

**A STUDY ON  
HEIDEGGER'S THINKING AND  
HERMENEUTICAL PHENOMENOLOGY**

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**BABU. M.N.**

**DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY  
UNIVERSITY OF CALICUT,  
KERALA, INDIA**


**DECEMBER 2005**

Dr. S. Radha  
 Prof. and Head  
 Department of Philosophy  
 University of Calicut  
 Calicut University P.O. - 673 635

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This is to certify that the thesis entitled **A Study on Heidegger's Thinking and Hermeneutical Phenomenology** submitted to University of Calicut for the award of the Degree of **Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy**, under the Faculty of Humanities, is a bonafied research work done by **Shri. Babu M.N.**, during the period of his study in the Department of Philosophy, University of Calicut under my supervision and guidance and the thesis has not previously formed the basis for the award of any degree, diploma, associateship, fellowship or any other similar title.

Place : C.U.Campus  
 Date : 31.12.05



*Radha*  
 Dr. S. Radha 31/12/05

HEAD  
 DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY  
 UNIVERSITY OF CALICUT

Babu M.N.  
Research Scholar  
Department of Philosophy  
University of Calicut  
Calicut University P.O., 673 635

### DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the thesis entitled **A study on Heidegger's Thinking and Hermeneutical Phenomenology** submitted to University of Calicut for the award of the Degree of **Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy** is a record of research work done by me under the supervision and guidance of **Dr. S. Radha**, Prof. and Head of the Department of Philosophy, University of Calicut and it has previously not formed the basis for the award of any degree, diploma, associateship, fellowship or any other similar title.

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Date : 31.12.2005

  
Babu M.N.

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# **Introduction**

One of the oldest and most important questions of philosophy, holds Heidegger, is the history of man in amazement of Being. According to Heidegger, this problem of Being was first raised by Anaximander. He holds that Being is the closest to us than our inner most essence. Heidegger points out that pre-Socratic philosophers alone dealt with this problem in the correct perspective. Since then, philosophers for centuries considered Being as an empty concept. Heidegger says that the history of philosophy from Plato and Aristotle until Nietzsche committed a grievous error. The error was that Being came to be understood in terms of substantial beings with an over dose of the Christian concept of a personal God within the frame work of logic. Consequently, the ultimate Being was transformed into an abstract term and an empty concept. Being of beings was pushed away into oblivion. Heidegger's contentions is that Being is the most real and we possess at least a rudimentary awareness of it. Therefore, Heidegger wants to open a new avenue to think of Being.

From the time of Plato and Aristotle, there has been a deterioration in the understanding of Being. Heidegger states that man's thinking which tries to penetrate the ground of metaphysics is not itself a form of metaphysics. In the modern metaphysics,

the cause of being is often called God. Heidegger holds that to consider God as the cause of the world is an improper way of considering the issues. This type of thinking can be found in modern thinking especially in Descartes. He was shifting the subject of metaphysics from the realm of Being to the domain of substance. This openly gives way to the transformation of metaphysics to an ontology. In a well-known passage Descartes compares philosophy with a tree whose roots are the other science. Commenting on this passage, Heidegger remarks that Descartes forgot to mention the soil as the ground of metaphysics.

Heidegger says that the traditional metaphysics has no ground, it is not grounded. According to Heidegger, the truth of Being, which is assumed to be the ground of metaphysics or ontology, has remained hidden from the metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle to that of Nietzsche. The result was that Being and beings were often confused and Being was totally ignored or eliminated.

Heidegger conceives the question of Being differently from Aristotle. To Aristotle the question of being is Being as being or Being *qua* being. But Heidegger sees it as a question of the Being of being. To Heidegger the subject of thinking is indeed, be.

But he points to its difference from being. According to Heidegger, the relation of being to being is the relation of being to its ground.

Heidegger in his work, *Identity and Difference*, sees the fundamental mistake of traditional metaphysics in the fact that since Plato philosophers have forgotten or neglected the essential difference between Being and beings. For this reason, their thinking degenerated into what Heidegger designates as ontotheology which reached its peak in Hegel. The being of traditional metaphysics and the God, but they are only forms of our representative thinking, i.e., metaphysics is ontotheological. For, the ontotheological character of metaphysics has become questionable to thinking people not because of some kind of atheism but because of an experience of thinking in which still unthought unity of the essence of metaphysics is revealed in ontotheology.

The God of ontotheology is the God of metaphysics, and not the God of genuine human freedom. For him God of metaphysics is God who is *causa sui*. In *Identity and Difference*, Heidegger says: this is the right name for the God of philosophy. Man can neither pray nor sacrifice to this God. Before the *causa sui*, man can neither fall to his knee nor can play and dance before this God.

For Heidegger, the theologians must not be satisfied with the metaphysical understanding of the notions like creation from out of nothing or God as first cause, etc. Truly speaking, it is necessary to overcome metaphysics and abandon the metaphysical conception of God. In short, in his later philosophy, Heidegger discusses the absence of God. God, he tells us, has withdrawn from the contemporary Western world. Again, in *Identify and Difference*, Heidegger writes about the task of stepping back from the traditional ways of thinking of philosophy. For, the Western languages are languages of metaphysical thinking. He again holds that theology is a statement made by representational thinking about God. The theologians believe that God has been necessary to metaphysics because God is the very foundation of existence, the first cause as *causa sui*, and the ground on which all other existence rests. Hence, metaphysics is ontotheological.

The implications of Heidegger's search for Being are manifold and complex. The attempt to recall Being from its oblivion constitutes, for him, not only a change in the direction of metaphysics, but an actual overcoming of metaphysics. This overcoming of metaphysics would result in a radical reversal of history of metaphysics and a change in the understanding of human nature itself. Heidegger's aim is the destruction of the

history of ontology. Destruction does not mean here the annihilation of something worthless and it also does not mean an anti-metaphysical attitude. Destruction involves the removal of the hardened insensitivity into which traditional metaphysics has fallen. The concept of universality, indefinability and self-evidence are inadequate precisely because they are concepts and postulates of reason. They should be removed from the soil in which metaphysics is born, in which they constitute an unwarranted extension of categorical thinking. This sort of rationalism is a kind of subjectivism which began with Plato and lasted until Nietzsche.

However, the philosophy of Heidegger consists of a peculiar set of challenges for all thinkers of today. His writings contain fundamental challenges for major metaphysical traditions in Western Philosophy. He is welcomed and seen as freeing religion from metaphysics. Heidegger meant that the overcoming of ontotheology is a philosophical activity. The overcoming of metaphysics is not meant for rejecting God for the transvaluation of values (Nietzsche). Heidegger holds that metaphysicians need to recognize the difference between Being and beings. However, they constitute ontotheology by raising being to the highest level.

What is it which is the most worthy of thought? The ontotheological character of metaphysics makes it questionable as

the object of thinking. Ontotheology has arisen not because of atheism but from the experience of thinking of metaphysics, logic and theology. Heidegger's rejection of the ontotheological tradition poses a major challenge to contemporary theology. However, his own position is not so established and secure and no one can suggest that an absolutely clear and consistent alternative has been provided by Heidegger to what he considers to be the negative characteristic of ontotheology.

*In Being and Time*, Heidegger had written about the relation of Dasein to ready to hand and present at hand. In that treatment Heidegger shows that he is not an idealist or a pragmatist for whom subjectivity or will is the ground of Being. By using the expression unconcealing he presents to us the process of revealing of Being. The history of Being is the history of the process of unconcealment. Heidegger speaks of the groundless ground of Being. He writes that one can see how human beings (Dasein) are related to Being. Dasein and Being belong together because Dasein has essentially a relationship of responding to the call of Being. For, it is Dasein who is open to Being, lets Being arrive at presence. The event of unconcealing of Being to Dasein is the necessary condition for the existence of man. But man conceals the source of existence and there by

conceals his own nature and nature of objects. Hence, a mode of thinking needs to be discovered that reveals what metaphysics conceals.

Heidegger holds that it is possible to use the language of Being to characterise the mode of thinking, after metaphysics has been overcome. He adds that the modern thinkers would today rather remain silent on god. For the ontotheological character of metaphysics has become questionable for thinking. The terminology of metaphysics gives us a set of vocabulary which reveals that thinking on Being is totally different from essential thinking on Being. The essential thinking includes the overcoming of metaphysics. In other words, it is dropping that language which gives primacy to beings. Heidegger claims that if we treat unconcealment as the essence of truth and the truth of Being, then we recognise the ontotheological difference between Being and beings. To maintain the ontotheological difference between Being and beings, Heidegger followed the method of poetry of Holderlin in his philosophy. Holderlin writes of heaven, earth, gods and mortals as the four aspects of the world of unconcealment in which we dwell and wherein we think essentially. In his later phase, Heidegger used these four symbols to express his characterisation of essential

thinking. We are within these symbols and the world is constituted by them.

The thesis entitled, *A study on Heidegger's thinking and Hermeneutical Phenomenology* falls into the following chapters and we explore some of Heidegger's reflections on thinking.

The first chapter examines the fundamental problem of Being before Heidegger, the question of Being and his critique of the scholastic theory of Being.

The second chapter gives an account of the background of Heidegger's thinking in Parmenides and Heraclitus, and overcoming of metaphysics.

The third chapter is typically on Heideggerian kind of thinking, Being, language and also includes Rorty's critique on Heidegger.

The fourth chapter entitled, *Heidegger's Hermeneutical Phenomenology* is devoted to Heidegger's ontological hermeneutics and hermeneutical turn.

And finally dissertation draws out the conclusion deriving from this study.

## **Chapter One**

### **The Fundamental Problem of Philosophy**

In this postmodern era, Heidegger's phenomenological analysis of human existence oriented towards a science of Being or ontology gives another Copernican revolution in the history of Philosophy. Heidegger is the only philosopher who reopened and responded the bankrupt metaphysical tradition. Heidegger, in fact, covers the fundamental question of philosophy i.e., being in its Being<sup>1</sup>. This is the fundamental question of philosophy. This is the only question which has moved the philosophers of the past to think. But according to Heidegger, this fundamental philosophical question is miserably forgotten today. Heidegger begins his chief work *Being and Time* with the charge that Being has been forgotten in the philosophical world today, which seems itself progressive in metaphysical thinking.

Heidegger does not mean that the problem of Being was completely forgotten. It reminded always as a problem. The history of traditional metaphysics has not carried on a radical reflection upon its own grounds. It has not understood its metaphysics precisely as metaphysics, but metaphysical thinking has taken a wrong turn. It has lost its way. Heidegger found it necessary to dig deeper and blow traditional metaphysics. He has come to the very bottom, to the very ground of all metaphysical thinking. His philosophical speculation is solely to mediate on the meaning of

Being which lies at the foundation of all metaphysical thinking and which metaphysics never really investigates, or rather which metaphysics since the time of Plato continually forgets. Infact, metaphysics was born precisely when Being is forgotten, namely, with Plato”<sup>2</sup>.

Heidegger claims that the history of philosophy is a history in which Being has been forgotten. Heidegger has insisted that it is only in recognising the ontological difference between Being and beings that the “truth of Being” can be attained. The Scholastic Philosophy particularly St.Thomas Acquins maintains that metaphysics of *esse*<sup>3</sup> of the primacy with being (*ens*). For Heidegger, the scholastic distinction between essence and existence lies, therefore, in the oblivion of Being. Heidegger says that the distinction between Being and beings supersedes the distinction between essence and existence.

### **1.1. THE CRITIQUE OF SCHOLASTIC THEORY OF BEING**

Heidegger maintained that the fundamental problem of philosophy is the problem of Being. The 1927 Lectures are devoted to a discussion of four main “thesis” that have been put forward concerning Being.

1. Kant's thesis is that Being is not a real predicate.
2. The Scholastic thesis says Being is composed of essence and existence (for example Aquinas)
3. The third thesis of modern ontology that Being divides into *res cogitans* (a thinking self) and *res extensa*<sup>4</sup> (Physical thing).
4. The last is the thesis of logicians that Being is the copula.

Kant's thesis is related to that of the scholastic. Both Kant and Aquinas give ontological arguments regarding Being. Neither Philosopher can real Being be attained by knowing the definition. Both requires a judgement in order to attain real being, even the Being of God. Both Philosophers held that God's essence includes existence. Kant's ontology thus in an extension of medieval ontology.

When we turn to Kant, we find that Kant's metaphysics becomes a science that "has to deal only with principles, and with the limits of their employment as determined by those principles"<sup>5</sup>. The question of the notion of being is brought by Kant only in connection with the so-called ontological argument for the existence of God. It is clear that Kant has forgotten the question

of being. Kant hardly uses the terms being or be. It has been eliminated along with the dogmatic metaphysics. For Kant, God as *ens realissimum*<sup>6</sup> is the necessary condition for the possibility of any and all beings. What this means ? Heidegger points out that Being can be identified with God, the highest Being, and the first cause much is the cause of itself (*causa prima or causa sui*). Heidegger holds that there can only be one Being as the ancient philosophers and they seen it. Heidegger tells us that any attempt to separate beings from the question of Being will end up in confusion.

The thesis of medieval ontology, which goes back to Aristotle. Being-what (*essentia*) and Being-present (*existentia*) belong to the structure of Being of the being. The medievalists argue that this particular ontological thesis does not go back to Aristotle or to any Greek Philosopher. The Greeks has no idea of creation and held to the eternity and necessity of the world. Heidegger does mention that Aristotle does not much to say about existence. Heidegger found the scholastic distinction between essence and existence in relation to his own ontological difference, essence and existence belong to the structure of Being of the being (*die Seinsverfassung eines Seienden*). Accordingly,

essence and existence belong on the “Being” side of the Being-being distinctions.

Heidegger begins his discussion by differentiating three different positions concerning essence and existence that have been historically taken by the scholastics. The scholastics agree that in God (*ens a se*) essence and existence are identical. Heidegger expounds his theory that essence and existence represent different aspects. It is truly different but not separable aspects of the self same concrete being (Heidegger’s ontological difference). There is a distinction between Being which is to be met with only in Dasein’s understanding of Being and begins. Being is not any existing, particular being and must never be confused with such. Being is rather than upon which beings are projected in order to be understand in their Being. Being must be understood before beings, even as general metaphysics precedes special metaphysics. Thus fundamental ontology - the enquiry into Dasein’s understanding of Being-precedes the metaphysics which is to be built upon it and which will deal with particular existing beings. From Heidegger’s phenomonological stand point, Aquinas’s view represents more of a theory which attempts a conceptual interpretation of the idea of a created being.

In *The fundamental Problem of Phenomenology*, Heidegger states the origin of essence and existence in human productivity and making. Both essence and existence refer back to the idea of what is produced. Essence is the look which the thing to be produced. Existence is actually being brought forth. But the conceptual frame-work of producing and making leads back to Dasein's own concrete Being-in-the-world. Dasein lives its everyday life within the horizon of a world of tools and instruments, of things which Dasein makes and uses, whether these things be actual products of his (for example farm tools) or that of which being already there. This conception of Being within which Dasein lives his daily life is what Heidegger calls "being ready to hand" (*Zuhandensein*) i.e., Being which is accessible to Dasein's use<sup>7</sup>.

Dasein itself, in its preontological understanding of Being supplies the horizon with which being can be conceived or made or used. Accordingly, Dasein itself supplies the horizon within which Being is interpreted in scholastic metaphysics, in which the Being of God is determined as the creator and the beings around us are determined as created. Thus the idea of essence and existence take their origin from the subjective existential sphere.

In Heidegger view, ancient ontology was tailor made to the needs of medieval Christian Philosophy and theology.

Even though the concepts of ancient ontology were modified by the medievals, the scholastics still remained within the fundamental understanding of Being which existed in antiquity. They made new assertions about beings, the demiurge and prime mover were replaced by a creator God, the psyche' of Plato and Aristotle became the medieval *Anima*, the bearer of immortal life. But what Being itself meant derived from antiquity, that which being made according to a pattern.

Heidegger's interpretation must indeed appear most provocative to the medievalists. For Heidegger, the notion of *esse* is but an extension of Greek ontology which leaves and untouched the basic framework of Greek ontology. Heidegger raises the question of the relationship of this distinction to his own ontological difference. He approaches this problem by criticizing the applicability of these categories to Dasein. Dasein, he says, does not answer to the question of what is it, but to the question who is it. It is inappropriate to speak of the whatness or quiddity of Dasein. Nor is Dasein's existence more *existentia*, having-be-brought-forth. On the contrary, Dasein is the thrown and factual being whose Being is an issue for itself.

In place of *essentia* one must speak of Dasein's being. Dasein is always 'I myself', whether in the mode of being faithfully to itself or not. In place of *extentia* one must speak of Dasein's facticity. Essence and existence are categories of things and fit under a more general distinction between how a thing is and that it is.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger shows that the essence of Dasein lies in its "existence"<sup>8</sup>. But he puts the word essence to differentiate it from the traditional idea, and he uses "Existenz". In the Kierkegaardian (philosopher) sense, which is sharply differentiated from *existentia*. Here he uses the language of the tradition to say something quite untraditional. "How and that" constitute the basic articulation of Being. This distinction is itself differentiated according to the various kinds or regions of beings to be considered.

The categories of essence and existence have a two-fold. In the first place, they are the categories of things. They do not apply to man. Nor do they apply to God, who is not a thing either. These are categories which have been drawn from the sphere of Dasein's everyday Being-in-the-world and from the sphere of its commerce with things. They befit neither man nor God. Hence one gets no closer to the Being of God or men when one settles

the question of whether essence and existence are the same or different in each. For one's understanding of the Being of each is radically defective<sup>9</sup>. According to Heidegger, man alone exists in the very concrete sense that he alone can "think of Being"<sup>10</sup>. The tree, the rock, God is, says Heidegger, but does not exist if we understand by existence the capacity of man to stand outside himself, to make himself ecstatically open to the radiance of Being.

Scholasticism would have conceptualized the ontological difference. It would have recognized the radical difference between Being and being, that Being is never a being and it can never be confined within a single kind of Being. But instead the scholastics contented themselves with the understanding of Being which had been passed down to them from antiquity. The criticism which Heidegger has in mind when he says that the scholastic distinction remained on one side of the ontological difference.

It is not possible to give Heidegger's interpretation of the scholastic doctrine of essence and existence without including an account of the later Heidegger's treatment. The destruction of the history of metaphysics was his aim and he used the method of hermeneutical phenomenology-the subject (Dasein) as the explanatory basis for what Being means-has been overcome in

favour of a thinking in terms of the history and mission of Being. Heidegger says : But this destruction, like phenomenology and all hermeneutical-transcendental question, has not yet been thought in terms of the history of Being<sup>11</sup>.

In 1927 Heidegger traces the distinction between essence and existence, back to Plato and Aristotle. The difference is this. For the later Heidegger the original essence of Being is expressed in the Greek words *aletheia* and *physis*, i.e., Being is the process of emerging into presence and abiding there. It is the process of self-showing by which the being shows itself from itself. Rather than being the light projected by Dasein's understanding of Being. It is the light of Being itself in which beings are made visible to Dasein. This original essence of Being is found in its pristine form in the Pre-Socratics. Plato and Aristotle are the first figures in the history of metaphysics, and that means they are already fallen out of the experience of Being. But Being so close to the Pre-Socratics. They have retained something of the power and meaning of their original experience.

To give a historical perspective to our endeavour of understanding Being, we begin with a reflection on how Being was discussed in ancient western tradition beginning with Heraclitus and Parmenides. Concerning Being, holds Heidegger, Parmenides and

Heraclitus have similar views<sup>12</sup>. For Parmenides, the question of Being is concrete rather than abstract. His thinking seems to be that he wants to insist that the act of thinking is one with the act of Being. He never separate Being from thinking or identified one with the other. Parmenides says “thinking and being are supposed to be the same<sup>13</sup>.”

For Plato, Being is the presence which abides (*ousia*)<sup>14</sup> not in individual beings but in the *eidos*,<sup>15</sup> which is the true and abiding look of a thing . Essence (*eidos*) is prior to individual things (existence). Aristotle with this distinction between *ousia* in the primary and secondary sense reverses this order. For Aristotle, Being is the presence which abides in the form of the singular individual. Thus Plato and Aristotle opened the distinction between essence and existence, and in so doing inaugurate the history of metaphysics. In both case Being is determined as *ousia*.

So far we find the distinction between essence and existence and it leads to a failure to attain Being itself. In fact, Heidegger considers the scholastics to have determined Being in terms of the categories of a particular kind of being. They attain not to Being but to the beingness of beings and scholasticism arises from the forgottenness of Being. That is the central claim of Heidegger’s critique.

Heidegger finds that the West has forgotten Being because it has forgotten what it means to be a ground. The west has ceased its metaphysical thinking by forgetting that the task at hand is not the substitution of one metaphysics for another, but rather to find the way back to authentic metaphysical thinking. And this way back to the ground of all metaphysical thinking is a path which for Heidegger leads ultimately to Dasein. Heidegger's belief is that only when all beings are held up for questioning, not merely some beings, be possible to understand Being. It is impossible to understand Being without a prior analytic of Dasein's ontological structure. Basically, metaphysics is the attempt to explain all beings by dividing beings into what founds and what is founded. Basically, the attempt to account for the Being of some beings through the agency of a privileged particular entity, which then is fittingly called Being. Therefore, a being is said to be a being, in so far as it is the effect or product of that single being. Heidegger says God is chosen as that part of Being which is said to serve as the cause of the other part of Being.

Heidegger's contention is that the history of western thought has been simply the history of the various proposals for the privileged particular being which, as founding all others, is designated as Being itself in no need of ground. For Heidegger,

it is the time to stop substituting one metaphysics for another (i.e., one founding being for another). Metaphysics does not place that privileged being into question. The privileged being never enter into the something of why is the there something rather than nothing ? Heidegger says that one who holds to such a faith can in a way particular in the asking of our question, but he can not really question without ceasing to be a believer and taking all the consequences of such a step .... From the standpoint of faith, our question is foolishness<sup>16</sup>.

Heidegger's way of thinking of metaphysics has led to three major blunders committed by the West :

1. Forgetfulness of what it means to be a thing
2. What it means to work and
3. What it means to given an account.

First the West has forgotten the Latin word *res*<sup>17</sup> originally meant that which is of concern to men, something which confronted men and was an issue for men. According to Heidegger, the Latin *res* designates that which concerns men in one way or another. To concern men, that is, the essence, the reality. He further says that *res* came to mean something entirely different. It meant something which could stand independently of human

interest and concern, something which, when once produced or made, would have its reality precisely in the light of its ability to exist in itself, outside and beyond human concerns and projects. To be a thing became to be something independent, existing as an in-itself, not related to human consciousness in many way.

The general outline of Heidegger's criticism of the traditional understanding of metaphysics becomes a bit clear. A thing be regarded as essentially related to man's concerns. A thing draws its thinghood from being a concern to men. Work is the process by which a thing is put into presence, is brought from concealment into presence. To Heidegger it seems obvious enough that the west has forgotten what it means to be a thing, how it is that a thing comes to be a thing and how to understand the nature of the recounting of how that thing came to be.

The entitative metaphysics takes for its basic thesis the division of beings, explaining one group of beings by another group or by one particular being, never really giving an account on ground for beings in their entirety. The question of the totality remaining unasked. It is elsewhere encountered in the traditional understanding of the relationship.

- (a) of Being to Becoming
- (b) of Being to Appearing
- (c) of Being to thinking
- (d) of Being of Value.

In each case Being seems to be regarded as somehow behind and causative of what becomes, what appears, what is thought and what is held in esteem. But never is Being which becomes, which appears, which is thought or which is held in esteem. Rather it is always Being which produces or effects such things as do become, appear, become thought, become esteemed, but without in any real way being intimate to the very becoming, appearing, thought, becoming esteemed. But to Heidegger, each of these modalities obviously serve to reveal the very truth of Being itself.

## **1.2. THE TRUTH OF BEING**

In our experience with beings, Being manifests itself in a certain way, namely, as the Being of beings. This Being of beings is not something posited by consciousness as the unseen cause of what does appear before us. Being exercises itself as Being simply by being this dispensing, this unwilling of beings, which, of course, seeks to remain veiled. Heidegger's remarks that the ground

of all at once beings forth and posits in a substantial way the objectivity of the object, and through that same act relates the object to its very objectivity, i.e., the being in question to its Being<sup>18</sup>.

The Being of beings, the very thinghood of things is not beyond beings or things, causing them to become, to appear, to be thought or to be esteemed. Nor can Being or thinghood be something which can be accounted for an appeal to the efficacy of a particular being. Rather the Being of beings, thinghood of things is the representative activity of subjectivity (the immanence of subjectivity) by which a thing is raised from mere representation of it together with its thinghood, i.e., with the reason for its being a thing.

Heidegger maintains that Plato, as well as the entire metaphysical tradition which followed him, got no further than this. Heidegger says only Parmenides' famous passage "That which is, is; and that which is not, is not and can never be."<sup>19</sup> The very Being of every being, the thinghood of everything, as the coming out into the open of all things which are concerns to men, has been forgotten. And because the West also has forgotten what it means to be being, it has forgotten what is to ground, hence forgetting Being. The West also has forgotten the essence of a

thing, the reality of the real, this is the very coming into the open of a thing. The metaphysical tradition of the West has neglected to recognise the fact.

The fundamental question of metaphysics has not been asked since Plato and Being has never been viewed as *logos*<sup>20</sup>. Heidegger repeatedly remarks that every being, even the *causa prima*, is ruled by the principle of sufficient reason. The domain of the validity of the principle of sufficient reason embraces every particular being. Heidegger states that : Man's Dasein can only relate to what is by projecting into Nothing. Going beyond what-is is of the essence of Dasein..... But this going beyond is metaphysics ; and in metaphysics philosophy comes to itself and sets out on its explicit tasks. Philosophy is only set in motion by leaping with all its being as only it can, into the ground-possibilities of being as a whole. For this leap the following things are of crucial importance; first, leaving room for what-is into Nothing, that is to say, freeing oneself from the idols we all have and to which we are to go cringing; lastly, lettering this suspense range it will, so that it may continually swing back again to the ground question of metaphysics, which is wrested from Nothing itself. Why is there any Being at all-why not far father Nothing<sup>21</sup>.

Heidegger says our inquiry into nothing will lead us to metaphysics, the sort of inquiry which goes metatrans, beyond-what-is as such. Metaphysics is an inquiry over and above what-is, with a view to winning it back again as such and in totality, for our understanding. In short neither classical metaphysics nor Christian dogma had the least idea of what nothing really means.

