

**POST-METAPHYSICAL THINKING AND THE PROBLEM OF
INDETERMINACY OF TRUTH AND MEANING**

**A CRITICAL STUDY WITH REFERENCE TO FRANCOIS LYOTARD, JACQUES
DERRIDA AND RICHARD RORTY**

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By

CHANDINI . P . K .

**Department of Philosophy
University of Calicut
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C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Dr.P.K.Pokker, do hereby certify that this Ph.D Thesis entitled, **Post-metaphysical thinking and the Problem of Truth and Meaning-A Critical study with reference to Francois Lyotard, Jacques Derrida and Richard Rorty** is a record of bonafide research work done in this University by **Ms.Chandini.P.K.** under my Supervision and guidance.

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
Dr.P.K.Pokker
(SupervisingTeacher)

DECLARATION

I, Chandini.P.K., do hereby declare that this thesis entitled **Post-metaphysical Thinking and the Problem of Truth and Meaning - A critical study with reference to Francois Lyotard, Jacques Derrida and Richard Rorty** has not previously formed the basis for the award of any Degree, diploma, fellowship or other similar title or recognition.

Calicut University

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Chandini.P.K.

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Chapter I

AN ENQUIRY INTO THE QUESTION OF MEANING AND TRUTH IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

Introducing preliminaries

Language philosophy plays a very important role in the history of philosophy. One of fundamental questions of philosophical discussion is regarding the origin of things. In order to arrive at the origin of reality language is one of the important means. From pre-Socratic philosophers onwards language has been considered as the source of reality.

Language is often viewed as a communicative system with a set of signs for communication. Nowadays philosophers seek the meaning of signs in relation to the system of which they partake. Linguistics like any other science, is concerned not with the mere collections of facts, but with the construction of a system of abstract concepts, which accounts most adequately for the particular properties that language displays. The problem of the origin of meaning is the basic and open issues in the various contemporary approaches to language. Semantics as study of meaning is not concerned with the meaning of utterance, but with the meaning of sentences and it equally follows that we cannot study semantics without assuming a great deal about grammar and other

aspects of the structure of language.

What is at issue in philosophy of language today is the question regarding the source of meaning and truth. In the contemporary world the question of meaning has come to a peculiarly elaborate and fruitful issue in the philosophy of language and the fate of the language philosophy is bound up with the future possibilities of meaning. Philosophers, social scientists and humanists deal with variety of such problems. Ancient philosophers like Socrates, Plato and Aristotle were not much concerned about the linguistic problem such as meaning generation and its relation to truth.

However philosophical enquiry from the very ancient period onwards reflects such problems of meaning and truth. Socrates asked the question what is virtue? To define right or wrong involves the meaning of the term. Aristotle's notion of the reality is also related to symbols. According to Aristotle written words are symbols for spoken words and spoken words are symbols for thought. In the ultimate analysis thoughts are images of things. Attempts to define the concept of a "true proposition" in a spoken language inevitably lead to antinomies. Plato's theory of ideas contains an implicit distinction between the meaning of an expression and its reference. The attempt to explain the basis of meaning in terms of the relationship between a word and the object it referred to by the term has a long tradition in philosophy.

The linguistic turn in modern philosophy commences with Descartes' fundamental question of all knowledge. "The instrument of examination was the methodological doubt which unmasked all traditional knowledge as ultimately unfounded and left no certainty except itself, the process of doubting."¹ The significance of Descartes' doubt lies in the new concept of knowledge which is the positive aspect and the end of this doubt.

The failure of Descartes' thinking is apparent in his realization that the scientific domains are characterized by an unprecedented internal consistency and a rigorous and progressive interrelatedness, but are at the same time without ultimate, scientifically explicit foundations. Hence the methodological doubt, which had made room for the new scientific enterprise was also, to provide a scientifically satisfactory foundation for the sciences. Descartes' arguments to this end failed historically in that the Cartesian foundation of the sciences was never accepted and developed in the way in which the sciences were. It failed historically as well as philosophically. The methodological doubt, which so effectively destructs our world, seemingly based on mere belief, cannot at all serve as an unshakable basis and origin for the reconstruction of an unassailable world.

Language is only incidentally a topic of Descartes' investigations. But the casual remarks on language that we do find complement the general outline of Descartes' philosophy, and additionally and more im-

portantly, they point out how the problem of language is connected with the significance and limitation of Descartes' thought.

“One would expect that an investigation of language would play an important part in those considerations of Descartes' *Meditations* where the unreliability of sense impressions is argued. For if sense impressions are irretrievably unreliable, then language with its common nouns and verbs illicitly leads us to believe that there are entities that exist as invariably and commonly as the words that we use in referring to them.”² Language for Descartes was not a peculiar or fundamental disclosure of reality, but merely a means for communicating or representing something real. In the Cartesian grammar and logic, what is to be explained is the way language presents and conjoins ideas. This formulation of the problem leads to great advance in grammatical theory because the troublesome problem of reality is divorced from grammar. The ideas are of themselves the tokens of reality. But on this view, the essential problem of how language can be the presence of reality is skipped and what remains is a formal system of combining units into larger wholes. As a rationalist philosopher Leibnitz follow the laws of logic. Leibnitz who regarded the laws of logic as absolute, held that *Truths of Reason* are true in all possible world, where as *truths of facts* are true only in some worlds. David Hume and Immanuel Kant made a similar distinction. Modern logic maintains this distinction without regarding it as absolute.

Almost every philosophical development of significance in the West since 1800 has been a response to Kant. The central problem of the *Critique of pure Reason* is the *a priori* and Kant dealt with it from the complementary perspectives of judgments and experience. He introduced an epistemological revolution with his theory of experience and unprecedented account of the *a priori*. Kant discovered the notion of synthetic a-priori judgments. Kant in his transcendental move shows that reality is not given readymade as either intangible units or objectively specifiable metaphysical elements. Reality is rather co-constituted by reason. He attains again a level where there is an original unity of reason and reality "in-to-fundamental-structure." But Kant's analysis fails to be truly radical since language remains untouched by, and unrelated to the analysis, which is in fact, guided and sustained by language. The early stages of logical positivism may be viewed as a development to the point of exhaustion of this aspects of Kant's original idea. Actually meanings had a more honourable ancestor within the field of traditional logic in the category of concepts or more generally, representations. "In one of the many aphorisms Quine aimed at the semantic tradition, he noted that meanings are what concepts become.....when wedded to the words."³

Our philosophic period is sometimes described as an age of analysis. The term 'analytic philosophy' is used in contemporary philosophy to cover the kind of analysis practiced by G.E.Moore. Moore's analysis

consists in the demands that we make explicit and become clear about some of our basic concepts even about the ordinary terms and words enough by their means. The contemporary analytic philosophy represents a shift from the issues of logic to that of linguistics. The contemporary analytic philosophy is dominated by attention to matters of semantics.

Gotlob Frege is considered as the founder of new logic. The modern logic has extended its investigation into a range of topics not explicitly recognized in the old logic. So with the contemporary logico-linguistic analysis we enter into a new realm of approach in philosophy. The present study is an endeavor to critically analyze the outcome of this new approach in philosophy especially in relation to post-structural understanding.

Most of the linguistic philosophers accept the referential theory of meaning. According to this theory, for any word to have a meaning is for it to name, designate or refer to something other than itself. However various theories differ over whether the meaning of a word is to be identified with (1) what it refers to (2) the relation between the word and its referent. The contemporary analytics explain the word-world relation on the basis of referential theory. In view of the difficulties with the first form of the referential theory the more careful versions identify the meaning of an expression with the relation between an expression and its referent. Every meaningful expression does refer to something. First

there are many classes of words including prepositions and conjunctions, which do not seem to be individually connected with the discriminable thing or aspects of things in the extra linguistic world as a name is connected with the thing named. Reference deals with the relationship between linguistic elements, words, sentence etc., and the non-linguistic world of experience.

Difference Between Meaning and Reference.

There is nothing to which meaning refers in the strict sense of reference. Two expressions can have the same referent but different meanings. Frege's theory of sense and reference, which comes under this consideration, and accordingly sense is to distinguish between two very different thought related aspects of meanings. Sense related to the complex system of relationship that holds between the linguistic elements themselves as it is concerned only with intra-linguistic relations. Frege's explanations regarding the morning star and evening star is the distinction between sense and reference. Anything to which we can refer can be referred to by a variety of non synonymous expression. Meaning can vary without a corresponding variation in referent. A certain meaning need not consists in referring to a certain object. Referential theorist has been troubled with the 'categorical' term. The referential theorist is using "reference" in a wider sense as a general type of word-world relation of which referring in the strict sense is only one special case, along with connoting, denoting etc. If to have a meaning is to refer

to something, then it must be possible to find a referent for every meaningful expression, including all sentences. If one holds the referential theory one must find a referent. Some thinkers have told that all true sentences have the same reference, which has been variously specified as existing universe as a whole and truth conceived as a single abstract entity. Most discussions of meaning in referential term suffer from superficiality as it fails to account for other possibilities of generating meaning and truth.

In modern philosophy of language, Bertrand Russell's analysis of theory of meaning play a major role. Russell's theory of description is considered as the analysable facts of meaning and truth in language philosophy. His discussion on every area is based on mathematical and logical foundation. Logical atomism is the guiding principle of Russell's linguistic analysis. The theory was not originally attached to any particular formalized language; though it was later incorporated into the *Principia Mathematica*. Still it manifests the spirit of ideal language philosophy as it was designed to resolve some Paradoxes of ordinary language through an explication of logical structure of the paradoxes, a structure that Russell claimed to be designed in ordinary language. The paradoxes result from phrases in ordinary language that seems to function like proper names and are recognizable by their form which is "the so-and-so" where "so-and-so" stands for some singular term. These phrases seem to describe some definite entity and are therefore called as definite description.

In order to understand the proper logical analysis of definite description according to Russell, first we must explicate more precisely the description between names and definite description, for it is our failure to see this distinction which is at the bottom of the puzzle. A name, Russell says, is a symbol directly designating an individual which is its meaning, and having this meaning in its own right, independently of the meanings of all other words. A definite description lack this autonomy and immediacy as they have meaning in a complex and dependent fashion which is brought out when we reflect on the general form of the contexts in which they can occur. These are two such contexts. The first asserts or denies existence of "the so-and-so", the second ascribe or denies some property to "the so-and-so".

"Russell seems to claim that definite descriptions are recognizable by their grammatical form. But the so-and-so is a form shared by expressions, which we would not call definite descriptions and mistake for names."⁴ If the difference between names and definite descriptions is granted according to Russell's intentions, another difficulty follows just from this difference. A name has its meaning, the bearer of the name, to understand the name is roughly to be acquainted with the thing named. A definite description has no separate meaning. On the other hand the proposition into which it is analyzed conveys meaning through its constituents and their configurations. We want to leave aside a question whether the difficulties is the theory of definite de-

description just discussed derive from limitations of that theory of definite description or from the way it was applied and illustrated by Russell. It is not easy to prove the claims Russell made for his theory.

Logical positivist like Moritz Schlick Rudolf Carnap, Hame Richenbach and A. J. Ayer explain meaning and truth by using logical analysis. Carnap urges a distinction between the questions that pertains to linguistic frame works as a whole and those that obtains within the frameworks. The external questions are of a practical nature and practically settled, ie. by the success or failure in practical use of the linguistic forms in questions. Speaking more directly to Carnap's positions, we must ask; in what type of language will we investigate, establish, and discuss "success or failure in practical use" and the convenience of our presently employed myth? Clearly this is the decisive question which the end decides the value of the internal questions and of our concern with canonical notations. But this Meta - theoretical problem is not only left unexplored, but is declared inaccessible and is thus occluded. The Meta - theoretical problem in turn failed to assert itself independently of corresponding meta language because words of themselves seemed inconceivable as the presence of things.

In analysis of meaning and truth Ludwig Wittgenstein's theory plays a major role in linguistic philosophy. He is considered as the author of linguistic turn although he confessed his indebtedness to Frege and Russell. He gave importance to the ordinary language. According to

him logic is arbitrary and all propositions have equal status. All propositions can be evaluated as true or false by a mechanical procedure i.e., the truth table method. According to Wittgenstein, Russell and Frege misunderstood the logic of other languages. Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus* pictures an ontological atomism. Wittgenstein's atomism is extreme because he took the notion of truth-values to the extreme. All sentences, which are true or false, can be reduced to elementary propositions in a language and analysed as true or false. Wittgenstein envisages that there is a structural identity or one to one relation between proposition and reality. For Wittgenstein there is one to one relation between proposition and facts and hence truth and false are positive and negative states. According to Wittgenstein quantifier logic is reducible to truth function. But logic does not give any procedure for quantification. Then Wittgenstein's system gives no decisive procedure for quantification.

The main discussions of early Wittgenstein revolve around the picture theory of language. The central question of *Tractatus* is that of the relationship of language and reality. "According to his ontology, the basic constituents of the world are not objects, but facts."⁵ The objects attain reality through their combination of facts. Language, in Wittgenstein's view, initially appears to be quite parallel to reality. A Name corresponds to, and has 'meaning' where it stands for object. They are however, just as unreal in isolation as objects are names that

properly have reference only in the context of propositions. Proposition corresponds to facts more specifically elementary propositions corresponds to atomic facts. Wittgenstein develops metaphysical social system from consideration of language and meaning in the *Tractatus*. "The metaphysical and linguistic doctrines, which he held during this period, are so essentially bound up with one another that neither can be understood in isolation from the other."⁶

When Wittgenstein's views regarding the connection of language and reality are considered, his thought becomes significant and systematically complicated. The common logic, according to Wittgenstein is exhibited, but not described and, in fact not describable. On Wittgenstein's account, there is at least a partial answer to this question. Language presents reality in being logically identical with reality. He is very explicitly concerned with the interrelation of reality, language and logic. Accordingly the problem of how language not only serves as a theme but also as a base of analysis is at least explicitly posed remains partially unsolved. But the *Tractatus* gives hints and outlines of arguments and demand and invite argument through its practice though not in its pronouncements.

Wittgenstein's presentation seems to be most rigorous and tangible where he elucidates the notion of atomic fact and atomic proposition. He proposed a level of compounds constituted of irreducible and necessary elements and it is just on this level that the striking struc-

tural identity of language and reality becomes apparent. But Wittgenstein never gives an example of either an object or a name, a fact or a proposition. For Wittgenstein ordinary language and scripts obscure the basic elements and configurations of which they consist. The analysis and notation of symbolic logic are not perfect.

The present explication of the picture theory of language leads to an impasse. This may be due to the narrow and literal cast of the explication. Wittgenstein nourishes this suspicion through his refusal to give more than suggestive examples of instances of a logically perfect language and through his contention that ordinary language is logically perfect though in a complicated and concealed manner. A logically perfect language, not sharing this concealment would be the perspicuous language. If names are said to have reference by convention, the function of the names is not so much explained as it is made a problem because one wants to know how the assignment is made and what sustains and guarantees the representative power of a name. But this unsolved problem one might say, is better than a spurious solution to it. A picture theory of the name would in fact be spurious. It would explain the referential power of a name through the likeness of name and object, but likeness is always counteracted by crudeness or by a duplicative tendency. Pictures of themselves are referentially ambiguous or indifferent. A picture requires a relating instruction that tells us how and to what extent to relate some entity pictorially to another. Thus a

map has an arrow, a scale and a legend. But these are again pictures, requiring relational instructions and so on ad-infinitum. For Wittgenstein of the *Tractates*, the logic of the perspicuous language was also and already the logic of reality. Here early Wittgenstein endeavours to show in a rigorous way by rendering reality and especially language perspicuous.

Wittgenstein's latter writings are entirely different from his earlier thinking. His earlier ideas are theoretical. But latter Wittgenstein was practical. According to early Wittgenstein meaning is determinate and depended on truth condition. In *Philosophical Investigation*, which was published posthumously, Wittgenstein says that meaning is determined by use. He changes his early position and he is more concerned with the pragmatic aspects of language. *Philosophical Investigation* holds that language is an autonomous system having no relation with external reality. The prevailing attitude later crystallized in to a slogan "Don't look for the meaning look for the use". The background of this attitude is a pragmatic view of the nature of language.

The philosophical concept of meaning has its place in a primitive idea about the way in which, language functions. But one can also say that it is the idea of a language more primitive than ours. The term 'language-game' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life. "A word has no meaning if nothing corresponds to it. It is important to note that

the word "meaning" is being used illicitly if it is used to signify the thing that 'corresponds' to the word."⁷

In our failure to understand the use of a word we take it as the expression of a queer process. "To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to be master of a technique."⁸ According to Wittgenstein the meaning of a word is not the experience one has in hearing or saying it, and the sense of the sentence is not a complex of such experience. The sentence is composed of the words and that is enough. Wittgenstein says that our paradox is that no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. If everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here. According to him on the bases of this there is some misunderstanding that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after another as if each one contented us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another standing behind it. This shows that there is a way of grasping a rule, which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call 'obeying the rule' and going against it is actual cases.

For Wittgenstein sentence as an instrument. Its sense and its employment, are to mean something, it is not having a dead picture (of any kind).⁹ But there are many significant differences in Wittgenstein

and his followers' analysis; one thing is that it is an attempt to locate the meaning of an expression in some realm of being or other. For another they stress the diversity of uses of language and hence are protected against such over simplification as that language is always used to convey information or that every meaningful expression function as a "sign" of something. Finally the theory has focused on the behavior of the speaker as the place to look for use of language.

According to Wittgenstein, "using language is playing language games."¹⁰ Speaking a language is engaging in certain modes of behavior that exhibits a variety of abilities or skills. It is to engage in what Wittgenstein calls 'forms of life'. For latter Wittgenstein words are not pictures, but pieces used in various language-games in which it figures, the kind of behavior in which its use is embedded. An expression has meaning and derives meaning from-these modes of behavior. He says that words have meaning only as 'pieces' in the language-games which are their original home. According to Wittgenstein philosophical problems arises as and when "language goes on holidays". Words are often used in the context of practical activity, in situations in which non-linguistic behavior plays an essential part-impure language games. Wittgenstein focuses his attention on such language-game.

Wittgenstein's account is just inapplicable to the use of words in pure language-games and hence is of only limited interest. The words that are used undoubtedly have meaning and yet they are not woven

into any pattern of nonlinguistic behavior. A person who has mastered the uses of the words in both pure and impure language games has a greater and deeper understanding of the meaning of the words than a person who has mastered them only in impure language game. Wittgenstein says that the meaning of a word is its use in the language. He speaks not only of the meaning of a word, but also of the sense of a sentence as consisting in its use. The meaning of a word is what is explained by the explanation of the meaning. ie. if you want to understand the use of the word 'meaning' look for what are called explanations of meaning.

Wittgenstein's identification of meaning and use leads him to speak of the meaning of proper names and even of their definitions, but in so speaking he is simply misusing the words, meaning and definitions. Those two words are not used, as a rule, in connection with proper names. Wittgenstein has committed a mistake by identifying the meaning of a word with its use in the language.

