of the world is founded on the illusion that the so-called laws of nature are the explanation of natural phenomena (TLP 6.371).

The *second* difference between the opposite of *Zufall* is the concept of *universality* (law-likeness). This is a notion of causality a view of natural science. We cannot talk about *accidents* in nature as we have no scientific procedure to assign meaning to *Zufall* in contrast with causality. Hume arrived at the idea of causality to its logical conclusions by excluding the possibility of accidents. Mauthner maintains that there is no sense in talking about 'accidents' at all. 'Our belief in Free Will', Mauthner speaks, 'prevents us from maintaining causality and accidents simultaneously. This is inconsistent with any modern accounts of Cognitive Science. This is also the view equally shared by philosopher like Pears and more recently Tin Thornton.

Nietzsche's rejection of historicism originated in Schopenhauer's idea that history cannot be a science because its subject matter is always the

individual. In Science the subject matter is always general. So the application of causality in history is impossible. Hence 'all history is *Zufallsgeschichte* is a rejection of the concept of history *qua* science. Mauthner's historiographic pursuit is relevant in this context.

Following Rickert who says that there are no specific historical concepts, Mauthner believes that historiography can be scientific only in a limited sense. Writing history is a quest for connecting events sometimes in casual terms. But the casual connection is not the same as the events in nature. Mauthner believes that it is more anthropomorphic notions of cause in what an agent intentionally act. On Mauthner's view historical study is not an impersonal search for objective laws but a *deed*, always pursued from the point of view of the present and in the *language of the present* , the only language we really understand.³⁰

Mauthner gave an explanation of his own statements that some events was the necessary consequence of another. The notion of *Zufallsgeschichte* has a slightly different meaning in historiography. Model concepts is useful as a working concepts in historiography. It means that *Zufall* can be used as an explanatory concept of historiography. We employ model concepts in historiography both an event occurred accidentally or it occurred necessarily. Then these concepts (in the form of *natural law*) are *hoministic*. The use of the concept in a given context as an indication of our knowledge and attitudes.

Once we have ‘information’ and the ‘psychological make-up’ we cannot see a necessary connection between those events.

Mauthner’s reflection on history and philosophy culminated in his *The History of Atheism*. According to him, the religion of the ancient world was without dogmas. The liberation of the belief in God began when this belief definitely expressed in *words*. Thus this historical work is in line with his ‘critique of language’ maintained that ‘God’ is only a *word* which does not refer to anything real. From this, it is understood that Mauthner’s project is to turn the *history of liberation from the belief in God into the history of the word God*.³¹ In this sense, we read again ‘History of language, history of a word are always history of culture.’³² Mauthner criticizes the theological arguments of God. Hence the history of atheism becomes the history of the abandonment of the language of theology. According to Weiler, Mauthner does not recount all the details in his work for developing the central idea, ‘the growth of language-consciousness which reveals ‘God’ as a non-referring term.’³³ The work concludes with the thesis that the ultimate consequence of the ‘critique of language’ is *Godless mysticism* ‘so far has consciousness come’. From Weiler’s point of view, Mauthner’s historiographical enterprise is essentially Hegelian.

There are *two* ways of looking at the forms of historicism in Hegelian point of view. 1) It is the so-called *Geistesgeschichte* (history of the spirit) 2)

and the history of ideas. According to Hegel, 'events themselves occur as historically meaningful only when the concepts, which can be used to describe those events, are already present. The concepts of the *narrative* are real ingredients of historical events. This is the view referred in (1). For them the whole history as the expression of spirit or a certain period of history as the expression of a specific idea. This resulted in the Hegel's distinction between *events* and *narrative* that is blurred. The concept of narrative is a factor in affecting historical events. As far as it is concerned with (2) the job of the historian is to trace the 'ingredients of a larger idea' to his 'unit – ideas in various conceptual compounds. Thus the history of ideas becomes an enquiry into a certain concept in its historical setting. This requires a *linguistic analysis* of the meaning of the 'term' which refers the particular idea in question.