Heidegger is necessarily on the horns of a dilemma in regard to the history and historicity of Being. Either Being is radically different and distinct from beings, in which case Being can be nothing other than the old Platonic real which is impossibly vague, abstract and lacks content and historical becoming of Being. The history of Being can be seen as utterly dependent on the history of beings. Heidegger admitted that the history of Being must be seen in terms of the history of beings. That is, his concern with Being would be replaced by concrete attention to beings. Heidegger has recourse to the ordinary history of nations, persons and their relation to beings in order to give concreteness and definiteness to his ontological history.

The history of Western metaphysics, according to Heidegger, is centuries-old oblivion of Being, the shadow of which reaches all the way from Anaximander to Nietzsche. If Heidegger himself

claims to have recalled Being itself, Being in its truth, Western metaphysics has contented itself with various counterfeits for Being. Either with generic categorizations of beings in general or with a causal first-being which causes other beings. Heidegger finds various counterfeits of Being. Being as unity in Plato, as *ousia* in Aristotle and as essence in modern Rationalism and Idealism. He criticises the oblivion of Being as lies in essentialism.

The main themes of Heidegger is that the interpretation of metaphysics as an oblivion of Being. Metaphysics, he says in his well known commentary on Descartes' view that the root of the tree of philosophy. Then Heidegger asks, is the nourishing ground of these roots? Metaphysics apprehends through the light of Being, but Being itself remains hidden from it. In its place metaphysics proffers various counterfeits: In whatever manner beings are interpreted-whether as spirit, after the fashion of spiritualism, or as matter and force, after the fashion of materialism; or as becoming and life, or idea, will substance, subject or energies; or as the eternal recurrence of the same events-every to time beings are beings appear in the light of Being. When metaphysics gives answers to its questions concerning beings as such, metaphysics spooks out of the unnoticed revealedness of Being. The truth of Being may thus be called the

ground in which metaphysics, as the root of the tree of philosophy, is kept and from which its is nourished<sup>22</sup>.

The history of metaphysics is the history of the various historical configurations which Being brings about within beings while all the primordial events by means of which this configuration occurs. The primordial light by means of which this kind of clearing is made, remains out of sight. Metaphysics therefore occurs in and as an oblivion of Being. It does not recall or think on Being. In so far as metaphysics always represents only being as beings does not recall Being itself. Heidegger's thought which comes to pass as the attempt to retrieve those forgotten origins.

Metaphysics gives, and seems to confirm, the appearance that it asks and answers the question concerning Being. In fact, metaphysics never answer the question concerning the truth of Being, for it never asks this question. Metaphysics does not ask this question because it thinks of Being only by representation being as beings. It means, all beings as a whole, although it speaks of Being. It refers to Being and means being as beings. From its being to its completion, the propositions of metaphysics have been strangely involved in a persistent confusion of beings and Being.

Failing to attain Being itself and persisting in confusion, metaphysics settles its accounts with beings, and this in either of two ways. First, it may replace Being itself with beings in general characterizations of Being drawn from particular groups of beings (life, matter, will, idea, etc.), which Heidegger calls the beingness of beings. This is called 'ontology'<sup>23</sup>. or else it settles for an account of other beings in terms of a first being-cause of beings, an *ens relictissimum*, and this is called theology. Hence metaphysics leads to ontotheology.

We formulated Heidegger's position in terms of the distinction between Being and beings, a distinction which in the early works were known as the ontological difference. In fact, Heidegger's thought matured, this difference becomes considerably more complex and subtly nuanced. In *Identity and Difference*, Heidegger provides an excellent development of his later understanding of the difference in his interpretation of metaphysics in the ontological nature of metaphysics. Heidegger's intention is on moving back to their unspoken origin. If we are able to carry out the step back. Heidegger says, we will enter into a confrontation with the very source from which a thinker's thought arises. The step back is a movement from what the thinker explicitly thought

to what is unthought in his thinking. What is unthought is precisely what is to-be-thought, for it is that which has fallen into oblivion.

Now Heidegger develops the step back by means of two different differences, or two levels of difference. To begin with, there is the straight forward difference, the ontological difference between Being and beings. Heidegger, in *Identity and Difference*, says, “the difference (*Differenz*) of being and Being is the area within which metaphysics, Western thinking in the totality of its essence, can be what it is<sup>24</sup>”. This difference is metaphysics. It sets forth the conceptual framework within which metaphysical reflection occurs.

To do metaphysics, whether it be Heglian or Thomistic, is to establish an ontological difference between Being and beings to understand beings with a certain horizon of Being. All metaphysics is possible only as distinction between Being and beings. But the task of thought is to step back. That means the step back is a step back out of the difference (*Differenz*) between Being and beings into that which makes the difference possible, to what is differing in the difference, to the difference as such. The step back moves from the native acceptance of the difference into thinking the origin of the difference.

### 1.3. ONTOTHEOLOGICAL METAPHYSICS

The word logic is the Greek *logos* which was translated by the Romans as *ratio*. As such, Hegel's logic seeks a ground of beings, the most general ground (ontology) and the highest ground (theology). All metaphysics, not just Hegel's move within an understanding of Being as ground and of being as grounded. It thinks the difference between Being and beings in terms of ground and grounded. The onto-theo-logical nature of metaphysics, therefore, rests on a particular conception of the difference between Being and beings

Heidegger articulates the difference within metaphysics operates as two-fold process. In the first place, Being, as the Being of beings, gives itself up to beings, comes to pass in and as beings, discloses and reveals itself, unconceals itself in beings, "Being comes to presence (West) here in the mode of a going-over beings"<sup>25</sup>. Being goes over or comes over into beings. Being is the very process of coming over. Being on the other hand do not merely wait there, on the other side as it were, for the coming of Being, as if beings somehow pre-exist the coming of Being. Rather beings themselves appear only in and through this coming-over. "Being goes over into, comes unconsentingly over,

that which arrives as something unconcealed, only through such a coming-over”<sup>26</sup>.

Thus the coming over of Being into being is at the same time the coming in, the coming-on-the-scene of beings. Beings come on the scene, arrive in appearance, only in the coming over of Being. The two processes are not only correlate, they are at bottom one, the coming-over of Being into beings is the coming-on of beings in Being. Just as the coming over of Being is revelatory, so the arrival (coming-on-the-scene) of beings is concealing. For by the coming over Being reveals itself in and through beings, and by the coming on the beings itself remains concealed.

This two fold process is called by Heidegger scission between Being and beings or in the Stambaugh translation, the differentiating. Heidegger calls the *aus-tragen*, is the literal German translation of the Latin *de-ferre*, dif-ferrens, to carry or bear outside of or away from. Thus we will call the *aus-targ* the differing in the difference between Being and beings, that which makes the difference between them, that which open up the difference, holding them apart while sending them one another in the appropriate manner, so that Being revealingly conceals itself in

beings<sup>27</sup>. The differenting is thus the revealing concealing difference.

There is radical step back, from the different which belongs to metaphysics. Metaphysics thinks beings in their Being. It thinks the difference between. Being and beings. It understands beings in terms of same idea of Being. But it never thinks the origin of this difference, that which makes the difference, that which opens it up as the particular kind of difference which it is.

In terms of Hegel's metaphysics, this means that his thought possible because being gives itself only in the light cleared for Hegel's thinking. To understand a particular metaphysical system is to understand how the difference between Being and beings has been cleared and opened up in that thinker, and in that epoch. It is to understand. "...the respective interpretation of beings as such"<sup>28</sup>. The character of metaphysics is determined by the character of its understanding of the difference. The difference is the hidden source, which has long been forgotten, from which the epochs of metaphysics take their origin. The only thing that now matters for our task is an insight into a possibility of thinking of the difference as the differing (*Austrag*) so as to clarify to what extent the onto-theo-logical constitution of metaphysics has its essential origin in the differing (*Austrag*) which beings the

history of metaphysics, govern all of its epochs, and yet remains everywhere concealed as the differring (*Austrag*), and thus forgotten in an oblivion which even escapes itself<sup>29</sup>.

The distinction between Being and beings belongs to metaphysics, but the differring (*Austrag*) which makes this metaphysics difference possible. It is not so much an oblivion of Being as an oblivion of the difference. In the case of Hegel, the difference between Being and beings, which is the difference between ground and grounded. The differring (*Austrag*) holds Being and beings apart, but it also holds them together. So that while Being grounds beings, beings in turn ground Being. Thus, original *logos*, which was sent itself to the early Greeks as the gathering of what unifies gives itself to onto-theo-logic as the unity of the most general and as the unity deriving from the highest being. The onto-theo-logical nature of metaphysics originates out of an understanding of Being as the ground of being, and of being - i.e, the highest being, God-grounding other beings.

It is clear that metaphysics cannot itself comprehend what has been said here about metaphysics, for we have entered the region from which metaphysics, has itself originated. With the account of Heidegger's *Austrag*, or differing, we find ourselves

face with the full force of Heidegger's *Austrag* or differing is historical structure, that it is at once a process of clearing and of historical dispensation, and there by a process which makes the western historical tradition possible. The differing is a lighting process, a clearing process, a process of opening up what in *Being and Time* and in phenomenology generally would be called the horizon within which metaphysics takes place. Heidegger continues that the way in which it clears itself. But this way is dispensational, an error epochal stamping, which is for us only if we release it into the having been which is proper to it<sup>30</sup>.

For Heidegger, Being is the very light within which things are manifest, within which the real and ideal, the mental and extra-mental, both cause and effect, are themselves manifest. It is in what Heidegger calls the clearing that the Greek experience of *einai* and *on*, and the medieval experience of *esse* and *ens*, and the modern experience of ground and grounded, takes place. The unconcealment (*aletheia*) is the primal origin, the ordinary source of light, from out of which whatever is in way illuminated. The oblivion of Being of which Heidegger speaks means that the Being of metaphysics, even of the metaphysics of *esse*, is a gift of an historical sending an issue of original dif-ferring and as such the outcome of a more primordial origin which remains essentially

unknown for and in oblivion in metaphysics. Here we seen Heidegger's sweeping interpretation of the history of metaphysics as an oblivion of Being.

The term onto-theology first turns up in Kant and means theology based on the ontological proof for the existence of God. Heidegger uses the term ontotheology in a wider sense to signify the basic construction of western metaphysics until Hegel, which is, as the science of being, simultaneously a science of God as the cause of all beings different from Him. Even though Heidegger's critique of western metaphysics and his thesis concerning its "forgetfulness of Being" does not do justice to the history of metaphysics, the characteristic of western metaphysics as ontotheology may be irrefutable - at least since Aristotle's metaphysics.

Heidegger's thinking of Being is not a move away from metaphysics. Admittedly after the turn, Heidegger does reject concepts such as metaphysics and philosophy, but thinking should not simply be identified with philosophy. Heidegger seeks to overcome onto-theological metaphysics in a new thinking. Therefore his statements about the end of metaphysics are for more nuanced than is often assumed. Heidegger is not of the opinion that metaphysics is at the end at all. Heidegger's thinking

about Being seeks to save metaphysics in its essence. Therefore Heidegger's thesis about the end of metaphysics is not incompatible with his earlier claim that philosophy ultimately cannot do without its genuine optics-metaphysics. If one does not restrict the notions of metaphysics and philosophy to the western tradition of thinking until Hegel - and there seem to be no reason why such a restriction is obligatory - then one can apprehend Heidegger's thinking of Being itself as a crucial contribution to a changed metaphysical form of thinking.

According to Heidegger, the difference is the difference between the Dasein of man and all beings whose beingness is mere existence in the sense of being-available. Heidegger's Dasein and the "I" of Kant's transcendental apperception are not simply the same. But both describe a being that in its Being is substantially different from the Being of the things within the world. The Being of the ontological difference is not something being-like, it is, but not in the way a being is. Being is beyond all beings. Similarly, the being of the ontological difference is not the Being of God. Heidegger says explicitly : Being is not God because Being is in essence finite. The Being of the ontological difference is the prevailing difference in Being itself, within which the being-understanding Dasein. So Being that with which all philoso-

phy must begin according to Hegel-amounts to a quite simply unavailable ground that is presupposed in all thinking, even in speculative thinking<sup>31</sup>.

Because Being itself is finite according to its very essence, Being and nothingness belong together. Therefore one can ask: why are there beings at all, and not rather nothingness? The primeval ground of everything must lie beyond the Being of the ontological difference, and that means beyond time<sup>32</sup>. Yet, such a ground, it is to be understood as the nameless abyss of Being. This is the real reason why “the onto-theological character of metaphysics has become questionable for thinking”<sup>33</sup>. Heidegger’s philosophy is not a philosophy against God. Admittedly, this thinking stands before a decision on theism; Yet this is not because of any indifferent attitude, but rather out of for the limits that have been set upon thinking. Hence it is understandable that Heidegger prefers “to keep silence about God in the realm of thinking”<sup>34</sup>.

Heidegger’s thinking about Being claims rather to think in that dimension within which alone we today can ask meaningfully about God. Only from the truth of Being can the essence of the holy be thought. Only from the essence of the holy can the essence of divinity can we think and speak about what the word God is to signify. After the end of onto-theology, the question

about God can be no longer be pursued on old paths. We must achieve a new understanding of what is brought up in the question of God. Thus according to Heidegger, we have to return to the genuine “matter of thinking, whose revealedness remains a mystery”<sup>35</sup>.

Even though ontotheology has become questionable for thinking, there remains for thought the very task that, according to Plato, is the purpose of philosophy is a sea-journey in search of ground and leads to the absolute the origin of everything. Admittedly, Heidegger’s thinking about Being includes the thought of the absolute in the thought of the abyss-line ground of Being. Heidegger’s critique of the modern philosophy of subjectivity leads him in his later thinking to dissolve human subjectivity in the truth of that very Being that has been returned to its finitude. But the identity in which Being and thinking belong together is not without the subjectivity of man. Therefore this subjectivity must be made as clear as possible through the metaphysical rising above.

Beyond the philosophy of Being lies the back into the forgotten origins of the difference of which philosophy makes use. The oblivion of Being, as we said above, is in the end. It is not an oblivion of Being but an oblivion of that which gives Being, of the difference which opens up the way in which Being and

beings are given in a particular epoch. Heidegger's Being must always be understood in terms of *Phainomenon* and *aletheia*. Heidegger's hermeneutic of *esse*, a rethinking of it which disentangles it from the objectivistic treatment it receives in St. Thomas's scholasticism. What Heidegger himself has said that *aletheia* gives the clue to the unthought meaning of *esse*.

#### 1.4. THE FORGETFULNESS OF BEING

Heidegger criticized the scholastics from the standpoint of a transcendental-hermeneutical phenomenology. A naive objectivism which failed to recognize the genetic origin of its ideas in Dasein's own Being-in-the-world. But later Heidegger dropped the criticism and shifted to a new standpoint, viz., that of Being as *altheia*. So we discuss three questions below.

(1) The early Heidegger's phenomenology of essence and existence

(2) Secondly, Heidegger's notion that principles of essence and existence belong within the framework of a metaphysics. Heidegger in the early period making is the transcendental horizon upon which beings are projected by medieval Dasein. In the later period making is the face with Being turns to medieval man.

(3) Thirdly, Heidegger's charge that the doctrine of essence and existence represents a term of the oblivion of Being.

According to Heidegger, scholastic theory is naive, because it believes an objective being-in-itself whereas in fact every objective structure is a projection of subjective life. Heidegger's and Husserl's genetic phenomenology denies the whole idea of objective being-in-itself and so of realism or scholastic, or scientific. Being for Heidegger is always Being as it enters into Dasein's understanding of Being. There is Being, Heidegger says, only insofar as it is understood by Dasein. Being is always thought in terms of a horizon which is projected by Dasein. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger builds up the meaning of Being of being is time, that is, Being is projected upon time in as much as temporality constitutes the Being of Dasein.

The theory allows us to believe that we attain being-in-itself, even if such being is only imperfectly grasped. But it is only because the genetic origins of such being-in-itself have forgotten, in Heidegger's view. Thomas Aquinas makes use of Heidegger's idea of a preontological understanding of Being which Dasein always already possesses. The task of metaphysics is to make this implicit understanding of Being explicit.

Heidegger has maintained that scholastic metaphysics takes place within the horizon of making, that it does not grasp Being as such but Being within the determinate horizon of a particular region of beings, the things which are to be made. Heidegger calls onto-theo-logic, a demonstrative science (logic) of being as such (ontology) which has recourse to God as the cause of beings (theology). It is occupied in giving an account of the relationship between beings instead of savoring and unfolding its original insight into the simple act of being itself.

Acquinas has developed an ontology of truth which reposes in the unveiling of every being (*ens*) in its Being. No thinker of the past has been more clearly aware of the ontological difference than Thomas Aquinas. Nobody has clearly distinguished between being (*ens*) and being (*esse*), or interpreted being more consistently in the light of being. Plato and Plotinus think Being not as Being but as the one, Aristotle as substance (*ousia*), Augustine as eternity, and so on with Descartes, Kant and positivism. Each of these metaphysical systems calls essentialism an attempt to reduce Being to some whatness, some particular kind of Being.

We now turn to Heidegger's treatment of the Greek words *physis* and *altheia*, around which his whole understanding of

Being turns. *Physis* for Heidegger refers to Being. Being as an emergent power, as an active upsurge into being. For Heidegger, Being is inseparable from truth not propositional truth, but a manifestness proper to Being itself. It is here that the phenomenological (both early and later Heidegger) character of Heidegger's work must be accord its due. In his early writings Heidegger instead Being is to be met with only in Dasein's understanding of Being in which the meaning of Being is constituted. Being is that in reference to which beings must be understood in order to manifest as beings.

In the later work Heidegger retains this relatedness between Being and Dasein's understanding, but now he reverses the direction of the relationship. In *Being and Time*, the being is projected in terms of a certain understanding of Being. being is unconcealment because it is what is uncovered in and through Dasein's disclosive activity. But in the later works Being rises up and discloses itself to Dasein, addresses Dasein, reveals itself, the task of Dasein is not to project Being but to realise it, to let it be. Thus Being is truth for Heidegger, i.e, a process of emerging (*physis*) into presence unconcealment (*aletheia*).

For Heidegger, the conception of Being and truth is a victim of the naivete of Being-in-itself, Being prior to its revela-

tion to Dasein. It is naivete which forgets that Being is always and already something understood by Dasein. We now are in a position to understand why Heidegger charges the scholastics with the forgetfulness of Being. He means that Being has ceased to mean that which shows itself, that which emerges into manifestness. Being as pure self showing passes over into Being as caused and uncaused.

Heidegger's approach is radically different. He speaks from within Being, out of the experience of Being. His words are not propositions or assertions about Being but the words in which Being itself is given birth in language. Heidegger's whole approach is to listen, to hear, to be touched by Being. Heidegger's approach was at the outset phenomenological. From Heidegger's standpoint Being is truth, from Aquina's truth is a predicate of Being.

The questions of being fascinated Heidegger throughout his long philosophic life. What is the meaning of being? Ontology is the main concern throughout his life. The phrase meaning of being on careful examination seems to vague philosophers and nonphilosophers alike. Many wonder what kind of question this is. The meaning, refer to all beings such as rocks, trees, colours, sounds, dreams etc. Heidegger made it clear that there is a meaningful concept of the being of all beings- a conception that

underlies all our understanding of reality. He says this conception has been the aim of all metaphysical thinking, even if it was not always properly understood.

It is not possible to trace the meaning of this question fully. Heidegger says the Greek philosophy is the most serious omission in the history of western philosophy concerning being. The problem of the meaning of being is the guiding star of his philosophical thought, started to concern him while he was still a high school student.

The Greek language favoured the development of ontology, the science of being, as Aristotle called metaphysics. Even in prephilosophical Greek it was common to refer to being, to what there is both in the sense of things and in the sense of what we would call states of affairs. The fact that there is a clear linguistic distinction between beings and the abstraction being, *Ousia* (the natural being).

It is Aristotle's doctrine of the categories of being that Heidegger refers to when he presents his view of the historical development of Western thought that ended in complete forgetfulness of the question of being. To understand Heidegger's reaction to this tradition that made the conception of substance its main focus, we have to take a closer look at Aristotle's theory.

Aristotle distinguishes as many meaning of being as there are categories of entities. There is the primary category of substance, designating natural things that exist in their own right. Aristotle remained a metaphysical realist discovered the natural structure of reality. This structure is based on the primacy of substances, naturally existing independent entities that form the building blocks of Aristotle's universe. To be, Heidegger means either to be a substance or to be attributes of a substance<sup>36</sup>. Aristotle says the being of a substance, a quality, a quantity, or other attributes and has no unified sense of being. The conception of being determined the future of development of metaphysics not only in later antiquity but from Middle age to the Modern age. Substance remained the central term in traditional ontology.

Heidegger finds his own way to overcome the traditional metaphysics found in Aristotle and that continued to exert its influence even over Kantian and Post-Kantian philosophy. Heidegger criticised the psychologism of that time. He firmly believed that the meaning can not lie in the empirical observation at the actual psychological processes that constitute our thoughts. His reflection on the psychological philosopher's explanation (Husserlian phenomenology - intentionality of acts of consciousness) forced Heidegger to reflect more on the connection between

the act of thinking in contradiction to the meaning of the thought. Heidegger was moving forward a characterization of being that is different from the one generated in the Aristotelian naturalist ontology. The “division of being”<sup>37</sup> into the realm of the physical, psychic, metaphysical, and logical makes no claims to being comprehensive. Heidegger is clearly still far from seeing any way to provide for the possibility of a united meaning of being. According to Heidegger, there the being of reason and the being of nature cannot by any simple correspondence theory of truth in the sense that our thoughts could be mirror of reality. Heidegger’s own holistic conception of human existence as Dasein, that is, as being-in-a-world, or of care as the meaning of our existence.

Heidegger found a clue for the question of the meaning of being in a new way and that he found it necessary to invent an original philosophical language in order to prevent any confusion of his new approach. Heidegger who never publish anything before he produced the monumental work *Being and Time*. Husserl’s phenomenology clearly formed the background of Heidegger’s critique of psychologism. Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* helped him to solve the problem of being.

Husserl’s practice of the phenomenological method guided him and helped him in *Being and Time* : Husserl’s phenomenol-

ogy adopted Brentano's conception of the intentionality. All mental acts give objects (contents) or different types of acts of consciousness. Every objects is to be interpreted as its grasped by an act of comprehension in consciousness. It may be something thought of, wished out, imagined, seen, heard or known. If we want to understand the nature of all phenomena, we have to work out the precise way in which consciousness intends its objects. Husserl is characterized as a transcendental subjectivist because, held the view that it is the subject that provides the conditions of all determinations of the objects of experience and thought.

Heidegger's initial project, in *Being and Time*, was designed to reawaken the question, what is the sense of the Being (*sein*) of beings (*seiends*)? He called it a fundamental ontology required a "recapitulation and destruction"<sup>38</sup> of the history of the ontology. Metaphysics was not only a traditional branch of philosophy for Heidegger but also he used to express man's relationship to what is as "metaphysical". In so far as man relates to beings, he represents being to himself with reference to the fact that it is, what and how it is, how might be and ought to be; in short he represents being with reference to its being. This re-presentation is thinking.

In whatever manner man may represent beings as such to himself. He represents them in view of their Being. Because of this man always goes beyond beings and crosses over to Being. In Greek beyond is meta. Hence man's every relationship to beings as such is metaphysical<sup>39</sup>.

Heidegger sought to overcome traditional metaphysics in the name of a fundamental ontology which finds its roots in an older metaphysics-that of the Pre-Socratic Philosophers. His endeavour is to reawaken the lost sense of Being and to recall traditional metaphysics from its obliviousness to its own origins that is the thought of Being. Heidegger says that traditional categorical treatment of Being failed to articulate clearly what is meant for a thing to be in general. According to (early) Heidegger, it is the traditional defects. He argued that the criteria which sustained approach to Being was indefinable and not simply adequate but are themselves the result of an inadequate account of Being, via, the narrow sense of metaphysics.

## NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. This question is taken from Aristotle which has been the guiding question of the Western Philosophical tradition and has motivated the thinking of Heidegger.
2. W.J. Richardson, "Heidegger and Plato", *Hythrop Journal*, 1963, P.273.
3. Latin word which means being, the present participle of *esse*, "to be". In St.Thomas Aquinas' theology, the ultimate *ens* refers to God in whom essence and existence are identical.
4. *Res Cogitans* is a Latin word means "a thinking thing", "a thinking being" or a "thinking self". Descartes used it as a phrase to signify "thinking substance" in contradistinction to *Res Extensa*, means "a material thing" or a "material being".
5. Oliva Blachette, "Are There Two Questions of Being?" *Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. XLV, December 1997, P.275.
6. For Kant, God as *ens realissimum* is the material condition for all the possibility of any and all beings. He identified God as the highest being and the first cause of itself and, thus, God is said to be an absolute and necessary being.
7. John D. Caputo, "Heidegger and the scholastics" *The Thomist*, Vol. 47, January, P.70.

8. George Steiner, *Heidegger*, London : Fontana Press, 1992, P.82.
9. Here Heidegger does not identify God with Being but locates him within the sphere of beings. Heidegger does not mean that God is an *individuum*. He means that Being of God is always approached from some prior understanding of Being which lays down the basic framework in terms of which we determine God's Being.
10. Heidegger, *Op.Cit.*, P.71
11. *Heidegger and the Scholastics*, *Op.Cit.*, P.75
12. Martin Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, Ralph Manheim (trans.) London : Yale university Press, 1959, PP.97-98 and PP.133-34.
13. *Ibid.*, P. 137
14. *Ousia*, Greek word which means "essence", the "inner essential nature of a thing" or "the true being of a thing".
15. For Plato, the word idea was *eidos*, translated as idea or form, sometimes as constitutive nature or essence.
16. *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, *Op.Cit.*, P.6
17. The word *res* means a thing, that is essence and not appearance. Heidegger says they forgot the real meaning of ontology.