The examination of various semantical questions about reference and truth belonging to the sphere of philosophical logic is associated with recent development in formal logic and linguistic. W.V.N Orman Quine, P.F.Strawson, Soul Kripke, Donald Davidson, Michael Dummett are all under this category. Quine's major contribution lies in rejection of traditional dualism of synthetic analytic distinction and reductionism. Quine says that the traditional method of identifying analytic state-

ment is unsuccessful. Since in appealing to the notion of synonymy it makes use of a concept that is first as unclear and in need of further analysis as in the original case of analyticity. Synonymous depends on how people use it. Demerits of synonyms is that no two words have exactly the same meaning. Different words may have the same meaning and that the same word may have different meaning. Quine Writes, "For all it's a-priori reasonableness, a boundary between analytical and synthetic statements simply has not been drawn. That there is such a distinction to be drawn at all in an unempirical dogmas as of the empiricist, a metaphysical article of truth. According to Quine we accept the truth of a statement as well as the grounds upon which we may first reject or modify our claims to know truth. In determining the truth and our knowledge of truth we should not consider an individual sentence, taken simply and apart from its interrelations with other statements in a total network or web of belief. Quine insists that by using a formal language, we can tell exactly where and to what this language is ontologically committed. But this does not of itself determine what it is that warrants an ontological commitment.

P.F.Strawson's philosophical career begins actually with his attention towards philosophy of logic and philosophy of language. According to Strawson, Russell's theory of description misrepresented the true character and function of the phrase 'the so-and-so'. Strawson in his logical theorems points out the illusion of formal logic. According to

him formal logic is a kind of idealized abstraction. A theory of meaning is generally believed to be an account to show how words and sentence in a language get going as meaningful expression. To know the meaning of a sentence of a language is to be at least partially equipped to understand how any serious utterance of it by a particular speaker in a particular context is to be taken. He asks what is it for anything to have a meaning at all, in the way or in the sense in which words or sentence or signals have meaning. In one of his writings named 'meaning and Truth' Strawson discussed a certain conflict more or less dimly discernible in current approaches to these questions. According to Strawson the correspondence theory of truth required not purification, but elimination. He says that we cannot be satisfied with an adequate general understanding of the notion of meaning unless we are satisfied that we have an adequate general understanding of the notion of truth. In the problem of truth the philosopher's concern is to elucidate a certain general type of discourse, must stand back from language and talk about the different ways in which utterance are related to the world. But the occurrence in ordinary discourse of the words 'true', 'fact' etc. signalize without commenting on the occurrence of a certain use of language. When we use these words in ordinary life we are talked within a certain frame of discourse.

Strawson argues that sentence can be meaningful or meaningless and yet cannot strictly be characterized as true or false. State-

ments which are made by using sentences and at the same time distinct from sentences are or can be either true or false. Strawson criticizes the semantic theory of truth and proposes an alternative analysis to the effect that true does not describe any semantic properties. Speaking the truth is not a manner of speaking, it is saying something true. As a common sense logician, he rejected the formal logic and accepted the conclusion that there is no logical truth in the strict sense. His assertion is to pay more attention to language than logic as is implied in the following words, "we know nothing of human language unless we understand human speech."¹¹As an ordinary language philosopher he criticizes some kind of reductionist programme.

Some philosophers hold that meaning and meaningfulness are prior conditions for describing truth. Unless we know what some statement means we cannot even begin to inquire into or try to establish whether it is true or false. The logical positivists mainly centred upon the problem of meaning and the criterion of meaningfulness. Logical positivists apply verification theory to find out meaning and truth. On the one hand they are interested in the method of sciences as the only reliable way of giving the truth and on the other hand they are interested in pointing out what often passes for a statement of factual truths turn out to lack all possibility of being empirically confirmed or disconfirmed. The interests of the positivists in the problem of meaning and then it is linked with the broader methodological question of ana-

lyzing the logic of science as well as seeking to eliminate what they regard as the superior truth claims to be found in metaphysical speculative systems of thought.

Logical analysis of meaning and truth

Most of the contemporary philosophers analyses language only from a logical point of view. Alfred Tarski and Rudolf Carnap considered semantics and truth could be eliminated only in logical way. So for them meaning and truth applies only to formal language and mathematics. They ignored natural language and speech act theory. Tarski proposed for a formal language constructed by logical definition. He who refers the term "truth" to the semantics of object language requires the semantic to be formulated in a special meta language, whereby it becomes impossible to state the paradox. The term meaning is employed by Rudolf Carnap as a proposed explanation of analyticity. The idea is that we can lay down a logical connection as a postulate governing the two predicates of the synonymous sentences. Carnap says that the analyticity is then exhibited as a logical consequence of a conventions that we have adopted.

Importance of Natural Language

Another linguistic philosopher Donald Davidson formulated a theory of truth criticizing the theory of Tarski. Davidson says that Tarski's T-Schema can be applied into formal logic and mathematics. All phi-

losophers have been forgetting to apply truth and meaning in naturalized language which we speak. Donald Davidson's truth conditions are applied into natural language. According to Davidson truth condition gives the meaning of a sentence. To know the meaning of a sentence is to know under what conditions that sentence as a whole to be true. Davidson's theory of truth is known as 'homophonic theory'. Homophonic means 'same language'. According to Davidson when sentences are translated into same language then we get the truth of that sentence.

Practical Use of Language

Many of the definitions and methods about meaning and truth show that their explanations are only an academic level of explanation and they adopt rules and conventions. All of them considered theoretical use while many others neglected practical use of it. While we understand theoretical notion of meaning and truth we are neglecting pragmatic, contextual and communicative aspects of their uses. According to communication theorist meaning and its cognates are essentially relevant to an understanding of language. The communication theorists say that it is impossible to give an adequate account of the meaning without reference to the possession of the intentions of audience. The theorists of transformational grammar like Noam Chomski also developed a grammatical structure of a sentence of a deep structure and surface structure and these deep and surface structure gave meaning to the sentence.

Chomski says that our command of syntax does not primarily results from empirical data. This is not only apparent from immediate constituent analysis where, the analysis is not a discovery of previously unknown structures, but the articulation of a competence that is present at the very inception of the analysis. Chomsky assigns only a subordinate importance to the question of performance regarding the sequence in which the syntactic, semantic and phonological components of a grammar cooperate. According to Chomsky a proper understanding of language will importantly advance our understanding of the human mind. "Chomsky has tried to argue more specifically that there are rules of grammar not explicable by the demands of efficiency which rules may, therefore, be typical and indicative of the nature of man's mind."¹² Chomsky thinks that it is possible and advisable to bracket the problem of embodiment, i.e. the problem of linguistic ontology.

Some philosophers like J.L.Austin and Grice accepted the speech act theory of language. Austin's speech act theory is based on three terms. Locutionary acts, illocutionary acts and perlocutionary acts. Like Austin Wittgenstein, was convinced that many philosophical problems resulted from a misunderstanding and misuse of ordinary language. But in addition to this, his investigations were motivated by the realization that ordinary language. The standards of all 'speech' was in itself a region of great surprises and gratifying discoveries.

Austin's most important discovery is the distinction between constative and performative sentences. "Constative sentences are those that state a fact. Where the distinctions between language and reality is made in a facile manner, language appears primarily as a reflection of reality and a constative is then the paradigm of language."¹³

The Structure of Language

The systematic account of language does not tell one what would constitute an exemplary realization of the possibilities determined in their full extension by the systematic account. Since the possibilities are infinite the ideal grammar tells nothing about a particular piece of language in its particularity. The account given by the ideal grammar seems unsurpassable complete and yet the account is unintelligible unless we acknowledge additional features and force of language which have always and already interacted with those described by the ideal grammar.

At the beginning of this century Ferdinand de Saussure took a decisive step in providing a model for the organization of the language. He recognized that language is not only quantitatively prevalent in everyday talk, but is present in such talk as a finally balanced and self-sufficient system. "Common speech is not just the rough prelude or the incept sequel to literature nor it is merely the source of materials for historical investigations; it is rather at every point in time a fully devel-

oped and adequate system of signs in a society. To become aware of this, one must rigorously exclude the historical perspective and look at language, as it exists at one moment.”¹⁴ Saussure called this static or systematic approach towards language, as it exists at a particular time as misleadingly ‘synchronic’ while the investigation of the changes of language through time, he called, ‘diachronic’. In an era where every linguistic feature spoke eloquently of its past to every linguistic it required great effort and ingenuity to resist the historical pull and exhibit language in its temporal and systematic way.

Saussure begins with a consideration of whole phenomenon of language in terms of two fundamental dimensions, which it exhibits, that of *Langue* and *Parole*. The distinction between *Langue* and *Parole* is more or less that which pertains between the abstract language system and the individual utterance made by the speakers of language in concrete everyday situations, which we call speech. *Langue* stands for rule whereas *Parole* stands for speech act. So it is the differentiation between the functional and nonfunctional. Here the distinction between rule and behaviour becomes crucial to any study concerned with the production of communication of meaning. As Jonathan Culler shows, in the case of Social and cultural phenomena the rule is always at some distance from actual behavior and the gap is a space of potential meaning.¹⁵ The nature of language lies beyond, and determines, the nature of each manifestation of parole, yet it has no concrete existence of its own, except in the piecemeal manifestation that speech effects.

For Saussure, in the total linguistic phenomenon, speech has two aspects (1) the immediately observable and recordable linguistic activity of speakers, that is speech (2) abstract system which underlies and is the same in all acts of speaking but is explicitly present in none of them, that is language in the concise sense which is the proper object of linguistics. Saussure never denied the significance of historical investigations, but rightly insisted on the priority of the synchronic approach. We must be clear about what language is in itself before we can securely establish what language is in its historical development. Thus Saussure secured the important systematic insight, which was a matter of course to the classical and Sanskrit grammarians as well as to the inventors of the phonetic alphabet. But the methodological soundness of the linguistic pioneer was in part the result of lack of historical and insert linguistic sophistication, Saussure regained their approach in the midst of the diversified and distracting historical material.

Saussure thus laid the foundation for a remarkable development in linguistics. The new approach was freed from the historical bias and permitted accent to the structure of language. It was freed from the preoccupation with literature and the attendant exercise of linguistic value judgments, instead it insisted on the description of language, as it exists immediately and predominantly. This is called descriptive or structural approach.

The immediate constituent structure of a sentence is nothing but a schematic representation of the knowledge that we somehow possess regarding the coherence of that sentence. The syntax of descriptive linguistics is not even able to reflect all the explicit insights that we naively possess. We know that for most sentences in the active mood, there is semantically never equivalent one in the passive mood.

According to Saussure language often inheres not in 'the material substance of words' but in the larger and abstract 'system of signs' of which those words are bearers. In fact signs and their relations are one what linguistic studies and the nature of both the signs and the relationship between them is also seen to be structural. The linguistic sign can be characterized in terms of the relationship, which Saussure's work made famous, signifier and signified. As Saussure says 'any subject in order to be discussed must have reasonable basis'. But the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign is not 'reasonable' and so it cannot be discussed in the sense that we cannot profitably consider to debate its adequacy. Language is self-defining, and so whole and complete. It is capable of undergoing transformation within itself. These capacities exist precisely because it allows no single, unitary appeal to reality beyond itself.

If all aspects of language are thus 'based on relations' two dimensions must assume particular importance. Saussure presents these as linguistic sign's Systematic (historical) relations, and its simulta-

neous 'associates' (vertical) relations. Each word has a linear or horizontal relationship with the words that precede and succeed it. Language must finally be judged to be a 'form and not a substance'. It is a structure, which has modes rather than aggregate of items which has content. The sameness and difference partly provide for its fruitful distinction between *Langue* and *Parole*, structure and individual events.

Binary Concepts of Language

Roman Jakobson postulates two general linguistic notions to focus on the particular character of language. The notion of polarities and the notion of equivalence. Jakobson's observation is that the two major and binary opposed component discords seems to be strikingly related to the two basic rhetorical figures, metaphor and metonymy. Jakobson considers metaphor and metonymy as the characteristic modes of binary opposed polarities by which linguistic signs are formed. The given utterance is a combination of the constituent parts. The messages are constructed, as Saussure said by a combination of 'horizontal' movement, which select the particular words from the available inventory, or inner 'store house' of the language. The opposition between metaphor and metonymy, there fore may be said to represent in effect the essence of the total opposition between the synchronic mode of language and its diachronic mode.

A.J.Greimas attempts to account for verbal meaning of all kinds. He introduced a method of structural analysis, which provides rules

and concepts to account for the meaning produced when they combine in sentences or in complete texts. Greimas also establishes his theory with the study of literary texts. Accordingly in every story or whatever uttered we get a conceptual map of possible features of the world, independent of any language, and the actual groupings of these features consist in the words and sentences of the language. The plan of immance consists of minimal semantic features or 'semes' which are the result of oppositions. (Male/female, young/old, man/animal, heaven/earth etc). Any semantic theory will require a hierarchically organized set of semantic features. He states that for any two lexical items that differ in meaning there must be one or more semes, which account for that difference.

C.S.Peirce, the American pragmatist is considered as the founder of Semiotics. He has proposed a complex system of signs precisely in terms of the different relationship, each manifested between 'signifier' and 'signified'. For Peirce, "Logic can be seen as 'the science of general necessary laws of signs'"¹⁶. Logic – a sign of representation is something, which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It is something which determines something else (its interpretant) to refer to an object to which itself refers (its objects). A sign thus stands for something as its objects. It stands for something to somebody in some respect. The terms representation, object, interpretant and ground can thus be seen to refer to the means by which the sign that is a signifier.

In these kinds of relation as Peire argues, normally there are three elements, sign, object and ground. These three kinds of triadic structures or trichotomies are 1. Triadic relation of comparison. 2. Triadic relation of performance involving actual entities in the real world, based on the kind of ground and 3. triadic relations of thought based on the kind of object.

Peirce goes on to propose various possible combination of these types of sign are described. These three types again classified into various kinds of signs. Peirce argues that, the framework for the existence of knowledge derives from the assertion of propositions through second kind of signs : icon, index and symbol.

The Icon is the relationship between sign and object, a signifier and signified, a similarity or fitness of resemblance proposed by the signs, to be characterized by the receiver. Thus a diagram or a painting has an iconic relationship to its subject in so far as it resembles it. The index is the relationship between concrete or actual and usually of a sequential causal kind. The pointing finger is a signifier whose relationship to its signified is indexical in mode. In the symbol the relationship between signifier and signified is arbitrary, it requires the active, presence of the interpretant to make the signifying connection.

Phenomenological Background of Theories of Meaning and Truth

For Husserl, the telos of rationality was objective knowledge, knowledge of a world and he could not rest content with a mere subjec-

tive or even a purely logical self-evidence, but on the other hand, he insisted upon self-evidence as the goal of phenomenological reflection. Phenomenology is absolutely free from presuppositions, which would simply describe consciousness precisely as it is, and objects only given to consciousness. There is no appearing of an object without an experience within which it appears, so there is no experience without an object of which is experience. The category of 'objectivity' and of evidence are thus, Husserl says 'perfect correlates'. The objectivity is a unity of specific kind which is precisely correlative to a possible experience of corresponding kind.

It seems that objects appear only in experience. But what is given to consciousness is given 'as what it is' with the specific 'sense' or meaning which is appropriate to the type of objectivity. If what is experience has the sense that is transcendent being then it is experiencing itself that constitutes sense.

Thus what is 'outside' is given as part of the 'inside' yet not as an actual or real material objects, but as the sense 'material object'. This means that to retain the phenomenological 'view point' in which the problem of transcendence is resolved, we must leave behind 'natural standpoint' which science and the common man share.

Phenomenology, as a reflection upon this natural consciousness, seeks merely to describe what is evident. Thus phenomenological reflection suspends or 'brackets' the existence and puts out of action

the thesis or judgment that things exist, and reflects on the 'experience of a live' by which the thesis is posited, yet without itself positing anything concerning the being of the objects, of the experiences it reflects upon. Phenomenology as 'bracketing out' of existence in itself and of phenomenal hags and therefore to the definition of being and meaning such is the purpose of 'reduction'. The thing is reduced to the meaning and it 'offers' to consciousness. Consequently phenomenology is a form of 'idealism' and has sometimes been accused of having become, with the reduction nothing more than ordinary 'subjectivism'. But object – as – perceived, contains as part of its sense or object as perceived. It is an objective world. Thus phenomenology subtends both realism and idealism as they originally have been conceived.

According to phenomenology everything that exists must be capable of being described as the meaning offered by the lived through by someone or other. Husserl says that lived experience is the origin of Truth.

All these theories show that the linguistic definition of meaning and truth cannot be closed as determinate. Philosophers used to explain meaning and truth at their own convenience. In contemporary modern linguistic philosophy, the explanation or definition of meaning and truth is going on in many ways. The contemporary linguistic philosopher's incapability lies in their failure to give a strict sense of definition. The problem of indeterminacy of meaning and truth is a domi-

nant discourse in our present day. However some of the great philosophers of the present world with postmodern outlook in art and literature present a new picture of reality and an entirely new logic of disintegration. A very turning point in the development of philosophical thinking commences with the post-structural approach towards meaning and truth. From the new approach myriad of thinking processes have evolved in philosophy as well as culture criticism.

Postmodernism and Post Structuralism

Postmodernism emerged as a significant cultural, political and intellectual phenomena that define our era. Now it is widely admitted that Postmodernism has several intellectual and economic manifestations. So there are postmodernisms of politics rather than one postmodernism.

Modernism thought compulsively about the new and tried to watch its coming into being, but postmodernism looks for breaks, for the event rather than new worlds, for the telltale instant after which it is no longer the same for the "when it - all changed", as Gibson puts it, or better still, for shifts and irrevocable changes in the representation of things and of the way they changes. The moderns were interested in what was likely to come such changes and their general tendency. They thought about the things itself, substantively in utopian or essential fashion. Post modernism is more formal in that sense, and more distracted, it only clocks the variations themselves and knows only too well that the contents are just more images.

As for postmodernism, Fredric Jameson has not tried to systematize a usage or to impose any conveniently coherent thumbnail meaning, for the concept is not merely contested, it is also internally conflicted and contradictory. According to him "Postmodernism is not something we can settle once and for all and then use with clear conscience. The concept, if there is no one, has to come up the end and not at the beginning, of our discussion of it"¹⁷

According to Fredric Jameson High modernism is credited with the destruction of the fabric of the traditional city and its older neighbourhood culture, while the prophetic elitism and authoritarianism of the modern movement are remorselessly identified in the imperious gesture of the charismatic master. Postmodern becomes little more than the form taken by the authentically modern in our own period, and the mere dialectical intensification of the old modernist impulse toward innovation.

According to Jameson, "In postmodern culture "culture" has become a product in its own right and the market has become a substitute for itself and fully as much a commodity as any of the items it includes within itself. Postmodernism is the consumption of sheer commodification as a process."¹⁸ The 'life-style' of the superstate therefore stands in relationship to Marx's "fetishism" of commodities as the most advanced monotheism to primitive animations or the most rudimentary idol worship, indeed, any sophisticated theory of the postmodern ought to bear something of the same relationship.

Economic preparation of postmodernism or late capitalism began in 1950s, after the wartime shortages of consumer goods and spareparts had been made up, and new products and new technologies could be pioneered. On the otherhand, the psychic habits of the new age demands the absolute break, strengthened by a generational rupture, achieved more properly in the 1960. For Jameson, the term late capitalism has very different overtones. According to him no one particularly notices the expansion of the state sector and bureaucratization any longer, it seems a simple 'natural' fact of life.

While postmodernism as the protagonists of the same claim is used to identify certain stage in the history of civilization, at least in the West. As Jameson claims, it is used in order to have a cognitive mapping of the world. So if the claim is accepted it becomes a hand mark in culture. At the same time the changes in the realm of economy and culture has brought for the changes in the sphere of theory also. These changes are visible in the writings of Lyotard, Jameson, Rorty, Derrida, Baudrillard and many others.