In this context of Mauthner's thesis, that all history is *Zufallsgeschichte* is inconsistent with Hegelianism. Mauthner says that the 'very idea of a history, arise only after people had ceased to believe in the intervention of God into their affairs. The connection between events was a casual one but it does not mean its inevitability. Casual explanation in history is one way of connecting events making them intelligible. But on analysis, the mode of connection is revealed as a *deed* of the historian and not discovered something in the events themselves. Mauthner recognizes the overall casual factor, is the *language*, the whole *Weltanschauung* in which thinkers are

dependent. For Mauthner, language is a contingent product of historical development of an idea but *personal* re-creation of the past.³⁴ History, for Mauthner, is a way of presenting his own critical point of view. In that sense critique of language and the history of the rejection of God are one and the same enterprise. All things and ideas are contingent is the true outcome of his scepticism. Now we shall turn to the major findings of the thesis.

5.4. Research Findings and Scope for Further Research:

At this juncture, the narrative of the thesis is to be reconstructed once again. We started the project with an open end in which we wanted to investigate the full significance of the phrase 'critique of language' that Wittgenstein has introduced in his early work. We did not start with an idea to investigate Mauthner's influence on Wittgenstein. Even now it remains so. We tried to assess how interpreters began to cope up with this phrase. According to our assessment no one interpreter has taken seriously Wittgenstein's alliance to Mauthner let alone Wittgenstein. On the other hand, we found that the correspondences between these *two* thinkers can still be pursued as an independent research project.

- (1) Thus one of the key findings of our research is to look at the crucial phrase in all its ramifications. (the five-layered model is suggested in this context). Accordingly, we maintain the tempo of our investigation by addressing ourselves to one question or other throughout the thesis.

This is a remarkable achievement because there is not enough corpus of literature which focus on this aspect of Wittgenstein's work.

- (2) *Secondly*, we pave the way to a continuum and adjust this to what we call as *interface*. The interface is meant to convey that the early and the later work are having an interface even though the received reading prefers to treat them as rivals to each other. The rivalry between realism and anti-realism has been almost exhaustively treated in the literature but no one has seen it as a dilemma to be rejected forthwith. We try to go beyond the ordeal of rejecting it and begin to favour an interface in the manner in which Pears has done a great service to Wittgenstein scholarship. So rivalry, opposition, continuity are replaced by interface. Interface subsumes other modes and the ground under the rivalry is cut. This is what is captured by the celebrated phrase 'critique of language'.
- (3) The interface also gets absorbed into the early and later work respectively in the ubiquity of alternative systems which is aired in both of these works.
- (4) We have consulted a large number of interpreters starting from Fogelin, Stuart Shanker, Derek Bolton, Baker and Hacker, Engel, Pears and numerous others but we find that the references to Mauthner's works were extremely constrained. Practically the

references are few and far in between. It becomes thus obvious that Mauthner is a neglected figure. We inquire into the reasons why this should be so. We found that, Mauthner 'is' an avowed sceptic and Wittgenstein's own affiliation to scepticism is not clearly laid out. The only scope here is *not* to treat Mauthner as a sceptic in the received sense in which he opposes the epistemological projects. On the other hand, Wittgenstein endorses epistemology as well as scepticism. His work is rather directed against the possibility of the epistemology of psychology. For Mauthner, the possibility is hampered by the way the conceptualization are pursued without psychology.

- (5) Thus he accepts functionalist equivalent of brain but wants to put a note of caution, which Wittgenstein adumbrates in his dictum which holds that 'let us not be bewitched'. The alternative is to exhort us to exercise critical attention to language, a phrase that is a *positive* equivalent of the *negative* critique of language.
- (6) Our investigation found it necessary to focus in this phrase, as it is deemed that it provides the right entry into all the other doctrines in the *Tractatus* as well as in the *Philosophical Investigations*. Not only that this phrase seem essential to make much of Wittgenstein *coherent*. This is what probably many interpreters missed. Perhaps they thought

that this is too narrow a focus to concentrate. They are under some constraint or other.