18. Donald A. Cress, "Heidegger's criticism of Entitative Metaphysics in His Later Works", *International Philosophical Quarterly*, VOL-XIII, March 1972, P.80
19. Peter A. Angeles, *Dictionary of Philosophy*, New York : Barnes and Noble Books, 1981, P.25
20. The principle and methods used to explain phenomenon in a particular discipline i.e., the study of Being.
21. R.F.C Hull and Allan Crick. (trans.), *What is Metaphysics*, Chicago : H. Regnery & Co., 1985, P.349
22. John D. Caputo, "The Problem of Being in Heidegger and Aquinas" *The Thomist*, Vol. 47, 1977, P.62
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25. *Ibid.*, P.64
26. *Ibid.*, P.64
27. E. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phemenology to Thought* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962, P.579
28. *Identity and Difference, Op.Cit, P.67*
29. *Ibid.*, P.68

30. *Ibid.*, P.67
31. J. Stambaugh (trans.), *On Time and Being* New York : Harper and Row Publishers, 1972, PP.49-50
32. *Ibid.*, P.19
33. *Identity and Difference, Op.Cit.*, P.55
34. *Ibid.*, P.55
35. *On Time and Being, Op.Cit.*, P.82
36. Charles B. Gurgnon, *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, P.45
37. *Ibid.*, P.47
38. Berned Magnus, "Heidegger's Metahistory of Philosophy Revisited" *The Thomist*, Vol.47, October 1981, P.446
39. *Ibid.*, P.447

## **Chapter Two**

### **The Experience of Being**

## 2.1. BEING IN ANCIENT GREEK PHILOSOPHY

For the Greeks, nature or *physis*<sup>1</sup> in its primary sense meant being<sup>2</sup>, and in its secondary sense, a principle of coming-to-be. In its state of being, nature/*physis* constitutes some uniformity or *monas*. But considered in its coming-to-be, it is always found in some multiformity (*dyas*). For the Pythagoreans, uniformity and multiformity are two principles of all natural things. Thus constituting some unity and multiformity of everything in being and becoming, in the former, uniformity (*monas*) is the primary arche of nature. In the later, multiformity (*dyas*) is the *genesis* of things in their composition.

This twofold aspect of nature/*physis* as uniformity of being and multiformity of becoming, superimposes in the early Greek Philosophers a very difficult problem of establishing an ontological identity of natural things in regard to both their unity and diversity. If nature/*physis* is analyzed in its beingness as some uniformity of things, then the ontological identity of being consists of that which is the primary *arche* out of which everything can be made, preserving at the same time that diversity of all natural things. But if nature/*physis* is analysed in its becoming as some multiformity of things, then the ontological identity of being consists of how one could become

the other, retaining at the same time the specific unity of particular things. In a word, nature/*physis* considered by the Greek philosophers as a polarity of uniformity and multiformity, requested that they find the underlying principle of coherence of all things as constituting some unity in multiformity.

The pre-Socratic discussion revealed nature/*physis* in its original unity (*monas*)<sup>3</sup>. But as always being posited (thesis) in some specific duality (*dyas*), namely as a unicity in being and multiplicity of becoming. In other words, nature/*physis* in its original unity in being disposes itself in a multiformity of becoming. This dual structure of nature/*physis* led the Greek thinkers to some onto-cognitive ambiguity in establishing an underlying principle of the coherency of natural things in both their identity and diversity.

This onto-cognitive ambiguity of understanding the dual character of natural things in their identity and diversity depends on the interpretation of nature/*physis* both in regard to its being and its coming-into-being. In general, when the stress is given to the ontological character of nature/*physis*, then the natural things constitute some totality, and their dual structure will call for conjunction of all things, thus constituting some integrated unity of being, in spite of the manifest diversity of things in reality. But

when nature/*physis* is analysed from its coming-into-being, then the natural things appear in their singularity, and their dual character seems to consist only of the disjunction of all things. Thus constituting some diversified plurality, which is in a constant and successive processing of becoming. Consequently, its being remains always hidden.

The pre-Socratic ambiguity between identity and diversity of natural things, in their diathetical structure of nature/*physis* in its being and becoming, reached its acme in the respective doctrine of Parmenidean priority of being over becoming and Heraclitean priority of becoming over being. Though both Parmenides and Heraclitus proclaim the priority of unity over diversity of things, the latter explains oneness of things by a tension of opposites, and the former by likeness and similarity.

Parmenides, by giving priority to being over becoming, must stress the unity and continuity of being because only being can be known and understood as something which exists: “that which is possible to think is identical with that which can be”<sup>4</sup>. The paradigm of identity of thinking and being leads Parmenides to explain nature/*physis* only in terms of beings and to negate the reality of becoming. If only being can be known, and if being consists of unity, then being is ungenerated and imperishable,

whole, unique, immorable, and complete. If being is unique and complete, then there cannot be exist all in all or not at all. Furthermore, if being is one and not many, then there cannot be any genesis of natural things of coming-into-being, because otherwise this would mean that being becomes from non-being. But is it is impossible for natural things to come-into being, then there is no ontological difference among natural things, and everything that exists constitutes one single spherical unity.

If there is no ontological difference among natural things, then the mind can not grasp the diathetical character of nature/*physis*, because Parmenides “regardes perception and thought as the same”<sup>5</sup>. If they are the same then the human mind can know nature only in its unity of being, both without its *multiplication* into many and the possibility of its distribution throughout various and different things.

The reason for this consists in the Parmenidean teaching of being based on the similarity of the knower and the thing known. In view of this similarity between the knower and the thing known, natural things can be known by the human mind by what they have in common, i.e., being. But if being can only be known, and if becoming means only non-being, then natural things cannot

be known either as being in any, particular place or dispersed through out various instances of being.

Parmenidean paradigm of identity meant that nature/*physis* not only deprived of having any diathetical character and ontotheological foundation in reality, but that the pre-Socratic question of what-is of natural things received only epistemic meaning. In other words, if 'to be' means to be-thought; then nature/*physis* can be known not as it is in reality, but as it is found in or by the human mind. Consequently, Parmenidean parallelism between ontological and epistemological meaning ended in an ambiguity of nature/*physis* between its facticity and its activity<sup>6</sup>.

In trying to overcome the pre-Socratic ambiguity of nature/*physis* in its diathetical constitution, Heraclitus bases his quest for the natural things on a presupposition that there is an essential opposition between the knower and the thing known. This opposition of the knower and the known seems to follow from the Heraclitean teaching of *logos* as both the actual unifying principle of being (all things are one) and the factual diversifying principle of becoming. For Heraclitus, then, the diathetical structure of natural things seems to contain some ontological inconsistency between its uniformity of being and its multiformity of becoming.

For Heraclitus, all natural things are dyadic in structure, because they are ontologically constituted out of different and various opposites. Although Heraclitus insists that nature/*physis* is in a perpetual flux of becoming and that all things come to pass through conflict. This paradoxical situation of nature/*physis* results in an epistemological relativism, and ends in an ontological duality of natural things as being simultaneously both in unity and plurality, namely, in being and becoming. For Heraclitus, *logos* is supposed to be both the principle of intelligibility of nature/*physis* and the underlying structural coherence of all things, nevertheless Heraclitean *logos*, however, is not uncovering becoming but covering up being. The Heraclitean paradigm of *logos* as a principle of covering and uncovering simultaneously being and becoming leads to a dichotomy between unity and plurality of natural things.

The Heraclitean world without transparency of unity of natural things in being shows that nature/*physis* consists in a ceaseless process of becoming, where any solid and substantial reality is dissolved and nothing is left as explained by Martin Heidegger. But any temptation to follow the Heraclitean philosophy of becoming will ultimately lead to nihilism. The diathetical structure of natural things, the ancient Greek sages were

stressing either the priority of plurality over unity or giving the primacy of unity over plurality the former resulted in Heraclitean perpetual flux of becoming of things, and the later led to the Parmenidean ontological immobilism of being. In other words, the pre-Socratic thinkers not only failed satisfactorily to explain the underlying principle of coherency of all natural things, but also brought about an ambiguity between the way of differentiation of being and the mode of unification of becoming. So the question of being remained a problem up to Heidegger.

In overcoming this dichotomy between unity and plurality of being and becoming, Aristotle tries to resolve by his teaching on *logos*. He understood as a rational problem which takes place among natural things.

Apply this dialectical structure of reality to anthropological evaluation of human being as *unitas multiplex*<sup>7</sup>, human existence can be analysed in two ways: as it is in itself or in relation to its manifold modes of being. As considered in itself, human existence constitutes a unique individual entity which various elements which establish different levels of its nature. But as considered in relation to its manifold modes of being, human

existence constitutes itself a person. This manifest various forms of his unique nature.

In order to understand human existence as unified multiplicity, one must indicate the very foundation of human existence through which man can be himself and realize all possibilities of both his individual and personal being.

The very formation at the essence of human existence as unifying multiplicity indicates that man in himself is an organically integrated, unique and indispensable in his own nature<sup>8</sup>. Being, however, a diversified multiplicity of various entity, socially interconnected with others, and determined by the environment both human and natural. While searching for the very foundation of human existence as a unified multiplicity, one must keep in mind as unified multiplicity, one must keep in mind this dual characteristic of human existence as both individual and communal.

The dual character of human existence as unity and multiplicity requires, however, findings such as element through which man can be understood as *unitas multiplex*. The question is how can the duality of human existence as both unity and multiplicity be possible and real? In order to answer we find, a universal con-

crete which could be the most essential characteristic of human existence. Searching for the universal concrete of human existence, one has to find the most essential attribute of human existence, both in regard to its individuality and personality. Existence by itself does not predicate anything about a particular thing, but only reveals the very fact that by being present in reality, a thing has something of its own, *i.e.*, some specific nature.

In fact there are many things, existence reveals their natures according to various modes of being through which things find themselves in a state of separation from each other. Being a principle of separation, existence reveals that the perfection of being is distributed among things disparately and shows that in the order of actualization of their beingness, things are transcending each other, both in ontological and phenomenological order. Transcendence from an existential point of view belongs most properly, to human existence, for in man. As Heidegger points out "transcendence constitutes selfhood"<sup>9</sup>. But in man the transcendent character of human existence consists not only of separation, but of integration through which human existence is transcendental in nature and intentional in character. This twofold aspect of human existence of transcendental and intentionality points to *logos* as the universal concrete of human behaviour through which

constitutes himself as self-dispositional agent.

Early in *Being and Time*, Heidegger announces that the primary concept by means of which he aims to understand Dasein (human) is the concept to which he gives the name existence. Heidegger's existentialism lies the claim that humans are given their content neither by historical transcultural essence, nor by nature. Rather, Dasein itself determines this content in its act of self-understanding<sup>10</sup>.

## 2.2. BEING AND THINKING

Heidegger assigns a seminal place to Parmenides's assertion: "to gar auto noein estinte kai einai", i.e., "thinking and Being are the same"<sup>11</sup>. For Heidegger, this provides the basic theme for whole of Western thinking. Heidegger points out that "the history of thinking is at the bottom a sequence of variations on this one theme"<sup>12</sup>. Heidegger again points out that with respect to thinking: "The beginning was strongest and mightest. What comes afterwards is not the development but the flatterings that result from mere spreading out, it is inability to retain the beginning"<sup>13</sup>. The meaning that Heidegger assigns to the expression gathering shows that Parmenides can not be interpreted in terms of Kant,

whereas the reverse in both possible and necessary. For Heidegger, mover over the inspiration to deal with the notion of thinking again through the dialogue with succeeding philosophers.

In Heidegger's studies of Heraclitus and Parmenides, Anaximander and Plato, Descartes and Kant, Hegel and Nietzsche, and many others, there is the repetition of the issue of "unconcealment....., so to speak, the element in which Being and thinking and their belonging together exist"<sup>14</sup>. He explored the ways of thinking that might be appropriate in the process of unconcealment and that might articulate the affiliation of Being and thinking.

Heidegger's *Being and Time* already contains significant reference to Parmenides and Heraclitus, and to their questioning of Being, perception of Being, truth, the world and the like. Heidegger's examination of the earliest Greek thinking become decisive for him only when he developed the question as to what extend the truth of Being is forgotten in Platonic thinking, and when Nietzsche's slogan about the death of God enable the Western to be seen in a new light. Heidegger is the first thinker who goes back to the thinking of Parmenides and Heraclitus in order to be able to recast the metaphysical difference between Being and appearance, Being and becoming, Being and thinking and

Being and ought. The distinction of Being and becoming stands set forth the Being of the assent in contradiction to becoming.

Parmenides' poem reveals coming-into-being and passing away. He further says we are looking-towards Being from within Being. On the contrary, Heraclitus says everything i.e., essent or entity is in flux. Everything is becoming and here Being and appearance means the real in contradiction to the unreal, the authentic over against the inauthentic. But from a Heideggerian point of view appearance belongs to Being, the appearing. Being as appearing is the power of Being as unconcealment.

Sophocles and Holderlin are a few of the poets who put forward this idea through art and literature. Thinking and Being, for the Greeks were a struggle for a decision between the great powers of becoming and appearance. This led to mould the relation between thinking and Being into a definite form.

The distinction between Being and thinking is not only what is contrasted with each other but also different in content from becoming and appearance. Thinking means to reflect, to deliberate over a situation, a plan or an event. Thinking also serves as a name for the work of those who call themselves thinkers. Thinking refers to the future, present and past. Thinking brings something

before us, represent it to us. This representation starts always from ourselves. It is a free act. Thinking is reflective, we pursue in thinking the thing represented or thought. The representation may be meaningful or superficial, empty, serious or irresponsible. Thinking is one of our capacities along with others like desire, willing and feeling. The formula Being and thinking designates a differentiation. But it is sure that an inner union between thinking and Being cannot be inferred from what we have said so far about thinking. We arrived at this conclusion through logic. Logic is the science of thinking and it deals with doctrine or the rules of thinking and forms of thought. Moreover, it is one of the earliest philosophical disciplines. Logic gives us the tools for an inquiry into the essence of thinking.

And yet, the question arises what does logic mean? The name logic is an abbreviation for *epistemologia*, i.e., it is the science of the *logos*, and *logos* here means a statement. But how is that logic, supposed to be doctrine of thinking, turns out to be the science of statement. This is by no means self-evident. Logic and logical statement are not simply a way of defining thought.

In course of thought we are trying precisely to penetrate the source from which the essence of thinking is determined, namely *atetheia*<sup>15</sup> and *physis*, Being an unconcealment, the very thinking

that has been lost by logic. Logic still dominates our thinking and discourse and from an early day it has contributed in a large measure to determining the grammatical view of languages. Logic began in later Greek philosophy and placed in the curriculum of Platonic and Aristotelian schools. Logic, its formal structure and rules of thought arose only after the separation of Being and thinking from *logos*. Logic is in need of an explanation regarding its claim to provide an authoritative interpretation of thinking. According to Hegel: "The logical the absolute form of truth and, what is more, it is also the pure truth itself"<sup>16</sup>. Hegel applied the logic to the discipline known as metaphysics.

According to the early Greek philosophers, thinking should have become a doctrine of *logos*<sup>17</sup>. For them, there is a relationship between Being, *physis* and *logos*. If we go back to two great Greek thinkers, Parmenides and Heraclitus we can find the relation between Being and *logos*. The German poet Holderlin, and Hegel were very much influenced by these thinkers. But in Nietzsche we find a current of opposition to Parmenides and Heraclitus. Christian theology also is responsible for the misinterpretation of Heraclitus' doctrine of *logos*. The *logos* in Christianity is Christ, the absolute personal God. The real

appearance at truth in the form of the God-man. remarks Heidegger, “sets the seal on the Greek’s philosophical insight concerning the role of the *logos* over all existence. This confirmation and seal establish the classicism of Greek philosophy”<sup>18</sup>.

The concept of *logos* has many meanings in Plato and Aristotle. A simple interpretation is not to grasp adequately the basic meaning. *Logos* does not mean judgement. We understand judgement as “connecting two things”<sup>19</sup> or “taking a position either by endorsing or rejecting. Rather, *logos* as speech really means *deloun*, to make manifest what is being talked about”<sup>20</sup>. On the other hand, Heidegger construed *logos* as truth in the sense of “correspondence” or “accordance” (*Ubereinstimmung*)<sup>21</sup>. This idea is by no means the primary one for the concept *aletheia* means to take beings that are talked about out of their concealment to let them be seen as something unconcealed, to let them be seen in themselves.

According to Heraclitus, *logos* has characteristics, First and foremost it has permanence and endurance. Secondly, it has togetherness in essence<sup>22</sup>. In accordance with this permanent togetherness Being is the dominant power. And this goes against the popular interpretation of Heraclitus who asserts that everything flows. There

is an attempt to set forth the essential bond between *logos* and *physis* and on the basis of that unity. Secondly, we show the possibility of the separation between them on account of the inner unity. But there arises a question of Heraclitus on *logos* and Being are so intimately and essentially linked together, how can this unity and identity of *physis* and *logos* give rise to the opposition between Being and thought. The explanation for the opposition between Being and thinking is that Being is the object and thinking is of the subject, i.e., thinking is subjective. The relation of thinking to Being is that of the subject to the object. Probably, the Greek may have conceived this relation in an extremely primitive way because they might have lacked training in epistemology.

What is the essential law separates *physis* and *logos* ? We here seek the help of Parmenides who stands on the same ground as Heraclitus. For Heraclitus, Being is unique and unifying, complete and fully standing-the-permanently manifested power which shines perpetually in the appearance of the one-and-many-sided. So the indispensable way to Being is three fold and it leads through unconcealment. What is understood as thinking is that it is an activity of the subject. The thinking of the subject determines what Being is Being is nothing other than object of thinking. That which

is thought. But thinking remains activity and thinking and Being are supposed to be the same according to Parmenides and thereby everything becomes subjective. Nothing is objective .

Thinking is an activity of the subject and the thinking of the subject determines what being is. Being is nothing but an object of thought. But thinking remains a subjective activity. According to Parmenides, thinking and Being are the same.<sup>23</sup> But why does Parmenides says Being and thinking are one and the same? This is because of the meaning of *physis* to stand in the light to appear, to enter into unconcealment where Being prevails, it also means apprehension. Hence, the two belong together. Apprehension, the receptivity to bring-to-stand of the intrinsically permanent that manifests itself. Parmenides states that where there is Being, there is appearing and entering into unconcealment. Concerning man Parmenides' idea was that by an account of the essence of Being, being human is determined. In other words, Parmenides holds that man's being is determined by the essential belonging-together of Being and apprehension. He says that it is rather a process in which man first enters into history as a being, an essent.

Apprehension (*verne hunung*) is not a faculty of man but it is rather a happening that man is. The separation between Be-

ing and being-human comes to light in their togetherness. For the Western Philosophy, this is a crucial definition of being-human and at the same time an essential characterization of Being. Hence, there is no dichotomy of Being and thinking. Fundamentally, man is defined Western doctrines of psychology, ethics, theory of knowledge, anthropology, etc.

But nothing of that kind was explained by Parmenides. According Parmenides, manifestation of being-human first occurs and was stabilized due to apprehension. Being is defined from the stand-point of thinking and reason. It says "there is a reciprocal bond between apprehension and being".<sup>24</sup> However, the Greek treatment of thinking was diluted and misinterpreted by the modern concept and that tradition lasting upto the time of Nietzsche.

The experience of philosophy propounded by philosophers starting from Plato, Aristotle until Nietzsche already announces another way of thinking. Heidegger, therefore, proceeds with the question of another beginning by recalling the beginning of the metaphysical tradition in the pre-Socratic philosophers. The First beginning is not left behind. The tradition is overcome only through its remembrance. That is why it is called "another beginning"<sup>25</sup> The task of Heidegger is to rectify the misunderstanding of the ancient, medieval and modern thinkers. Heidegger is here not to

bring about the complete comprehension, but rather to pave the way for a transformation of the fundamental mood".<sup>26</sup> Since the time of Plato and Aristotle, Western metaphysics transformed Being into a new mythology. He points out that Western metaphysics has never fully developed its primary question *viz.*, the question of being. The remarkable thing in Heidegger is that the path of thinking certainly was moulded by past decision, slowly awakening change, and by sudden revolutions.

Heidegger takes up Aristotle's question of the manifold way in which Being can be expressed. He assimilates medieval thought and, indeed, with its entire burden of tension. Heidegger puts that. "I am indebted for vision and understanding of modern logical problem."<sup>27</sup> Heidegger chooses for himself transcendental philosophy and Phenomenology in order to be able to settle metaphysical questions. Heidegger's roots are in phenomenology and his research is to understand the factual life and its vicissitudes. But in doing so he does not turn back to psychologism against which he had struggled in his early works. According to Parmenides, the pure intuitive perception enable us to discover Being. The "Primordial and genuine truth lies in pure intuition. This has henceforth remained the basis of western philosophy."<sup>28</sup> and of Heidegger as well.

The metaphysical doctrine of Being, i.e., ontology is grounded in fundamental ontology which raises the question about Being which functions as the ground for every possible meaning of Being. By ontological questioning Plato, Aristotle, and even Kant developed a productive logic which does not hang behind the sciences, but rather springs ahead as it was into a definite region of Being.

Metaphysics thinks of Being and it interrogates Being in its various aspects. It also thinks of Being in general in accordance with the fundamental character of Being. Thus, metaphysics is the theory of Being of beings. Ontology comes across as self-evident and its presence as the fundamental features of Being. Beings are grounded in Being which is constantly present. Thus, metaphysics seeks Being and in a specific way fulfills the demand for being to be constantly present. But in the course of time what happened in this, the self-sufficient, divine being meets this requirements. Therefore, metaphysics not only is ontology, the foundation of beings (i.e., Being) but also of theology where the fundamental Being is the supreme being. It turns out, therefore to be ontotheology.

In short, we find Heidegger's question about Being and the Being of beings. We have also examined the Platonic-Aristotelian

question of being and the concept of *logos*, *aletheia* and *physis*. We also see the Christian interpretation of *logos* giving it a personal connotation. Heidegger's examination of the earliest Greek thinking became decisive when he developed the question as to what extent the truth of Being is forgotten in traditional thinking. We also find the thinking of Parmenides and Heraclitus, being reinterpreted in the context of the metaphysical difference between Being and appearance, Being and becoming, Being and thinking, and Being and ought. In short, we can say that the echo of the great Greek philosophy is being made audible once again by Heidegger.

### **2.3. HERMENEUTICAL APPROACH OF HEIDEGGER**

Heidegger's philosophy within the phenomenological tradition has remained too much a philosophy for Heideggerians. We find a fundamental level of Heidegger's ontology in *Being and Time* and *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, his Dasein, analysis and interpretation, a critique which demands an expansion of his hermeneutical phenomenology. First a few remarks are in order concerning the general trust of existential phenomenology, constructing a general context for focusing on Heidegger.

Existential phenomenology, by deepening and extending intentionality, requires changed view of sense experience, understanding, imagination and schemata, in contrast with the epistemological emphasis of the moderners. In dealing with sense perception existential phenomenology attack the empiricist view of senses as a cause-effect relation and any reductionistic view of perception, it attacks the intellectualist theory of judgement. Merleau Pomy puts it “that from the amount behaviour is considered ‘in its unity’ and in its human meaning, one is no longer dealing with a material reality, nor, moreover, with a mental reality, but with a significative whole or a structure which properly belongs neither to the external world nor to internal life”<sup>29</sup>.

Existential phenomenology deepens and broadens the notion of intentionality. It requires this redefinition of understanding. Heidegger extends and deepens the notion of understanding to the level of Being-in-the-world, no longer considering it to be particular acts or function of connection in the Kantian context. Understanding, rather than an act, is a mode of being of Dasein, distinguished from the derived levels of understanding. Thus, for Heidegger, we must distinguish the understanding as one type of cognizing distinguished from explanation, from the understanding

which is their ground as “one of the constituents of the Being of there in general”<sup>30</sup>. The former is an existential derivative of the latter, just as intuition, including the phenomenological intuition of essences, and thinking are remote derivatives of understanding.

The primordial understanding constituted by the circularity of the forestructure and as structure involves the possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing.<sup>31</sup> The whole of *Being and Time* attempts to question of adequacy of the fore-structure of Dasein taken as a whole. Further hermeneutic phenomenology in general must proceed by constantly deepening its fore-having (fore-structure), explicating the hermeneutical situation. Here, Heidegger tells us that this is the condition for primordial knowing that the presuppositions are explicitly worked out. The fore-structure of Dasein’s understanding is worked out in terms of the things themselves. The fore-structure must be presented by the things themselves and not by anything else such as prejudices, fancies, and popular conception. Heidegger says: in a circle is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing. To be sure, we genuinely take hold of this possibility only when, in our interpretation, we have understood that first, last, and constant task is never to allow our fore-having, foresight, and fore-conception to be presented to us by fancies and popular

conceptions, but rather to make the scientific theme secure by working out these fore-structures in terms of things themselves<sup>32</sup>.

The whole of *Being and Time* take place in the context of primordial knowing. Since it is constantly concerned that its theme is secured by working out the fore-understanding, fore-sight, and fore-conception in terms of the thing-itself-Dasein as a whole.

Heidegger's notion of destruction will be dealt with in relation to his treatment of Kant in the context of the ontological tradition and time. Dasein, essentially constituted by primordial time, has grown up in a traditional way of interpreting itself. The past, a constitutive aspect of Dasein, already goes ahead of Dasein, becoming an important part of any analysis which tries to be authentic and adequate, especially dealing with the question of being. Dasein can fall back upon its world, but it can fall prey to tradition too. Heidegger realizes the need therefore to destroy the tradition in terms of the content and history of ontology.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger indicates both the negative and the positive aspects of this destruction. He says that we must on the contrary, take out the positive possibilities of that tradition, and this always means keeping it within its limits, these in turn are given factually in the way the question is formulated

at the time, and in the way the possible field for investigation is thus bounded off. On its negative side, this destruction does not relate itself towards the past; its criticism is aimed at today and the prevalent way of treating the history of ontology. Its negative function remains unexpressed and indirect.

The destruction of the history of ontology is essentially bound up with the way the question of Being is formulated, and it is possible only within such a formulation. In line with the positive tendencies of his destruction, we must in the first instance raise the question whether and to what extent the interpretation of Being and the phenomenon of time have been brought together thematically in the course of the history of ontology, and.... In pursuing this task of destruction with the problematic of temporality as our clue, we shall try to interpret the chapter on the schematism and the Kantian doctrine of time, taking that chapters as our point of departure....<sup>33</sup>

The role of repetition in Heidegger's philosophy is likewise an essential aspect of his entire project, for it is central to the hermeneutical approach to the history of ontology and must be aligned with his attempt to destroy that history. The cornerstone of the temporal is the future and since he deals with the repetition of possibilities in terms of future, his search into the

history of ontology reveals possibilities especially in relation to future.

Historicality is simply a more concrete working out of temporality, and is interrelated with the resoluteness of Dasein. “The resoluteness which comes back to itself and hands itself down, then becomes the repetition of a possibility of existence that has come down to us. Repeating is handing down explicitness that is to say, going back into the possibilities of the Dasein that has been there<sup>34</sup>”.