The period of modernity expressed deep rooted faith in a kind of correspondence theory and accepted the notion of determined meaning. In France Levi-Strauss and early Barthes exhibited their faith in modernity by formulating semiotic and structural studies. For them the encoded meaning is inherent in every sign and there by the every text. Post-structuralism evolved as a counter measure to structuralist

project of correspondence theory. Post-structuralism asserts that the thinkers of structuralism simply followed the traditional phonocentric path. Post-structuralism claims that the sign is not a vehicle which carries a definite meaning. In this regard Roland Barthe himself had switched over to the new awareness in his later writings especially, with his *Death of the author*.

For Post-structuralists the notion of the deep structure and surface structure only helps to evade the real problems. Post-structuralism seeks truth on the surface, periphery and margins. In other words like Budha who saw truth in the process of becoming poststructuralists see truth in the day to day exchanges. Accordingly signs are used not to impart one and only one meaning. On the other hand linguistic signs makes discourse that gives certain meaning and fails to give certain other meaning. The meaning and truth of the discourses are determined by the reader and not the author. So we may have different meanings and truths as and when we read a text.

Post modernism and Post-structuralism are closely related. It doesn't mean that they are the same. While Derrida is a post-structuralist, for instance, he doesn't want to be identified with the postmodernism. So postmodernism on the one hand involves several different arguments post-structuralism in general shares the common view that the meaning and truth of any text depends upon the discourse of which it is a part. In addition to this post structuralism shares

in common that meaning and truth need not be one and the same for all readers since they read within different cultural contexts. So an enquiry into the prominent post structural thinkers like Lyotard, Rorty and Derrida alone can pave way for a better understanding of their arguments.

Nowadays western philosophy is moving towards a post metaphysical phase in philosophy. Metaphysics believes that it can reduce the problems of the world as a whole in to a single principle. The Question of the identity of the one and the many emerges from the Platonic doctrine of ideas onwards. Lyotard and Derrida are the most important French thinkers who put forward vehement criticism, against the unitary principle of metaphysics Lyotard in his *Postmodern condition* brings forth a kind of radical contextualism with a view to question the rising 'incredulity' towards metanarratives" on the other hand Derrida brings forth deconstructive strategy in order to question the basic assumptions of philosophy and literature which according to him is "logocentrism"- Richard Rorty formulates a kind of pragmatic contextualism to avoid "every idealization" and it leads to an ethnocentric standpoint. These great thinkers of the contemporary world provokes an entirely new way of philosophizing.

A critical inquiry into the problem of indeterminacy of meaning and truth by the above mentioned philosophers is very important in the present world. Derrida's critique of Husserl is a very important piece of

analytic work in the philosophy of language. In this work Derrida questions the Husserlian 'a-priori' rules which prescribe the conditions under which a linguistic utterance can be unified. Hence in his critique of Husserl, Derrida even questions the distinction between sign and a reality and thereby establishes a philosophy of indeterminacy of the Meaning and Truth. Jean-François Lyotard also poses the same question of indeterminacy. Lyotard writes speculative or humanist philosophy is forced to relinquish its legitimating duties, which explains why philosophy is facing a crisis wherever it persists in interrogating such functions and is reduced to the study of system of logic.

Richard Rorty also argues that Truth does not signify the correspondence between statement and some 'x' prior to all interpretation. Truth accordingly is simply an expression of commendation. Indeterminacy and contextualism are becoming the leading spirit of the times. It is the reflections of a "functionally differential society." The question of determine truth and meaning is at the bottom of all philosophical investigations. The proposed theses undertakes a critical inquiry with the question of indeterminacy of meaning and truth in the philosophy of Derrida, Lyotard and Rorty.

Postmodernism has emerged as a significant cultural, political and intellectual force that defines our era. Definitions of postmodernism range from eclectics, and montage to new skepticism and anti-rationalism anti-foundationalism. Postmodernism has consistently challenged

our understanding of unity, subjectivity, epistemology, aesthetics, ethics, history and politics. Postmodernist thinkers investigated ways in which the manifestation of any presence depends upon the differential movement; presence is not possible apart from absence. This necessity of absence to presence disallows that presence be original or full. Postmodern epistemological shift subverts the metaphysics of presence, consequently the subversion of accepted standards of culture and philosophy problematises the existence of Supernatural unitary nature of subjectivity etc. Within the framework of postmodernist discourse, deconstruction has come to play an important role. "Merleau Ponty's reading of Saussure and the linking up of phenomenology with semiology was the first indication of a new way of thinking about modernism."¹⁹

Jacques Derrida's work is a critical engagement with phenomenology and structuralism. The major oppositional philosophical discourse commencing from his critique of structuralism paved the way for a paradigm shift. He is often placed within the leanage of Nietzsche, Husserl Heideger, Freud, Saussure and Immanuel Levinas. Derrida addresses some of the main questions relating to the nature of language and to human knowledge, the possibility of truth, the determination of being and the legitimation of philosophy as an episteme.

Though Derrida is highly critical of any 'posts' and 'ism' what is more of any attempt, to stabilize under a label what he perceives in

terms of movements. His works need to be appreciated within the wider postmodern critique of the modern enlightenment tradition as a critique which is primarily the dialogue of this tradition with itself. Derrida's interventions in the post modern debate concerning the dialogue of this tradition with itself. Derrida's interventions in the postmodern debate concerning the value of enlightenment logos consist then, an invitation to rethink it from a position other than the ones it has sanctioned: a call, in other words to re-inscribe it in a language which parts its mastery at stake by forcing it to acknowledge its limits. This is in fact, the operation of what Derrida calls deconstruction. Though the term exceeds the specific context in which Derrida employs it and has repeatedly been misconstrued as an assault against all forms of reasoning, deconstruction is an achieve movement which, by chasing meaning to its aporias demonstrates its dependence on that irreducible alterity which refuses its further passage. In his early work *Of Grammatology*, Derrida examines the history of writing and thereby shows that logocentrism is a highly specific historical formulation which cannot be perceived in isolation from Western ethnocentrism and the project of colonization.

In *Of Grammatology*, Derrida explains that Western thought sees presence as the meaning of being in general and the presence, signifies the presence of things, temporal presence as a point in time, presence as true essence and self presence as consciousness in the Cartesian

sense. Hence for Derrida Heidegger's analysis of temporality in *Being and Time* comes close to a deconstruction of the metaphysics of Presence, but in the end only sketches the boundaries of the onto-theology.

Logocentrism refers to the privilege of speech over writing, but it also refers to the notion that words, ideas and systems have fixed meanings rooted in the authorizing presence of some centre or speaker. Derrida's early works deconstruct these binaries between speech and writing, presence and absence. Unlike Heidegger, Derrida, draws on the structuralist linguistic of Saussure who points out that language is a system of differences. Hence unlike thinkers in the hermeneutical tradition, Derrida's view is that language as a system, a structure that is in some sense produces subjects. Logocentric thought privileges speech because when speech occurs speaker is present to clarify, edit, and explain the meaning of the spoken words. Western thought favours speech over writing because the presence of the speaker insures the transference of the proper, unadulterated meaning of speech. Where as writing and absence are open to the proliferation or dissemination of words uncontrolled, polyvalent meanings. Derrida finds logocentrism even in Saussure. But he uses the notion of language as system of focus on the erasure of presence. At the same time for a post structuralist like Derrida this system is never an immutable or monolithic one.

In Derrida's analysis language cites past meanings and contents, but in its citation language also repeats and alters the past by relating

old meanings to current citation and interaction that is altered as it is spoken, changed as it recurs. This process is what Derrida refers to as the logic of the supplement. We cannot stand outside of language as self-present, Cartesian subject because we have always already produced by language and re-producing language, always citing, interacting and supplementing it. That is as much as language constructs subjects continually alter and fragment language. Derrida goes on to explain that language is a system that precedes the subject, then all communication is based on the citational, structure of writing. For deconstruction, writing refers not merely to that which is written on a page but to any differential trace of writing. It seeks the trace which is absent but capable of producing meaning.

The same indeterminacy is pictured in Lyotard's philosophy. Lyotard's central concern in the text, the crisis of legitimation, comes to define the postmodern condition. His declared war on "grand narrative" initiates a neo-sceptical re-appraisal of knowledge, aesthetics, and politics in a post-enlightenment era. In his book *Postmodern condition* Lyotard directly and indirectly critiques a range of philosophical perspectives on the issue of knowledge which he argues is made possible through an appeal to universal narratives, a feature of enlightenment progressive purporting to resolve the perceived problem of difference. Postmodernism as described by Lyotard is rejection of that appeal to universality and its subsequent resolution of difference by imposition of

rule governing phrases. By maintaining difference as radical heterogeneity through the invocation of little narratives. That do not claim or appeal to universality, Lyotard offers a politico aesthetics philosophy that prevents totalization and univocity in art and politics. In the 1980's Lyotard's view on the postmodern condition drew criticism from various ideological positions for its perceived sympathy for the logic of late capitalism and its attending exploitative practices. The Marxist literary critic Fredric Jameson, in his famous preface to the *Post modern condition* makes clear his suspicion of the rejection of appeal to universality. While it can be argued that Lyotard's writings take issues with grand narratives, it also argued that this procedure is not merely oppositional. Lyotard does not propose a counter metanarratives to those offered via the so-called incomplete project of enlightenment rather he disassembles the appeal to universality under writings these grand narratives. In other words, Lyotard calls into question an insistence on a metaphysical necessity vis-a-vis language that is the prominent feature of all(post) enlightenment grand narratives, including Marxism, Capitalism, Feminism and psychoanalysis.

Coming out of the Anglo-American analytic philosophical tradition, Richard Rorty has been the most significant mediators between analytical and continental philosophers. Richard Rorty argues that philosophy does not describe or investigate a real world but it is rather engaged in an ongoing process of pragmatic redescription and herme-

neutics conversation. His work addresses the field of philosophy, literary theory, hermeneutics, political philosophy and the philosophy of science. Rorty claims that language goes all the way down and his anti-foundationalism leads him to stress the historical situatedness of our philosophical conversations over the efforts to secure an universal, a historical truth Rorty's central idea, repeats the objection of nineteenth-century idealists to the correspondence theory of truth that there is no access, except through other beliefs to the facts in correspondence to which the truth of our beliefs is supposed to consist. Rorty's most of the theories are closely related to the social philosopher like Habermas. Rorty thinks of Jacques Derrida as the most intriguing and ingenious of contemporary philosophers and of Jorgen Hebermas as the most socially useful- the one who does the most for social democratic politics. Rorty's strategy will be to urge that Derrieda and Habermas complement rather than oppose each other.

Habermas is the most important critic of post-structural developments. He argues in favour of the project of modernity. So he says that metaphysical thinking, the linguistic turn, situating reason and overcoming logo centrism are among the most important motive forces of philosophizing in the twentieth century. The linguistic turn of philosophy paved the way for post metaphysical thinking. Yet in many of its manifestation the philosophy of language is still wedded to the very metaphysical figures of thought it sought to overcome. By metaphysical

he means the philosophical pretension to penetrate appearance and arrive at knowledge of reality, which is ontologically superior to, and epistemologically more certain than appearance.

As to the end of metaphysics we find that Marx, Hebermas and Foucault react to the theme by elaborating each in their own way, a political philosophy which is consciously developed as a response to the end of metaphysics. Habermas' enlightenment thinking undertakes a critique of the over-reliance on a subject centered epistemological paradigm. His aim is to reformulate the transcendental paradigm theory that retains the commitment to values of truth, critique and rational consensus. In so far as Foucault's notion of metaphysics, it exhibits that the notion of metaphysics appears as a kind of narcissism by which the dispersion of history is overcome in the form of a teleologically finalised totality. In detail the theory of language and meaning which seems to play a central role in Habermas' later writings. According to Habermas meaning may not be understood in an objectifying attitude, since this would reduce language to noise and behavior to physical motion.

For Habermas, language cannot reveal the world, and in as much as the condition of a true statement can never be established, truth must be displaced to a telos lying at the end of an infinite discussions. Further more the equation of language with validity claims installs Habermas within the radical opposition between relativism and

an absolutism, mercifully differed into an indefinite future. Also in as much as language equals validity claims, it must be either true or false. Habermas defense of a post metaphysical universalism has often been explicitly and emphatically directed against relativistic and ethnocentric brands of particularism.

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Chapter II

DERRIDA AND POST-META PHYSICAL TURN

Postmodernism interrogates the temporality and the subject-object binary in the history of philosophy. Philosophers from Nietzsche to Wittgenstein, Lyotard, Deleuze and numerous others belonging to the hermeneutic tradition have written on the question of interpretation and its relations to the question of meaning and truth. Arguing against one-dimensional approach towards an understanding of language, Wittgenstein suggests the ways in which people choose and value certain words over others. Lyotard discusses how Paralogic language game challenges Western discursive order through the concept of performativity and the reemergence of enunciation. Heidegger's significance for postmodernism is relevant to a large extent the preoccupation with language and the attention to the etymology apparent in most poststructuralist work as the result of a direct Heideggerian influence. Heidegger's "phenomenological destruction" of Western philosophy has become one of the central concerns of poststructural theories.

Structuralism and Post-structuralism

One of the basic tenets of structuralism comes from Saussure's notion of a social system that is defined in terms of language and speech. Structuralism is fundamentally a way of thinking about the world, which

is predominantly concerned with the perception and description of structures. "Every perceiver's method of perceiving can be shown to contain an inherent bias which affects what is perceived to a significant degree."¹ Accordingly, the relationship between observer and observed achieves a kind of primacy. It becomes the reality itself. In consequence, the true nature of things may be said to lie not in things themselves, but in the relationship which we construct, and then perceive between them. Structuralism claims that the nature of every elements in any given situation has no significance by itself. The full significance of any entity or experience cannot be perceived unless and until it is integrated into the structure of which it forms a part.

"Saussure inherited the traditional view already referred to, that the world consists of independently existing objects, capable of precise objective observation and classification."² Linguistics of this outlook yields the notion of language as an aggregate of separate 'meaning' attached to it. Saussure's contribution to the study of language lies in his rejection of that 'substantive' view of the subject in favour of a 'relational' one, a change of perspective closely in accord with the larger shift in perspective. He proposed that a language should be studied as a unified field, a self-sufficient system. Language is self-defining, and so 'whole' and 'complete'. It is capable of undergoing a process of 'transformation' that is of generating new aspects of itself in response to new experience. It is self-regulating. It has these capacities precisely be-

cause it allows no single, unitary appeals to a 'reality' beyond itself. In the end, it constitutes its own reality. Language is constructed as a system of sign, each sign being the result of conventional relations between words and meanings, between a signifier (a sound or sound image) and a signified (the referent, or concept represented by the signifier). The constitutive importance of social reality and knowledge is the power of discourse as a system of signs. "In a complex system or structure of correspondence between distinct signs, and distinct ideas or 'meanings' to which those signs, distinctive by relate."³ The vocal apparatus has become the chief instrument and vehicle for language's concrete actualization in the real world of social intercourse. The meaning of each word resides in a structural sense in the difference between its own sounds and those of other words.

There are two kinds of 'difference.' There is that which actually occurs on the phonetic level but the structure of the language does not register, and the speaker does not recognize when they speak. And then there is that which also actually occurs, but which since the structure of the language does take account of it, is recognized. This 'recognized' level is called phonemic level, the elements which appear in it are called phonemes, and it is these sounds that the speakers of the language hear as 'different', that is as opposed in a pattern of meaningful contrasts. The many 'sameness' or differences that actually occur in the language, we only perceive those which the language's synchronic struc-

ture makes meaningful, and vice versa. The mode of relationship between signifier and signified can be said to be essentially, albeit minimally, sequential in nature. Saussure endeavors to emphasize that the linguistic structure is 'closed', self sufficient, self-defining in nature. Signs, like phonemes, function not through their intrinsic value but through their relative position', and thus – since the total mode of language is oppositional-whatever distinguishes one sign from the others constitutes. Thus language in the final analysis is to be judged as form and not a substance. It is a structure, which has modes, rather than an aggregate of items which has content.

Saussure argued that our knowledge of the world is inextricably shaped and conditioned by the language that serve to represent it. Saussure's insistence on the arbitrary nature of the sign led to his undoing of the natural link that commonsense assumes to exist between word and thing. Meanings are bound up, according to Saussure, in a system of relationship and difference that effectively determines our habits of thought and perception. Language brings a whole intricate network of established significations. In his view, our knowledge of things is insensibly structured by the systems of code and conventions, which enables us to classify and organize the chaotic flow of experience. Reality is carved up in various ways according to the manifold patterns of sameness and difference, which various languages provide. This basic relativity of thought and meaning is the starting point of structuralist

theory. The structuralists project seems at first blush to epitomize the hayday of sentences. "It abstracts from any historical or psychological context and attends to the logical grammar or syntax in which any meaning or message is embedded."⁴ It has a foot also in the hayday of meanings as it relies on the total system of coding and decoding. Derrida's critique exploits the split between these allegiances..

The linguistic sign as such is arbitrary and unmotivated. The very principle of significance is a differential one. Meaning is located at the pole of the "signified" and is considered inseparable from its opposite, the signifier, for each become a term within a differential relation.

Structuralism, it might be argued is fixated on the age-old delusion which in one form or another has always pre occupied philosophy. This gave rise to the critique of realism in literature and art. Claude Levi-Strauss contributed a great deal in the field of structural studies by his analysis of anthropological evidences. His endeavor to decode the meaning inherent in primitive systems of life proved a strong venture in the realm of cultural studies. He says that the different aspects of social life cannot only be studied by the methods of, and with the helps of concepts similar to those employed in linguistics, but also whether they do not constituted phenomena whose inmost nature is the same as that of language. Levi-Strauss' thinking is that structure as a mode of intelligibility immune to the assault of sceptical doubt. Like the linguistics, he sets out to identity the genuinely constitutive

elements of what appears at first sight to be an apparently disparate and shapeless mass of phenomena. Levi-Strauss proposes that structure may be homologous with the structure of the language of the society involved in them on the grounds that different types of communication systems exist in the same societies.

As in the studies of Levi-Strauss structuralism operates with a grid of binary distinction. It is a kind of formalism. For structuralism operates with and within closure, locating even the pathological accident as resolvable according to rule and thus still part of structure. The structuralist approach we studies culture in the basis of binary opposition followed a kind of early Wittgenstein's position. According any culture a language hides a specific meaning, which is to be digged not by means of analytic tools. As Derrida later criticizes that it is a kind of waiting for an unknown, hidden meaning. When Levi-Strauss approach to the binary opposition he knowingly or unknowingly gives primacy to one over the other. For instance nature/culture distinction favour the first and thereby fails to see the other in its true spirit. "What he fastens on in Levi-Strauss's project is the central opposition between 'nature' and 'culture', the starting-point for all such attempt to theorize the emergence of human institutions(language, myth, kinshippsystem) from a realm, of imaginary pre-social existence."⁵So poststructuralist especially Jacques Derrida Criticizes Levi-Strauss and the methodology of structuralism as such.

Poststructural thinking begins with one of the famous essays written by Roland Barthes. Although Barthes followed the path of semiotics and structuralism, his article, 'the Death of the author' was an entirely new step in the history of Linguistic philosophy and cultural studies. More or less same way of thinking was introduced by Derrida's famous article on 'structure, sign and play'. Both these articles dismantled the 'aura' around the author and the external value attached to the 'meaning' and 'truth'. For Levi-Strauss, man 'equals' society and society 'equals' language. When language becomes the most formative feature of human culture. So problem of truth and meaning attains new dimension.