- (7) If our start is a correct one, one remarkable result is that we can plot one position in relation to others (including Pears) except when they sound too critical. Thus we are facilitated to a great extent to put forward a reading that subsumes other major readings, including Hintikka or Peacocke, which we have not chosen to explore within the compass of the thesis.
- (8) The question what exactly is the doctrinal content is answered by tracing it to the master concept of *Zufallssinne*, that occurs in Mauthner's writings. It is opposed to necessity and it holds the key.

As far as the scope for further research is concerned, we deem it necessary to record that the affinity between the major doctrines of Mauthner and Wittgenstein in the light of contemporary Cognitive Science is desirable. To this end, we have singled out Mauthner's remarks on memory, reason, language, attention etc. On the side of Wittgenstein, we wish that major interpretations like Pears has not been sympathetically considered by other writers.

Finally, the relation to Wittgenstein's philosophical account of mathematics have never been considered by writers. The last batch of books are all on this contribution towards the philosophy of mathematics. One

contention is that if any project turns out to be genuine, they may not be quite inconsistent with our own reading. This is because the rival schools require fresh interpretations in the light of Wittgenstein's ambivalence to a viable philosophy of mathematics. Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics may attract reconsideration, in the light of the research carried out here.

Notes:

- 1) P.M.S. Hacker, *Insight and Illusion* (Oxford : Clarendon press, second edn., 1986/1989) p. 78 –79.
- 2) *Ibid.*, p. 91.
- 3) Gershon Weiler, *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p.20.
- 4) *Ibid.*, p. 17.
- 5) See Tin Thorntun, *Wittgenstein on Language and Thought : The Philosophy of Content* (Edinburgh University Press, 1998).
- 6) Fritz Mauthner, 'Beitrage zu einer Kritik der Sprache' referred in Gershon Weiler's *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p. 62.
- 7) *Ibid.* , p. 63.
- 8) Gershon Weiler, *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p.64.
- 9) Fritz Mauthner, 'Beitrage zu einer Kritik der Sprache' referred in Gershon Weiler's *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p. 65.
- 10) *Ibid.* , p. 66.
- 11) *Ibid.*, p. 66.
- 12) *Ibid.*, p. 66.
- 13) Gershon Weiler, *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p.68.
- 14) *Ibid.* , p. 69.
- 15) *Ibid.* p. 69.
- 16) *Ibid.*, p. 74 .
- 17) *Ibid.*, p. 76.
- 18) See Gershon Weiler, *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p.78.
- 19) Fritz Mauthner, 'Worterbuch der Philosophie' referred in Gershon Weiler's *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p. 79.
- 20) Gershon Weiler, *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p.79.
- 21) Fritz Mauthner, 'Worterbuch der Philosophie' referred in Gershon Weiler's *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p. 79.
- 22) Gershon Weiler, *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p.81

- 23) *Ibid.*, p. 82.
- 24) *Ibid.*,p.84.
- 25) See Gershon Weiler, *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p.307.
- 26) *Ibid.*, p. 308.
- 27) Fritz Mauthner, 'Beitrage zu einer Kritik der Sprache' referred in Gershon Weiler's *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p. 308.
- 28) Fritz Mauthner, 'Worterbuch der Philosophie' referred in Gershon Weiler's *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p. 309.
- 29) See Gershon Weiler, *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p.309.
- 30) Fritz Mauthner, 'Worterbuch der Philosophie' referred in Gershon Weiler's *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p. 311.
- 31) Gershon Weiler, *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p.312.
- 32) Fritz Mauthner, 'Worterbuch der Philosophie' referred in Gershon Weiler's *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p. 313.
- 33) Gershon Weiler, *Mauthner's Critique of Language* (Cambridge, 1970) p.313.
- 34) *Ibid.*, p. 317.

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