This repetition, strictly in terms of possibilities, does not attempt to make past actualities. The anticipatory resoluteness is the essential ground for the authentic repetition of a possibility of existence that has been there. Thus allowing, as Heidegger says, “the possibility that Dasein may choose its hero”<sup>35</sup>. Kant’s role in the history of ontology decisive for that history and merits repeating as delving into the latent possibility to be handed down from the future. Since, “the laying of the foundation (of metaphysics) is based on time”<sup>36</sup> and since “the first and only person who has even let himself be drawn hither by the coercion of the phenomenon themselves in Kant”<sup>37</sup>. Heidegger approaches Kant as playing a decisive role in the tradition of ontology.

Heidegger proceeds to give an ontological interpretation based on Kantian texts, especially from the edition of 1781 to the copernican revolution, showing that Kant does not wish to establish that all knowledge is ontic, nor does he want to exclude what that presupposes-ontological knowledge. For “ontic knowledge can be adequate to the essent that is, if the constitutive of its Being is known.... The manifestation of the essent (ontic truth) depends upon the revelation of the constitution of the Being of the essent ontological truth”<sup>38</sup>.

Once the hermeneutical situation, the totality of presuppositions has been explicated in *Being and Time*, the way is open to investigate the ontological tradition. For, once the foreunderstanding has been explicated, we have the stance from which to interpret the history of ontology in terms of possibilities latent in that tradition. Such an analysis is necessary to bring the question of Being to its depth: “The question of Being does not achieve its true concreteness until we have carried through the process of destroying the ontological tradition”<sup>39</sup>. This effort of destruction of the ontological possibility of Dasein. In the context of the destruction and repetition of the ontological tradition that *Being and Time* is the prolegomenon to *Kant and the problem of metaphysics*. The fundamental theme of Heidegger

is focusing on the Being question. Heidegger says: “The laying of the foundation of metaphysics is based on time. The question as to Being, the fundamental question of a laying of the foundation of metaphysics, is the problem of *Being and Time*. The title contains the directive idea of the present interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* as laying of the foundation of metaphysics”<sup>40</sup>.

Heidegger expresses the view that ontological, primordial knowledge is made up of transcendental determinations of time. Primordial time is the basis and origin of all else in human finite knowledge and existence. It is primordial time which allows the pure formation of transcendence to take place. Thus primordial time, as the innermost essence of the self. It makes possible transcendental imagination as essentially spontaneous. Only in this unity can pure sensibility as spontaneous and pure apperception as receptive spontaneity belong together and form the essential unity of pure sensible reason. This interpretation, in the context of Kant’s language and problematics, indicates how Heidegger pulls Kant in the direction of the presupposed ontology from which he is operating.

If a being is to be given to man, a finite being, man must be receptive or oriented to receive it beforehand. Heidegger’s

account of the Kantian's pure *a priori* schematization of concept for an image is really an attempt to show how almost speaks of the fundamental originary level of schematizing and an entity and the structure of Dasein in terms of its comprehension of Being. Heidegger is less interested in the *a priori* and pure dimensions of Kant's account, than he is in interpreting the cognitive synthesis as an ontological synthesis presupposing the synthesizing temporalizing primordial time, which produces the horizon in the schemata. "The pure schemata as transcendental determinations of time from the horizon of transcendence".<sup>41</sup>

For Heidegger, the experience of an entity demands the entity must have this anticipatory structure as its mode of Being. According to Heidegger's interpretive appropriation of Kant, the schema, formed as a mode sensibilization. The present discussion turn to consider epistemic dimensions latent in the Heideggerian effort toward a fundamental ontology and his interpretation of *Critique of Pure Reason* in the context of fundamental ontology. Heidegger concludes that the rule is represented in hour of, its regulation, that is, according to the manner which, in regarding the presentation, it inserts itself in, and imposes itself in, the aspect which presents the presentation. The act of representation of the hour of the regulation is the free "construction" of a

sensibilization. The latter, in the sense just described, is the source of the image.<sup>42</sup>

The shift of focus from the strictly ontological consideration to epistemological considerations, the perspective upon the schemata is no longer limited to the context of the Being of entities encountered in Being-in-the-world. The epistemic focus changes the attitude toward the schemata but retains the legacy of existential phenomenology regarding the nature and role of the schemata results from the deepening of intentionality, in one way or another. This epistemological consideration obtains at the ordinary level just as does any fundamental ontology. In short, critique of Heidegger's view of epistemology rounding out the above critique of his claim for the inclusiveness of ontology under the guide of primacy of being and ontology.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger expresses charging with traditional epistemology, as well as traditional metaphysics, because both have failed to get the derived mode of Being of the present-at-hand in question of Being and of knowledge. This he takes back to their foundations in the existential analytic of Dasein. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger shows why an epistemological question fails. He says our task is not to prove that the

external world is present at hand or to show how it is present-at-hand, but to point out why Dasein, as Being-in-the-world-has the tendency to bury the external world in nullity, epistemologically before going on to prove it. The reason for this lies in Dasein's falling and the way in which the primary understanding of Being has been derived to Being as presence-at-hand a diversion which is motivated by that falling itself.<sup>43</sup>

Again, Heidegger indicates an important aspect of his view of epistemology. He states that what is needed is the basic insight that while different epistemological directions which have been pursued have not gone so very far off epistemologically, their neglect of any existential analysis of Dasein has kept them from obtaining any basis for a well secured phenomenal problematic<sup>44</sup>.

It is necessary to agree with Heidegger's insistence on existential analysis of Dasein for an adequate basis. The first part of the above statement reflects philosophically naive and archaic view of epistemology. For, epistemology, not limited and restricted to Heidegger's view of it, can enter the contemporary world view just as the ontology to which Heidegger subordinates his restricted and limited epistemology.

Epistemology does not necessarily remain within framework of the modern era. A viable theory of knowledge must

today seek the originary levels of existence, of experience and of Being, grounded of all aspects and levels knowing and understanding. Once we overcome the narrow and fixed epistemology criticized by Heidegger, we can go beyond it or beneath it to its epistemic existential foundation, in a way similar to the way in which Heidegger has done in his fundamental ontology. This requires the investigation of the fundamental level of Being-in-the-world from the point of view of its epistemic ramifications. Especially with regard to what Heidegger calls primordial knowledge as a possibility of Dasein contained in the circle of understanding, which constituted Dasein's being. There is an alternative to logical and epistemological analyses of meaning by opening them up to their full epistemic depth to reach the fullness and richness of existence, mode of being, or being-in-the-world.

#### **2.4. DECONSTRUCTION OF METAPHYSICS**

The meaning of Being by Heidegger's project is of fundamental ontology that unifies his manifold reflection on Being. Fundamental ontology involves a twofold task. On the one hand, as a structural existential analytic, and, on the other hand, as a structural analysis of the already existing ontologies. The existential analytic sets into operation analysis of Being insofar

as Being is there, of the *sein* that is *Da*, that offers itself whenever a concrete human being actualized its own Being temporally in-the-world. The analysis yields a set of existentials that lay bare the essential structure of Dsaein's factual existence and its ontological constitution<sup>45</sup>. The analysis of existing ontologies, in contrast, takes the form of a radical critique of the history of western metaphysics. Since for Heidegger's philosophy is always a construction such a critique necessarily becomes an historical destruction. Heidegger said that these three basic components of phenomenological method-reduction, construction, destruction-belong together in their content and receive grounding in their mutual pertinence. Construction in philosophy is necessarily destruction, that is to say a constructing of traditional concepts carried out in a historical recursion to the tradition<sup>46</sup>.

Destruction should be understood as an appropriative destructive of a particular tendency of philosophical thinking. The objective of this consists in de-constructing sedimented layers of interpretation in order to explicate what remain concealed and unthought in the horizon of comprehension of the traditional determination of Being. The path way of Heidegger's destruction is truly geneological, that is, to the unthought (*das ungedachte*) the unsaid in the traditional metaphysical thinking and sayings.

Destruction must be tradition oriented and object specific. It is historically informed deconstruction aimed specifically at the ontologies prevailing from ancient Greece object-oriented and working within the tradition it attempt to undermine. Heidegger's destruction is at once a philosophical and historical cognition that works as a positive appropriation of the tradition from its forgotten and concealed sources. The history of philosophy, destruction strives for what Heidegger later calls the true overcoming (*uberwindung*) of that history by effecting an intense genuine analogue with the past.

Destruction is only to construct a true science of Being in terms of an original and originary moment of truth memorative in that it amounts to a receptive approximation toward the fresh self-presentation of Being. Under the diagnose of this step-back Heidegger means and says the set back thus moves out of metaphysics into the essential nature of metaphysics<sup>47</sup>. That is Heidegger's aspiration for home-coming. The genuine home-coming Dasein is the roundabout journey in the remembrance of Being, a return at long last the whereabouts, of Being. Ontology orients the fields Being by articulating its *logos*. It is by virtue of this destruction or that those primordial experience of Being manifest in the profound simplicity of the fragments of

pre-Socratic thinkers can be identified and located, that the the first appearance of Being can be brought to view again.

The western metaphysics represents for Heidegger an eclips, a failure, something gone wrong. The reason for it lies in what Heidegger calls the oblivion of the distinction between Being and being namely the oblivion of the ontological difference. This oblivion is both productive and constructive in the true sense of the terms. With the ontico-ontological differentiation, Heidegger says the history of the western world comes to be borne out. It is the event of metaphysics.

The moment of the eclipse of Being is indeed the moment of beginning. Yet this is the beginning of darkness, a beginning whose development and continuation are determined by fateful indistinction. The time of darkness is the time when things are not clearly seen. It is the time of not being able to see, of invisibility. As a result of the indistinction of Being and beings, philosophical thinking is lost to itself, oblivious to its proper object and ignorant of the source which provokes thought to begin with.

The oblivion of the ontological difference is not the result of a contingent historical decision and part of the

philosophers. Heidegger remind us that by no means the consequence of a forgetfulness of thinking. Oblivion of Being belongs to the self-veiling essence of Being. It belongs so essentially to the destiny of Being that the down of this destiny rises as the unveiling of what is present in its presencing. Since Being together with its essence, its distinction from beings-keeps to itself<sup>48</sup>.

The notion of the ontological difference contains a double edged indication concerning the unique relation between Being and beings in general and the self-eclipsing nature of Being in particular. On the one hand, it refers to Dasein's straightforward oblivion of the difference between Being and beings, a forgetful indifference between that makes possible to the interpretations that reached in the western ontology. That is a groundless ontology that is ever since at a distance from its intended object, an ontology that treats Being as a being. On the other hand this notion brings essentially an intrinsically elusive nature of Being. It indicates as an instantaneous interply of presence and absence, this simultaneous self-veiling and self-unveiling, is the self-spectable of presencing.

The self-veiling of Being expresses the fact that Being as being does not leave its point of origin. In letting things be, in

unveiling itself for thinking. The double sense of ontological difference be clear that the ontological difference not only constitutes the condition of ontology but also it becomes its object. That is to say that, the difference is between the ontic and the ontological constitutes the difference between the heterogeneity. The project of ontology, an approximation toward the elucidation of Being. On the other hand, the difference evokes the ontological approach that difference becomes the-first and primary object for ontological reflection, that ontology starts by thinking difference. The ontological difference functions as a difference that anticipated transcendence of that difference.

In order for the ontological inquiry to take its first step, Dasein must in some sense exist both in and outside the ontological clearing; Dasein must be both authentic and inauthentic. Defined by its pre-ontological comprehension of Being, Dasein embodies, so to speak the between with open passages toward both Being and beings. This betweenness of Dasein is precisely the transcendence of existence with grounds Dasein's compartment toward the world, and, as *Being and Time* took great pains to show, is ultimately rooted in the temporality of Dasein. The transcendence of Dasein thus constitutes the difference between

Being and beings which, according to Dasein's own truth, takes the form of a temporal unfolding.

Heidegger means the factual existence of Dasein as a temporal being-in-the-world (that is Dasein's existence takes time and is in time) manifests the ontological difference; that the existence of Dasein is the temporal embodiment of the ontological difference. Dasein being-there is the same as the performance of this distinction. In fact, Dasein is what it is precisely by performing this distinction. To the extent that Dasein is there, the sheer fact that it exists. Dasein exists across two realms, the ontic and the ontological and its transcendent nature anticipate the transcendence of ontological indistinction by first realizing its ontic ambiguity. In Dasein's existence, in the existential performance of the ontological difference i.e., we found only the oblivion to that difference but also the possibility of overcoming that oblivion as Dasein's pre-ontological cognizance of the difference develops into an explicit understood difference.

The ontological difference and the meaning of Being make up that one thought that Heidegger-along with those great thinker poets like Holderlin-continuously thinks. This destructive thinking back to a Being. It is a hermeneutic, found on a notion of truth as self-presence which seeks to claims to precede all forms of

discursive and rationalist representation. Heideggerian destruction realizes a violence of interpretation, violent hermeneutic that ferries us across to the flows the logos of western rationality at the end to arrive at early Greek thinking. Heidegger says that to think Being of beings means to think Being without regard to metaphysics. Yet disregard for metaphysics still prevails even in the intention to overcome metaphysics. Therefore, our task is to cease all overcoming, and leave metaphysics to itself<sup>49</sup>.

This determination to “cease all overcoming, and leave metaphysics to itself” reveals Heidegger’s understanding the difficulty that even though the past is past, its ghost may still be with us. The very idea to think through tradition to replace a disoriented metaphysics with a fundamental ontology is itself tradition-guided. But this self-awareness does not stop Heidegger. The persistent inquiry toward a true understanding of Being has led him to “trace Being its own from appropriation”<sup>50</sup>.

Heidegger at the end of the essay “*on Time and Being*”, concludes: “Appropriation neither is, nor is Appropriation there .... what remains to be said? Only this: Appropriation appropriates”<sup>51</sup>.

## 2.5 BEING AND BEING HUMAN

Heidegger states that it is the first and foremost a happening of Being itself, because it offers itself in the centre of human existence in such a way that it demands the priority over thinking. Not beings, but Being is most worthy. The ontological difference, which essentially characterizes man's being<sup>52</sup>, must be thought in function. It is the necessary condition for the possibility of the turn-to being (*Kehre*). As the ontological difference occurs primarily in thought, as understood by Heidegger, the *Kehre* is also a return of Being into thought. Only this turn of Being into thought overcomes metaphysics as the mode of thinking in which came about the forgetfulness of Being.

The *kehre* of the being occurrence is also verbalized in Heidegger's particular thought. It implies that his thought by the *Kehre* intends to be a victory over metaphysics. Heidegger's thought is defined by a shift in thinking. This shift leads to a critical evaluation of Heidegger's thought against the background of the authentic thinking of Being. *Being and Time* is an analysis provided of the being of man. It is an inquiry into the basic features of being-human. Temporality is pointed out as characteristic of the being of man. The question about Being must

like wise be thought in and along a times perspective. He elaborates the basic question at the beginning of *Being and Time* namely the question about the meaning of Being. But after the *Kehre*, Heidegger thinks Being in a time perspective. Heidegger states that understands the happening of being human in together with others.

*Kehre* is a dialectical event not only in thought of Heidegger but of Being itself in and through beings. According Heidegger, thinking is a responding to Being. His thought intends to be a thinking to Being<sup>53</sup>. The starting point of thinking of Being is the being of man who is attuned to Being as such. Man 'know' Being as the horizon of his existence as being-in-the-world. The fact is that man knows about. It is very clearly shown by language. Being human understanding Being. But Being as such can dawn the horizon of being-human. It is (happens, appears) the necessary ground for man's existence. This Being ground is the over against of the being that is such a way that it utters itself first out of nothingness.

Being is the antithesis of beings, primary human being. Not in the sense that man posit Being as such as again himself (this would be some kind of ontological idealism, a transcendental subjectivity). But in the sense that man finds himself over against

being as merely transcendent or other words, in his understanding of Being, he reached. Being as the non-being that grounds him. In this relationship man is the shepherd of Being. Being itself make of man the keeper and guardian. Here being enacts itself also in man and sends him forth into his undermined nature.

It is an undeniable stand in Heidegger's thinking that thinking is equated with concealedness and with the happening of unconcealedness. Being as unconcealedness lets every being be in its own unconcealness, lets being be present. Thus being as unconcealedness is the formal happening, that must be said as condition and ground to all that which happening. Every being lets it be seen that it is and is thus an unlocking of the happening of Being as un-concealedness. Whereas, according to Heidegger, in western philosophy, starting with Greek philosophy, namely, with Plato, Being was identified with and narrowed down to what-ness. Heidegger himself identifies it with and narrows it down to thatness

Speaking and thinking about language and the word, Heidegger's claims that the nature of language evokes and admits being as beings. In language Being exerts a thrust, because the utterance of language refers to which is to be named by some it is. As (utterance) language is a happening of Being, this Being

which is imported by language and word, is as logos and sage (utterance) called un-concealedness. The being that is imported and unlocked by language and word is empty being, it formally causes the thing to be. Although as formal ground of the Being of beings this Being has an essential and necessary relationship to beings.

Heidegger's thought between Being and beings—a relation of beings to Being, that, is a necessary significance of, being for Being itself, is practically absent. Heidegger says that there exists a relation of man of Being, which consists in the fact that his nature belongs to Being by giving it a hearing. The autonomy of Being with respect to beings is expressed by Heidegger when he emphasizes concealedness of Being. The anxious desire to give priority to that which the deepest forgetfulness of being characteristic of metaphysics, which confused being. Beings, misleads Heidegger and causes him to fall into empty and abstract Being.

As a disciple of Husserl, Heidegger intends to philosophize by starting merely from the things themselves, but in fact he does it in such a way that they are ultimately escape him. Whatever is empirical is called ontic and referred to the nonphilosophical sciences. Heidegger is convinced that rationalism we see his

antirationalistic and antisubjective frame at least in its idealistic form, saw through Being, because ultimately the thinking subjectivity posits Being as constitutes the nature of Being. Hegel and Neitzsche are clear examples. This looking through Being is a well determined form of dominating and mastering Being, and he reached a certain peak in today's technology.

The reaction against subjectivism and rationalism lead Heidegger to an objectivism and an irrationalism, which we mean that for him Being is a dark in itself lack all content. Greek conception of being that calls be appearance, presence, collecting, logos, and so on may lead to a thinking for which being thus understood is everything. Being must be thought in the extreme discord of the togetherness of everything and nothing. Accordingly, this togetherness is the essential concord of being itself. Beings must be thought together with Being, and vice-versa. Every being, whether man, thing or word, is an unlocking and rendering present of Being as ground. Because this Being has neither name nor content and is only itself, the Being to each being is likewise empty. Thus beings are formally equal to each other.

## **2.6 ECLIPSE OF BEING**

Heidegger has tried to name Being in accordance with the

starting point of his thought. Being can be aimed at only by starting from the Being of beings, especially from the being of man. The most conspicuous and important term for Being is *welt* (world). The world is formally Being as unconcealedness, present in beings, even as the earth is called the formal dimension of the concealedness of Being. The world has here an historical significance, that is Being discloses itself in the history. This world as the unconcealedness of Being possesses also well-determined content which must be called historical. Heidegger speaks of the world that is set down and set open by the Greek, he certainly also means the culture, thought, religion, daily activity history, and so on, of the Greek people during a certain period.

In Heidegger's thought confrontation with poets, especially with Holderlin, world assumes an even more dynamic meaning. World is the happening, the enacting of the four religions of being: gods and materials, heaven and earth. Heidegger in the conception of Being has drawn the consequence of his deepest thought intention, namely, to bring Being and time together in thought by starting from the temporalized being of man.

The thinking of Being which corresponds to this connections is first and foremost a commemorating of Being, one



gets the impression that which must be commemorated is especially the dawning of Being in and through thing yet metaphysics, the destruction of western philosopher seems to be guided by the idea that the end is already preset at the start. Here start means the authentic origin (primordial leap) it belongs properly to the leap of Being, that to the opening up, to the unlocking of Being, that it should already contain its end, although in a hidden way.

Heidegger claims that Being happens in thinking. Being dares man to listen to the happening of Being and on the other hand, man claims Being as history for himself. The dominating and independent function of the occurrence Being is the fact that the subjective individuality of human being becomes ever more subordinated. This development stands under the influence of Heidegger's utter rejection of rationalism, idealism, subjectivism, and Being so on a forms of human domination over Being. The passionate rejection of man's subjectivity has influenced Heidegger the conception of Being. After the *kehre*, this realization human subjectivity gains ground.

Heidegger does not sufficiently view the individual man person as a unique arrangement of Being. He overlook the insight that individuality makes Being into history. Plato, Plotinus, Descartes, Churchill, and so on are moment of Being, by which

Being becomes history, is presence, while at the same time, an account of the limitation of individuality.

Heidegger by pointing out to the significance of the artist, as concrete subject for the being of the work of art. Heidegger states emphatically that, in this connection, individuality has no significance. What matter is that the work of art be there as made, and present itself as being. According to its nature, the work of art is an unlocking of Being as unconcealedness, not a proclaiming of the creative artist. With regard to Being the artist is only an obedient servant. It is quite clear that in this way Heidegger takes a stand against Nietzsche.

It is something similar in Heidegger's considerations about technology. According him, technology is not a human activity, the essence of technology is Being itself that unveils itself while at the same time hiding itself. In technology beings rules but under the spell of rational subjectivity. As forgetfulness of Being, technology is a danger. Heidegger points out that what we experience in the frame as the constellation of Being and man through the modern world of technology is a prelude to what is called the event of appropriation. This event, however, does not necessarily persist in its prelude. For the event of appropriation the possibility arises that it may overcome the more dominance

of the frame to turn into a more original appropriating of the world of technology from its dominance back to servitude in the realm by which man reaches more truly into the event to appropriation.

This brings us to the conclusion that thinking of Being like that of Heidegger may mean a flight from historical reality. The responsibility of man as critical consciousness, as the possibility of affirming-and denying, for the history Being of which man belongs as first called is too much over looked in such a thing. It is the possibility possessed by the individual and the community of Being, i.e., of telling Being happen in this determined way namely, in one's own history, culture, community, and on.

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## **Chapter Three**

### **Dwelling, Building and Thinking**

### 3.1. HEIDEGGER ON THINKING

Thinking in the sense of thinking of Being or meditative or essential thinking is the kind of thinking that Heidegger is advocating. He hopes that meditative thinking may “grant us the possibility... of anew ground and foundation upon which we may stand and endure in the world of technology without being imperiled by it”<sup>1</sup>. This kind of thinking, Heidegger tells us, dwells in what lies close to us and meditates on what is the closest. The task of Heidegger’s thought places before us is that of learning how to think. In the world of thinking, Heidegger has such an enduring presence first and foremost as a teacher, then as the practitioner of the art of thinking.

From the point of Heidegger the oldest and the most important question of philosophy is the question of Being. According to Heidegger, this problem was first raised by Anaximander. He adds that Being is the closest to us than our inner most essence. The noticeable thing according to Heidegger, is that the pre-Socratic philosophers alone dealt with this problem of Being in its authentic and unblemished form. Modern thinkers considered Being, following Aristotle as an empty concept. Some fundamental error in metaphysics caused this misfortune. Man is one who

can think and, hence, he is called a rational animal. Man can think in the sense that he possesses the capacity to think. To be capable of thinking, we need to learn how to think. We learn to think by giving our mind to what there is to think about. Everything is capable of provoking thought and that enable use to think. What this most thought-provoking ? From the Heideggerian point of view the most thought-provoking thing in our thought provoking time is that we are still not thinking<sup>2</sup>. Today, every where there is an interest in philosophy. Almost every claim to know that philosophy is all about is, in fact, is a claim to know philosophers who are thinkers par excellence. They are called thinkers precisely because thinking properly takes place in philosophy.

In our era man thinks the profoundest thought. Buy thinking so, we do remain related to what must have been thought in the past. What has been said so far is that science dose not think the way thinkers think. This is shocking. The gulf between thinking and the science becomes very wide and it remains unbridg able. Hence, it is important that we should learn how to think and we learn it only if we unlearn at the same time. The matter before us is that we can learn thinking only if we radically unlearn what thinking has been traditionally. To do this we must come to know it.

Heidegger asserts that there is a difference between *logo* and *mythos*. *Mythos* means “to utter the word”. For the Greeks to utter is to lay bare and make it appear. *Mythos* is what has its essence in its utterance, what is apparent in the unconcealedness<sup>3</sup>. On the contrary, the early Greek thinkers (for instance Parmenides) are precisely the one to use *mythos* and *logos* the same sense. *Mythos* and *logos* become separated and opposed to each other only at the point where neither *mythos* nor *logos* can keep to their original nature. But Heidegger in his characteristic manner remarks that nothing holy is ever destroyed by logic, but can be destroyed only by God’s withdrawal.

The thinking back to what is to be thought is the source and ground of *poesey*<sup>4</sup> (poetry). This is why *poesey* is the water that flows at times towards the source, and at times towards thinking as thinking back, i.e., a recollection. As long as we take the view that logic gives us information only about what thinking is, we shall never be able to think how much all poetry rests upon thinking back, i.e., recollection. Everyone admits that arts and sciences are totally different from each other. If a distinction is made between thinking and science and then the two are contrasted, then the fear may arise as to thinking might open hostilities against the science. When we speak of sciences, we

shall not be speaking against it but speaking of its essential nature. The existing fact is that today's sciences belong to "the realm of the essence of technology"<sup>5</sup> and not simply "in technology". Along still surrounds the essence of modern science, that fog is not produced by individual investigators and scholars in science, i.e., it is not produced by man. It arises from the region of what is most thought-provoking that none of us is still thinking. This is most thought-provoking that none of us is still thinking. That is why we are here attempting to learn how to think. The writing of poetry is no more exempt from thinking.

The art of good teaching is more difficult than learning. A good teacher has a large store of information. Today, nobody wants to become a teacher because of his attitude towards teaching. And, presumably, this disinclination is linked to that most thought-provoking matter which makes us to think. We are trying to learn how think. At any rate, it is an art or a craft, handicraft. Thinking itself is man's simplest, and yet for that reason the hardest handiwork, if it is accomplished in its proper way. We must learn, how to think because our being able to think is still no guarantee that we are capable of thinking properly.