The primacy of structure is overshadowed by this fundamental query into the stability of meaning. This questioning of the sign constitutes the basic shift in ideas from structuralism to post structuralism. "The Saussurean signifier/signified relationship is complicated by 'another type of signification which bears on nature of code itself.'"⁶

Similarly, the death of the author and the antiessentialist thinking combine to complicate the different domains of language. Since writers only write within a system of language in which particularized authors are born and shaped, text cannot be thought of in terms of their authors' intentions, but only in relationship with other texts: in intertextuality. Hence with the death of the author, the burden of meaning is shifted to the role of the reader, who while reading a text intelligible. In the full stage of poststructuralism, Barthes announces the binary of

writing and reading by text. According to Barthes readerly by and writerly text can produce erotic, corporeal sensations in the reader.

Foucault takes the instability of the relations of meaning and builds a theory of the relations of power. He argues that institutions are intentional to historical constructions and discourse, which he calls 'episteme' while he sees power and capillary as circulating through individuals and their actions and practices. For Foucault, knowledge is a social and so there is no author or stable meaning, he advocates the reduction of the universal intellectual to a political function limited to the quality of a specific intellectual, an advisor to conjunctural micro-politics. In Foucault's case the standpoint of totalization is necessarily that of the Panopticon "Foucault notes that for Nietzsche, there is no origin of meaning. As interpretation tries to get beneath sign to something more fundamental than them, it discovers only more interpretation. Meaning comes through the imposition of interpretations. Signs, then, are not prior to interpretations; instead signs are always already the product of interpretations."⁷ In a world without beginning, without a secure meaning to search out, the goal of interpretation also becomes mysterious.

Derrida says that structuralism and Semiotics remain a part of tradition of Platonic dualism as long as they preserve the Saussurian bar between signifier and signified. According to Derrida subjectivism is not the only trap that philosophy has to avoid, structuralism has its

own special dangers. The structuralist quest, as Derrida reads it, is always for a form or function organized according to an internal legality in which elements have meaning only in the solidarity of their correlation or their oppositions. The genetic demands on other hand, is the search for the origin and foundation of the structure. In *Speech and Phenomena* the object was mainly to deconstruct such ideas of 'origin' and 'foundation' by showing them to be always inscribed in a differential structure of meaning. "Derrida saw that structuralism had not abandoned the commitment to an unproblematic ontology, even though at first glance it might have seemed as if the Saussurian formulation and its subsequent derivatives had moved away from making assumptions about what there really is in the world."⁸

Derrida's critique of structuralism as we find in his essays 'Force and signification' and 'structure signs and play' questions the internal self-sufficiency of a theory given over to system and concept. Structuralism always asserts itself where thinking yields to the consistent order and stability. Its achievement, however impressive and intrinsically limited to a reflection of the accomplished, the constituted, the constructed what is suppressed by this static conceptualization in the 'force' or animating presence of intent which exceeds at the bound of structure. Structuralism lives on what he calls the difference between its premise and practice.

Some of Derrida's most powerful essays are devoted to the task of dismantling a concept of 'structure' that serves to immobilize the play of meaning in a text and reduce it to a manageable compass. Poststructuralism refuses to accept the idea of the structure as in any sense given or objectively 'there' in a text.

Derrida says that the organizing principle of the structure would limit what we might call the 'play of the structure.' Accordingly even today the notion of the structure with a specific centre destroys the possibility of generation of meaning. The concept of centred structure is in fact the concept of a play based on a fundamental ground, a play constituted on the basis of fundamental immobility and a reassuring certitude, which itself is beyond the reach of play. Derrida says that the substitute does not substitute itself for anything, which has somehow existed before it. "Hence forth, it was necessary to begin thinking that there was no centre, that the centre could not be thought in the form of a present- being, that the centre had no natural site, that it was not a fixed locus but a function, a sort of non locus in which an infinite number of sign-substitutions came into play."⁹ For Derrida with the absence of a centre or origin, everything became discourse. That is to say, a system in which the central signified, the original or transcendental signified, is never absolutely present outside a system of differences. The absence of the transcendental signified extends the domain and the play of signification. One could call the play the absence of the

transcendental signified as limitlessness of play, that is to say as the destruction of onto-theology and the metaphysics of presence. Derrida shows that this play is a field of infinite substitution. He formulates a decentred discourse and thereby open up multicentred discourse. By means of introducing the deconstructive strategy. Derrida questions the veracity of a metaphysics of meaning, which works on the basis of 'logic of supplement'.

According to Derrida, a system in which the central signified, the original or the transcendental signified, is never absolutely present outside a system of differences. The absence of the transcendental signified extends the domain and the play of signification infinitely. Derrida says that there is no transcendental or privileged signified and that the domain or play of signification henceforth has no limit. For the signification "sign" has always been understood and determined, in its meaning, as sign-of, a signifier referring to a signified, a signifier different from its signified. If one erases the radical difference between signifier and signified, it is the word "signifier" itself which must be abandoned as a metaphysical concept.

Saussure saw that the connection between the word and the idea it represents is arbitrary. This arbitrary relation between signifier and signified implies two things. First there is a politics of language in the absence of natural linkage between signifier and signified, a set of words must be established and thereafter maintained. So language as

a device for communication. "Saussure did not dwell on the political implications of linguistics, focusing rather on the second consequence of his formulation of arbitrariness: the impact of words devices as much from their difference from other words as it does from the referential relationship between signifier and signified."¹⁰

Levi-Strauss discusses the significance of the floating signifiers, which is under the servitude of all finite thought. The 'overabundance' of the signifier, its supplementary character, is thus the result of a finitude, that is to say, the result of a lack which must be supplemented. Derrida shows, why the concept of play is important in Levi-Strauss thinking. His reference to all sorts of games, notably to roulette, is very frequent, especially in his conversations. Further, the reference to play is always caught up in tension. According to Derrida play is the disruption of presence. The presence of an element is always a signifying and substitutive reference inscribed in a system of differences and the movement of a chain of play is always play of absence and presence, but if it is to be thought radically, play must be conceived of before the alternative of presence and absence.

In his endeavor to oppose the process of totalization Derrida attacks the concept of Book! The idea of a book is the idea of totality. This totality of the signifier cannot be a totality, unless a totality constituted by the signified preexists it, supervises its inscriptions and its signs and is independent of it in its ideality.

Deconstruction as a Strategy

Derrida's deconstructive strategies are practised to undermine the mainstream of logocentric tradition and their effectiveness lies in challenging stock assumptions about language, writing and experience. Derrida is a rigorous thinker who invents a method of his own to topple the metaphysical tradition of the history of philosophy. Derrida says, "Deconstruction is not, he says primarily a matter of philosophical contents, themes or theses philosophemes, poems, theologemes or ideology but especially and inseparably meaningful frames, institutional structure, pedagogical or rhetorical norms, the possibilities of law of authority, of representation in terms of its very market."¹¹ Derrida does not claim to offer a 'method' but provides us instead with exemplary acts of reading which in turn acts as a new method. Deconstruction does not do anything, it only reveals the inherent structure the text often conceals. "It does not take things apart, it is not an operation, it only reveals how things are put together."¹² It may be nothing more or less, than taking responsibility for the act of reading, rather than seeking to avoid that responsibility in the name of some institutionally approved method of interpretation.

One of Derrida's points is that there is no such thought, idea, concept which is not constructed out of or contaminated by, group of other thoughts, ideas, concepts. He suggests that there are nothing but texts and that there is no such thing as reality. There is 'no outside the

text', signifiers that one never accedes to a text without some relation to its contextual opening. In the section from *Of Grammatology* Derrida argues that, if one comprehends the system of writing in its proper sense, one come to understand how concepts such as 'inside' and 'outside' become, at the very least problematized, not at least or the fact that inside and outside are not strictly separable, always being connected to each other, being part of each other as with the figure of the hymn which strictly speaking is neither simply inside nor outsider the body of the text.

For Derrida to deconstruct a piece of writing is, therefore, to operate a kind of strategic reversal, seizing on precisely those unregarded details which are always and necessarily passed over by interpreters of a more orthodox persuasion. Derrida insists that all thinking about language, philosophy and culture must henceforth be conceived within the context of a massively extended writing.

Derrida tended to suggest that nothing remained immune to the movement of Deconstruction. So that each term employed to designate this movement would have a limited self life-wood sooner or later be sucked down into the vortex of its own dissemination. Now however he states empathetically that the possibility of deconstructions is itself 'undeconstructable'. "Indeed, he writes what remains as irreducible to any deconstruction as the very possibility of deconstruction is perhaps a certain emancipatory promise or a certain idea of justice which is not

be equated with any empirical edifice of law.”¹³

Derrida, to admit that empirical facts could have any status other than that of examples for the procedure of imaginative variation to contradict the very premises of phenomenology. This is essential insight *de jure* precedes every material historical investigation. And has no need of facts as such to reveal to the historian the a-priori sense of his activity and objects. Thus the activity of Deconstruction is strictly inconceivable outside the tradition of the enlightened rational critique whose classic formation are still found in Kant. Derrida’s deconstruction extends to every form of discourse whose rhetorical complexity exceeds its own powers of presumptive control over language. “Deconstruction insists on thinking through the paradoxes in the nature of reason (pure and applied) whose effects are most starkly and urgently visible in unclear-strategic debate.”¹⁴ Deconstruction is not a mere unveiling of hidden truth. It is not just decoding of hidden truth. It is not just decoding of the binary opposition in favour of the minor discriminated term but a method and politics of demystification.

Priority to Writing

Deconstructive strategy begins with its analysis of phonocentric tradition. In this regard Derrida goes through various texts that favour speech over writing. In the history of western philosophy, the philosophy of language including a great deal of its metaphysics has almost invariably been based on speech rather than writing. Writing, for Levi-

Strauss, is an instrument of oppression, a means of colonizing the primitive mind by allowing it to exercise the power of the oppressor. In Derrida's reading this theme of lost innocence is seen as a romantic illusion.

Derrida put forward the following criticism against Saussure's....

(1) Writing is systematically degraded in Saussurian linguistic.

(2) This strategy runs up against suppressed but visible contradiction.

(3) By following this contradiction through one is led beyond linguistics to a 'grammatology' or science of writing and textuality in general.

Derrida often attaches the notion that writing is somehow external to language, a threat from outside which must always be countered by the stabilizing presence of speech. Writing becomes an exteriorized agency of violence and corruption, constantly menacing the communal values so closely identified with speech. Derrida's aim is to show that contrary to speech writing emerges both within the very theme of speech and within the text which strives to realize and authenticate that theme. Deconstruction is in this sense the active accomplice of a referred but already articulated writing. In Derrida's much quoted phrase, "It is a *pas de hors-texte*' (there is nothing outside the text). The character of writing also generates a permanent gap between any text and any unitary 'meaning'. If the text and its 'meaning' are not one and the same thing

then a text can have no ultimate, final meaning: in fact, it is in the nature of writing and of language not to be confined to specific structures of meaning."¹⁵

In structuralist writing speech is represented not only as the opposite of writing but as a good kind of writing that is inscribed in the soul by revealed or self authorized truth. Derrida attaches this idea of inscription inherent in the logo centric thinking. Whenever Plato or Rousseau treats writing as inferior they commit the inevitability of writing. Same is the case with Levi-Strauss who gives the primacy to speech. When he discusses the nature of Nambikwara inhabitants Levi-Strauss says that they could sing which they could not write. However he admits that they had drawn certain marks. When Levi-Strauss considers the primitive people of Nambikwara as incapable of writing he actually refuses "dignity of writing" to "non-alphabetic signs". Here Derrida claims that, "all the liberalizing criticism and legitimate denunciations with which Levi-Strauss has harried the presupposed distinctions between historical societies and societies without history."¹⁶

Writing is clearly an important figure in Derrida's thinking. For him, writing is a metaphor, a figure which names in the word of Gayathri Chakravathy Spivak "an entire structure of investigation, not merely...writing in the-narrow sense-graphic notation on tangible material."¹⁷ Spivak points out that Derrida is not merely opposing writing to speech, in the process of reversing a binary opposition, so as to give

precedence to a term, which is traditionally considered in our thought to have a secondary role, while speech is then relegated from its important role to a secondary position. As Spivak points out that, 'writing' is a key figure in Derrida's writings but as a figure, which announces structure, and not merely as the opposition to speech. Writing says Spivak, is a broader concept than the empirical concepts. For Derrida writing has the potential to function in the radical absence of its author, and of any empirically determined readership. In other words its effectively is not bound to any context. Derrida begins signature, event, context with an exposition of his account of writing. "On closer inspection of Austin's original argument, however, it quickly becomes apparent that Derrida's assimilation of Austin to the tradition of logocentrism requires a bizarre level of hermeneutic violence."¹⁸ Derrida's argument is that the distinctive reflexivity of language, the recognition of a speech act as successful in an essential component of its success. In order for a speech-act to be recognized as successful, however, the context would have to be saturated—all the necessary and sufficient conditions would have to be satisfied. Thus Derrida states in order for a context to be exhaustively determined in the sense required by Austin. Derrida says that no context can be determined by conscious intention. Derrida's assumption is that unless the context can be saturated, no speech act can proceed successfully.

Derrida sees the whole metaphysics working behind the privilege granted to speech in Saussure's methodology. Voice becomes a metaphor of thought and authenticity, as source of self-present living speech as opposed to the secondary lifeless emancipations of writing. In speaking one is able to experience an ultimate link between sound and sense and inward and immediate realization of meaning which yield itself up without reserve to perfect transparent understanding. Writing on the contrary displays this ideal of pure self-presence. It obtrudes an alien:de personalized medium, a deceiving shadow, which falls between intent, and meaning, between utterance and understanding. It occupies a promiscuous public realm where authority is sacrificed to the vagaries and whims of textual dissemination. Writing in short, is a threat to the display traditional view that associates truth with self presence and the natural language where in it finds expression.

Against this tradition Derrida argues, "what an extra ordinary case, that writing is in fact the pre-condition of language and must be conceived as prior to speech. The word of writing thus comprehends language."¹⁹ This shows that the concept of writing cannot be reduced to its normal sense. Writing, in short, does not 'reproduce' a reality beyond itself, nor does it 'reduce' that reality. Derrida says that the term writing is closely related to the elements of signifying difference. If "writing" signifies inscription and especially the durable institution of a sign(and that is the only irreducible Kernel of the concept of writing).

According to Derrida writing in general covers the entire field of linguistic signs. "In that field a certain sort of instituted signifiers may then appear, "graphic" in the narrow and derivative sense of the word, ordered by certain relationship with other instituted hence 'written', even if they are "phonic" – signifiers. The very idea of institution-hence of the arbitrariness of the sign is unthinkable before the possibility of writing and outside its horizon".²⁰ Writing for Derrida is the 'free play' or elements of undesidability within every system of communication. Its operations are precisely those, which escape the self-consciousness of speech and its deluded sense of the mastery of concepts over language. Writing is the endless displacement of meaning which both governs language and places it for ever beyond the reach of stable, self authenticating knowledge. In this sense, oral language already belongs to a generalized writing, the effects of which are everywhere disguised by the illusory 'metaphysics of presence'.

Derrida's expositor, Culler, puts his point for more defensibly than Derrida himself when he says, "writing.....turns out to be the best illustration of the nature of linguistic units".²¹ Culler's structuralist commitment reveals itself to best advantage in his insistence that a writing cannot be treated on the model of speech. The written word is independent of the 'presence' of a speaker, and as an object in its own right enjoys an autonomous 'productivity'. That is, it characteristically subjects the overt signifier signified legements to a covert and poten-

tially dislocating strain, finally making it possible to 'free' the one from the other. Writing exceeds the whole traditional edifice of western attitudes to thought and language. According to Derrida the progress of writing is a natural progress. Derrida ask why is that progress natural? He himself answered that no doubt because it is necessary. But also because necessity operates within language and society, according to ways and powers that belongs to the state of pure nature.

The repression of writing lies deep in Saussure's proposed methodology. It shows in his refusal to consider any forms of linguistic notation outside the phonetic alphabetical script of western culture. As opposed, that is to the non-phonetic varieties which Derrida often discusses hieroglyphs, algebraic notions formalized language associated with phonetic alphabetic writing is that within which logocentric metaphysics, determining the sense of being as presence, has been produced. This logocentrism has always placed parentheses, suspended and suppressed for essential reasons, all free reflections on the origin and status of writing. "Grammatology, says Derrida, would be the science of the written sign conceived in this way: the way in which writing has always been conceived in oriental societies. Its terms its conditions, and its presuppositions are not those of a dominant oral version of language, but those of writing itself. It communicates, not as a surrogate for the voice, not orally, but visually and legibly."²²

Derrida traces the exclusion or degradation of writing as a gesture perpetually re-enacted in the text of western philosophy. Its meaning could only attain a state of self-sufficient intelligibility, language would no longer present any problem but serve as an obedient vehicle of thought.

Deconstruction is therefore an activity or reading which remains closely tied to the text it interrogates, and which can never set up independently as a self enclosed system of operative concepts. The deconstructive leverage supplied by a term like writing depends on its resistance to any kind of settled or definitive meaning to call it a concept is to fall straight away in to the trap of imagining some worked-out schemes of hierarchical ideas in which writing would occupy its own privileged place.

For Derrida writing is at once the Source of all cultural activity and the dangerous knowledge of its own constitutional that culture represses always. Derrida says that the supplementary of writing is indeed the root of the matter. Rousseau condemns writing as destruction of presence and as disease of speech. He rehabilitates it to the extent that it promises the reappropriation of that of which speech allowed itself to be disposed. Rousseau gives undue importance to speech as it belongs to the domain of 'nature' that is opposed to "culture" while speech is treated as an original and natural phenomenon the writing become secondary and supplementary. At the same time Rousseau re-

tains certain traces of writing and his adoration for writing with in his text. Actually by means of deconstruction Derrida shows the inseparable trap, which the writer could not escape. Similarly as and when Rousseau subordinates writing to speech it is a kind violence to the process of writing.

It is the addition of a technique a sort of artificial and artful ruse to make speech present when it is actually absent. It is a violence done to the natural destiny of language. There is a fatal necessity inscribed the very functioning of the sign, that the substitute makes one forget the vicariousness of its own function and make itself pass for the plenitude of a speech whole whose deficiency and infirmity it nevertheless only supplements. For the concept of supplement-harbour within itself two significations. "The supplement adds itself, it is a surplus, a plenitude enriching another plenitude, the fullest measure of presence."²³ But the supplement adds only to replace. It intervenes itself-in-the place of: if it full, it is as one fills a void. It is compensatory and vicarious, the supplement is an adjunct, a subaltern instance which take-place. As substitute it is not simply added to the positivity of a presence, it produces no relief, its place is assigned in the structure by the mark of an emptiness. In Derrida's view the supplement is neither a presence nor an absence. No ontology can think it operation. The sign is always the supplement of the thing itself. Writing is the example of par excellence of a supplement, which enters the heart of all intelligible

discourse and come to define its very nature and condition. Derrida deploys a whole rhetoric of similar terms as a means of presenting the conceptual closure-or reduction of an ultimate meaning-which might otherwise threatens his texts. Among them in the notion of supplement itself bound up in a supplementary play of meaning which defies semantic reduction. As Derrida argues that violence of writing is there at the outset of all social discourse, that in fact it marks the origin of morality as of immorality the non-ethical opening of ethics. Derrida says that the supplement proposes itself as supplement of supplement, sign of sign, taking the place of speech already significant one that henceforth spoken language or its analogues with the value of positive and self-authenticating truth, writing will appear in the oppositional, as a supplement an accessory or substitute sign, twice removal from sources. Writing is not merely a second-best recourse but an accident that somehow befalls language and threatens its very well-being. For writing, through, defines as the supplement of a supplement, has a way of intruding upon the privileged relation between truth and speech. Derrida calls the logic of supplementary as precisely the strange reversal of values, an apparently derivative takes on the critical role in determine an entire structure of assumption. Writing is always alonal. The place of the subject is there taken by another, it is concealed. Derrida says about spoken sentence is that which is valuable only once and remains proper only to the place where it is, loses its place and its proper meaning as soon as it is writtern down.

Difference Against Identity

“Difference is a term, which without being, a logical operation acts as a negative”.²⁴ As Derrida says, any definition of any identity is only ever possible because of that which is different from it. Identity is constituted and only possible by differences. Even the very concept of identity, what Derrida calls the identity of the principle of identity, is marked by difference. Identity as a concept is only articulable because of a field of other concept, principles, ideas, which serves in its articulation. Beginning with the principle of identity and difference, Derrida says that the difference become the primary term, that which makes the identity possible.

Derrida says that structure draws on concepts and philosophers, which are themselves articulated and structured, while hiding their structurality. As Derrida points out every concepts belongs to a systematic chain and constitutes itself a system of predicates. He says identity is always being formed in countless ways, dependent on context. “Identity is never known until perceived in a particular form.” The question of identity is always shown to be fraught with paradoxes, contradictions and other disjointing movement which make the unity of identity impossible. That which is named deconstructions within a field of forces is the location of the paradoxical or contradictory, and provides the means of interviling in the field of opposition by showing the articulation concealed within the supposed unified presence.

Adorno argues, that what terms the non-identical and what is left behind by the concept, is merely an inaccessible and indefinable 'x' the belief that nature knows no forms and no concepts is itself the result of the primacy of the universal in identity thinking. According to him non-identity is opaque only for identity's claim to be total. The immanent claim of the concept, he writes that its order creating invariance over against the variation of what is grasped under it. This is denied by the form of the concept. However Adorno does not undertake to counterpoise the contingent and particular to the universality of concepts. His argument is that pure singularity is itself an abstraction, the waste product of identity thinking. The attempt by poststructuralist thought to isolate singularity will simply boomerang into another form of abstraction; and that what it mistakes for immediacy will in fact be highly mediated. Adorno says that identity can become adequate to its concept only by acknowledging its own moment of no-identity. What we differentiate. For him there is no necessary antagonism between conceptual thought and reality, no inevitable mutual exclusion of knowledge and becoming. For Adorno, the non-identical is no longer viewed as the isolated particular, which it is forced back into being by identity thinking. "The particular is now seen as standing in a pattern of relation to other particulars, a historically sediment 'constellation' which defines its identity."²⁵ The internal to non-identical, Adorno writes is its relation what it is not itself, and which its instituted, frozen identity

withholds from it. The characteristics of reality which poststructuralist thought ontologizes are in fact merely the reflection of a historically obsolete imperiousness of consciousness, a lack of equilibrium between subject and object. Adorno, as a materialist, argues for the anchoring of consciousness in nature, while resisting any attempt to collapse the dialectic of subject and object into a metaphysical monism.

The higher principle of non-identity for which Derrida's most common name is 'différance'. "Since absolute difference, lacking all determinacy, is indistinguishable from absolute identity: Derrida's evocations of a trace which is origin of all repletion origin of ideality, not more ideal than real, no more intelligible than sensible, not more a transparent signification than an opaque energy, provide perhaps the closest twentieth century parallel to the 'identitätsphilosophie' of younger Schelling.²⁶

It appears; therefore, that Derrida's attempts to develop a critique of the self-identical subject which eschews any naturalistic moment result in a position no more plausible than Lyotard's monistic metaphysics of libido. One could argue that Derridan différance in fact differentiated by what is differentiated. While it is true that nature and culture, signified and signifier object and subject would be nothing without the difference between them, this is not sufficient to ensure the logical priority of non-identity, which is crucial to Derrida's whole philosophical stance.

Differance-A New Term to Counter Logocentrism

Differance is a part of neologism created by Derrida particularly to express the indeterminacy of meaning. Derrida deconstructs philosophy into its marginalized inconsistencies. Derrida takes the structure of sign from Saussure, but transforms it into a fluid entity, where by meaning and writing consists solely in signifiers. Signifiers refer only to each other and meaning becomes unstable since any deferral to yet another signifier implies difference in an endless chain of signification. Unlike Heidegger, Derrida draws on the structuralist linguistics of Saussure, who points out that language is a system of differences hermeneutical tradition, Derrida can view language as a system, a structure that in some sense produces subjects.

The verb to 'differ' seems to differ from itself. On the one hand, it indicates differences as distinction, inequality, or discernability, on the other it expresses the interpretation to delay, the internal of a spacing and temporalizing that puts off until later what presently denied, the possible that it is presently impossible, sometimes the different and sometimes the deferred correspond to the verb to differ. Differance represents the principle by which language works. It stands for both differing and deferring. Linguistic terms become meaning full owing the process of deferring and differing. As Saussure puts it, in language there are only differences. "To differ or differentiate, Derrida argues, is also defer: to postpone; to propose a distinction between entities such as

will enable one to refer to the other, or to be distinguished from it. That is, it represents involvement in a structuring process."²⁷

In the one case to 'differ' signifies non-identity in the other case it signifies the order of the same, yet there must be common, although entirely different root within the sphere that relates the two movements of differing to one another.²⁸ Derrida argues that the 'deferring' process in which writing appears to be involved-the written word acting as surrogate for the spoken word-in fact applies to the spoken word itself. That is, language's grounding in 'difference' also implies a commitment to 'differance'. Thus speech cannot stand as the reality to writing shadow for speech already itself appears to be a shadow of some prior act of signification, of which it manifest the 'trace' and so on, in an infinite regression. In fact nothing has the 'purity' of absolute presence. Speech is 'impure', as 'trace'-ridden as 'secondary' as any signification.

'Differance' is neither a word nor a concept. It has been most decisively inscribed in the thought of what is conveniently called our 'epoch'. It is used to show "how meaning is at once 'differential' and 'deferred', the product of a restless play within language that cannot be fixed or pinned down for the purposes of conceptual definition."²⁹ As distinct from difference, 'differance' thus points out the irreducibility of temporalizing. 'Differance' is not simply active it rather indicates the middle voice, it precedes and sets up the opposition between passivity and activity, with its a differance more properly refers to what is classi-

cal language would be called the origin or production of differences and the differences between difference and the play of difference. Its locus and operation will therefore be seen wherever speech appeal to difference.

For Derrida the play of differences suppose, in effects syntheses and referrals that forbid at any moment, or in any sense, that a simple elements be present in and of itself, referring only to itself. Whether in the order of spoken or written discourse, no element can function as a sign without referring to another element which itself is not simply present. Derrida says that this interweaving results in each “elements” phoneme or grapheme – being constituted on the basis of the trace within it of the other elements of the claim or system. This interweaving is the text produced only in the transformation of another text. Nothing, neither within the elements nor within the system, is anywhere ever simply present or absent. There are only, everywhere difference and traces of traces.³⁰

We notice that Derrida’s neologism is spelt with the graphic difference between the ‘e’ and ‘a’ which functions only within the system of phonetic writing and within a language or grammar historically tied to phonetic writing and to the whole culture which is inseparable from it. However this difference is silent, and ‘difference’ sounds no different from difference. Derrida coined the term for several reasons, amongst these being a critique of structuralism and Saussurian linguistics, which

had always privileged voice over writing. The silence of the written 'a' and its phonic in 'difference' to its conventional counterparts are, for Derrida, a demonstration of the alterative that always inhabits writing. But this is no mere pun or word-play for Derrida, for his neologism combines the possible writing or two concepts, these being deferment and differentiation, both of which are implied in Derrida's term, and performed for his in the silent 'a'.

"Saussure had only to remind us that the play of difference was the functional condition, the condition of possibility, for every sign and it is itself silent. The difference between two phonemes, which enables them to exist and to operate, is inaudible."³¹ Differance does not exist. It belongs to no category of being, present or absent. As Derrida suggests that words, signs, graphic, marks or traces are always readable in our absence. The possibility of their being read and repeated is already installed in them as graphic marks, and this possibility is not a condition of the presence of either an author or an audience. As such they are open to interpretation, translation, analysis and questioning in ways, which one can neither foresee nor any ways in which one cannot control or predict. Actually Derrida's neologism establishes the death of the author and thereby rescues the text from the author.

Differance does not resist appropriation, it does not impose an exterior limit upon it. Differance began by broaching alienation and it ends reached until death. Death is the moment of differance to the

extent that movement is necessarily finite. This means that deferral makes the opposition of presence and absence possible. "Without the possibility of difference, the desire of presence as such would not find its breathing-space. That means by the same token that this desire carries in itself the destiny of its non-satisfaction. Difference what it forbids makes possible the very thing that it makes impossible.³² If difference is recognized as the obliterated origin of absence and presence, major forms of the disappearing and the appearing of the entity it would still remain to be known of Being, before its determination into absence or presence, is already implicated in the thought of differences. It would lead to think a writing without presence and without absence, without history, without cause, without telos, disrupting absolutely every dialectics, every theology and every ontology.

As the condition for signification the principle of difference effects the whole sign, that is both the signified and the signifying aspects. Every concept is necessarily and essentially inscribed in a chain or a system, within which refers to another to other concepts, by the systematic play of differences. Such a play then, difference is no longer simply a concept, but the possibility of conceptuality of the conceptual system and process in general. For the same reason, difference which is not a concept, is not a mere word, that is it is not what we represent to ourselves as the calm and present self referential unity of a concept and sound. Within the system of language there are only differences.

These differences play a role in language in speech as well as, and in the exchange between language and speech. As a result of the play within the text we get difference. The difference will not only be the difference within the language. The use of language or the employment of any code, which implies a play of forms with no determined or invariable subtraction, also presupposes a relation and protection of differences, a spacing and temporalizing, a play of traces. According to Derrida this play must be a sort of inscription prior to writing, a protowriting without a present origin, without an 'arche'.

Derrida's point is that Saussure could not think the differential nature of language without contradicting his own premise as regarding the natural bond between sound and sense. Language can only be grasped as a system of differing terms, it moves beyond the reach of phonocentric concepts and then falls to a generalized grammarology or science of writing. For it is precisely at those points where Saussure pushes furthest towards a purely differential theory of meaning that he always falls back, as if by necessity on grammatical uniqueness and metaphor. Derrida shows that Saussure's attempt to conceptualize language as a system of purely differential signs led him to the point where only writing could serve as a basis for this generalized theory.

In *Of Grammatology* Derrida writes there cannot be a science of difference itself and it is impossible to have a science of the origin. Derrida says that the trace is the difference, which opens appearance

and signification. Articulating the living upon the non-living in general, origin of all repetition, origin of ideality, the trace is not more ideal than real, not more intelligible than sensible, not more transparent signification than an opaque energy, and no concept of metaphysics can describe it.

Derrida uses difference is not simply for the semantic instability of the text, but for the movement of the world and of history in general. The difference which is frequently made of Derrida at this point-that he is engaged in some form of parody of the philosophy of origin. It is scarcely adequate. Derrida did not become involved in a dubious argumentative strategy against transcendental philosophy. A difference which is prior to all determinate differences collapses into absolute identity. The status of Derrida's attack on the concept of origin clearly need to be reassessed. Derrida shows the impossibility of an origin, in the sense of an epistemological ground which would be made present. But he cannot be said to have abandoned the concept of origin. It by 'origin' we understand the unconditional source of the conditioned structures of experience. Accordingly subjectivity - like objectivity- is an effect of difference, an effect inscribed in a system of difference.

Derrida envisages that the written-ness of all language is open to semantic 'play'. According to him there is no literal meaning. His primacy arguments seems that a given utterance can not determine implicitly and in advance the infinitely many context, in which it might

enter, it can not lay claim to a univocal or 'proper' meaning. Does the argument then commit Derrida to saying that no statement ever has a determinate meaning. "And if Derrida is right that writing is read, and in the last analysis does not give rise to a hermeneutic deciphering to the decoding of a meaning or truth."³³ Much of his effort is accordingly directed to exploring the limits of construal, to the articulating and joining together of all manner of readings – that is the point of the exercise. He does not reconstruct but 'deconstruct' meaning, by demonstrating the looseness of the syntactic mechanisms that are supposed to produce it. For Derrida meaning is after all contextual, a function of the shared predicament of speaker and audience.

As Derrida suggests in *Writing and Differance*, writing will never be simple "voice-painting". It creates meaning by enregistering it, by entrusting it to any engraving, a groove, relief, to a surface whose essential characteristic is to be infinitely transmissible. Meaning or value are therefore never intrinsic or imminent in the written sign, they only become possible by the chance of their representation. Inscription precedes meaning.³⁴ According Derrida meaning is neither before nor after the act.

There is no meaning, which can be fixed prior to metaphorical entanglements. All such entanglements presuppose the doubly metaphysical displacement of meaning. For Derrida, notion of the ante-predictive and the pre-reflexive, not to mention that of 'our primordial be-

longing to the world' are still contaminated with the metaphysics of presence.

On Derrida's account structuralism consists not in erasing or destroying meaning. Rather it is a question of determining the possibility of meaning, which does not mean that it is either the non-sense or the anguishing absurdity, which haunt metaphysical humanism. According to Derrida structuralism in its most original and strongest aspects involves a reduction of meaning. Derrida does not question the possibility of such a reduction. Indeed, he again makes the point that of its consequences would be a break with the hermeneutical question of the meaning or the truth of Being, as conceived by Heidegger. As a result of this we come to realize that for Derrida the meaning of meaning (in the general sense of meaning not in the sense of signalization) is infinite implication, the indefinite referral of signifier to signified.

Condition of Truth.

Derrida suggests that the condition of truth is the possibility of writing, rather than the inscription of writing. "For Derrida, both the possibility and the horizon of metaphysics are predicated on the normative exclusion of writing from the procedure of truth." ³⁵Distinction between speech and writing constitutes the determining relation of the oppositional axiomatic of metaphysics.

'Phonocentrism' is both metaphysical and violent. According to the very criteria which led Saussure to the opposite conviction. Lin-

linguistic is consequently seen to be founded on an ethicotheoretical decision which is disguised by the apparent naturalness of the object under consideration. But revealed by the obsessive insistence with which the founder of linguistics wishes to expel writing from the essence of language. Saussure thereby repeats exclusions specific to metaphysical logic, exclusion which follows from the disavowal of inscription or the condition of process of signification. The recognition and re-negotiation of their law, and this recognition is political. To re-negotiate this law means, for Derrida, to rethink the empirico-transcendental difference is to think the law of logic and the logic of law. Saussure's apparent phonocentrism must lead to its deconstruction, which is simultaneously the deconstruction of all empirical accounts of human facticity. Saussure says that writing is a secondary representation of a primary unity of sound and meaning.

Derrida shows more precisely, how the break with metaphysics in its traditional, idealist form can always go along with a kind of pre-critical positivist ontology that remain largely captive to the same dominant motives. It will take more than a simple inversion of exchange of priorities- an insistence on the 'real' as against mere 'writing' or representation to achieve any kind of effective materialist critique. And it is here, "Derrida argues that deconstruction has its work cut out since it has to avoid both a premature metaphysics of 'the real' and a fetishized notion of 'the text' which would then fall prey to all manner of idealist delusions. It should thus be possible to generalize the concept of writ-

ing while not winding up, as Derrida says, with a new self interiority, a new idealism of the text."³⁶

Derrida is not one of the modern thinkers who are at last learn to live with the non-availability of knowledge, truth or cognitive 'foundations' of any kind. Derrida becomes a kind of halfway honorary pragmatist, having deconstruct a great deal of surplus ontological baggage but then fallen victim to the line of his own negative metaphysics or systematized antiphilosophy. Derrida rejects all forms of epistemological critique and treats philosophy as just one 'kind of writing' among others, with no specific interest in questions of knowledge and truth. He has insisted from his earliest writings, that there is no possibility of thinking back beyond the origins of this 'false' enlightenment, of returning to some primordial state of being when language was in touch with the ultimate truths of experience. "Such a project is too deeply implicated in all logo centric assumptions that Derrida detects as every stage of the western philosophical enterprises."³⁷

There has indeed occurred a momentous shift in the relations of knowledge and power, such that the operative truth conditions of any given programme will be subjected to all manner of delayed effects and unlooked - for incidental 'profit'. Derrida denied that perception or anything like it really exists. He also says about non-availability of knowledge, truth or cognitive 'foundations' of any kind. Derrida would appear to be headed towards the pragmatist conclusion through held up along the way by some unfortunate tangles with Kant, Husserl and other old fashioned seekers after truth.

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Chapter III

LYOTARD'S VIEW OF INDETERMINACY

Jean Francois Lyotard is one of the original thinkers of the twentieth century. His contribution with the publication of *The Postmodern Condition* has been widely acclaimed. His contribution lies not only in his criticism of the present information-oriented knowledge system but also demarcating the contemporary era from the earlier periods in history.

In his book, *The Postmodern Condition a Report on knowledge* he tries to situate the present Western world in a unique position where knowledge has attained a new status. He ever personally breaks with his own preceding works which assert a Kantian position. However he resorts to find out ways to counter the increasing vulnerability in the domain of dissemination of knowledge.

Lyotard's main arguments in his book *Postmodern condition* is that scientific knowledge does not represent the totality of knowledge. He discusses the incommensurability between popular narrative pragmatics, which provides immediate legitimation and the language game known to the west. He devotes to an analysis of the new problem pertaining to the relationship between the scientific institutions and society. Accordingly the modern languages exhibit a kind of consolidation

different from the primitive popular narratives. For Lyotard in modern societies the language game consolidates themselves in the form of institution run by qualified partners.

Lyotard despite his criticism against Marxism, resorts to the Marxian mode of analysis to identify the newly evolved postmodern condition of knowledge and successfully explains how the knowledge system in general has succumbed to the "terror of capitalism."

Criticism of Modern Knowledge

For Lyotard knowledge is a form of informational commodity indispensable to productive power. It is already and will continue to be a major strike in the world wide competition for power. Similarly, Foucault introduces the concept of power as an explicit counter to semiological models of the social life and he arguing that "the history which bears and determines us has the form of a war rather than that of a language: relation of power not relation of meaning. Foucault resists the suggestion that the 'untruth' of power-knowledge is revealed from the standpoint of resistance, insisting rather than all regimes of power are also regimes of truth. "Foucault admits that the attempt to bypass any inquiry into the conditions of possibility of knowledge runs the risk of accusations of naivety. He therefore tries-without notable success-to define a status for his historical description of discursive formations which would be neither that of science nor that of philosophy."¹ For the merchantalization of knowledge is bound to affect the privilege the na-

tion-states have enjoyed, and still enjoy, with respect to the production and distribution of learning. In Lyotard's view the ideology of communicational "transparency", which goes hand in hand with the commercialization of knowledge, will begin to perceive the state as the factor of opacity and 'noise'. It is from this point of view that the problem of the relationship between economic and state powers threatens to arise with a new urgency.