The gift of what must properly be thought about, is what we call the most thought-provoking. Our answer to the question

is “the most thought-provoking” might turn us away from the most thought-provoking thing. In fact, it has long since turned many men away. Socrates did nothing else other than placing himself at the disposal of this art. That is way he is called purest thinker of the West. All the great western thinkers after Socrates, with all their greatness were unlike him in this art. Thinking has entered into literature and literature decided the western science which, by way of the doctrine of the Middle Ages, become the *scientia*<sup>6</sup> of modern time.

We do not know what is thinking and what calls for thinking and, therefore, can't think about what poetry is? We, modern men, don't have the slightest notion of how thoughtfully the Greek experienced their lofty poetry. Its statement rests on its truth Beauty is a gift of the essence of truth (*aletheia*). We are compelled to let the poet's world stand in its truth in beauty. This does not exclude on the contrary, includes that we think the poetic world.

Holderlin's poetic statement with which Heidegger is concerned in his endeavour to think Being is said to be the “most thought-provoking.”<sup>7</sup> What is stated poetically, and what is state in thought are never identical. But there are, occasions when they become similar. And, the gulf separating poetry and thinking is

clear and decisive on such occasions. This can occur when *poesy* (poetry) is lofty and thinking is profound. Holderlin understood the matter well. The question “what is called thinking?” can never be answered by proposing an Aristotelian definition or by suggesting a universal concept of thinking. The truth is that we may not think about what thinking is. However, the Greek thinkers, and there after Kant and Hegel understood the fruitfulness of such a reflection. In the west thinking has flourished as logic, Logic refers to a special kind of thinking. The knowledge logic concerning logic has been made scientifically fruitful only recently, in a special science that calls itself logistics. It is the most specialized of all specialized sciences.

The essence of modern technology is worthy of thought. It is higher than the traditional views on science which sees science merely as a phenomenon of human civilization. The essence of technology pervades our lives in a way which we have barely noticed so far. But so long as the essence of technology does not closely concern us, in our thought, we shall never be able to know what the machine is. None of us know yet what handicap must modern man in the technological era carry even if he is not a worker at the machine. Neither Hegel nor Marx could know it nor could they ask why their thinking had to move in the shadow of

the essential nature of technology. This is the one track thinking that causes human laziness. This one track thinking, which is becoming more wide spread in various shapes, is one of those unsuspected and forms in which the essence of technology assumes dominion.

The one track thinking is something more than mere one sided thinking. It has a greater reach and a loftier origin. The word thinking means having a view. For instance, I think it will rain tonight. Occasionally we say the one who speaks that way is thinking, he merely expresses his views on something. Heidegger warns us that we must be very careful not to regard this "viewing" as a significance mode of thinking. It leads precisely the sphere of scientific exploration. Historical science may thought fully explore a period of history for instance, in every possible respect and yet never explore what history is about. It cannot in fact do so scientifically, By way of history, a man will never find out what history is. Similarly, a mathematician cannot show way of mathematics, i.e., by means of his science, what ultimately a mathematical formula is all about. In the like manner man remains inaccessible to spheres such as history, art, language, nature, etc. It must be said that the science *qua* science has no access to thinking, for, science does not think.

In a passage from the *Letter on Humanism*, where Heidegger, while commenting on the nature of thinking, says that “the thinking that inquired into the truth of Being and so defines man’s essential abode from Being forward Being is neither ethics nor ontology neither theoretical nor practical” but “come to pass before the distinction”.<sup>8</sup>

The sciences, i.e., fields of knowledge, have infinitely more knowledge than thinking. There is another side in every science which that science as such can never reach. That is the essential nature and origin of them. The sciences remain necessarily one sided. This one sidedness arises on account of a defect of our minds, for sometimes the minds hold the view that everything is identical. To day every news paper, every magazine, and every radio or television programme offers various items in an identical manner to all sorts of viewers. They also consider the subjects of science and that of thinking in an identical manner.

However, it would be an error for us to believe that such a phenomenon is merely to criticize our present age. Certainly, we should escape from the imperceptible power of the uniformly one-sided view. It is only on the plane of the one-sided uniform view that one track thinking takes its start. And this is what we mean when we say that we are still not thinking. Many thinkers give us

food for thought. That does not mean that we are thinking nor does it mean we have come to what is the most thought-provoking.

It is supposed that the forming of thoughts and ideas are one and the same. Traditionally it was believed that thinking is a kind of representation of ideas. But at the same time it remains obscure as to how this traditional understanding of thinking arose. When someone says, to think the matter is such and such, it clearly follows that to think is to form ideas. Basically, they are still inaccessible to us. Let us be honest with ourselves regarding the essential nature of thinking, the essential possibilities of thinking and the essential origin of thinking. They are all strange to us and they, in fact, give us food for our thought. Our manner of thinking still feeds on the traditional nature of thinking the forming of representational ideas. But that is not the nature of thinking and it is not the reality of thought. The real nature of thought will reveal itself to us if we remain open and docile to it.

The representative of traditional thinking who is the closest to us in time and when the most stimulating is Nietzsche. He sees clearly that the history of western man is coming to an end. Nietzsche saw the necessity of change in the realm of essential thinking. He was the first thinker to recognize it clearly

and the only one to think metaphysically. Within the purview of thinking, Nietzsche calls man the last man. He adds that the last man is no longer willing look beyond himself and to undertake the task of essential thinking, in a way that is essentially right. Man is in so far as incapable of it. He has not yet come into his own self. That is why Nietzsche says: “Man is the as yet undetermined animal.”<sup>9</sup> Western thought holds that man is a rational animal. Through reason, man raised himself above animals. But in Nietzsche man is still the undetermined animal. The rational animal in him has not yet been fully brought out. Nietzsche, says man is not willing to subject to himself. Nietzsche gives an ideal, the superman, which is often misunderstood. But does not refer this title to the existing man. Nietzsche’s words refer to the density of man and that density will take the foundations of man’s thinking.

According to the Greek doctrine, man is “that rising present which can make appear what is present.”<sup>10</sup> From the western conceptual view point man is a peculiar combination of animality and rationality. But to Nietzsche, the proper essential unity of the two has not been achieved. Therefore, as of now, the two domains of being, animality and rationality are separate and they do clash. This rapture prevents man from possessing the

genuine type of man and forces him to cast off his “humanity”. Nietzsche’s thinking gives the expression of something that already exists, but it is still concealed from our current views.

### **3.2 THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF THINKING**

The question “what is called thinking ?” is still remote and seems almost strange to us. From the point of the common man, Heidegger’s query is ambiguous since for him thinking is only an expression found in our day to day use of language. The vagueness of the question what is called thinking? lies precisely in the ambiguity of the expression “to call”. Moreover, this question has a unique meaning compared to any other question. We, in any given situation, are capable of thinking. But we are not actually involved in thinking because we are too occupied with other matters and, hence, disinclined to think. The people committed exclusively to think are very few. According to Heidegger, poetry and thought are the media for expressing the thought of Being in language. Thought and poetry never merely use language to express themselves, rather thought and poetry are themselves essential for language. If we utter the word “thinking”, it calls for an examination of the history of the word thinking. The words thought and thinking are expressions used in the history of language although thinking is an activity common to all of us.

We have placed thinking close to poetry and at a distance from science. The essential closeness of poetry and thinking do not ignore their difference. On the contrary, it is the difference, an abysmal kind. Due to this difference, we moderners have trouble in understanding the meaning of thinking. Thinking and poetry have long since been a part of literature. The history of language is accessible only by historical investigation and philosophical insights.

For the one who tries to understand the mind of Heidegger's philological explorations are of utmost significance. Philosophy opens up the pre-scientific mode of thinking, i.e., essential thinking, and shows the historical development of the notion of thinking. When we examine the etymology of the word thinking reveals its close relation to the old English word *thanc*. This word is rich in meaning and conveys more than what we generally understand from the word thinking as a mental activity. Heidegger's words: the *thanc* means man's inmost mind, heart, the heart's core, that -innermost essence of man which reaches outward most fully and to the outermost limit, and decisively that, rightly considered, the idea of an inner and outer world does not arise<sup>11</sup>

Here one finds the suggestive meaning of the word *thanc* which are closely related to thinking. First, we notice that thinking and memory have a close affinity with each other and it is summation of all that we care for as human beings. Secondly, find that thinking and thanks are closely related to each other in their meaning. Our unique capacity to think is here viewed as a gift of Being and, therefore, it enables us to ask the most thought provoking question.

Heidegger's understanding of memory is quite different from the general conception of it as the ability to retain or hold back the ideas which has got a reference to the past. The present day meaning of the term memory as the power to recall was something alien to it originally. Thinking, in Heidegger's opinion, is the all gathering thinking that recalls.<sup>12</sup> Here the essential nature of thinking is conceived as gatheredness. Memory is not exclusively related to the past, the present, and the future too have a place in it. In other words, it is the present having a reference to not yet and the no longer; they are encapsulated in the present. What is past and what is yet to come appear in oneness with the present. Since this basic meaning remains distorted. We are compelled to emphasize this particular meaning of thinking and this is conveyed through recalling memory or remembrance.

Moreover, the word memory suggests a steadfast and constant concentration on Being. Consequently, memory is not just the quality essential to recall, but it is fundamentally the gathering of everything that the heart holds in Being. Memory, therefore, cannot be taken as an after the fact collection of that which exists, but it covers the tiding that overtake all our doings.<sup>13</sup> In short, thinking is that gatheredness which recalls our essential relation to Being or makes possible to ask the most thought-provoking question.

Thinking and thanking are also closely related in meaning. As we have seen, the authenticity of *Dasein* rests in its constant attempt to remain in proximity to Being. Essential thought which Heidegger often speaks about is nothing more or anything less than this listening to the voice of Being. For, essential thinking is related to Being in two different ways. First, it is owned by Being and secondly, it attends or makes a response to the call of Being. Heidegger emphasizes the claim of Being to ourselves, and we ourselves are the text and texture of the question.<sup>14</sup> When we understand that our relation to Being is essential, there is a feeling of thankfulness or devotedness for this gift. This is the reason why Heidegger says: to think is to thank. Thanking is a gift of Being which is the highest and most rewarding for it

mines our essential nature, by revealing our relation to Being. According to Heidegger, one must be thankful for this unique endowment and one can express his gratefulness by giving to the most thought-provoking question.

But thinking is one of the major activities of man. The question what is called thinking is an attempt to reach out to the source of this activity. Indeed, the question is prior even to thinking. The question is directed toward what would be called supposition of thinking. We understand what thinking is in an ordinary, vague or implicit sense. However, the implicitness thinking betrays us because of the fact that what we understand by thinking is presented and handed down to us by logic.

Thinking expressed in terms of logical propositions affirm something of something. For instance, consider the statement: the moon is risen. In this proposition the predicate does not merely express in speech something but also presents or affirms something as something, *viz.* the moon is risen. Such a presentation and affirmation are ruled by a conjunction of what is stated with that is made. The conjunction constitute a sentence. Every proposition is a sentence. But every sentence need not be a proposition. "what is called thinking ?" is not a proposition, it is a sentence.

There is another way of looking at our query: "what is called thinking?" When we ask the question "what is called thinking?" in the first sense, the word thinking directs us to the essential sphere of memory, devotion, and thanks. In the second sense of the question, the meaning of thinking emerges differently. However, according to Heidegger, philosophically the word is related to thought, memory, and thanks. The decisive question still remains what is it which the western civilization and especially the European thinking (today) received in its essential character from the Greek thinking. The way of thinking cannot be traced from somewhere to somewhere, nor does it exist as such in any place. No thinker ever has entered into another thinker's solitude. Yet it is only from its solitude that thinking that comes after or that went before reveals itself. It was Parmenides who remarked that one should state and think that Being is. This statement of Parmenides has two aspects. The first concerns the content of the statement and the second is the manner in which we carry it over from the Greek to our own language.

1. The content of saying: The content of the assertion easily escapes and slips away from us into oblivion. The expression "Being is" hardly conforms to our accustomed ways of thinking. We often hear the sentence and find nothing worthy of

thought in it and we take the view that subject and predicate of it are equally clear. We have the 'is' even before it is spoken. In the course of two and a half thousand years, starting from the early Greek philosophers, thinking itself has slowly become accustomed to the idea which the sentence echos. Hence, a theory could be formulated stating that nothing further could be said about it than what the above expression tells us. Kant in his work, *Critique of Pure Reason* says that "being" and "existence" are among the "almost unanalysable concepts".<sup>15</sup> He further remarks that what the expressions "being" and "existence" tells us can be grasped only in a concept. Today we talk of "being" and "existence" in a routine manner. We only notice the monotony of the sentence "being is" and yet the day may come when some will find the sentence astonishing.

2. The translation of the saying: The translated form of above question "what calls on us to think?" is of a special kind because the expression in translation does more than conveying knowledge of an earlier view of philosophy. But the translation is nothing special and nothing worthy of distinction. The expression of the early thinking fits in splendidly with the common picture. Among the early thinkers we see Parmenide's fragments speaking, stating, and thinking of the Being of beings. It speaks of the

highest and the deepest, the most remote and yet the nearest, the most veiled and yet the clearest sense of Being.

Parmenides fragments concerning Being and thought which he nowhere elucidates, conceals a still deeper and wider sense than the expression of Being does in Holderlin's poetry. The later Greek thinkers like Plato and Aristotle state that thinking proceeds as though the meaning of thinking were the most obvious thing in the world. However, that is not the case in Parmenides' approach. Greek thinking seems to have reached its completion in Plato and Aristotle. But we are inquiring back into the past asking for the nature and the mode where determination will be ruled by logic. Parmenides says: "Needful the saying and so thinking too, that Being is."<sup>16</sup> Being is what is to be stated and thought. Here the character of the sentence "Being is" has been stressed. To the modern man the thoughtfulness will ofcourse, seem entirely to be out of place. Yet, the modern man will, perhaps forgive us for reminding him that the expression thinking is a remarkable word of western logic and without logic there would have been no age of Enlightenment and no dialectical materialism and without it the world will look different.

The concept of thinking established by logic is only a preparation to disclose what is concealed. The age of

Enlightenment obscures the essence of thinking. The medieval and modern philosophy explain the Greek essence of thought in terms of the concept called *ratio*.<sup>17</sup> Kant's main work, *Critique of Pure Reason*, deals mainly with logic and dialectic. In general, it blocks our access to essential thinking of the early Greeks. But it does not say that philosophy after the Greek is false. We can say that most philosophers despite all logic and all dialectic do not aim at the discussion of the question "what is called thinking?" And philosophy strays farthest from this hidden question when it is led to believe that thinking must begin with doubting and the characteristic of thinking is not an apprehending but rather conceptualizing. In the unfolding of its essence, thinking knows nothing of grasping a concept. All the thinking of the Greek thinkers, including that of Aristotle, holds Heidegger, was non-conceptual.

Greek thinking remains fundamentally different from the modern ways of thinking of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, who think in opposition to the system, but for that very reason remain captives of the system. The interpretation of Greek thinking by modern thinkers, whose thinking is guided by modern conceptual thinking, is, therefore, inappropriate. One important thing regarding our modern way of thinking is that it is representational and hence, blocks its access to the beginning of Greek thinking.

When we say “Being” it means “Being of beings”. Again when we say “beings” it means “being in respect of Being”. We are speaking always within a duality. The duality is always an *apriori* datum to Plato, Kant, and Nietzsche. The duality has developed before hand in the relation of beings to Being. This relation can be interpreted and explained in various ways.

According to Heidegger, to discover what thinking is we need to go back to the origin of Greek thinking. Heidegger has long before reflected on the mysterious nature of language, its relation to thinking and Being.

Heidegger is mainly concerned with the way language is related to thinking and its response to the call of thought. Heidegger was encouraged by his study of Holderlin’s poetry to think of Being as divine without, however, being God. In fact, he is singular among the modern philosophers in attaching special importance to poetry. This may be taken partly as a reaction of Heidegger against abstract concepts. In a needy time the poet is rich, for he holds his ground in nothing. He creates to manifest what is hidden, and in this endeavour Heidegger has combined the role of both the seer and the philosopher. Heidegger says poetry is the founding name of Being. He speaks of poetry, rather than God, as a mediator. Poetry is the record of the dialogue of the

poet with Being. Thus, thinking and poetry are the two modes that lead us to Being.

The proximity between thinking and poetry reveals a secret kinship between the poet and the thinker. It is the same which is called Being by the thinkers and “Holy” by the poets. They, thus, reveal Being in their own ways. Both the poet and the philosopher are peculiarly responsive to Being. Genuine thinking, according to Heidegger, is a dialogue between the thinker and Being just as a genuine poetry is a dialogue between the poet and the Holy. Heidegger’s question is about Being and not about the existence of man. However, he holds that this question of Being can be examined and answered only within the framework the analysis of the Being of man. In his works, *Being and Time*, *Letter on Humanism*, etc., he tried to remove the Cartesian dichotomy between the human and the world by pointing out what could be loosely called participatory view of knowledge which has a direct and immediate bearing on thinking and Being.

Perhaps, the main of benefit of this study is this: we may with a joyous return to Being, i.e., home coming, from which we have been in exile, may gain entry again to the domain of Being which Heidegger claims exclusive to his philosophy. This has been the general aim of Heidegger’s philosophization, viz. to attain entry

into the domain of Being. And here, in terms of the treatment of thinking, Heidegger demonstrates how that aim can be achieved.

Now, we come to consider Being in its relation to man. The projection of the world by man in the understanding of Being and the experience of nothing in man as invitation to the authentic signification of Being have already shown as the ultimate relation existing between man and Being. The essence of man is existence understood as possibility. The actualization of this possibility depends on the understanding of the truthfulness of Being.

The Being plays the important role in constituting the essence of man. Man is man only when he understand Being. Only in so far as man bestows some thought upon Being and endeavours to understand it, Being comes out of its hiddenness and manifest itself. Being and man are so intimately related that one is inconceivable apart from the other.

In the strict sense Heidegger does not consider man as such. In our way to Being we find Dasein as the 'Da' of 'Sein'. It happens that 'Da' of 'Sein' is in reality identical with man. Man is therefore the *Da-Sein*. Man is man because he is a "being there" and "is-there". It is because he is 'Da-Sein' that he became the ontico-ontologically preferable object of our investigation. The characteristic of Dasein is that understanding Being, can relate

itself to the *Sein* of being. Hence Dasein, detecting the Being of being (*sein des seienden*) manifests itself as the *Da of Sein*. The *Da* in Dasein is therefore the openness of man to Being. It is the place where Being reveals itself. Since revelation of Being is truth. *Dasein* is the seat of truth where Being manifests itself. The *Da* is the illumination of Being.

The Heideggerian understanding of man as Dasein. The *Da* constitutes the fundamental modes of 'Being-in' of man. The *Da* essentializes itself in two basically different modes of existence: authentic and inauthentic. The existential constitution of *Da*, presenting itself as beholding, understanding and speech, forms the authentic existence of man. The everyday being of *Da*, presenting itself as prattle, curiosity and ambiguity forms the inauthentic existence of man.

Heidegger states that "Dasein, man's Being, is defined as that living thing whose Being is essentially determined by the potentiality for discourse"<sup>18</sup> The understanding of man as *Dasein* gives us a hint of the nature of his existence. Heidegger in his later writings expresses it as Ek-sistence. Ek-Sistence in contrast to existence, signifies the proper nature of human existence because the Ek denotes the Extra, the world, to which *Dasein* existentially tends. In this tending out of itself Dasein finds

Being illumined. The Ek-Sistence of man is thus the standing in the illumined of Being. The illumination is truth. It is the standing out into the truth of Being. Beyond this Ek-Sisting man has no essence. The essence of man is his existence. But this existence is not understood in the traditional sense of 'existentia' as actuality or reality opposed to possibility. The sentence man 'ek-sist' does not answer the question whether man in reality exists.

Though Heidegger asks the question what is the essence of man, he never considers a substance as a 'necessary substract' for this changing *ek-sistence* of man. The existence of man is itself his substance. We have to think that in the whole question of Being Heidegger seems to treat the Being-how (*Wie-Sein*) of Being. Correspondingly the question about the essence of man is also question about the Being-how of man. The sentence the substance of man is his existence would then mean only the man in which man in his own essence essentializes himself to Being. The ecstatically temporalized Ek-Sistence in which man holds himself opened to Being is his essence.

Man is the very openness to Being. Openness indicates his existence is not complete or closed in itself. To exist in a fuller sense to realize his possibilities, he has to go out of himself. This

going out takes place in transcendence which is the must of Dasein. So Heidegger could say that man in his essence is ways ahead of himself is beyond himself and his Being is 'Being ahead-of-himself'. To the essence of man belongs what is not himself the Being-in-the-world.

In the *Letter on Humanism*, Heidegger states: Being is not a being, because it is that which enables beings to be present to man and men to each other. It is nearest to man, because it makes him to be what he is and enables him to enter into compartment with other beings. Yet it is farthest removed from him because it is not a being with which he, structured as he is to deal directly with only beings<sup>19</sup>

To be opened to Being is the fundamental character of his Ek-Sistence. Being on the other hand offers itself to the openness of man. Only in this openness of man, in this 'Da' of *Da Sein* could Being essentialize itself as Being. There is an inseparable inter-relation between Being and man. Heidegger thinks that the traditional understanding of Being and man was insufficient. We always say too little of Being itself when in saying Being we leave out the presence to the essence of man and thereby fail to recognize that this essence itself helps us to determine the Being. We also always say too little of man if, in saying Being

(not being human), we set man apart and then only being that which has thus been set apart into relationship as the 'Being'.

The relationship between Being and man may be compared to a sununoning-hearing relationship. Any presence (Being) to the essence of man and in so far as presence (Being) to the essence of man is a call, it summons the essence of man. In order to exist, man must carefully attend to the silent summonings of Being and attending their call preserve them in truth. As the preserver of the truth of Being, man is the shepherd of Being. Being needs this shepherd because only in the hearing of this shepherd is Being brought to its truthfulness and authentically constituted. That is man only in the summoning of Being. Being is Being only in the hearing of man.

### **3.3. THINKING AND THE ESSENCE OF BEING**

The essence of man is related to Being. Apart from Being man is unthinkable. This intimate relation between man and Being points out us also the relation between man and nothing. Being cause in the innermost essence of Being nothing as Being is. So any relation of man to Being should also have a counter-appearance of a relation between man and nothing. Being manifests itself only through nothing. Hence man who knows Being should

necessarily encounter nothing. The historical manifestation of Being to man, veiling and unveiling as it is, is a play of Being giving itself to man under the forms of Being and nothing. The oblivion of Being, which according to Heidegger is the characteristic note of the western philosophical tradition, has created such a misunderstanding or of nothing. The nothing result in nihilism.

The oblivion of Being, which began with the time of Plato, has already paved the way for misunderstanding. Plato is not less nihilistic than Nietzsche. Heidegger corrected Nietzsche's back to canonical metaphysics.<sup>20</sup> is a time nihilism is in its phase of completion. It is the normal state everyone.

This misunderstanding of nothing should be surpassed. The attempt of many to evade nihilism is not praiseworthy. That is no way to surpass nihilism. On the contrary, the attempt to flee from will only help to preserve nihilism for ever. The basic reason of nihilism is the misunderstanding of the nothing of Being revealed to man. This misunderstanding is fundamentally grounded in the oblivion of the truth of Being. Hence the only way to surpass nihilism is to enter into it and try to expose the real nature of nothing which is nihilistically understood.

Our thinking should approach more fundamentally to the innermost essence of Being which could manifest itself as

nothing at last for a period of time. Heidegger says nihilism is not so negative as it is normally thought to be. But only a directive for a new dawn of metaphysics. Truth, Heidegger says, relates fundamentally to nothingness. This nothingness, however, is not *nihil* (nothing)<sup>21</sup>

The new beginning marks a new direction of Being. Only with the aid of this new direction of Being we could surpass nihilism. The new direction of Being is only a new way of conceiving the genuine nature of Being in its relation to nothing and man. The essence of man is the central point in the new direction of Being. The intimate relation existing between Being and man allows us to conceive Being as a 'turning towards'. The question is more fundamental. The question touches the problem whether Being is something for itself or whether at times it turns also to the essence of man. Presumably this turning itself is what we call Being.

In this turning away Being withdraws itself the essence of man and conceals itself. The Being is absent, but the absence does not signify a nullity. Absence is only a mode of presence. The Being is present there, but the presence is concealed under its veil. This concealed presence of Being we call absence. Absence is thus the veiled revelation of Being. The absence of Being is the

withdrawal of Being from man in so far as it is veiled. But at the same time it is manifestation of the nothing of Being to man because nothing is the veil of Being. It is simply the other of Being through which Being manifests itself to man. Thus absence is a mode of presence, a mode of the hidden presence, a mode of the presence of the nothing in Being. Only genuine thinking could grasp the concealed presence of Being in absence.

The every concealment of Being may remain concealed and thus the average intellect may be tempted to assume the idea that absence is non-existence and nothing is absolute nullity. This understanding which is founded in the oblivion of Being gives way to the dawn of nihilism where Being is nihilistically understood. But the truth is not so. Nihilism, so-called is infact only a transitory state where Being withdraws itself from man manifesting itself in concealment.

Heidegger believes in the oneness of Being as distinguished from the distinct entities disclosed in our concernful dealings with the world. Being, he affirms, is not a bare general concept which we intellectually derive from our distinct perceptions; but it is indeterminate immediate, and which is the ground of all that is and determines all that is to be what it is.<sup>22</sup>

Man has to apply thinking to the concealment of Being and liberate Being from its concealment. This would bring about event of Being. The event of Being is that man by his thinking reveals Being from its concealment. It is the very unveling of Being where the truth of Being shines forth. Man should be consciousness of his intimate relation to nothing in the very way in which he should be conscious of his relation to Being, because Being, as the turning away, manifests itself to him, as nothing, the no-being. Man who openness to Being, the *Da* of *Sein* is the openness and the *Da* only in so far as he is the place keeper of nothing.

### **3.4. THINKING, BEING AND LANGUAGE**

Heidegger's concern with language arises from a prior concern with thinking, and thinking gives rise to the absolutely prior question about Being. We usually regard language as our communication. It objectifies our knowledge. It is a universal, public form for expression. Language guarantees that objective expression can survive from one generation to the next and thus gives rise to tradition. It encapsulates the world view of a people non-thematically in its structure, grammar, syntax, origin. It is also historical. For Heidegger, in *Being and Time*, Dasein has language

and shows itself as the entity which talks and language discloses the contents of consciousness.<sup>23</sup> We start to regard it as a means to communication, as a tool for handling ourselves in the business of the world. In so far as its being is regarded as purposive, as a tool, language also conceals the very thing it ought to reveal about itself.