The "producers" and users of knowledge have started to control the origin and dissemination of knowledge. With the advent of postmodern techniques of knowledge and information the logic of understanding as such gets changed. The relationship of the suppliers and users of knowledge has already been taken by the relationship of commodity producers and consumers. Habermas' opinion is that, knowledge is and will be produced in order to be sold, it is and will be consumed in order to be valorized in a new production: in both cases, the goal is exchange. Knowledge ceases to be an end in itself, it loses its usevalue. "In the postindustrial and postmodern age, science will maintain and no doubt strengthen its preeminence in the arsenal of productive capacities of the nation-states."²

Lyotard says that today the status of knowledge is unbalanced and its speculative unity is broken. The legitimacy of knowledge is gaining new vigor. Knowledge finds its validity not within itself, not in subject that develops by actualizing its learning possibilities, but in a prac-

tical subject, humanity. The principle of movement animating the people is not the self legitimation of knowledge but the self-grounding of freedom or, is preferred to its self management.

Scientific knowledge does not represent the totality of knowledge according to Lyotard. It has always existed in addition to, and in competition and conflict with another kind of knowledge. Scientific statement is subject to the rule that a statement must fulfill a given set of conditions in order to be accepted as scientific. "The Gaston Bachelard would say if scientific method, only produced through theory: it was mediator sublimating sonority and noise into its theoretical 'good'."³ In this case legitimation is the process by which legislator dealing with scientific discourse is authorized to prescribe the stated condition determining whether a statement is to be included in that discourse for consideration by the scientific community. According to Lyotard, the right to decide what is true is not independent of the right to decide what is just. The point is that there is a strict interlinkage between the kind of language called science ethics and politics.

Knowledge has become an informational commodity and also increasingly clear that if knowledge is to survive as knowledge, it must be translatable into information. Lyotard himself is less interested in knowledge statics than in the rules for establishing what counts as knowledge. For Lyotard scientific knowledge does not represents the totality of knowledge which Lyotard will call narrative in the interests of

simplicity. But he does not mean to say that narrative knowledge can prevail over science. But its model is related to ideas of internal equilibrium and conviviality. Since we entered into the period of modernity in West, Scientific reasoning has attained the status of meta narrative. As a result of this traditional and other knowledge system got marginalized or silenced or treated as secondary. But Lyotard argues that scientific knowledge no longer enjoys any special privilege. He questions the megaprescriptive status of other grand narratives. Post industrial societies have developed a new incredulity towards precisely the narratives or rather 'metanarratives', these legitimated themselves in the past. This incredulity now defines the postmodern condition. "Thus Lyotard's exploration of the Status of knowledge is not only linked to but framed and contextualized by the crisis of narrative. This crisis leads Lyotard to some of his most striking formulation."⁴

As to the reason for this incredulity, he says, "the crisis of scientific knowledge, signs of which have been accumulating since the end of the nineteenth century is not born of a chance proliferation of sciences, itself an effect of progress in technology and the expansion of capitalism." He states in a indubitable way that the obstacle before the imaginative development of knowledge is the socio-economic system and not of the pragmatics of science itself. According to Lyotard narration is denotative, prescriptive, descriptive and so on. However we do not necessarily establish stable language combinations.

The present technological revolution of society transform the status of self, and the nature of the social bond, in addition to provoking a crisis in the legitimating knowledge. Furthermore in the computer era the state itself becomes vulnerable and even “outmoded” on a number of fronts. The most obvious threat comes from the existence of the new multinational corporations, over whose use and production of knowledge the state has little or no jurisdiction. The traditional enlightenment assumption is that learning and education comes under the purview of the state. It also questions the notion of “free society”. On the other hand postmodern turn problematises the very issue concerning knowledge and its validation.

Lyotard, says that the narrative positions the narrator, addressee and referent in contrast to the different positioning of scientific researcher and apprentice in the production and transmission of scientific knowledge. Popular or customary narrative knowledge requires no external legitimation. Narrative in and of themselves determine criteria of competence and or illustrate how they are to be applied. Scientific knowledge is produced and transmitted according to the rules that are incommensurate with narrative.

Nevertheless, the fundamental incommensurability of narrative knowledge and scientific knowledge is that scientific knowledge has not prevented narrative from being used to legitimate the latter. Lyotard delineates two distinct modes of narrative legitimation in the modern

period, distinguished by whether or not the subject of the narrative is conceived as cognitives or practical as a hero of knowledge or as a hero of liberty. However the pursuit of scientific knowledge is justified for the sake of pure knowledge. "What presently serve to legitimate knowledge and indeed all social decisions at higher levels in the absence of any overarching larger narratives is the performativity model that Lyotard introduced earlier and which now assumes a key role in his argument."⁵

Postmodern science provides the most striking instance of one such new vital mode of knowledge. In Lyotard's arguments it suffices as the only example. Its importance resides in the fact that the production of contemporary scientific knowledge does not operate according to the quest for performativity which serves as the only model of social legitimation, now that the great narratives of emancipations and speculation are defunct. In its various searches for "instability", postmodern science even calls into question the basic assumption of such a model. Theoretically, the performativity model assumes a positivistic "determinism" in order to establish parameters of efficiency and control: at the practical level it assumes a quantifiable level of stability, according to which input/output ratio can be measured. Postmodern science destroys these assumptions.⁶ Postmodern science of necessity internalized the process of self-legitimation as the very means by which it develops as a science. As Lyotard concisely states that the discourse on the rules that validate postmodern science is immanent to it. As a con-

sequence, postmodern science is both able to transform what knowledge is and to function according to new model of legitimation. Postmodern science-by concerning itself with such things as undecidable, the limits of precise control, conflicts characterized by incomplete information, catastrophes, and pragmatic paradoxes. It is changing the meaning of the word knowledge, while expressing how such a change can take place. It is producing not the known, but the unknown. And it suggests a model of legitimation that has nothing to do with maximized performance but has its basis difference understood as paralogy. According to Lyotard's arguments, what is required for knowledge is a model of legitimation that would respect both the desire for unknown and the desire for justice.

For Foucault modern science is the result of latest mutation in a 'will to knowledge'. Foucault says that such arrangements must always mystalize an unequal relation of forces. Truth, accordingly is linked in a circular relation with system of power which produces and instains it. While Foucault links truth with the will to power Lyotard links truth with desire. As we find a Deleuze and Guattari postmodern desire is the limitless mental framework of the postmodern world.

If, "Jameson suggests the truth of experience no longer coincides with the place in which it take place but is 'spreadeagled' across the world's spaces, then a situation arises in which we can say that if individual experience is authentic, then it cannot be true; and that if a

scientific or cognitive mode of the same content is true, then it escapes in individual experience.”⁷

Legitimations of Grand Narrative

The term “grand narrative” was introduced by Lyotard to describe the kind of story that underlies, a given legitimacy, and explains a particular choices that a culture prescribes as possible course. A grand narrative is also called “master narrative”. It provides coherence by covering up the various conflicts, the differends that arise in the history of a society. Examples of such narratives are Christianity, the enlightenment capitalism and Marxism. Such grand narratives also act as metanarrative. Metanarrative provides a frame work in which all other cultural narratives find their ground and acquire their meaning and legitimacy. Postmodernism is heralded when grand narratives lose their credibility and little narratives proliferate.

Grand narrative constitutes the main ideological apparatus of modernity and pay a particular important role in legitimacy in modern science. Each grand narratives provides its own set of elements and promote a different ideology. For example in Marxism the subject is the proletariat and the goal is the socialization of the mean of production, whereas in capitalism the subject is the individual entrepreneur and the goal is the accumulation of wealth. The narrative according to Lyotard is a technical apparatus for ordering, storing and retrieving information that is in competition and conflict with scientific knowledge. Here

it seems that Lyotard somehow recalls the claim of Claude Lévi-Strauss in structural Anthropology that myths are a kind of alternatives or pre-science providing a coherent explanation for experience. According to Lyotard, traditional narrative possesses a narrative pragmatics of transmission. The post of sender, addressee and hero can be occupied by the same person at different times. It is this alternation among narrative posts that guarantees the legitimating function of narratives.

In the *Postmodern Condition* Lyotard discusses two grand narratives of the legitimation of knowledge. The first is the narrative of emancipation in which humanity is the hero where emancipation is achieved through scientific knowledge. The second is the speculative narrative which arises with the creation of the great modern universities. Here the hero is speculative spirit whose goal is the creation of a system, with the development of technology, the break-down of disciplinary boundaries, the rise of post-industrial society, and the preeminence of capitalism both narratives lose their credibility especially since now it is the capital that is financing the production of knowledge in the Universities. Lyotard often returned to the question of narrative knowledge and its legitimating function, but his most significant contribution is in formulating the concept of the differend. In his essay 'differend' narrative is discussed as the type of phrasing in which the heterogeneity of the phrases that constitute a differend is least noticeable. In this context, postmodernism can be defined as the eruption of differends in the

sociopolitical horizon in the wake of the break-down of grand narrative.

The grand narrative has lost its credibility, regardless mode of unification, it uses regardless of whether it is a speculative narrative or narrative of emancipation.⁸ In Lyotard's opinion the decline of narrative can be seen as an effect of the blossoming of techniques and technologies. Since the second world war, which has shifted emphasis from the ends of action to its means: it can also be seen as an effect of the redeployment of advanced liberal capitalism after its retreat under the protection of 'Keynesianism' during the period, 1930-60, a renewal that has eliminated the communist alternative and valorized the individual enjoyment of goods and services. Lyotard says that even if we adopted one or the other of these hypothesis we would still have to detail the correlation between the tendencies mentioned and the decline of unifying and legitimating, power of the grand narratives of speculation and emancipation. Lyotard's insistence on narrative analysis is a situation in which the narrative themselves, henceforth seem impossible is his declaration of intent to remain political and contestatory. However to choose one or the other is the way before the analyst. To refrain from this process as a whole seems rather difficult in the actual practice.

Science as metanarrative

The 'crisis' of scientific knowledge, signs of which have been accumulating since the end of the nineteenth century, is not born of a chance proliferation of sciences itself an effect of progress in technology

and the expansion of capitalism. It represents, rather an internal erosion, the legitimacy principle of knowledge. The potential for erosion intrinsic to the other legitimation procedure, the emancipation apparatus flowing from the enlightenment is no less extensive than the one at work within speculative discourse. Its distinguishing characteristic is that it grounds the legitimation of science and truth in the autonomy of interlocutors involved in ethical, social and political praxis. But there are some problems with this form of legitimation as the difference between a denotative statement with cognitive value and prescriptive statement with practical value is one of relevance and therefore a competence. There is nothing to prove that if a statement describing a real situation is true, it follows that a prescriptive statement based upon it will be just. The game of science is thus put on a par with the other.

For the Story's narrator must not be a people mired in the particular positivity of its traditional knowledge, nor even scientists taken as a whole, since they are requested in professional frameworks corresponding their respective specialities. Positive science is not a form of knowledge.⁹ For Lyotard a science that has not legitimated itself is not a true science. It seems to belong to a prescientific form of knowledge, like a "vulgar" narrative, it is denoted to the lowest rank, that of an ideology or instrument of power. And this always happens if the rules of the scientific game that discourse denounces as empirical are applied to science itself. For example the speculative statement: A Scientific

statement is knowledge if and only if it can take its place in a universal process of engendering. This statement only takes in a universal process of engendering. All it has to do is to presuppose that such a process exists and that it is itself an expression of that process. This presupposition is indispensable to the speculative language game without which the language of legitimation would not be legitimate: it would accompany science, in a nosedne into nonsense; at least if we take idealism's word for it.

Lyotard envisages that scientific knowledge does not represent the totality of knowledge: it has always existed in addition to, and in competition and conflict with, another kind of knowledge. Lyotard says that contemporary scientific knowledge cuts a poor figure, especially if it is to undergo an exteriorization with respect to the "knower" and an alienation from its user even greater than has previously been the case. Scientific knowledge requires that one language game, denotation, be retained and all others excluded. A Statements truth value is the criterion determining its acceptability. In this context one is learned if one can produce verifiable or falsifiable statements about referent accessible to the experts. Scientific knowledge is in this way set apart from the language games that combine to form the social bound. Unlike the narrative knowledge it is no longer a direct and shared component of the bound. Lyotard says that the relation between knowledge and societies becomes one of mutual exteriority. A new problem appears-that of

the relationship between the scientific institution and society. "The game of science implies a diachronic temporality, that is memory and a project. The current sender of scientific statement is supposed to be acquainted with previous statements concerning its referent (bibliography) and only proposes a new statement on the subject if it differ from the previous ones."¹⁰

Local Narrative

Lyotard says that we no longer have recourse to the grand narratives. We can resort neither to the dialectics of spirit nor even to the emancipation of humanity as a validation for postmodern discourse. But as we have just seen, the little narratives remains quite essential form of imaginative invention, most particularly in science. Accordingly little or counter narratives arise as a result of paralogical intervention. So it is not the logic of meta prescriptive science but paralogy, which begins to act in the contemporary world.

According to Fredric Jameson, the society of the future falls less within the provinces of the Newtonian anthropology (such as structuralism or systems theory) than a pragmatics of language particles. "If there are many different language games – a heterogeneity of elements we have then also to recognize that they can only give rise to institutions in patches-local determinism."¹¹ Local determinism have been understood by others as 'interpretive communities' made up of both producers and consumers of particular institutional context within par-

ticular divisions of cultural labour or within particular places. Individuals and groups are held to control mutually within these domain what they consider to be valid knowledge. Action can be conceived of and decided only within the confines of some local determinism, some interpretative community, and its purported meanings and anticipated effects are bound to break down when taken out of these isolated domains, even when coherent within them.

The decision makers attempt to manage these clouds of sociality according to input/output matrices, following a logic which implies that their elements are commensurable and that the whole is determinable. In matters of social justice and of scientific truth alike, the legitimation of the power is based on its optimizing the system's performance efficiency. Knowledge is produced and constituted at the particular sites where as localized power-discourse prevails. The logic of maximum performance is no doubt inconsistent in many ways, particularly with respect to contradiction in the socio-economic field. In short for Lyotard our incredulity is now such that we no longer expect salvation to rise from these inconsistency.

To the description of scientific pragmatics, it is now dissension, that must be emphasized. He expresses his opposition with Habermas saying that consensus is a horizon that is never reached. "Research that takes place under the aegis of a paradigm tends to stabilize it is like the exploitation of a technological, economic or artistic "idea". It

cannot be discounted. It is necessary to posit the existence of a power that destabilizes the capacity for explanation, manifested in the promulgation of new norms for understanding or if one prefers, in a proposal to establish new rules circumscribing a new field of research for the language of science. It is not without rules, but it is always locally determined.”¹²

Consensus has become an outmoded and suspect value. But justice as a value is neither outmoded nor suspect. The idea and practice of justice that is not linked to that of consensus. The principle that any consensus on the rules defining a game and the “moves” playable within it must be local, in other words, agreed on by its present players and subject to eventual cancellation. According to Lyotard the argumentation concerns metaprescriptive and is limited in space and time.

Language Game

Ludwig Wittgensteine, introduced the concept of language game in philosophy of langage. By language game Wittgensteine means that each of the various categories of utterance can be defined in terms of rules specifying their properties and the uses to which they can be put. But Lyotard says that there are three observations about language games. The first is that their rules do not carry within themselves their own legitimation, but are the object of a contract, explicit or not between players. The second is that if there are no rules, there is no game, that even an infinitesimal modification of one rule alters the nature of

the game, that a 'move' or utterance that does not satisfy the rules does not belong to the game they define. The third remark is that every utterance should be thought of as a "move" in a game.

This last observation brings us to the first principle underlying our method as a whole, that is to speak is to fight in the sense of playing and speech acts falls within the domain of general agonistics. A move can be made for the sheer pleasure of its invention. Lyotard says the endless invention of turns of phrase of words and meaning, the process behind the evolution of language on the level of *parole*. But undoubtedly even this pleasure depends on a feeling of success won at the expense of an adversary. This idea of an agonistics of language should not make us lose sight of the second principle, which stands as a complement to it and governs our analysis that the observable social bond is composed of language "moves". An elucidation of this proposition will take us to the heart of the matter at hand. "A Statement is a move. A move implies for the game, a previous move (the preceding statement) and a looseness in the linkings. It is this last which is excluded by speculative discourse."¹³ Lyotard admits that one's mobility is relation to these language game effects is tolerable, at least within certain limits: it is even solicited by regulatory mechanism, and in particular by the self-adjustments the system undertakes in order to improve its performance. It may even be said that the system can and must encourage such movement to the extent that it combats its own entropy:

the novelty of an unexpected “move” with its correlative displacement of a partner or group of partners can supply the system with that increased performativity it forever demands and consensus.

It should now be clear from which perspective, Lyotard choose language games as Wittgenstein’s general methodological approach. Lyotard is not claiming that entirety of social relations is of this nature. But there is no need to resort to some fiction of social origins to establish that language games are the minimum relations required for society to exist even before it is born, if only by virtue of the name it is given.

Language game made of denotations. It is answerable only to the criterion of truth. The veracity of the same depends on the governing ethical, social and political practice that necessarily involves decisions and obligations. But according to Lyotard the language game of legitimation does not belong to the realm of politics but philosophy. Philosophy must restore unity to learning, which has been scattered into separate sciences in laboratories and in pre-university education, it can only achieve this in a language game that links the sciences together as moments in the becoming of spirit, in other words, which links them in a rational narration or rather metanarration. Lyotard presents an aesthetic pragmatic narrative theory of language game which rests on a simplistic theory of communication and interaction in society. “He sees Scientific knowledge as a model of innovatory language

games, a strategy he terms 'paralogism.' Moreover, he extends his critique to propose (in a contradictory global account) that the characteristically unstable and dispersed Social reality of the present cannot be captured in a totalising 'grand narrative' which plots an historical teleology towards equality and justice."¹⁴

Wittgenstein's strength is that he did not opt for the positivism that was being developed by the Vienna circle, but outlined in his 'Investigation' the language games as a kind of legitimation not based on performativity. There is no possibility that language game can be unified or totalized in any meta discourse. Most people have lost the nostalgia for the lost narratives. It, in no way follows that they are reduced to barbarity what save them from it is their knowledge that legitimation can only spring from their own linguistic practice and communicational interaction.

Lyotard says that there has to be a metalanguage to determine whether a given language satisfies the formal conditions of an axiomatic. Metalanguage is replaced by the principle of plurality of formal and axiomatic systems capable of arguing the truth of denotative statements. These systems are described by a metalanguage that is universal but not consistent, what used to pass as paradox, and even paralogism in the knowledge of classical and modern science can, in certain of these systems acquire a new force of conviction and modern science can in certain with the acceptance of community of experts.

Language game would then be games of perfect information at any given moment. But they would also be non-zero-sum games, and by virtue of that fact discussion would never risk fixating in a position of minimax equilibrium, because it had exhausted its stakes. For the stakes would be knowledge, and the reverse of knowledge is exhaustible. Knowledge of language games as such and the decision to assume responsibility for their rules and effects. Their most significant effect to precisely what validates the adoption of rule. "Lyotard argues that the criteria regulating the 'truth claims' of knowledge derives from discrete, context-dependent 'language game' not absolute rule or standards."¹⁵

According to Lyotard technology is a game pertaining not to the true, the just or the beautiful etc., but to efficiency of the technical "move" is 'good'. The production of proof which is in principle only part of an argumentation process designed to win agreement from the addressees of scientific message, thus falls under the control of another language game, in which the goal no longer exists. The state and or company must abandon the idealist and humanist narratives of legitimation in order to justify the new goal in the discourse of today's.

Lyotard says the only credible goal is power. Scientists, technicians and instrumentalists are purchased not to find truth, but to power. When Lyotard distinguished the denotative game from the prescriptive game from the technical game. "Force" appears to belong exclusively to the last game, the game of technology. Lyotard is excluding the case in

which force operates by means of terror. "For the techno-science proceeds, for its part, from an anamnesis which in the form of a fundamental crisis has affected the sciences no less than arts."¹⁶

'Reality' is what provides the evidence used as proof in scientific argumentation, and also provides prescription and promises of a juridical, ethical and political nature with results. "By reinforcing technology, "one reinforces" reality, and one's chances of being just and increase accordingly. Reciprocally technology is reinforced all the more effectively if one has access to scientific knowledge and decision making authority."¹⁷

Lyotard says that the science plays its own game: it is incapable of legitimating the other language games. The game of prescription, for example escapes it. But above all, it is incapable of legitimating itself, as speculation assumed it could. Lyotard says that people have no universal metalanguage, the project of the subject is failure. We are all struck in the positivism of this or that discipline of learning. The learned scholars have turned into scientists, the diminished tasks of research have become compartmentalized and no one can master them all.

According to Lyotard the scientific knowledge is seeking a 'crisis resolution' – a resolution of the crisis of determinism. Determinism is the hypothesis upon which legitimation by performativity is based : science performativity is defined by an input/output ratio there is pre-supposition that the system into which the input is entered is stable:

that system must follow a regular “path” that is possible to express as a continuous function possessing a derivative, so that an accurate prediction of the output can be made. Lyotard says that the producers of the postmodern writer are not in principle governed by pre established rules and they cannot be judged according a determine judgment, by applying familiar, categories to the text or to the work. These rules and categories are what the work of art itself is looking for.

Legitimation by Paralogy

As Lyotard asserts we “no longer have recourse to the grand narratives- we can resort neither to the dialectic of spirit nor even to the emancipation of humanity as a validation for postmodern scientific discourse.” So the “little narrative” remain the quintessential from of imaginative invention Lyotard rejects the notion of consensus established by Habermass as it is based on the validity of the narrative of emancipation. Again he rejects consensus as it sender the validation of power. So Lyotard wanted paralogism as the local counter measure to overcome the incredulity of the metanarrative.

According to Lyotard the problem is to determine whether it is possible to have a form of legitimation based solely on paralogy. Lyotard’s view that the ultimate vision of science and knowledge today as a search not for consensus, but very precisely for instabilities as a practice of paralogism. The point is not to reach agreement but to undermine from within the very framework in which the previous normal science had

been conducted. Lyotard used language game method by his current thought of paralogism. "Paralogy the hallmark of postmodern science, introduced dissent and heterogeneity into the language games of science, and this move works against the principles of consensus, performance and market value which serve to transform knowledge into a saleable commodity"¹⁸

According to him in the knowledge of classical and modern science a new force of conviction resulted from the acceptance of the community of experts by using paralogism. Paralogy must be distinguished from innovation. Knowledge of the language games as such and decision to assume responsibility for their rules and effects. Their most significant effect is precisely what validates the adoption of rules – the quest for paralogy. "What Lyotard calls the activity of paralogism – exercised in illogical or contradictory reasoning – produces a breakthrough into the unknown of new knowledge."¹⁹

In Lyotard's view postmodern knowledge is not simply a tool of authorities, it refines our sensitivity to differences and reinforces our ability to tolerate the incommensurable. Its principle is not the expert's homology, but the inventor's paralogy. The figural logic of simulation and paralogy have undermined the enlightenment myth concerning science and truth as liberators of humanity, for the enactment of this myth has created the current crisis in representation.

Lyotard also undertakes a deconstructive strategy similar to that of Derrida. For Lyotard the “outside” is what lies beyond the discursive power of language. In fact reading through the discourse, we notice a shift in the connotations of the term “figure” that mirrors its two deconstructive aspects. In the earlier section of his book *postmodern condition* Lyotard says that the figural is what allows us to distinguish between the truth and knowledge, between orders of visibility which are “seeable” but not readable: but in later section he “uncovers a connivance of disire with the figural which is now analyzed in relation to the libidinal drives, as the trace or evidence of a desire that disrupts representation and rational discourse, or that stirs beneath or within representation.”²⁰ This transgressive disordering, and dispersive effects of the figural is to be reckoned. Lyotard associates with the unconscious primary processes and the death drive postulates by Freud.

In a complex series of critical moves Lyotard proceeds to complicate the Saussurian theory. First he gives the ‘flat’ space of linguistic value—he calls it the “table of language” — a depth by introducing into consideration the deictic signs (like here, now, I, you) that allows the speaker to position himself or herself along an axis of designation not assimilable to the diacritical relations among clustered terms in the closed linguistic system. Yet Lyotard is not interested in merely playing off a language theory which privileges signification: he seeks instead that space of difference within their opposition and out which the figural may emerge.

“Signification does not exhaust meaning, but signification plus designation doesn’t either. We can’t remain in the alternative of these two spaces, the space of the system and the space of the subject, between which discourse sides. There is another space a figural space. It must be supposed as buried; it gives itself neither to be seen nor to be thought. It is in a lateral or figurative fashion at the heart of discourse and perception as that which troubled them. It is the proper space of desire, the stakes of the struggle that painters and poets never ceased to wage against the return of the ego and the return of the text.”²¹

Lyotard argues that as soon as the object becomes a sign it acquires a position by which it conceals a hidden content within its manifest identity, and it reserves another face for another view focused upon it. Lyotard means by this that any designated object caught up in language becomes a multi dimensional sign inadequately accounted for by the Saussurian ‘table of language’. In the very act of designation the sign acquires a ‘thickness’ of opacity absent from the transparent Saussurian sign, a thickness that can even reduced on the word itself in its graphic or scriptive identity. This opacity or thickness in the sign brings about or makes possible an “otherness” of meaning within signification, sometimes disrupting discursive meaning and sometimes playing against it.

The figure does not provide a means for desire’s fulfillment; indeed, the figure is not an image allow the articulation of phantasy, but

assumes for Lyotard a critical function by reversing the logic of phantasy in a formalization. But to follow Lyotard's argument here, along this lateral critical lack we must first consider the significance of negation within discourse.

Lyotard like Freud play against whole phonetic of language theories, Saussure's structuralist account, Merleaus-Ponty's phenomenological account, by articulating the different forms of negation with what he calls the "negativity of transcendence". Lyotard asserts, in a move fundamental condition of negation posed by the fact of language as a prying loose from the world. Lyotard wants to avoid any purely linguistic conceptions of the unconscious such as Lacan adumbrates, even while asserting that the advent of language necessarily brings about a primal phantasy or matrix-figure that will never cease to disrupt and seeks to overturn the order of language. For this reason Lyotard is led to privilege the disruptive aspect of desire, which again, contrary to Lacan's linguistic theory, is seen to operate on language rather than merely being articulated within it.

Lyotard rehearses the Nietzschean argument for the impossibility of ultimate truth. In truth, there is no such thing a lie, except measured by the standard of the desire for truth, but this desire is no truer than anyother desire, and the paradox does not state what is really the vicious circle of the lie, but the circulation of mask which do not mask anything, beneath none of which can be discovered, the face itself. How-

ever where as Foucault is primarily concerned with the implication of the ultimate arbitrariness of the criteria of truth in relation to the view of human science, Lyotard is much more concerned with the repercussions on philosophy itself. Thus where as Foucault takes science as the paradigmatic modern form of a discourse which conceals its own motivation, Lyotard considers theory, by which he understands less the individual sciences than philosophical discourse claiming to provide an apodictic universal, and systematic foundation for knowledge, as a form of fiction which denies its own fictive status. Lyotard's initial task, therefore, is to reveal the structural of libidinal investment which characterizes theory, a task which he attempts to carry out in the concluding chapter of economic libidinal.

Lyotard suggests that theoretical discourse is characterized by the demand for clarity and consistency; whether an object falls under a particular concept, whether a judgement is true or false must be unambiguously decidable. Lyotard admits that a discourse, which tells a story may form a similar unified body, but points out that theoretical discourse is distinguished from narrative - figurative discourse by the fact that the totality which it constitutes is not situated at the pole of reference, but becomes one with the theoretical text itself. Lyotard suggests that between these two poles, abstract painting constitutes an intermediate case. But whereas, is the case of abstraction which has not degenerated into mere system, the apparent immobility insignifi-

cant for an eye which takes no pleasure in it, if the patterns of points, lines, surfaces, colours, is precisely what desire makes movement out of a movement on the surface of the canvas, which contrasts with the immobilization of the spectator - in the theoretical discourse this movement tends towards repeatability, and is complemented by the disconnection and emotional neutrality of producer and consumer.

The notorious universality of knowledge, Lyotard writes, generally interpreted as Kantian a-priori condition of theoretical discourse in its communicability, is understood in terms of desire, a mark of the destruction of personal identities. Theory is characterized not by its detachment from libidinal investments, but by the distinctive configuration of those investments.

Lyotard does not claim that theory as an error, a perversion, an illusion, an ideology. Lyotard cannot entirely prevent a note of disapprobation from colouring his conclusions. Indeed, from the standpoint of an ontology of singularity theory is illusory. Since it demands an elimination of the inherent dissimulation of libidinal reality. Every fixation of a standard is related to a demand for appropriation. Which invests the disjunctive bar in its exclusive function, and induces the confusion of intensities and identities.

Lyotard is more inclined to study the question of philosophical claim to truth. So we find prominence to logical and historical reflection on the problem of foundational philosophy in Lyotard's writings while it

is missing in Foucault's writing. If Foucault is claiming truth for his historical theories, while insisting on an immanent connection between truth and power. He can only claim recognition for the particular system of power with which his own discourse is bound up. Far more consistently than Foucault, who continuously equivocates over the epistemological status of his own discourse, Lyotard appreciates that a pluralist ontology of forces cannot claim to be true, except at the cost of self contradiction, but can rather only be affirmed. If we understand by affirmation, a form of acceptance disconnected from the recognition of truth.

In 'Just Gaming', Lyotard analyses the question of truth and falsehood as that which is concealed by the power of the philosophical text. Accordingly it is this power, in the sense of rhetorical force, which strives to conceal the problem of truth and falsehood. Foucault appreciates that, far from the concept of truth implying domination and forcible unification, it is precisely contempt for the truth which characterizes the arbitrary use of political power; nothing is more inconsistent than a political regime which is indifferent to truth, but nothing is more dangerous than a political system which claims to prescribe the truth.

So both Foucault and Lyotard evades the problem of political power as that which exist as concrete reality. As Fredric Jameson in his forward to Lyotard's postmodern condition suggests it might be the reflection of an unconscious phenomenon of the postmodern condition.

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Chapter IV

RORTY : PRAGMATISM REVISED

Richard Rorty is one of the most influential among the philosophers whose influence is beyond the confines of the professional academic philosophy. Rorty's philosophical thinking provides a perspective of his own that is particularly interesting and valuable. While revising pragmatism Rorty illustrates the relation between anti-representationalism, ethnocentrism, and the virtues of the socio-political culture of the liberal democracies. As Rorty himself claims he follows Dewey and at the same time deviates from Dewey in stating the problematic of representationalism and antirepresentationalism in terms of words and sentences rather than in terms of ideas and sentences.

Wittgenstein and Davidson propounds a holistic attitude towards intentionality and language use. They say that there is no language use without justification, no ability to believe without an ability to argue what beliefs to have. But Rorty says that this is not to say the ability to use language, to have beliefs and desires, entails a desire to justify one's belief to every language using organism.

Rorty has stated the issue with fine lucidity in his essay, 'philosophy as a kind of writing.' He argues that there are two 'traditions' of philosophy, which exists in a state of perpetual rivalry, but which can

never properly confront one another because their aims and idioms are so remote. On the one hand those thinkers rely on the conviction that philosophy is a rational dialogue of minds pursued from age to age in the quest for communicable truth. Skepticism is to be allowed to place in this philosophy, but only so long as it serves to clear away mystification and establish more firmly the indubitable base of truth. Opposed to this tradition is another, more desperate company of minds one that carried out periodic raids and incursion into 'mainstream' philosophy. Philosophy as a writing in Rorty's sense, uses language not as a more or less efficient means of rational exchange but as a fighting - ground on which to conduct its major campaign. The self conscious practice of philosophic style goes along with a rooted skepticism about ultimate truth and method.

What Rorty shares with Derrida is the way both debunk the truth claim. They show that the truth validity claim can be questioned by showing the bankruptcy of all epistemology and the need for philosophers to give up the imaging that they might have special truth to impart. For Rorty Derrida's problems are of interest only insofar as they figure in the unfolding narrative of Western philosophy to date. Rorty argues that linguistic philosophy has plainly undermined the whole project of epistemology by showing the nature of contradictions emerging from the effort to interpret its central claim. So philosophers who want to revive that tradition are misreading not only the multiplied

evidence of past failure but also the signs of a new, more worth while, activity presently to hand.¹ What Rorty calls the Realist backlash in current ideas about language and representation is merely one instance of an unfortunate – but, he hopes, a short-lived reversion to bad old Kantian habits of thought.

The other forms of retrograde thinking according to Rorty, is that which pins its faith to political progress through enlightened critique of existing institutions and ideas. Since every kind of knowledge must ultimately appeal to the validating context of cultural assumption from which it take place and within which its truth claims are judged. There could be no way to make sense of any theory that issued such a radical challenge to prevailing ideas. And from this Rorty draws the implicitly conservative lesson that revolutions in thought must be either ineffectual.(Since meaningless according to the dominant consensus), or really no ‘revolutions’ at all, since the consensus does in the end find room for them without the kind of drastic upheaval theory envisages. Rorty’s position is that of the commonsense pragmatist, mistrusting all those grand theories (of knowledge, history, class-consciousness or whatever). When Rorty calls himself a postmodern bourgeois liberal. It is precisely in order to distance his kind of liberalism from the rest of postmodern leftists of America.² Postmodern liberalism is the rightest version of American Postmodernism.

Rorty argues that 'first-order' natural narratives are really all we possess, so that any new attempt to tell the story of stories is a species of grand delusion. All that is left of the grand narratives tradition is what Rorty calls 'Naturalized Hegelianism' or the story-telling interest minus the idea that everything makes sense from the view point of Absolute Reason or historical progress. Rorty argues with Habermas against others that there are no incommensurable language that any language can be learned by one who is able to use any other language; Davidson is right in denouncing the very idea of a conceptual scheme. But Rorty disagrees with him about the relevance of this point to the ultimate ideas of universal validity and objective truth. Rorty says that we shall not be tempted to ask about the place of intentionality in a world of causation or about the relation of language and thought. According to him there is no such thing as one to one language world relationship to worry about. In his view the world is just a shadow of our discourse. For Rorty, Habermas is one of the most socially useful philosophers. Habermas wants to put philosophy in the service of human emancipation. He sees Habermas' theory of 'communicative reason' as a giant step towards completing the task that Dewey began reformulating traditional philosophical conceptions in ways that will make them more useful for the self-description of a democratic society.

Epistemological Shift in Rorty

In *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* Rorty criticizes a number of ideas that have found a home in philosophy's "epistemological

projects'. According to Rorty the consideration of knowledge as accurate representation, made possible by special mental processes and intelligible through a general theory of representation, needs to be abandoned.³ A common thread among them is the idea of knowledge as 'cognition', by which Rorty means a mental state that qualifies as knowledge by having been caused "in the right way" whatever is defined as the right way becomes our source of privileged representations, which are the best knowledge, uniquely deserving the name of science. Rorty seems to assume that epistemology in any usual form presupposes this "cognitive" concept of knowledge, thinking that knowledge is distinguished from non-knowledge by its being caused in an appropriate way. That is why the notion of a theory of knowledge will not make sense unless we have confused causation and justification.⁴ If epistemic quality depends on cause, then we are dealing with the epistemology of privileged representations that is mental states which are certain because of their causes rather than of the argument given for them.

Rorty says that Kant advances in the direction of taking knowledge to be of propositions rather than of objects. He asked what would a full-blown conception of knowledge as fundamentally 'knowing that' look like? If sentences replace experience and justification then it should be carefully distinguished from causation. Conversation, the exchange of statements replaces the contemplative monologue of the mentalism of transcendental synthesis. This is Rorty's anti-epistemological argu-

ment. According to Rorty knowledge has to be true of course, but there is no practical differences between a true belief and one which passes for true because it is so well justified. Passing for true does not make a statement true. Rorty thus depart from the old pragmatic tradition of a theory of truth. True does not have the same logical meaning as 'justified', but the logical distinction between them makes no difference in practice and can be dropped. The justification of belief is the dialectical defensibility of statements of belief. Knowledge chases agreement up the true of conversation.⁵ As Rorty has put, nothing counts as justification unless by reference to what we already accept, and there is no way to get outside our beliefs and our language so as to find some test other than coherence. Knowledge is what we are justified in believing, then we will not imagine that there are enduring constraints on what can count as knowledge.⁶ According to Rorty justification is a social phenomenon rather than a transaction between the knowing subject and reality.

Rorty goes all the way from presence and representation to an entirely linguistic and anti-representational view of knowledge. Knowledge does not require a real something that transcend our belief in order to measure the cognitive quality of our conversations. Knowledge revolves entirely within the discourse. It is entirely a matter of sentences people believe true, the statements they make, the interlocutors who receive and criticize such statements, and the standards they go

by. In the eighteenth century it was said that nothing but an idea could be like an idea. Rorty transcribes this insight in the register of language. Nothing but a sentence can justify a sentence, showing that a sentence is warranted means showing its connection with other sentences assumed to be warranted. Further more since a perception is evidence for a sentence only when it is described or interpreted with a sentence verification that revolves entirely within language.

Rorty says that we understand knowledge when we understand the social justification of belief, and thus have no need to view it as accuracy of representations. The social justification of belief, he says, is not a matter of special relation between ideas(or words) and objects, but of conversation, of social practice.⁷ This presupposition entails a number of consequences. Some are negative, for instance, that there is no such thing as a justified belief, which is non propositional nor justification which is not a relation between proposition. According to him everything which is not a matter of social practice is no help in understanding the justification of human knowledge. More positively conversation is said to be the ultimate context within which knowledge is to be understood. Justification is relative to the different conversations we can have. Alternative standards of justification make knowledge that depends on what a given society, or profession or other group takes to be a good ground for assertions of a certain sort.

On Rorty's view, "we have a variety of language games; the use of words in a language game is determined by what Rorty sometimes refers to as "algorithms" or programs. The input of these programs are themselves, Rorty says, always tailored to the needs of a particular input-output function, a particular conversion of representation, and the output are ways of coping, ranging from technological strategies to emotional aesthetics, even spiritual attitudes."⁸

Rorty establishes his own claims to deny truth as the ultimate aim of philosophy. Rorty's view is that we should think of inquiry, in science or any other area of culture, as solving problems rather than aiming at truth. Only the discredited correspondence theory of truth makes it plausible to think of truth as the name of a goal. Once that notion is given up, we can give up the idea of inquiry converging to a predestined point and consider the horizons of inquiry as constantly expanding as we encounter new problems.