The later Heidegger recalls us to that which lies behind language, and this is accomplished by analysing two ways wherein man allows Being, namely, thinking and poetry.<sup>24</sup> His path to Being is through thinking.

Heidegger in *On the way to Language*, finds the idea of discourse. Throughout he is unfolding the connection between thinking and poetry, and he repeatedly warns against the inadequacy of calculative thinking. He begins with a poem in order to raise the question about the nature of poetic insight: how is one to express that for which one has no word? "Nothing is where world is lacking...."<sup>25</sup> Heidegger argued that he reached in what is metaphysics? On the nature of nothing, where nothing does not mean negation.

Heidegger is summoning us to an experience of language which has to be a thinking experience. This thinking is not calculative or purposive but foundational, a thinking not meant to produce knowledge but to cut furrows in the soil of Being. In this

sense poetry and thinking are neighbors in the same soil. Authentic thinking is another side of Dasein's openness; just like the openness which grounds discourse, authentic thinking involves a listening . We discover that in asking about the being of language itself, starting with a poet's word, we are engaged in thinking inquiries about the language of being, the domain of nothing. Such thinking brings us into a region of openness where' thinking and poetry are neighbours.

The word, *logos*, is unique in the history of thinking. It applies simultaneously to Being and to saying. It may be that the essential nature, the being of language, simply refuses to let itself expressed in words and things. On the other hand, the word allows a thing to be a thing, sustains it in the region of being. Heidegger's point is that, when we speak about language, are not speak of something distant, but of a reality close to home. This point suppose his understanding of Dasein. Dasein already finds itself in this open region characterised by the nearness that touches whatever is. It is the region where all things are in their nothing like character. The answer to the question about language from us because Dasein is already Being-in-the-world and participate in the disclosedness of Being that simultaneously reveals and conceals.

The consideration of the relation between Being and man leads to consider those aspects where man and Being come into closest union. We seen that all explanation regarding the inter-relation between Being and man were based on thinking. A special consideration of this thinking itself in its relation with Being will reveal to us many other hidden truths of Being not yet sufficiently considered. The terms thinking and Being are equally important, because are understood in a pre-established relationship. Thinking, in order to be authentic and essential, must bring Being to its truthfulness. Being in order to manifest itself as authentic Being needs the thinking of man. Thinking is the thinking of man.

Thinking allows Being to shine forth as it is. Because the Being of being could shine forth only in the illumination of the inter-relationship between Being and man. In allowing the Being of being to shine for the thinking brings the relation between man and Being to clear perception, and thus to perfection. Being, giving itself to the thinking of man, brings its message to man. Man, by virtue of his thinking, understands the message and answers it. The language is supposed to be the house of Being. Thinking builds this house and, building the house of language, preserve Being in it.

Heidegger used (hermeneutical) phenomenology as a method, with its imperative to the things themselves and therefore with its own infinite tender care in handling these with its interpretation of the phenomena. The philosophy he used yields, contrary to Husserl's interpretation, as states or modes of being and not-being and nothingless opened the philosophical eye as no other method had done. He made the fundamental distinction between Being and beings. The fact that man's essence is his existence. So that man is precisely that being whose being is itself very problem. Here the radical difference between categories and existential modes of being. The fact that we are always in-the-world. So we are always concerned with this or that thing, including above all and behind all one very being and not being.

The hiddenness or concealedness or covered-up-ness of discourse as grounded in existential self-articulation. The fact that Dasein has always made some sort of decision. We are always ahead ourselves in our plans and projects. Heidegger interprets Dasein's characteristics primarily as ability, that is, characteristics that are not states, but rather capacities.<sup>26</sup> Dasein exists either authentically or unauthentically and that we exist authentically only when we concern ourselves with our ownmost possibilities.

Our everyday mode of existence in which all distinctions are averaged up or leveled down and in which we take no firm stand. The existential specialty of man, in the sense of being contained in space, space itself is contained in man and man himself is spatial. The fact that there is a primordial existential knowing in which all perception, scientific knowledge, determination of nature etc. are grounded. So we are always living with others. In fact we are always there always outside ourselves and always outside others. Being there as mood and being there as understanding. So that we are always in some mood or other. We are usually undecided and therefore ambiguous. So that if we said, we have already made some decision, the decision we have made here is to be undecided and vague.

Hence our essence is care (*sorge*), we are really full of cares all the time. The being of death in our life being conscience as the call from unauthenticated to authenticity for being, a call which our own careful existence makes upon us: a sudden pulling ourselves together into decisiveness and being. How time-past, present, future is grounded in our essence as care, and as mood and understanding? He says a temporal character adhered to every existential structure of Dasein. For instance, being some-how mixed up with the past, understanding with the future gossip and

'*das*' man with the present. He took and gives a critique of the traditional notion of time, especially gives a critique of the traditional notion of time, especially with Aristotle and Hegel. Heidegger refuses to admit any theory or doctrine without an authentic certification as to how it is integrally grounded in human existence. Man is the measure of all things not accidentally, not capriciously, not individualistically, but essentially and in a structurally existential.

### 3.5. RORTY'S CRITICISM

Later Heidegger or Heidegger II, tried to go beyond Dasein and to come to grasp with Being in general. This is called the turning (*Kehre*) from the fundamental existential analytic of Dasein in *Being and Time*. Both at the beginning and at the every end of his work emphasis that the existential analytic was only preparatory for this task of going beyond in as much as "philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology, and take its departure from the hermeneutic of Dasein".<sup>27</sup>

Heidegger considers *Being and Time* as only enkindle the problem of ontology. We find that *Kehre* is far from being, a departure from or reversal of *Being and Time*. But the fundamental distinction between Being and beings is retained throughout.

Indeed phenomenology would appear to be only one way of thinking and thinking now becomes the way to Being. Though his philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology, we find that thinking-meditative puts us in touch with Being.<sup>28</sup> Concerning the disclosure of Being Heidegger criticizes the tremendous historical phenomenon of Nietzsche as completing chapter modern metaphysics. The possibility of the opening up of a use in philosophy based on Heidegger himself seen with his phasis on man, existenz, Being and meditative thinking.

The radical disturbance which modern ruthless technology creates and promotes in Being. The grounding of this whole disturbance in something that happened to the human soul way back in the beginning of the modern era. An event which found its philosophical expression in the misfortune that was Descartes whereby reality is reduced to objects and our attitude to it is dominated by calculative thinking. This give a view to self-assertion, control, prediction, use and exploitation rather than by love and adoration with a view to dwelling respectfully and hopefully.

In *What is called Thinking* ?, Heidegger suggests an original relationship between thanking and thinking. He relates the old English 'thanc, to think, to thanc, to thank'.<sup>29</sup> In giving heart, he says the heart gives thought to what it has and what it is. We

give thanks for something by giving thanks to him who we have to think for it. The things for which we have thanks are not things we have, from ourselves. They are given to us. We receive many gifts, of many kinds. But the highest and really most lasting gift-giving given to us is always our essential nature.

Heidegger thinks that our essential nature is to think, rather than, in conformity with Leibniz, Schelling Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. Commentators are telling that Heidegger does not tell us that into whome we thank or are we thankful to Being for articulating itself through us? or is clearly in the end a mode of thinking ourselves. Richard Rorty suggests a series of criticism against Heidegger. In Rorty's view, Heidegger cannot really differentiate between Being and being in the way he wants. Heidegger can not give no sense to the word Being other than the old metaphysical one. That is, Being and the ontological difference are metaphysical and it is like of the Platonic distinction of the real and the apparent world.

In fact Rorty feels that Heidegger can make no real distinction. Rorty also claims that it is impossible to distinguish ontic from ontological becoming. That is the various epochs of Being which Heidegger distinguishes. Heidegger's account of ontological epochates is a species of idealistic reflection upon the

history of man's activity upon things. Rorty says: All we are told about Being, thought, and the ontological difference is by negation. Heidegger thinks that the historical picture which has been sketched offers a glimpse of something else. Yet nothing further can be said about this something else, and so the negative way to Being, through the destruction of ontology, leaves us facing beings-without-Being, with no hint about what thought might be of.<sup>30</sup>

Rorty in the first quote from Heidegger in the paper, from *Letter on Humanism* says that the distinction between Being and the truth of Being is swallowed, by the distinction between Being and being. The failure to note the distinction between Being and the truth of Being is perhaps not surprising, given that Heidegger himself is often unclear in regard to it.

Rorty says Heidegger used Being in two different, indeed opposed, senses. Firstly, Being is the Being of beings, what each being is thought to need so that it is, rather nothing. That is Being refers to that which each being involves simply and solely in so far as it is at all. The science which studies Being in this sense is metaphysics, the science of Being qua Being. Equally metaphysics as the science of Being qua Being, in ground of beings and itself. Thus metaphysics comes to see Being in this

first sense as both what is most general, that which every being possesses in that it is, and as that which supplies the ground for all such beings. "Metaphysics thinks of the Being of beings both in the ground giving unity of what is most general, what is indifferently valid everywhere, and also in the unity of the all that accounts for the general, that is, of the All Highest."<sup>31</sup>

Such views of Being are pure act, as absolute concept, or even Heidegger's own view of the Greek notion of Being as the presence of the presencing, all speak to this first sense of Being. In the second sense, Being is sometimes used, unfortunately as a shorthand express standing for the sense of Being or the unconcealment (truth) of Being in *Being and Time*, this Being as the sense of Being, time is the concern of Heidegger's thought.

Rorty's criticism of Heidegger is aimed at the content of the history of Being arises out of the history of philosophy. But the history of Being can be subsumed under the history of philosophy, Thus Rorty's Heidegger is necessarily committed to the view that metaphysics was always about Being. And that his own thought is tied to this tradition... the only thing which links him with the tradition is his claim that the tradition, though persistently sidetracked onto beings, was really concerned with Being all the time - and, indeed, constituted the history of Being.<sup>32</sup>

But if Heidegger's thought is really different from the tradition as Heidegger claims, then he is committed to the odd view that his thought is essentially a continuation of the same thinking as metaphysics, although at the same time he utterly rejects everything in that tradition. The criticism thus has three steps. First, Being without being is a vacuous notion. Second this vacuity is overcome through a consideration of the history of philosophy. This in turn commits Heidegger to the obscured position that his thought is both entirely different from the tradition and also a continuation of the tradition which is about the very same thing as that tradition. Heidegger needs the tradition in order to identify the matter of his thinking, but then turns around and denies that tradition.

Rorty's initial claim is that Being without being is a vacuous notion. And also Heidegger's thought, the truth of Being may also prove to be vacuous. Rorty says Heidegger is unable to determine the truth of Being without recourse to his version of the history of philosophy. As Heidegger rejects that tradition as, at least, inadequate, he would once again be in the position of identifying the matter of his thinking through ontology, while denying that ontology has nothing positive to say about that matter.

Heidegger's truth of Being is in no sense the same as is thought in Kant's thing-in-itself that is the truth of Being is not a real world or being as they are independent of experience. Moreover, the truth of Being can not successfully be made into an object of experience. Rorty is asking if the truth of Being can never be an object of experience, how can it be indicated or pointed to? So it cannot be ostensively determined. And also, it can't be distinguished as this, as opposed to that and it can't be in terms of some being.

Kant suggests a transcendental procedure for the determination of the truth of Being. But Heidegger uses transcendental sounding language in his later writings. But is considering the truth of Being as merely the necessary condition for the possibility of experience, as this would be every subjectivistic. Heidegger often uses quasi- transcendental arguments in order to identify the place and role of the truth of Being.

It is clear that Heidegger thinks there can be no direct access to the truth of Being, no uncovering of the truth of Being such as occurs in regard to beings. We find that Heidegger substitutes a quasi-transcendental approach. The tradition for this transcendental access is not experience, however, but rather Being. Rorty says if the truth of Being can only be identified in

and through Being, then Being itself must be available to us. But Being as presencing is not. Concerning Being as presencing, Heidegger explicitly addresses on *Time and Being*. Rorty's contention is that Heidegger can only determine Being from out of the tradition of ontology. But what gives us the right to characterize Being as presencing? This question comes too late. For this character of Being has long since been decided without our contribution.... Thus we are bound to the characterization of Being as presencing. It derives its binding force from the beginning of the unconcealment of Being as something that can be said.... Ever since the beginning of western thinking with the breaks, all saying of Being and is held in remembrance of the determination of Being as presencing which is binding for thinking.<sup>33</sup>

For Heidegger, the tradition of ontology is not wrong in regard to its continuous thinking of Being as presencing. But it is inadequate and incomplete and it fails to think the clearing, or truth of Being in which there can be both present beings presencing itself, Being.

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3. By unconcealedness, Heidegger means disclosedness, *aletheia* or truth, which in final analysis means Being.
4. *Posey* means poetry. Heidegger in his philosophical thinking was very much influenced by the German poet, novelist, and dramatist, Holderlin
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## **Chapter Four**

### **Heidegger's Hermeneutical Phenomenology**

Heidegger's analysis of Dasein starts from examining Dasein in its everydayness. Here the goal is to transcend from everyday perspective to an ontological perspective. One of the basic constitution of Dasein is Being-in-the-world. Because, Dasein is always in the world. In the study of Heidegger, which involves two important methods one is phenomenology and the other is hermeneutics.

Husserl who sought to make philosophy a rigorous science was also that he who sought to make phenomenology a rigorous science. In fact, the first was to be accomplished through the second.<sup>1</sup> Phenomenology as a method, founded by Husserl tries to form a presuppositionless, and rigorous science to lay the foundation for a radical start in Philosophy. It strongly advocates the suspension of all epistemological and ontological presuppositions. So that we can have a glimpse of the reality unaffected by theories and concepts. This sounds clearly in the motto back to the things-themselves (*zu den sachen selbst*)

In phenomenology consciousness is considered as the primary datum. It doesn't study consciousness in all its empirical varieties, but the essential structure alone. The essential structure is same for all consciousness, it seemed possible for Husserl to

eliminate all personal variations in our experience. Whatever is presented to our consciousness immediately for the bestwal of meaning i.e. without any mediating inference, is called phenomena. In Husserl's phenomenology, Heidegger found a tool which was not available to any philosophers before him. Husserl considered philosophy to be a science. He distinguished between exact science and rigorous science.

Fundamentally and primarily, hermeneutics deals with the task of interpretation and meaning of understanding. Hermeneutical phenomenology is a method that martin Heidegger accepts in his philosophical or ontological enterprise Heidegger attempts to inspect human being directly as it were. He turns hermeneutics from an analysis of text to an analysis of this being Dasein. This consequences of this shift in problematic are far reaching on ontontology of understanding replaces an epistemology of interpretation.<sup>2</sup> Hermeneutics as a philosophical discipline is very much influenced by both phenomenology and existentialism. Husserl in his transcendental phenomenology holds that it is possible for us to arrive at such a pure datum, the *noema* which is ready to receive the meaning assigned to it by the transcendental ego. Heidegger asks a question is it possible for us to arrive at such a pure datum and his answer is no. Husserl's contention

is that understanding is possible only interpretatively, only way of interpretation. Heidegger reclaimed that the words hermeneutics and hermeneutical to characterize the method of his project in *Being and Time*, a fundamental ontology<sup>3</sup>. Its philosophical aim was to return to our own being as the openness from which being springs.

The term hermeneutics originally used to designate a classical discipline that formulated rules for correctly interpreting texts. Early forms of this discipline, can be found in biblical studies, philology and jurisprudence. The philosophical discussion of hermeneutics, which began in the nineteenth century, likewise initially engaged in the development of rules for proper interpretation. As the discussion developed, however, its attention shifted to the more basic question of the conditions of the very possibility of understanding. The distinctive characteristic that emerged in hermeneutic discussion of understanding was found a rejection of classical Cartesian and Kantian epistemology.<sup>4</sup>

Hermeneutics has more or less taken the place of epistemology for these philosophers. To be sure, they usually refuse to identify hermeneutics with epistemology, but this is due to the empiricist and reductionist connotations which they sense in the

latter term. There are essentially two problems which hermeneutic philosophers have with traditional epistemology. First, they disagree with the reduction of the entire cognitive process to a single model drawn basically from the natural sciences, i.e. empirical observation. Second, they reject the ahistorical conception of the knower as one who stands outside of what of that which is known and imposes meaning upon it.

Hermeneutic philosophers have tended to distinguish between the phenomenon of explanation which is appropriate to the natural sciences, and the phenomenon of understanding which is appropriate to the human sciences.<sup>5</sup> If we say in an extreme form, they have made the empirical method (explanation) a derivative of the broader phenomenon of understanding. Hermeneutic philosophy has stressed the contextuality of knowing subject and the influence of one's pre understandings on the knowing process.

The best way to characterize the difference between Kantian epistemology and hermeneutic philosophy is to note the difference in how they understand experience. For Kant, experience referred primarily to the reception of empirical impressions which must then be formed by the categories of understanding. By contrast, hermeneutic philosophers view experience historically as the accumulated knowledge of a tradition.

The difference regarding experience is the source of a different view of truth as well Richard Rorty puts it: the first tradition thinks of truth as a vertical relationship between representations and what is represented. The second tradition thinks of truth horizontally as the culminating reinterpretation of our predecessors' reinterpretation....<sup>6</sup>

In brief, hermeneutic philosophy is an approach to question of truth and knowledge that focuses on the recovery for the present to the experience of the past as expressed in various cultural forms. Moreover, it understands this focus as at least a supplement and, more commonly, an embracing alternative to the ahistorical empirical focus of classical epistemology. By this method, Heidegger in his work, *Identity and Difference*, points out that pre-Socratic philosophers able to approach the problem of Being in a new way one of the most important and the oldest question of philosophy.

#### **4.1. HEIDEGGER'S ONTOLOGICAL HERMENEUTICS**

Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology developing a theme which centered on life as the ultimate behind which one could not inquire. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger states that it is the fundamental shortcoming... of any serious and scientifically

minded philosophy of life... that here life itself as a kind of Being does not become ontologically a problem.<sup>7</sup> That is to say, that life essentially is accessible into the science of the interpretation of that which is the hermeneutic of Dasein. The phenomenological analysis of Dasein as the Being of mankind, Heidegger not only deepens the epistemological analysis of Husserl. But he provides a critique of the assumption that they share with the whole of western philosophical tradition and which Heidegger identifies as metaphysics.

Heidegger's fundamental ontological conception provided a complete re-orientation and a more radical in conjunction with the categories-characteristics of Being for entities whose character is not that of Dasein. Heidegger's central insights in *Being and time* is the ontological difference between *Sein* (Being) and *seiendes* (entities), the realm of the ontological and that of the ontical. Heidegger's existential-ontological interpretation is concerned with the constitution of Being rather than its theoretical-critical generalization. He says neither the ontical depiction of entities within the world nor the ontological interpretation of their Being is such as to reach the phenomenon of the world. Dasein's characters of Being are defined in terms of existentiality, i.e., existentials. The meaning of Being can only be arrived at through

an interpretative effort. Therefore hermeneuting is a fundamental concept of ontology and provides the basic for a transcendental inquiry.

Since Dasein is characterized by its understanding of Being, the meaning of Being can only be interpreted from within the pre-current understanding. Hermeneutic theory can be a derivative of the fundamental hermeneutic of Dasein in which we try to explicate and clarify an already existing pre-understanding that is a structure of our Being-in-the world. Heidegger's development of a hermeneutic philosophy has so far been considered in its relation to the question after the meaning of Being and to Dasein as understanding.

Heidegger formulates the relationship of Dasein, care and temporality as that Dasein's totality of Being as care means ahead-of-itself-already-being-in (a world) as being alone (entity encountered within-the-world) the primordial unit of the structure of care lies in its temporality the essence of which is the temporality ... i.e., the phenomena of the future, the character of having been, and the present.<sup>8</sup> Heidegger says temporality as the condition for the possibility of original care and as the ultimate horizon of the interpretation of being-in-the-world. This represents the aim of Heidegger's fundamental ontology.

Hermeneutics played a revolutionary change in the history of thought. Heidegger in his *Being and Time*, makes an interpretive understanding concerning the human existence i.e, Dasein. Heidegger did his account of understanding as a revolutionary break from the traditional philosophical emphase on problems about knowledge and on the dichotomy between subjectivity and objectivity. He was against the background of traditional hermeneutics as well as of Cartesian and Kantian philosophy.

Hans-George Gadamer in his *Truth and Method* (1960), was the first philosopher to develop Heidegger's account of interpretation into a general hermeneutics. He defines hermeneutics as the philosophical enterprise for which the central question is, how is understanding possible? For Gadamer, the primary task of philosophical reflection on hermeneutics is not to develop a method of interpretation or understanding, but to clarify the (ontological) conditions in which understanding takes place<sup>9</sup>. Gadamer's project is a hermeneutic philosophy of human understanding. Gadamer does not consider discussion of method subsidiary. He actually considers it and is usually guided by consideration of method tend of obscure and hinder the natural human capacity of understanding. His goals is to free that natural capacity by clarify its nature and conditions.

For Gadamer these conditions are the key to see that all acts of interpretation and understanding take place within a polarity of familiarity and strangeness. That is a tension between that which is pre-understood and that which is being presented for understanding<sup>10</sup>. Gadamer's conviction is that it is the tyranny of hidden preunderstandings that makes us deaf to the language that speak to us in tradition. He is not calling for presuppositionless interpretation. He sees enlightenment (Kantian) understanding of interpretation freeing oneself from all prejudices.

Gadamer recommends that interpreters seek to bring all pre understanding above board from the beginning. So that they might be given full play and tested during the act of interpretation. Thereby, a distinction can be made between legitimate and illegitimate preunderstanding. One cannot escape starting with a preunderstanding, but that does not mean that one cannot test the preunderstanding during the act of interpretation or that the results of the act of interpretation are bound totally by the preunderstanding.

Heidegger describes interpretation as a thematic articulation of totality of meaningful relationships grasped by pre-structure of understanding.

The ready-to-hand is always understanding in terms of totality of involvements. This totality need not be grasped explicitly by a thematic interpretation. Even if has undergone such an interpretation, it proceeds into an understanding which does not stand out from the background. And this is the very mode in which it is the essential foundation for everyday circumspective interpretation. In very cause the interpretation is grounded in something we have in advance in a for-having... in something we see in advance-in a fore-sight... in something we group in advance in a fore-conception.<sup>11</sup>

The most important consequence of the circularity of understanding for hermeneutics that there is no pure starting point for understanding because every act of understanding takes place within a finite historically conditioned horizon, within an already understood frame of reference. It is no longer a question of how we are to enter the hermeneutical circle, because human consciousness is always already in it. We understand only by constant reference to what we have already understood, namely, our past and anticipated experience. The experiencing and reflecting subject is never a *tabula rasa* upon which the understanding. of raw experience inscribes its objective character, rather, all experience and reflection are the result of a confrontation between

one's pre-understanding or even prejudice and new or perhaps strange objects. The inevitable presence of pre-understanding or prejudice is not necessarily the distortion of the meaning of an object by an arbitrary subject, rather, it is the very condition for any understanding of all.

Heidegger, however, contends that presuppositions are the very condition for any reception of the object whatsoever. His notions of the ontological character of understanding and the primordial connection of subject and object in their pre-understanding and the primordial connection of subject and object in their pre-reflective relational whole provides the foundation for this contention. For him, all interpretation is a derivative form of a prior understanding, in which the prior relationship between subject and object is brought to explication. If we try to eliminate pre-judgements or preconceptions in order to meet the requirements of objectivist science, then we miss what Heidegger as well as Gadamer mean by understanding.

“But if we see this circle as a vicious one and look out for ways of avoiding it, even if we just sense it as an inevitable imperfection. Then the act of understanding has been misunderstood from the

ground up. The assimilation of understanding and interpretation to a definite ideal of knowledge is not the issue here. Such an ideal is itself only a subspecies of understanding what is decisive is not to get out of the circle but to come into it in the right way. This circle of understanding is not an orbit in which any random kind of knowledge may move, it is the expression of the existential fore-structure of Dasein itself. It is not to be reduced to the level of a vicious circle or even of a circle which is merely tolerate. In the circle is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing".<sup>12</sup>

In short, all inquiry depends upon prior insight. Human being (Dasein) anywhere at anytime exists with some insight. The priority of insight places knowledge obtained through methodological inquiry at the level of a secondary mediation of experience<sup>13</sup>. A presupposition helps constitute the unspoken horizon which makes a supposition possible. A fundamental presupposition refers us to the structure of the most basic insight, the pre-reflective connection between the knower and that which is known. Presuppositions are inevitable; they are shared; they determine the

form of the questions we ask; and they provide the condition for the possibility of acquiring new understanding.

Heidegger's analysis of Dasein as being-in-the-world change our understanding of understanding from a derivative phenomenon to the key stone of human experience. Gadamer remarks "Heidegger's temporal analytic of Dasein has I think, shown convincingly that understanding is not just one of the various possible behaviours of the subject but the mode of being of Dasein itself.... And hence embraces whole of its experience of the world".<sup>14</sup> The hermeneutic approach to philosophy is in contrast to the traditional approach running from Descartes through Kant to Husserl. The traditional approach held that the human being as a "subject" a knower disengaged from the world and from practical activity in the world.

Heidegger's hermeneutic turning is different from the earlier philosophy. It avoids the traditional model of the subject as the knower. Heidegger's methodology shows both the mentalistic vocabulary of the subject-object model is not the only possible starting point for philosophy and this vocabulary is derivative from the conterminous understanding. He conceives Dasein and world as forming a circle. He then extends the

traditional hermeneutical circle<sup>15</sup> between a text and its reading down to the most primordial level of human existence.

Traditionally the method of hermeneutical circle is the reading of a text, where the parts can't be interpreted without any understanding of the whole. And the whole cannot be grasped without understanding the parts. Heidegger's conception of hermeneutic circle is a feature of human existence in general. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger says "understanding" in the sense of one possible kind of cognizing among others (as distinguished, for instance, from 'explaining') must, like explaining, be interpreted as an existential derivative of that primary understanding which is one of the constituents of the Being of the 'there' in general."<sup>16</sup>

Heidegger is saying that *Being and Time* is an interpretation. He had a deep conception of what is understanding and do have different conception of interpretation, a different account of how interpretation arises from understanding. Heidegger is describing that "primary understanding" which runs through various ways to existing in and interpreting the world. Heidegger argues that something is derived from something else. He is trying to show us that we need not to take "knowledge" as primary and see "understanding" and "interpretation" as derived, but we can reverse this derivation. He criticises and says that traditional philosophy

has come up against unsolvable and unbridgeable dichotomies, his reordering acquires greater plausibility to the degree that it avoids such difficulties.

According to Heidegger, there are two types of truth, one is the ordinary philosophical sense of truth, where an assertion uncovers or discovers some fact about the world. He usually describes truth in this sense as being about things that do not have the character of *Dasein*. The contrasting term, 'disclosedness', suggests that the total context is opened through understanding. Heidegger says understanding does not consist only in making an assertion about the world. But also in grasping the entire mode of being-in-the-world. Understanding grasps the world as such and without the discovery of particular features of the world. So understanding grasps not only the world but also *Dasein's* way of being-in-the-world. Hence understanding of the world is always a self-understanding. By self-understanding Heidegger means instead that disclosure involves both the world and *Dasein* at the same time, *Dasein's* understanding of its world is thus not distinct from its understanding of itself, but is at the same time an interpretation of itself. This self-interpretation thus does not discover facts about the properties of mental substance but discloses how *Dasein* has dealt with and is dealing with the issue of its own existence.

Heidegger suggests that the disclosure of possibilities could not be derived from the discovery of factual features. His philosophical interpretation is trying to show that both discovery and disclosure are necessary to human activity. Heidegger draws a distinction between 'facticity' and 'factuality'. Factuality has to do with nonhuman things, discrete facts about which could be entered in a list. According to Heidegger, Dasein finds itself thrown into a world. It finds itself as already projected or thrown into a situation which concrete possibilities. These possibilities are concrete and differ from, purely logical possibilities in that they come with concrete limitations. So he speaks of these limitations as Dasein's facticity in contradistinction to the other kind of fact that he calls factuality.<sup>17</sup>

#### **4.2. HEIDEGGER AND HERMENEUTICAL TURN**

Heidegger's turn may be comprehensively characterised as an overall attempt at appropriation and reappropriation, i.e. as an effort to come to terms with the significant tendencies of contemporary philosophy. His attempt is an over all re-examination and renewal in two ways: either the philosopher adheres to some existing tendency of the day or a priori disengages it from any one of them. We find that the philosophical position that

Heidegger preliminarily adhered to his own phenomenology. It was Husserl's phenomenology that provided him with the 'method' and devices for to re-examing the very concept of philosophy which means that the rethinking of philosophy became for him inseparable from coming to grips with phenomenology.

It was phenomenology that provided him with the device and strategy of re-examining and reappropriating contemporary tendencies as well as the whole philosophical tradition, inclusive of phenomenology. Heidegger not just occasionally concerned with itself but he brings criticism. Heidegger sought radically an re-examination and reappropriate the original subject matter of philosophy. Heidegger says philosophers could either persist in their effort to pursue systematic or scientific philosophy or philosophers could choose to dramatically enunciate the irrationality of life there by vehemently attacking and indeed rejecting, systematic or scientific philosophy together with its claim to universal validity.

We may say that Heidegger enthusiastically adhered to the view of contemporary philosophy that the object primarily to be approached and investigated was life. He was reluctant to join in which the ardent criticism of scientific philosophy. Heidegger

offers an alternative to rational concepts and theoretical knowing, by way of such a 'destruction' is what he calls 'hermeneutical' 'concepts'<sup>18</sup> overagainst pure or theoretical intuition 'hermeneutical intuition.'

The 'Hermeneutics' or 'hermeneutical' have their meaning as rival concepts to 'theory' or 'theoretical', understood in terms of 'theoretical neutral.' Generally speaking, it is due to Heidegger's search for proper methodological devices regarding an adequate conceptual expression of 'factual life' that his hermeneutic outlook emerges in the postwar.

The description of life or 'facticity' Heidegger comes to call as an overall hermeneutic character precisely in virtue of the insight that interpretation cannot be regarded as something. Heidegger finds that hermeneutics cannot remain an auxiliary discipline of human sciences as has been traditionally conceived within a pre-established realm of sciences (like Dilthey). Dilthey held hermeneutics to be the methodology of the understanding of recorded expression. Understanding is for Heidegger no longer a way of knowing proper to the human studies. It is in contradistinction to explanation as the way of knowledge characteristics of the natural sciences, but is rather a way of being of the being called human.

Humans are understanding, so to speak all along, but the way they find themselves in the world involved in it. As an interpreting animal, the human being interprets being as well. Heidegger formulates his being-question specifically as a question of the meaning of being. So he links hermeneutics to ontology and he called ontology as hermeneutics of facticity. Heidegger's modified outlook is that by adopting a hermeneutic way of seeing, traditional empiricism can be shown to be insufficiently empirical. There is a difference that Heidegger has in mind is something entirely different from the concept of experience applied in empirical or positivist philosophy.

Heidegger's dissatisfaction with contemporary descriptive strategies of life soon led him to the insight that the predominance of the theoretical commitment is not an occasional mistake committed by the philosophy of the day, but rather something that dates back to the origins of the distinction of rationalism and irrationalism or metaphysics and life-philosophy. Those insights provide Heidegger with a basic perspective to be applied in his historical connotations. They give him important clues for viewing the way of European philosophy up to the present. The task Heidegger assigns to phenomenological hermeneutics of facticity is therefore to deconstruct backwards the "dominating interpretedness in its hidden motives".<sup>19</sup>

Heidegger's new concept of philosophy is in itself hermeneutical, i.e., situation centered, equally detached from relationalism and irrationalism, absolutism and relativism or historicism. This concept centers around questionable, essential to it is passionate dedication to the matter itself-which is Heidegger's way of taking over, appropriating, and immediately radicalizing Husserl's insistence on rigor. Heidegger's *Being and Time* announces itself as a work of fundamental ontology if whose aim "is to lay a foundation for the regional sciences by posing the question of the meaning of Being."<sup>20</sup>

The fundamental thought in Heidegger is that the whole world is a text to him and is interpreting it with thoughtful meditation. Hence Heidegger writes that language, the house to Being and speaks us that ours is not to found either languages or being but only to let being be within language. The fact is that fundamental ontology that lie puts even in Heidegger's earlier thought and the most immediate evidence consists in Heidegger against the function, that is, he asserts equally in the ancient ontology of substance and the modern subject epistemology.

It is clear to Heidegger from the beginning that prevailing epistemological approach to the task was misbegotten. Heidegger's search was directed towards the transposition of the ground to ontol-

ogy. His interpretation on Kant as an ontologist rather than an epistemologist is seen in 1927 lecture-course published as *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. Heidegger speaks against the foundational priority of epistemology as much as does the appeal for the reinstatement of ontology in the introduction to *Being and Time*.

In Heidegger's own words: "knowing is grounded beforehand in a being ready alongside the world, which is essentially constitutive for Dasein's being."<sup>21</sup> Heideggerian construction lives in the recognition of the poignant reality that all expression is self-encoding, so that all interpretation requires decoding. His construction is an articulated response to the acknowledged difficulty of thinking directly the ultimate points of reference in this life, working inevitably within a medium not transparently fitted to this purpose language.

It is well known that not only Heideggerian phenomenology but also so-called existential phenomenology in general broke with Husserl over the issue of the transcendental ego. Among the ground breakers of this movement only Heidegger preserved in full flash the salient and founding feature. In the sense that the multidimensionality of founding-relations permits no univocal ground conceived as basis to which the unity within consciousness can be referred.

The traditional philosophical obsession with the truth or falsity of interpretive claims may be on the work track in trying to understand Heidegger's account. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger is not primarily concerned with explicit, deliberate interpretation but with the interpretation of a practical sort that may not always involve articulated judgements or the thematizing. Contrary to present tendencies to think of the reading of texts as the paradigm case of interpretation, Heidegger's paradigm case are everyday activities like opening a door. Heidegger's philosophical interpretation is an interpretation not of a text, but of Dasein. Heidegger's point is that even the most obvious ordinary objects taken by themselves do not have their characteristics inscribed in them.

The early Heidegger does not emphasize textuality to the same degree, his account does underwrite the shift of philosophical attention from the epistemological model of perception to the hermeneutical model of reading. He features the notion of meaning centrally. He does so that will be congruent with this hermeneutic model and that will block some traditional problems, that arises from construction meaning as private, internal, or mental states. Heidegger's claim to have reopened for philosophy

the great inaugural question of “the meaning of Being.”<sup>22</sup> Meaning for Heidegger is something that one imposes on an object, it is neither a distinctive object of perception nor an intermediary between the subject and the object. Heidegger says it is understood is not the meaning but the entity.

There is a sense in which Heidegger eliminates the traditional philosophical notion of meaning from his vocabulary. He thinks that we grasp entities as entities in their webs of relation with other entities, not as aggregates of perceptual qualities. For Heidegger meaning, involves the holistic way in which something can become intelligible as something requires Dasein and only Dasein can be said to be meaningful.

Heidegger’s account of understanding and interpretations are influenced and lead to the hermeneutic turn later in the twentieth century. Two thinkers in the second half of the twentieth century and whose work would not have been possible without the section of *Being and Time*. Those philosophers are Hans George Gadamer (*Truth and Method* in 1976) and Jacques Derrida (*of Grammatology* in 1977). The hermeneutic theory developed by Gadamer and the constructive movement by Derrida take the Heideggerian account in different and apparently opposed direction.

Heidegger thinks that facing up to our own finitude can throw us back into our lives in a fuller way. Heidegger expresses that the clear-sightedly acknowledge that we are caught in the hermeneutic circle. It is also to realize that this circularity is an enabling condition which gives us access to our lives. As a result our aim should be “not to get out of the circle but to come into it in the right way.”<sup>23</sup>

Heidegger’s discussion of ‘authentic historicity’ propose that we fully recognize the finitude and temporality of our possibilities of self-interpretation.

#### **4.3. HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TRANSCENDENCE**

Heidegger elaborates the question of being as fundamental ontology, the science of Being. According to Heidegger, fundamental ontology as an enquiry into Being, was itself a possibility of human being which Heidegger called, Dasein, being-there or existence. Heidegger says Dasein is always operates with in a prevailing understanding of being. The investigation of Being taken up by Heidegger seeks the ground of Being, where Being could be ultimately founded. The fundamental ontology could be called fundamental only when the foundation (ground) of Being is shown in Being itself as far as it could be found in Being itself.

The search for the ground of Being was not at all new in philosophy. It has been the perennial current of all philosophies. As Heidegger sees it, very often the attempt has gone astray or at least was specially carried out that instead of seeking the ground of being in Being itself. But has been sought in something outside the Being- present. Heidegger tries to ground it in the very transcendence of Being.

In his search to find the ground of Being, Heidegger comes across the traditionally accepted principle of reason. It is quite natural that a philosopher well versed in the traditional inheritance of Western philosophy begins his investigation by commencing upon the already accepted principle of ground. Centuries before the problem of the ground remains a problem, open to further discussion. This discussion is leading us to the true region where Being could be ultimately grounded, which is nothing but the transcendence of Being.

Leibnitz who puts the problem of the ground took the form of the principle of sufficient reason. The principle of reason says about beings that every being has a reason (ground). But what the reason is, or where exactly is being grounded? About these questions the principle of reason does not give any answer. Hence, the sense of the ground which is the subject of our enquiry is not

yet made sufficiently clear in the so-called principle of the ground (reason). The principle of the ground touches only its periphery.

Although the principle of reason does not give us an adequate solution to the question of the essence of the ground. Heidegger thinks that it could be taken as an initial step of the problem of the essence of the ground. For this purpose Heidegger refers the principle of reason back to its historical setting and in doing so he shows us that the principle of ground (reason) is initially connected with the problem of truth.

Leibnitz formulates the principle of reason from the nature of true predication. It is the nature of every true prediction that the predicate should be contained in the subject that consequence should be in the antecedent, explicitly or implicitly. Leibnitz proposes this nature of true predication as the origin of the principle of reason. Leibnitz concludes that every true effect should have its pre-existence in its antecedents, namely have a cause. Heidegger has taken up this exposition of Leibnitz as the starting point of the problem of ground not because of the logic of the principle of ground but because in the statements of Leibnitz who found a union of truth with the problem of ground<sup>24</sup>. Heidegger takes this linking of truth with ground as a directive and goes further of the problem of ground, investigating the nature of truth.

Traditionally truth was considered as the adequation of the intellect with the thing. Heidegger thinks that this definition of truth is very vague and empty. This holds that good as a statement regarding truth. Heidegger again says Leibnitz has understand truth in this sense, as the truth of judgement. For a judgement to be true, the object judged should agree with the subject of judging. But Heidegger says that this does not reveal to us the essence of truth. The essence of truth should be explored further.

Heidegger conceives that the understanding of truth as agreement of subject-object originated in Plato and Plato thought Being as idea. In fact truth as agreement calls for a deep ground in light of which the agreement itself could be possible. Heidegger thinks agreement as agreement is possible only in the pre-supposition of something in relation to which subject and object are said to agree. As this meeting point of two terms of agreement, Heidegger proposes the original manifestation of Being (*sein*), which is essentially pre-predicative.

It is the very uncovering of Being (*aletheia*) of which the pre-platonic philosophers in their faithful awareness of the event of Being, spoke to us as truth<sup>25</sup>. It is this original manifestation of the Being of beings which makes being revealable, which being, in their turn, taking a representative form in the mind of

man, The original manifestation of the Being of beings is called by Heidegger ontological truth in opposition to the secondary revelation beings (*seiendes*) which is termed as ontic truth.

According to Heidegger, truth is to be considered more fundamentally as ontic and ontological. Both belong together, as the former is founded in the latter. But the belonging togetherness of the ontic and ontological truth is possible only on the -round of their relation to the difference between Being (*Sein*) and being (*Seiendes*). This difference between the *Sein* and *Seiendes* Heidegger calls the ontological difference. But any mention of the ontological difference reflects back to the existence of a *Dasein* only through *Dasein* is the ontological difference held open, because *Dasein* understanding the Being of being relates itself to being. Hence the difference between ontic and ontological truth which is based on the ontological difference of Being and being is more fundamentally based on the essence of *Dasein*, where the ascent (*uberstieg*) from being (*Seiendes*) to Being (*Sein*) occurs. This original happening occurring in the essence of *Dasein*, which furnishes a basis for ontological difference, is called by Heidegger transcendence<sup>26</sup>. Transcendence, because it signifies an ascent from being to Being.

The study of the problem of ground leads us to the study of the essence of truth, and the study of the essence of truth of the ontological difference and the ontological difference to the problem of transcendence. The nearer we come to the essence of truth the closer we come to the ground of Being. Being and truth come to ground in one and the same thing, namely, the transcendence of Dasein.

We find that the ground of Being is ultimately sought in the transcendence of Dasein. Naturally the question arises: what is this transcendence in its essence? Transcendence signifies an ascent. Ascent in its very nature implies a relation. A relation from something to something. It is the very structure of existence and the fundamental event in the essence of Dasein. The character of Dasein is that it can transcend ; that is, understanding the Being of beings, can relate itself to beings. It is not the individual being that, is attained in transcendence, but being as such and according to Heidegger, being as such, as well see, is founded in the world.

Because transcendence belongs to the fundamental structure of Dasein and because transcendence being-in-the-world, world it follows that the problem of being-in-the-world brings with it also the problem of the essence of Dasein. The being-in-the-world

belong to the basic grasp of Dasein, it is the necessary fundamental and *apriori* grasp of Dasein.

It may be asked now that how does Dasein, transcending as it is, build the world? To understand this we have to go back to the idea of world in Heidegger's philosophy. Because Dasein does not relate itself to this or that being, nor to the sum total of beings, the world to which Dasein relate itself is not the totality of the beings present. This view of the world seems to emphasize the Being-how of the world rather than the Being-what of the world. Heidegger shows us that this way of conceiving the world as the how in totality was already a feature of traditional philosophy.

In the early Greek thinking, they were thinkers, men caught in the radical astonishment of being<sup>27</sup>. They never, mean this or that being nor the totality of beings. In the early Christian period Augustine conceived the world in this sense in so far as he understood world, in the sense of the lover of the world. In the middle ages St.Thomas also thought of the world in this manner, at least to the extent of his distinction between being present.

Kant brings out the concept of the world still more clearly. He thinks that the totality, generall conceived in the idea of the

world, relates itself to the finite things present. Finiteness is understood in a new sense and considered as the object of a finite knowledge. The finite being considered as the object of an absolute and Kant calls the thing-in-itself, The same finite being in reference to its possibility of being understood Kant calls the thing in appearance. The unity of appearances is formed by means of the synthetic *apriori* judgement. The unity of the appearances necessarily depends on an accidental, actual and passive becoming, is, always conditioned and incomplete.

The incompleteness is overcome by a conceived idea which is said to be transcendent. This idea has a completeness to which no empirical knowledge may reach, and with it the intellect can achieve a synthetic unity of the whole. This idea Kant calls the world-concept. Since Plato, says, Heidegger Western metaphysics has not asked the question or where it has intimated it as in Kant, it has failed to press it. The existential understanding of the world slightly-indicated or vaguely proposed in the philosophies of the past, should be further clarified and founded in the deeper layers of its reality. This is what Heidegger aims to do in developing the concept of the world of Dasein.

We see many objects in the world. One may think that it is the objects that constitute the world. But in reality, Heidegger

says, it is the world that explain the objects. The,separate entities in the world are unintelligible. They are understood only by the help of an idea of the world already formed long before. It is because of this idea that we understood the objects in reference to one another. In fact, the one centre reference, the one point to which all other things could be referred, is the idea of the world.

Dasein in its average everyday existence is not conscious of this world. Every day existence is in activity and, thus does not understand the world as such with its preoccupations of the everyday existence, Dasein forms an environment at world which Heidegger calls the '*umwelt*'.

The environmental world (*umwelt*) has a spatial signification. It is the concern (*Sorge*) of Dasein that forms the environmental world not the spatial nearness or distance. The reality of the environmental world does not consist therefore in an objective understanding of things but rather in a utilitarian view of things. So Heidegger thinks that perhaps the Greek expression *pragmata* may be better express the idea of things. The things are as useful, as implements.

We have seen that the question of ground is related to Dasein's transcendence. We also seen that the world-building

ascent of Dasein's as being-in-the-world is transcendence. Now we have to re-explore further what is the ultimate ground in Dasein, Heidegger says that it is freedom. Dasein builds the world as it gives meaning-to being and thus ascends to the Being of the beings setting the world in its own world-system. Dasein however, can direct its action only as its existence demands.

Now concern (*Sorge*) constitutes the very Being of Dasein, and present itself as 'concern for' in so far as Dasein strives to relate itself with other men, and 'concern with' in so far as Dasein tries to relate itself with infra-human beings. In any case concern is that which constitutes the Being of Dasein. We understand the meaningfulness of considering Dasein as concern when we pay our attention to another fundamental principle of Heidegger. Fundamentally viewed, Dasein is the sum-total of possibilities. It is because of the reason that the being of Dasein reveals itself as concern. Only in actualizing its own possibilities does Dasein find its own meaningfulness. But in order to actualize itself it has to come in contact with the beings in the world. But it can relate itself with these beings only in such a manner as to actualize its own possibilities. To this end it has to build its own world. Hence the Purpose of building the world is to actualize its own possibilities.

The conceptual frame work of producing and making leads back to Dasein's own concrete being-in-the-world. For Dasein lives its every day life within the horizon of a world of tools and instruments, of things which Dasein makes and uses, whether these things being "already there"<sup>28</sup>, he uses. This world is founded only in understanding being in their inter-related system. In this understanding Dasein finds itself as one among beings, of course as the all-converging point of the world system that is being founded. According to Heidegger, the world, Being in their involvement with Dasein form the world. Only in this world Dasein finds itself meaningful.

It is this transcendental establishment of beings in their relation to one another and to Dasein itself, which necessarily includes the two other aspects of founding and footing, that we call ontological truth, the pre-predicative understanding of all Being of beings, which renders all other understanding of beings possible, namely, offers the possibility of ontical truth. The essence of Dasein is freedom. Dasein's transcendence being the determining factor in truth. The essence of truth is freedom and Being, being ultimately grounded in Dasein's transcendence, the ground of Being is also freedom. Everything is founded in freedom, in infinite freedom.

#### 4.4. THE GROUND OF METAPHYSICS

The whole philosophy of Martin Heidegger is an attempt to lay the foundation of metaphysics. The investigation into Being was begun to form the fundamental ontology. Since Dasein is the only privileged being capable of understanding its own Being. This attempt of forming a fundamental ontology was begun with the analysis of Dasein. Heidegger does not claim to have brought it to completion.

Metaphysics may still be in the process of being founded. It seems that metaphysics founded in Dasein. In Heidegger's later writings he does not speak of fundamental ontology. Evidently the stress is given to the thought of Being and the fundamental ontology. Heidegger sometimes attempts to ground metaphysics in Being itself. But because the revelation of Being is restricted to the horizon of time and to the phenomenological circle of Dasein's experience. The ground of metaphysics which Heidegger arrives at remains intimately related to Dasein. Though the grounding process is not yet completely brought to its end, this attempt at grounding has its own positive contributions.

Strictly speaking, it is not in Dasein that Heidegger seems to ground metaphysics. It is rather in the existence of Dasein.

Dasein being existing to the openness of Being<sup>29</sup>, it is in the existing openness to Dasein to Being that metaphysics is ultimately grounded. We call it the existing ground of metaphysics in contrast to the subsisting ground in which the existing itself must further be grounded.

The existing ground speaks of the real beginning of metaphysics. Metaphysics begins where man encounters Being. The essence of Dasein considered as transcendence, which is the surrounding of Dasein from being to Being, presents *Da- Sein* as the meeting point of *Da* and *Sein*, namely, man and Being.<sup>30</sup> This transcendence is further explained as Being-in-the-world, because the Being of being is attained only in the interrelationship of implement-circles, which, in so far as it gives meaningfulness to the Being of being, constitutes the world for Heidegger. Because this global system of the implementally characterized being is finally understood in relation to the Dasein's ground, Being.

Metaphysics seeks the meaning at Being. Being is to be attained in its truthfulness. Any consideration of Being invites us to view. Under this aspect Heidegger views Being, that is, Being only as it is manifested to us in the circles. The origin and the ultimate explanation of Being is never questioned. The consideration of the nature of being helps us to understand the real

nature of its Being. Because the nature of things necessarily presupposes Dasein's will to make use of them as it could be said that the nature of things are dependent on Dasein. This view defects this implementally-characterized Being of being. By this, we do not mean that Dasein functions as the efficient cause of the Being of being it encounters. Dasein is only searching after the meaningfulness of the Being of being.

The meaningfulness of Being is, however, delected in the aspect of which it is implementally characterized. Here Dasein sees the world as such ultimately related and subordinated to Dasein which we call freedom. In this sense it could very well be said that freedom is the ground of Being, which would only mean that Dasein, in its decisive openness to the Being of being, brings out the meaningfulness of Being and finds Being in itself in so far as the meaning of Being is finally understood only in its basic relation to Dasein.

Man in virtue of his openness to Being is always going out of himself in search of Being. The consideration of implemental character of Being helps us to clarify the pre-established harmony between man and Being. In this pre-established harmony man finds himself as the central point of the interrelations, as the ultimate

in order to and thus finds a possibility of grounding Being in himself. But the Being understood here is the Being of being considered in the aspect of its implemental character. Being in the aspect of its pure 'isness' is neither questioned nor considered. So the grounding of Being in man's openness to Being through it is true, considers Being only in a way limited realm of its causality. The whole grounding process is made possible because man is ready to accept the Being of being. It is with the original acceptance of the 'isness' of Being that man is concerned. The very consideration of the implementality of Being is made possible in the presupposition of the 'isness' of Being. It is accepting this 'is' that man is striving to go that of himself. The ground of Being in man is only an initial stage of man's search after Being. The search will be completed when man can find the explanation of the 'is' of being to which he relates himself.

Dasein in so far as it is existing to the Being to the Being of being, is really the ground of metaphysics, because it renders metaphysics possible. Existing by the very fact that it is existing, Dasein is going out of itself to ground metaphysics. This going out marks the beginning of metaphysics. But, in so far as it goes out, it acknowledge its own incompleteness and incapability of grounding metaphysics absolutely. The existing ground, by

the very fact that it is existing, call for another ground, free of this existing character, which is the subsisting ground of metaphysics.

In an important essay, *What is Metaphysics ?*, we can find confirmation for our interpretation: "The nothing is the, complete negation of the totality of beings. The totality of beings must be given in advance so as to be able to fall prey straightway to negation - in which the nothing itself could be manifest."<sup>31</sup> But the definition of nothing as the negation of the totality of beings, Heidegger warns us is not the, nothing as such. For negation is always an act of the intellect an exercise of logic, the result of which is that the nothing is treated as something, as a being, that we obtain only a formal concept of the imagined nothing but never the nothing itself. The nothing that really nothing can be achieved only on the basis of the fundamental experience of the nothing.

In fact, the nothing is revealed, becomes present through Dasein direct, that is, Dasein's fundamental experience of anxiety (*Angst*). Heidegger says that anxiety reveals the nothing. More precisely, anxiety leaves us hanging because it induces the slipping away of beings as a whole. This implies that we ourselves - we mean who are in being in the midst of beings slip from ourselves. At bottom therefore it is not as though "you" or "I" feel

ill at ease; rather it is this way for same "one". In the altogether unsettling experience of this hovering where there is nothing to hold onto, pure *Da- Sein* is all that is still there.<sup>32</sup>

The subject/object dichotomy takes hold at our thinking, the pure *Da- Sein* encounters the nothing in anxiety. "Indeed: the nothing itself - as such - was there."<sup>33</sup> Both Dasein and the nothing were there where Dasein confronts this thrownness into the world, his situated facticity of existence in a most immediate way as sheer being-in-the-world.

The nothing is not revealed as a beings, "just as little is it gives as an object."<sup>34</sup> Rather, Heidegger says, "in anxiety the nothing is encountered at one with beings as a whole,... the nothing marks itself known with beings and in beings expressly as a slipping away of the whole."<sup>35</sup>

Heidegger through the following passage gives the argument of "what is metaphysics?"

In the clear light of the nothing of anxiety the original openness of beings as such arises: that they are beings and nothing.... The essence of the originally nihilating nothing lies in this, that it brings Dasein for the first time before being as

such only on the ground of the original relation of, the nothing can human existence approach and penetrate beings.<sup>36</sup>

It would not be inaccurate to say that the nothing constitutes the condition of possibility of beings, that the nothing is constitutive of the pure essence in which only being can be and manifest as a being, as such and such. As the non-object of anxiety, beings as a whole, as not nothing, become present. But it would be a mistake to infer that the nothing is more primordial than beings. For the anxiety which reveals the nothing as such and brings forth beings to disclose the fundamental mood of Dasein that occurs to him when he finds himself most immersed in beings, so immersed that the overabundance of being outstrips this or that particular being. "Anxiety is indeed anxiety in the face of .., but not in the face of this or that thing."<sup>37</sup> The preponderance of beings defies determination and particularization on the part of Dasein. It announces itself as the "nothing" as nothing, paradoxically, that is fullest in its emptiness. The nothing is not nihil, it is rather the fullest expression of being's presence as a whole, so full that the presence as this or that particular being slips into absence, into the ground that informs the figure of the nothing.

*Da* in so far as existing to the Being of being, is really, the ground of metaphysics. Because it renders metaphysics possible. But it is only the existing ground. Existing, by the very fact that it is existing. *Dasein* is going out of itself to ground metaphysics. This going out marks the beginning of metaphysics. But, in so far as it goes out, it acknowledge its own incompleteness and incapability of grounding metaphysics absolutely. The existing ground, by the way fact that it is existing, calls for another ground, free of this existing character which is the subsisting ground of metaphysics.

We have already seen that metaphysics could proximately be grounded in the openness of man to Being. We have also seen that this existing ground calls for another and more fundamental ground where metaphysics could ultimately and absolutely be grounded. This ultimate ground, because it is the subsisting Being, as well shall see, we call the subsisting ground.

Some indications to the subsisting ground of metaphysics were already seen in the chapter where we treated Being in its relation to being, man and nothing. The consideration of any aspect of Being, when led forth the completion will logically lead us to this subsisting ground where Being and metaphysics are absolutely and ultimately grounded.

Heidegger does not arrive at this grounding of metaphysics, because he prefers to remain within the phenomenological circle of thinking-process. The absent to this subsisting ground demands a thinking beyond the limitations of phenomenology. Heidegger's quest to encompass all of thinking, willing, and feeling in a relationship to time could force phenomenological analysis into metaphysical realm or reduce it to a mythologizing of time.<sup>38</sup> But phenomenology analyses things as they occur in our experience and narrates them. Because it stops here and never goes into inner nature of things reflectively.

Phenomenology can never attain the positive content of experience in itself. Without reflectively attaining the positive content of our experience of being in itself, we cannot found Being in its ultimate ground. The existing ground which 'phenomenology arrives at, though right, leaves the whole thing unexplained. So to explain it further we go outside the realm of phenomenology. Phenomenology has already attained its end. Now it should give way to reflective thinking of demonstrative character.

Phenomenology was of course a good beginning. It has brought to us our own experience of Being. But in analysing them phenomenologically we have had many oblique experiences, which

aroused our curiosity, and yet were not clear. Now we are trying to clarify those glimpses of the so-called supra experiences indicated together with the phenomenologically attained experience of Being. We found an element of mystery in thinking of Being something unsaid remaining behind all the said words of Being, which left an experience of holiness in the whole field of thinking. What is this holdy ? This we see in the Being of beings.

We are inquiring into the inner nature of which we experience in transcendence. The whither of transcendence was explained as to-the-world, because the Being of being was understandable only as Being-in-the-world. But it was precisely in this understanding of Being as Being-in-the-world that man felt mystery. The whither of transcendence was not yet fully solved. Though man understands Being as Being-in-the-world in the light of the whither of transcendence and in understanding it so he finds Being in himself. Man finds himself as the ground of Being, because the meaningfulness of Being in its world is understood only in the light of man. But man fails to identify himself as the final ground because he finds himself dependent on Being and transcending it. The intellectual tendency is clearly manifested here in its experience of the mystry of Being, in its thought of

the unsaid in the said. They are already manifested even in the phenomenology attained grounding of Being.

The opening of man to Being, which is transcendence to the Being of beings, is meant for the acceptance of Being by man. This acceptance is completed when man absolutely asserts Being in judgement. The assertion of Being is, however, possible only under the supposition of the implicit acceptance of the subsisting Being. It was because of this subsisting Being hidden behind the Being of being, that man found mystery in his understanding of Being, that he was called to think the unsaid of the said words of Being, that he felt holiness pervading everywhere.

The transcending subsisting Being is that creative agent who is responsible for man's existence characterised by the transcending capacity of receiving Being by eliciting self extending, thinking, willing. Freedom is only the name for this capacity of man, or the name for its manifestation. Man with spontaneous impulse tries to disclose from within what he is. Participated as he is from the supremely transcending subsisting Being, he can not but reflect this supreme Being in all his actions, in thinking, in his willing, in taking his resolutions. In other words, in all his actions he transcends everything in this world and himself.

Thus we find meaningfulness in our thinking, we find richness in our thought, we find proportionate internal content in our experience of Being, but only when we arrive at this subsisting Being, where we could ground Being absolutely and ultimately. Metaphysics has therefore two grounds existing as well subsisting. The existing ground is the Dasein, which as the *Da* of *Sein*, is existing into the Being of being and renders metaphysics possible. The subsisting ground the subsisting Being, which as the subsisting Being makes possible and sustains the very existence of this existing ground itself. This subsisting ground, which is Being subsisting in itself, we call God.

We see that Heidegger does not lead philosophy to the ultimate grounding. Neither does he deny the possibility of arriving at his ground. That is, his philosophy is neither theistic nor atheistic. Heidegger leaves it undecided. According to Heidegger, arriving at this ultimate ground does not belong to the nature of essential thinking. The question is therefore the sense of thinking in Heidegger. How does Heidegger understand thinking? Heidegger says the most thought provoking thing about our thought provoking age is that we are still not thinking. He says it has been since the early Greeks. To discover what

thinking is we are instead lift back to the origins of Greek thinking before Aristotle.<sup>39</sup>

Essential thinking for Heidegger is poetising. In reflective thinking, according to him, the real nature of thinking dies out. He says poetical thinking is more authentic than abstract, demonstrative thinking. In “what is called thinking?”, Heidegger describes about the weakness of thinking in four statements.

1. Thinking does not bring knowledge as do the sciences.
2. Thinking does not produce usable practical wisdom.
3. Thinking solves no cosmic riddles.
4. Thinking does not endow us directly with the power to act.<sup>40</sup>

Heidegger says that because of that poetical thinking only man has the experience of reality in its wholeness. Correspondingly, the transcendental imagination appears to be the important factor in the thinking process. Transcendental imagination is that faculty whereby man has maximum sensibility and minimum intelligibility. Poetical thinking needs truth in its sensibility. So Heidegger gives greater importance to intelligibility presented in sensibility. It is true that all our thinking process begins with our

senses and it is the intelligible content of the sensible data that man always understands. So the beginning of the thinking process is always understood. So the beginning of the thinking process is always connected with sensibility.

The scholastics call the state of thinking as *cogitatio*. From this intelligibility man has to go to the intelligibility in itself. The way of this going is reasoning. Reasoning needs reflective and abstract thinking. So Heidegger dislikes reasoning. He really tries to arrive at intelligibility where reality is perceived. But he never arrives at it free of its sensibility, because reasoning is not duly attended. The lack of this attention to reasoning may be due to desire to surpass the subject object polarity of the traditional philosophy. The attempt to find out the unity of the subject-object relationship is really praiseworthy.

Though his method is phenomenology, his thinking to Being is phenomenologically attainable. This Being is not God. Heidegger clearly says that Being about which speaks is neither God nor the ground of world. According to Heidegger, Being is the Being that is phenomenologically attained and hence by Being as such he understands only Being manifested in beings.

The openness to Being and the revelation of Being in beings are worked out and clearly exposed in Heidegger's analysis of Being. Man is presented as openness to life to receive the fullness of Being. Once the proper functioning of demonstrative thinking is attained man could arrive at God from this openness to Being, as we have seen. It may be the natural facility of thinking of God, which God, has granted to man from the very beginning of human history, that facilitates his approach to God through reflective thinking. Man can arrive at the knowledge of a personal God by his reasoning. Actually, this knowledge may be pre-influenced by his traditional idea of God. So God is accessible by reason alone. This may be in some way, perhaps founded in an original revelation, influenced by the idea of God he already possesses. Metaphysics, is therefore ontotheological in character. It begins as ontology but ends as ontotheology. Ontology, when it turns to be ontotheology, passing through its existing ground arrives at its subsisting ground, which is the ultimate ground of metaphysics.

#### **4.5. HEIDEGGER'S CRAFTSMANSHIP**

Martin Heidegger in *Being and Time*, seems to offer the best access to the practical implications of Heidegger's fundamental ontology. To some readers of Heidegger's early works the

notion of authenticity implies an existentialist theory of action, with its emphasis upon choice and commitment.<sup>41</sup> Heidegger's notion of authenticity offers a theory of engagement at all. The figure of the craftsman and the issue of authenticity are usually examined by Heidegger in isolation from each other, but where we look at how both issues, we notice that the two are often incompatible.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger is discussing the nature of the world and the things within the world. Within these early sections of the book, the craftsman's use of a hammer has several significances one of which is to highlight the fact that Dasein is a being-in-the-world. Dasein can appreciate the contextual or worldly nature of a hammer only if it is intimately familiar with the way the hammer functions in relation to other tools. Heidegger has chosen the example of a Dasein that acts rather than one that contemplates an object in order to show that a tool is most truly itself. Heidegger's concept of world even though does not into restrict worldhood to any one type of world.

Heidegger defines worldhood in terms of the totality of references and involvements of useful or ready-to-hand things, he has in mind the pragmatic example of the craftman's tools. In other

words, the concept of world in *Being and Time* is understood primarily in instrumental terms. For it is the references and involvements of tools which define the significance of the world, provided of course that tool is understood in the broader sense of equipment, as Heidegger uses the term. Heidegger has chosen to illustrate being-in-the-world with a craftsman rather than the examples of an artist or a moral actor, given the priority of his concept of world places on the use of things.<sup>42</sup> He did not choose the example of an artist or a moral actor in *Being and Time*, because neither of these activities are concerned with the world exclusively in terms of objects of use.

If Heidegger's conception of world in *Being and Time*, leans strongly toward the activity of using things, this is understandable that he seeks to overcome a philosophical tradition which views man as a subject insulation from things and which views these things as mere things. By focusing on the example of the craftsman, Heidegger can show a thing is not a mere thing standing in opposition to a subject but is first and for the most part something tangible that we put to use. The emphasis Heidegger puts on the use of it is in short, a very effective way of disputing the Cartesian distinction between subject and object.

We exclusively concentrate on Heidegger's structural analysis of human existence to the neglect of its ontological orientation. Heidegger's phenomenological analysis of human existence is oriented towards a science of Being or ontology. At the every outset of his treatise, *Being and Time* Heidegger states that the main purpose of his enquiry is to raise a new question of the meaning of Being, and to reawaken an understanding for the meaning of this question."<sup>43</sup>

The purpose of enquiry according to Heidegger, sees purely intellectual, insofar as his enquiry merely aims at the understanding of Being. But on closer examination it can be shown that Heidegger's purpose is no less practical than intellectual. For, throughout his philosophy, Heidegger makes a distinction between authentic and inauthentic existence, and one of the definitions of authentic existence is that it consist in the cultivation of the awareness of Being as distinguished from the nothingness which seems to pervade the world of objects, and the consequent realization of freedom from erring and misery in life.

Heidegger's method is phenomenological in as much as he seeks to analyse the structure of human existence as disclosed in the concrete lived experience of the individual, but this analysis

is only preliminary to the individual preliminary to the understanding of Being in his philosophy. Since he reaches out to his conception of Being through the emotive concepts of dread and nothingness as disclosed in the structured analysis of human existence. Heidegger justifies his approach to Being through an analysis of human existence by pointing out that human existence unlike the other entities in the world is a unique kind of being. For, it provides us with a mode of being which we can understand from within in a manner in which we can understand no other entity, and hence serves as the best medium through which the meaning of Being can be grasped. Thus it may be broadly said that Heidegger's method is phenomenological.

Heidegger lays stress on the fallenness of human existence and plead for the necessity of freedom from there of, this freedom consists in an act of self-transcendence towards Being and both regard this transcendence as an experiential act. Heidegger works out in detail the psychological process of transcendence through the analysis of structural moods such as care, dread, nothingness and Being. Heidegger points out that we always discover man as being-in-the-world but his 'inness' is not mere spatial inness he is in the world not as thing are spatially in the world but as concernfully dealing with the world. Man can thus

be defined as concern, and his concern is always with the world and with himself as being in it.

Heidegger also points out that the empirical self is not locked up in a body but always stands out, so as to disclose the world within it. The self in this sense is being there (*Dasein*) in the world and its *thereness* implies its openness of being in which the world comes to be disclosed. The relation between the self and the world is thus structural since the world is what is disclosed in the self and the self is the disclosedness of the world.<sup>44</sup>

It follows that there can be no self without the world and no world without the self.<sup>45</sup> The structural unity between them is what is expressed in the phrase *being-in-the-world*, and this structural unity is *apriori* in the sense that it is primordially and constantly a whole as disclosed in the phenomenological analysis of concrete experience and not placed together by means of conceptual analysis.<sup>46</sup> Heidegger works out in great detail the theme of human existence as temporality and lays stress on the structural mode of human existence as and of itself towards death. Man is never a static being but is constantly 'drifting' and he is drifting towards death. Death is not an accident which cuts short human life at a point in time, but is the structural potentiality of

human existence. Man is cast into death since his birth and is capable of anticipating it as the most personal, unshareable, inevitable termination of his present life. Death turns a man's existence into the mode no longer being-in-the-world and disrelates him from all that is in the world. The anticipatory conception of this disrelationship to the world introduces into life, according to Heidegger, a sense of nothingness or worthlessness of human worldly pursuits and possessions even while they still exist as options and actualities. Heidegger thus emphasises the need for a revelation or devaluation of all that is on the part of man from the standpoint of one's own temporality and death.

The mood which discloses the nothingness or worthlessness of all that is called dread in Heideggerian's philosophy. Dread is not mere fear which has an external cause and can be overcome with the removal of that cause, but is a primordial mood which pertains to man's being-in-the-world<sup>47</sup> as such discloses the void which is present all through it,<sup>48</sup> what matters in dread is not the presence or absence of things or possessions but their utter lack of value, it is the oppressive feeling in which the whole world seem to slide away from one's own being, leaving behind a sense of void.

Dread usually announces itself not as that which we face but as that from which we free. Man's constant flight from the dread of his own being-in-the-world results in his fallenness or inauthentic existence whereas facing it marks the beginning of his authentic existence. Heidegger insists that man should not be misled by the apparent permanence of worldly possessions or succumb to their temptations, but should be aware of their basic transitoriness and act or live in the world with that awareness. This is authentic existence, in the sense that it expresses man's freedom from the deceptiveness of the world, and an act performed at this level, of existence can only be disinterested or unselfish, since selfishness or attachment always springs from mistaking the transitory for the enduring.

For Heidegger, human existence begins in birth and ends in death. Man's existence in this sense is finite and there is nothing for him beyond death. His phenomenological analysis of human existence excludes from its scope the postulates of soul and rebirth, and he finds no need for them either in explaining the structure of man's empirical existence or in emphasizing the need for his authentic existence.

Heidegger believes in the oneness of Being as distinguished from the distinct entities disclosed in our concerned dealing with

the world. Being, he affirms is not a bare general concept which we intellectually derive from our distinct perceptions of the particular entities, nor is it a mere totality of such entities, but it is the indeterminate immediate reality of which we are certain, and which is the ground of all that is and determines all that is to be what it is.<sup>49</sup>

According to Heidegger, the basic error which consists in the concealment of Being is structurally constitutive of man's being-in-the-world and basically underlies his knowledge of the world. Heidegger points out that it is not necessary that man should rest contented with his state of ontological error or misery, but he can rise above it or become free from it. This implies Heidegger's conception of authentic existence or transcendence which man can achieve in his own life. This transcendence he believes will not come as a result of his intellectual activity, but as a matter of his subjective encounter with Being.

For Heidegger, there is no contradiction in affirming that nothingness is the medium through which Being can be encountered. Nothingness and Being are thus integral to each other, and in order to emphasize the integral relation between them. Heidegger goes to the extent saying that Being and nothingness are one. This identity should not, however, Heidegger takes to man the denial of

Being but the nihilation of nothingness in Being which, according to Heidegger occurs when man reaches out to Being through nothingness.

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44. *Being and Time, Op.Cit.*, P.19
45. *Ibid.*, P.92, The world is not a way of characterizing those entities which Dasein essentially is not, it is rather a characteristic of Dasein itself.
46. *Ibid.*, P.65
47. *Ibid.*, P.231
48. The world as such is that in the face of which one has anxiety
49. *Being and Time, Op.Cit.*, P.22-26

## CONCLUSION

We began our analysis of thinking questioning the meaning of Being. We closed our analysis arriving at the ultimate ground of Being. The question into the meaning led us to the ground of Being. The Being of being invites us to ground of Being. In the beginning this investigation presents just an invitation to think into the meaning of Being. But this thinking of being turns out to be the grounding of Being and the thinking process of grounding of Being comes to an end when Being is ultimately grounded in the subsisting Being.

All philosophers are always conscious of the constant call of Being and this roused their curiosity to think, to poetize and to philosophize. The inquiry into the meaning of Being is the question, the fundamental question which made possible and enlighten every philosophical investigation.

In order to lay bare the meaning of Being, the phenomenological analysis must begin with entities themselves, since, Being is always the Being of some entity. But among the entities Dasein is privileged by its ontico-ontologico-fundamental priority to serve as the access to the question of Being. It is in this context that Heidegger finds that phenomenology has to be hermeneutical.

According to Heidegger, Being invites man to thinking. This thinking seeks to ground Being. Because Being is truth itself, the problem of grounding Being was connected with the problem of truth. This grounding is achieved by making an analysis of the traditional principle of reason, which is finally reduced to the primordial unveiling of Being to man's openness to Being. This openness of man to Being and the going out of man to the Being of being Heidegger calls transcendence. Because the unveiling of Being to man is truth itself, the grounding of Being was in fact a search into the essence of truth.

Heidegger's only pre-occupation in philosophy is the question of Being. But we find that Heidegger has a new way of questioning Being. The question of Being remained a central pre-occupation of his thinking from the beginning of his career. To follow him in detail at every one of these turns is impossible here. But it is possible to find a constant pattern in his approach to the question of Being and thinking.

According to Heidegger, to define thinking from someone else point of view would be as hopeless as describing colours to the blind. Thinking is questioning oneself and putting ourselves in the question. Heidegger wants to re-discover what thinking is and

for it we are led back to the origin of philosophy in the Greek thinking long before Plato and Aristotle.

Heidegger is more directly concerned with the way language is related to thinking and how it is associated to thought. In his work *An Introduction to Metaphysics* brings out clearly more about his central insights about the nature of thinking. It represents his attempt to translate the famous saying of Parmenides about thinking. We come to know what thinking means when we ourselves try to think. In this sense what is called thinking is a sign post on Heidegger's way,

Another theme which has increasingly captured Heidegger's attention is that of the nature of modern science and technology. He holds that science doesn't think in the way thinkers think. Moreover, science is determining more and more the character of contemporary reality, Heidegger points out that meditative thinking demands us that neither to cling one-sidedly to a single idea, nor to run down a one-track course of ideas. The fact is that we learn to think only as we inquire into those matters that normally remain unquestioned concerning our everyday existence and our traditions, As Heidegger develops such themes, it becomes evident that he conceives thinking as something quite different from having opinions or ideas, even something different from logi-

cal reasoning or scientific analysis, The most thought-provoking thing about our thought-provoking age, remarks Heidegger, is that we are still not thinking. The task which Heidegger's thought has placed before us is that of learning how to think.

In the world of thinking Heidegger is such a person who goes back to the very origin of Western philosophy, viz. the early Greek thinkers, to learn the art of thinking. Heidegger's works that are focussed on here refers to the question of thinking in a special way. In *Being and Time*, language is understood methodologically within the frame work of representation, and thinking is understood to be hermeneutic, i.e. a matter of clarifying the vague forgotten meaning of Being through the existential analytic of Dasein. In the same work Heidegger still seems to think that philosophy, even at the end of metaphysics, can get somewhere near Being. In his later works, however, language becomes the place where Being comes to reveal itself, a dwelling place opened up by a quasimystical, meditative thinking. We cannot learn what language is, no matter how radical our thinking is.

In *Letter on Humanism*, Heidegger speaks of the kind of thinking that inquires into the truth of Being and so defines man's essential abode in Being, According to Heidegger, thinking is the recollection of Being. But this recollection is also a building up

for thinking builds the house of Being, the house in which man dwells in the truth of Being. Heidegger understood thinking as re-collection of Being and in its most primordial or pre-ontological form, it has the primary function not of bringing a healing transformation of the human but of making man aware of his roots. Heidegger characterizes this fundamental movement of thinking as a journey where thinking conducts its historical existence.

Thinking, the thinking of Being, which Heidegger characterizes as meditative thinking, is peculiar to him. He linked this art to that of the cabinet maker.

Heidegger points out that we cultivate meditative thinking as a way of preserving our humanity against the approaching alienation by everydayness. He argues that thinking is not inactivity but itself a superior action which stands in dialogue with world-destiny and thinking establishes a participatory relationship between the essence of our being human and the essence of technology. Heidegger makes no claims such as that thinking can produce knowledge or can promote valuable practical wisdom or solve any cosmic riddles. Furthermore, Heidegger is working towards a theory of thinking that is at once both poetic and philosophic. Heidegger is not very confident or happy about the achievement of the logico-empirical (i.e. scientific) style of

thinking, He does not even question the idealist and realist positions regarding the nature of thinking. What he has in mind is a recollective thinking which he considers as the only way to Being. He never rejects the conventional mode of thinking, on the other hand, he wants to advocate meditative thinking.

Heidegger keeps the question of Being closer to the concrete entities by considering Being always in relation to beings. For Heidegger Being is not the pure Being of Hegel but always the Being of being. The main aim of Heidegger is to demarcate the domain of the question of Being from the area of the question of beings. And in so doing, for the contemporary philosophy which has re-defined being since Descartes, who remains very abstract and obscure, He also reminds us of our forgetfulness of Being. Heidegger's attempt is to link the question of Being to the interpretation of time as the possible horizon of any understanding of Being. In *Being and Time*, he is still concerned with the problematic as conceived by Kant which either eliminates any question of Being or makes it impossible to answer it. But it turns out to be possible for Heidegger to answer Kant.

Heidegger conceives the question of Being differently from Aristotle. Aristotle sees it as a question of being, of entities,

i.e. the question being as being. But Heidegger sees it as a question of the Being of being. According to Heidegger, Being has always been presupposed by ontology. Here comes the necessity to renew or recapitulate the question of Being or to see it as the question about the meaning of Being. Heidegger makes the point by asserting that the subject of thinking is, indeed, Being. The forgetfulness of Being, thus becomes the forgetfulness of difference between Being who thinks and beings that are thought, Accordingly, we think of Being as the subject only when we think of the difference between beings or entities and Being. This is to insist that Being must be seen in its relation to beings. According to Heidegger, the relation of Being to beings is always understood as a relation of ground or source to that which is grounded or originated. The question of Being understood correctly by the ancients is, thus, the question that turns one away from a direct reference to any particular beings. The question will lead, indeed, to the ontological difference between Being and beings.

To be and to think can be considered, and many have considered it to be so as separate domains of experience, one is ontological and the other is epistemological. For

Heidegger, however, the two are intimately bound up with each other. Indeed, the relationship is both active and essential to human life. Heidegger cites a fragment from Parmenides and remarks that thinking and being are the same. In *Identity and Difference*, he comments that thinking and Being are two different things, apprehend here as the same. Being and thinking do belong to each other and they belong together as the essence of man. The belonging-togetherness of Being and thinking is a togetherness and yet also a difference.

To understand thinking, it will be necessary to know what is the matter in question when thinking occurs. All thinking comprehends beings in thought. Being refers to beings thought because beings must be rendered present for them to be ontologically different from presence (Being) and without rendering Being present, there can be no meaningfulness in the human existence.

For Heidegger, thinking is an experiential knowing and doesn't restrict itself to the purely cognitive or theoretical modes of knowing. Hence, he makes the distinction between the activities of logic and that of *logos*. By a constant reference to logic one gives the resemblance of being

engaged in thinking though it is not the essential thinking, it is what Heidegger considers to be forgetting that one is thinking. Here one gets misguided. Logic understands thinking as the representation of beings. But what thinking is there in representation that thinks the truth of Being? Thinking the truth of Being is what Heidegger calls disclosedness, i.e. *aletheia*. Being is unconcealed or disclosed by being present. Thinking is rendering present that which is vague, viz. Being.

Thinking against logic doesn't mean being committed to the illogical. It means to return to the *logos* in one's reflection and to its essence as it appears in essential thinking. It also is to prepare oneself for reflection. The return to what the Greeks called *logos* is then the direction that thinking should take. *Logos* is the name which designates the Being of the essent. By thinking (on) *logos* we think of the ontological difference, the difference in meaning between Being and beings. *Logos* merits being thought. Thinking *logos* in *Being and Time* is the interpretation of the disclosedness, of Being qua essence of man.

To summarize in this thesis we have been studying Heidegger's elucidation of thought. We notice that there is a

close relation between the thinking of Parmenides and that of Heidegger. Heidegger stresses the fact that what Parmenides pointed out regarding the identity of Being and thought is the most authentic, Heidegger follows the same line of insight of Parmenides in his elucidation of Being and thought.

In our evaluation, we shall attempt to recall briefly several silent points of this thesis. First and foremost we find Heidegger's basic concern for Being, from the beginning of his philosophical enterprise his concern has been with the meaning of Being. Secondly, the very core of his thinking lies in the discussion of truth (*aletheia*). Thirdly, the history of Western metaphysics has been characterized by its forgetfulness of the difference between Being and beings and, hence, he wants to destroy it, i.e. the history of Western metaphysics. Fourthly, for Heidegger, logic is not an accidental accessory in the process of this forgetfulness of Being but it is the very condition for the development and deepening of the oblivion of Being and its difference. It has been the primary prerequisite condition and the first effect in the development of Western metaphysics which is logical and ontological.

Briefly, we would say that what is the most thought provoking could be something lofty, perhaps even the highest thing there is for man, provided man still is the entity who thinks that thought which appeals to him because his essential nature consists in the gathering of thought which is Being.

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