On Rorty's view, if we drop that distinction and that problematic, we cannot explain what we mean by "correspondence" unless we posit something like the world as it is in itself or the features that a thing has intrinsically independent of how we describe it. That is why Rorty thinks that when thing-in-itself goes, correspondence also goes. Although the idea of the things-in-itself is in disrepute, it seems to Rorty to survive, in disguise, in the purportedly non controversial idea that things have intrinsic, non description – relative features. That idea is

quite distinct from the claim that most things under most descriptions, have the features they do in entire causal independence from the way they are described. Habermas also rejects the correspondence theory. According to him such a theory is an objective illusion. Correspondence theories of truth lend to hypostatize facts as entities in the world. It is an intention and inner logic of epistemology.

Rorty's famous dictum about truth is that "true for me but not for you" and "true in my culture but not in yours" are weird, pointless locution. So is "true then, but not now" where as we often say good for this purpose, but not for that' and right in this situation, but not in that, it seems pointlessly paradoxical to relativize truth to purposes or situations. On the other hand, justified for me but not for you makes perfect sense."⁹

Rorty is mainly indebted to Donald Davidson. He realized that nobody even tries to specify the nature of truth. *A fortiori*, pragmatist should not whether or not one agrees with Davidson that it is important to be able to give a definition of "true in a given natural language, one can profit from his arguments that there is no possibility of giving a definition of "true" that works for all such languages. Davidson has helped as realize that the very absoluteness of truth is a good reason for thinking that no theory of nature of truth is possible.

Rorty argues that truth is not a goal of inquiry. If truth is the nature of such a goal then, indeed there is no truth. Rorty's important

view is that freedom is more important than truth. Like Rorty, Derrida and Foucault are fighting for human freedom. He says that we shall never know, for sure whether a given belief is true, but we can be sure that nobody is presently able to summon up and any residual objections to it, that everybody agrees that it ought to be held. There are to be sure, what Lacanians call impossible, indefinable sublime object of desire. But a desire for such an object can not be made relevant to democratic politics. On Rorty's view truth is just such an object. It is too sublime, so to speak, to be either recognized or aimed at.

Truth and Justification

There are many uses for the word true but the only one which could not be eliminated from our linguistic practices with relative ease is the "cautionary" use. That is the use we make with the word when we contrast justification and truth, and say that a belief may be justified but not true.¹⁰ Rorty interpreted Davidson as saying that the word "true" had no explanatory use, but merely a disquotation use, a commenting use, and what Rorty called a "cautionary" use. The latter is its use in such expressions as fully justified, but perhaps not true. The reason there is less to be said about truth than one might think Rorty suggested, is that terms used to commend or caution – terms such as "good", "right", "true", false way to go and watch it do not need much philosophical definition or explication.

Rorty's underlying idea was that the entire force of the cautionary use of "true" is to point out that justification is relative to an audience and that we can never exclude the possibility that some better audience might exist, or come to exist, to whom a belief that is justifiable to us would not be justifiable. "For any audience one can imagine a better-informed audience and also a more imaginative one- an audience that has thought up hitherto-undreamt- of alternatives to the proposed belief. The limits of justification would be the limits of language, but language(like imagination) has no limits."¹¹ The only difference between truth and justification which makes such a difference is, as far as Rorty can see, the difference between old audience and new audience. So Rorty takes an appropriate pragmatist attitude toward truth to be: it is no more necessary to have a philosophical theory about the nature of truth, or the meaning of the word 'true'. As a pragmatist Rorty thinks that beliefs are habits of action rather than attempt to correspond to reality.

Given this pragmatic view of the truth justification distinction, what about the claim that all human beings desire truth? Rorty's view of justification has two aspects, a contextualist aspects and a reformist aspects. A brief description of these aspects is necessary to analyse his argument. As having contextualist aspect, to be a justification is just to be counted as a justification by some group of people. Accordingly a justification means:

1. In ordinary circumstances, there is usually a fact of the matter as to whether the statements people make are warranted or not.

2. Whether a statement is warranted or not is independent of whether the majority or one's cultural peers would say it is warranted or unwarranted.

Rorty's proposal is that we give up the idea that there is any such thing as representing individual "chunks of reality" and also we give up the idea that there is any such thing as "objectivity" and talk about "solidarity" instead, the proposal that we think of warranted belief as a purely sociological notion, it does not seem that there is any clear sense in which that victory will represent a reform.

Although Rorty is famous for denying that there is any correspondence between our words and elements of reality, virtually all of Rorty's writings contain passages intended to reassure us that he is not denying that there is a world, or even denying that we are in immediate touch with the world.

Antirepresentationalism

The term 'anti-realism' was first put in circulation by Michael Dummett. He formulated the opposition between realism and anti-realism in the following term.

Dummett characterized realism as the belief that statements of the disputed class possess an objective truth-value independently of our means of knowing it. They are true or false in virtue of a reality

existing independently of us. The anti-realist opposes this view that statement of the disputed class are to be understood only by reference to the sort of things that they claim. Dummett believes that the difference between the realist and the antirealist is a difference about the meaning of the disputed class of statements. So he thinks that the theory of meaning is philosophically fundamental.

For representationalist “making true” and representing are reciprocal relations. But the anti representationalists see both notions as equally unfortunate and dispensable – not just in regard to statement of some disputed class but in regard to all statement. The antirepresentationalist is quite willing to grant that our language has been shaped by the environment we live in.

Indeed, he or she insists on this point that our language could not be “out of touch with the reality” any more than our bodies could. What he or she denies is that it is explanatorily useful to pick and choose among the contents of our minds or our language and say that this or that items corresponds to or represents the environment in a way that some other items does not. On an antirepresentationalist view, it is one thing to say that a prehensible thumb, or an ability to use the word “atom” as physicists do, is useful for coping with the environment. The representationalist notion is that the reality referred to by “quark” was of “deferminate” before the word “quark” came along. In Rorty’s view is that, great scientists invert description of the world which

are useful for purpose of predicting and controlling what happens just as poets and political thinkers invert other descriptions of it for other purposes. But there is no sense in which any of these descriptions is an accurate representation of the way the world is in itself.¹²

By an antirepresentationalist account Rorty measures one which does not view knowledge as a matter of getting reality right, but rather as a matter of acquiring habits of action for coping with reality. Representationalist typically think that controversies between idealists and realists were and controversies between skeptics and antiskeptics are, fruitful and interesting. Antirepresentationalist typically thinks both sets of controversies as pointless. They diagnose both as the results of being held captive by a picture, a picture from which we should by now become free.

Antirepresentationalist suggests that we throw out the whole cluster of concepts which are used to make us think we understand what the determinacy of reality means. They see no use in formulating an independent test of accuracy of representation-of reference or correspondence to an antecedently determinate' reality-no test distinct from the success which is supposedly explained by this accuracy. According to Rorty representationalist offer us no way of deciding whether a certain linguistic idems is usefully deployed because it stands in these relations, or whether its utility is due to some factors which have nothing to do with them. As Davidson puts, there is no chance that some

one can take up a vantage point for comparing conceptual schemes by temporality shedding his own. From the standpoint of the representationalist, the fact that notions like representation, reference, and truth are deployed in ways which are internal to a language or a theory is no reason to drop them. Thomas Nagel thinks that to deprive ourselves of such notions as representation and 'correspondence' would be to stop trying to climb outside of our own minds an effort some would regard as insane and that Rorty regard as philosophically fundamental.

Antirepresentationalists do not think such efforts insane, but they do think that the history of philosophy shows them to have been fruitless and undesirable. They think that these efforts generate the sort of pseudo-problems which Wittgenstein hoped to avoid by abandoning the picture which held him captive. When he wrote the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein was not suggesting that both realism and idealism share representationalist presuppositions which we would be better off dropping.

According to Rorty, 'Really talking about x is not the same as talking about real x'. 'Really' here is just a matter of 'placing' the relative ignorance of the person being discussed in the context of the relatively greater knowledge claimed by the speaker. "Anti-representationalists" thinks that there is no way to explain "what 'determinate' means in such context except by chanting one of a number of equally baffling words and so they see the realist use of determinate as merely incanta-

tory.”¹³ Rorty starts an anti representationalist account of the relation between natural science and the rest of culture, arguing that science is a matter not of discovering a true objective reality independent of mind and language but rather of acquiring habits of action for coping with reality independent of mind and language. “The appropriate position for the “antirealist” is just to admit that nothing will explicate “theory independent truth”, just as nothing will explicate “non instrumental” goodness or non-functional beauty.”¹⁴

Change of Meaning

The Philosopher had been portrayed, since the beginning of the ‘linguistic turn’, as a man who knew about concepts by knowing about the meanings of words, and whose work therefore transcends the empirical. But as soon as it is admitted that empirical considerations incites but do not produce conceptual change. According to Rorty once we give up the notion of meaning, we also give up the notion of reference as determined by meaning of the defining attributes of a term picking out the referent of the term.

Feyerabend himself had been content to suggest that when meaning changed everytime any feature of use also changed. For “meaning invariance” was simply the linguistic way of stating the Kantian claim that inquiry, to be rational, had to be conducted within a permanent framework knowable a priori, a scheme which both restricted possible empirical content and explained what it was rational to do with any

empirical content which came along. Rorty's view is that meaning only seemed important, because it provided a way to pick out an object in the world, which we could then determine to be the same or not the same as some object countenanced by our own culture, theory, story or game.

The need to pick out objects without the help of definitions, essence, and meanings of terms produced, philosophers thought, a need for a 'theory of reference' which would not employ the Fregean machinery which Quine had rendered dubious. Putnam, having cleared up part of the confusion created by Feyerabend's talk of meaning-change. But Rorty thinks to treat the difference between taking the notion of 'meaning' seriously and abandoning it, but rather as the difference between an 'idealistic' and a realistic theory of meaning. Putnam thinks, philosophers as typically having either strongly antirealist or strongly realistic institution. Rorty thinks that the quest for a theory of reference represents a confusion between the hopeless 'semantic' quest for a general theory of what people are really talking about and equally hopeless epistemological quest for a way of refuting the skeptic and under writing over claim to be talking about nonfictions.

Rorty agrees with the holistic point that words gain their meaning from other words rather than by virtue of their representative character, and the corollary that vocabularies acquire their privileges from the men who use them rather than from their transparency to the real.¹⁵

Rorty agrees that the much-advertised cleavage between thinking in the sciences and the humanities does not exist. Rorty rejects the idea of distinction between meaning and significance. He does not think philosophers have discovered or will discover something about the nature of knowledge or language or intentionality or reference which is going to make life startlingly different for critics of historians or anthropologists.

Rorty rejects the holistic theory of interpretation or general theory of interpretation. According to him interpretation has become a theme for philosophers largely as a result of the attempt to split the difference between the essentialist and the antiessentialist. For 'interpretation' is an existing notion only as long as it contrasts with something harder, less controversial something like explanation of natural science.

According to Rorty, Davidson is an anti-reductionist physicalist. It is to say that he combines this claim with the doctrine that reduction is a relation merely between linguistic items, not among ontological categories. Davidson envisages that to reduce the language of x's to the language of y's one must show either (a) that if you can talk about y's you do not need to talk about x's or (b) that any given descriptions in terms of x's applies to all and only the things to which a given description in terms of y's applies. But neither sort of reduction would show that x's are nothing by y's any more than it shows the converse.

According to Rorty, "nothing could show that an x is what it is and no other things. For to be and x is roughly, to be signified by the set of true sentences, which contain the term x essentially. For most interesting example of x and y (eg mind and bodies) there are lots of true sentences about x's in which y can not be substituted for 'x' while preserving truth. The only way to show that there are no x's would be to show that there are no such sentences. That would amount to showing that 'x' and 'y' were merely, so to speak, stylistic variation of one another. It is unlikely that any philosophically interesting cases of putative ontological reduction would be of this sort."¹⁶

It is very rarely the case that we can accomplish either (a) or (b) that we can show that a given language-game which has been playing for some time is dispensable. This is because any tool which has been used for sometime is likely to continue to have use. This case in which a tool can be discarded will be recognized as such only after a new tool has been devised and has been employed for some time. For instance after a hundred years of experience with Newtonian language we may all come to agree that we no longer need Aristotelian language. Rorty thinks that after five hundred years of experience with the language of a secular culture we may find ourselves no longer bothering to use religious terminology. In such cases, x-talk just fades away, not because someone has made a philosophical discourse of scientific discovery that there are no x's, but because nobody any longer has a use for

this sort of talk. According to Rorty ontological parsimony is not to be attained by armchair linguistic analysis, (the positivistic thought) but if at all in everyday practice.

Pragmatist turn in Rorty

Rorty argues that since the world neither is language nor is written in language, and since it can thus offer us no self descriptions and can tell us nothing about what it really is, we must therefore abandon the idea of science as the search for progressively closer approximations to something like the 'real nature of reality'. Like Goodman, he thinks that there is no such thing as 'nature proper', no one way the world is, nothing already formulated or framed and waiting to be transcribed. Rorty maintains that we ought to give up any philosophical attempt to make our criteria appear to be more than simply our criteria, but in addition the right criteria, somehow belonging to nature itself, and thus capable of leading us towards truth.¹⁷

In other words, nature might be the cause of the appearance or the foundation of certain conceptions and beliefs, but it cannot be the cause of the fact that certain conceptions are better than others or certain beliefs are true. As Rorty says the history of science tells us only that one day Newton had a bright idea, namely gravity, but says silent on how gravity caused Newton to acquire the concept of itself – or more generally, how the world 'guide' us to converge on 'absolute' rather than merely 'perspectival' terms. The reason we must stop thinking that the

progress of scientific knowledge allows us to claim that we are closer today to the truth than yesterday, seem for Rorty essentially to be because the world has no way of 'telling us' whether we are or not. The world has no way of telling us know that the conventions that allow us apparently more convenient and increasingly better control over the problems of present us, also tend to become more like those conventions according to which the world itself acts. This argument is further proof for truth is the property of our representations of the world, and not something we can hope to find in the world. It proves, as Rorty says, that "where there are no sentences there is no truth, that sentences are elements of human language and that human languages are human creations". In other words, reality can only let us know that our representations need to be improved it can no longer be replaced by ever better once because they finally represent the world as it really is.¹⁸ For Rorty, to take the determinacy of the world as already given, as another external 'authority' to be obeyed instead of what we ourselves do. Rorty's pragmatism wants to hold on to the materialistic world-view that typically forms the background of contemporary liberal self-consciousness, while refraining from the claim that this view has been established by a method, much less the "one reliable method for reaching the truth about the nature of things."

If one takes the core of pragmatism to be its attempt to replace the notion of true beliefs as representation of "the nature of things" and

instead to think of them as successful rules for action, then it becomes easy to recommend an experimental, fallibilist attitude, but hard to isolate a “method” that will embody this attitude.

Rorty says that pragmatism would like to stick with which to beat the people who refuse to share their naturalism, once they have deprived themselves of the ability to say that their antagonists are not “corresponding to the nature of things.” “The claim that antinaturalists are being irrational, or not using ‘intelligence’, seems the obvious way for an alternative. For this suggests that there is some neutral ground upon which naturalist and anti-naturalists can meet, and naturalist conquer. Unless there is some such grounds the specter of relativism looms.”¹⁹ Actually Rorty emphasises that all objects are already contextualized. Briefs accordingly do never represent non beliefs. There are only re;atopms pf “aboutness” and that too is within the context.

Rorty’s materialism and naturalism are ultimately a question of pure conviction, as he freely admits. “Accordingly, when, in the absence of persuasive grounds for adopting this philosophical orientation, one inquires into its deep cultural wellsprings, it becomes clear that Rorty is striving for the ideal of a perfected finitude of human life which has repeatedly-exercised an almost irresistible force of attraction over modern consciousness.”²⁰ Rorty is unwilling to abandon either the naturalism of the scientific world-view or its physicalism. Rorty does indeed see himself as an opponent of the scientification of culture, yet

the normativity of culture does not in his view, pose any chronic problem which might seduce us towards thoughts of a neo-Kantian division. Rorty wants to be naturalistic but not scientific.

Rorty suspects that realist who believes true utterances are true by virtue of something outside themselves to which they 'correspond', must also then be claiming that the final vocabulary of future physics will somehow pertain to nature itself. To hold that the objective truth of which realism speaks cannot be a property of our representations simply because these representations will always be by definition our own work and not that of nature itself, is to hold over realism victory, that is frankly much too easy not behold subject. For him, the idea that matter, spirit, the self or other such things have intrinsic nature that principle is no way dependent upon our activists of knowing.

Rorty advocates something quite different from the minimal realism. For him there is one thing we might possibly say about moral, social and cultural reality: it does not pre-exist to our own creative acts and as such it is in some way entirely made by us. Rorty's contention is to consider ideas as truth and objectivity as useless. He unquestionably speaks from experience and belief.

Rorty defines pragmatism as the view that there are no constraints on inquiry save conversational ones, no wholesale constraints derived from the nature of the objects. Rorty says that our inheritance from, and our conversation with, our fellow humans in our only source

of guidance. According to him sentences must play their way in the work they accomplish.

Rorty says that pragmatism denies the possibility of getting beyond. Derridian claims that concepts and discursive totalities are already cracked and fissured by necessary contradictions and heterogeneities. According to Rorty the later Wittgenstein's naturalistic and pragmatic point of view has given us a new language-game. Rorty's view is that Heidegger, Wittgenstein and others have failed to explain the language game. Pragmatist like Rorty rejects the principle of reason and argue that knowledge can only be assessed according to its practical or 'performative' effects.

Rorty holds William James and John Dewey to be strongest, most consequent of pragmatist thinkers in the American tradition. He is less interested in C.S.Peirce, mainly on account of Peirce's belief that every intellectual discipline requires some ultimate cognitive faith and he has some idea of truth at the end of enquiry. To Rorty this seems a regrettable instance of the pragmatist breaking faith with the perfectly adequate standards of relevance or interest provided by his own cultural time and place.

Rorty wants to make full use of the conceptual scope that has been opened up by the philosophy of language. The objective world is no longer something to be reflected but in simply the common reference point for a process of communication. The communicated facts can no

more be separated from the process of communication than the supposition of an objective world can be separated from the intersubjectivity shared interpretive horizon within which the participants in communication always already operates.²¹ For Rorty every kind of representation of something in the objective world is a dangerous illusion.

Rorty rejects the idea of convergence upon one Truth. As he sees that the only sense in which Truth is one is that, if the process of developing new theories and new vocabularies is chocked off, and there is agreement on the aim to be fulfilled by a belief – that is on the needs to be fulfilled dictated by that belief – then a consensus will develop about which of a finite list of candidates is to be adopted. This Sociological generalization, which is subjected to lots of obvious qualifications, should not be confused with a metaphysical principle. As Davidson has remarked, Putman's "naturalistic Fallacy" argument applies as much to his ideal acceptability theory of truth as any other theory of truth and also he says that the principle of reason can not be naturalized is that reason is normative and norms cannot be naturalized.

Davidson says that there is no room for a relativized concept of truth. Davidson's point is that the only sort of philosophers who would take seriously the idea that truth is relative to context and particularly to choice between human communities. But Davidson's says that we cannot have any language or any beliefs, without being in touch with both a human community and non human reality. There is no possibil-

ity of agreement. According to Davidson most of our belief must be justified in the eyes of our peers for a similar reason. Truth is not to be defined in terms of coherence rather than correspondence in terms of coping with non-human forces, but simply because to ascribe a belief automatically will ascribe in place in a largely coherent set of mostly true belief.

Rorty's idea of metaphysics

Rorty is an antimetaphysician and also interested in deconstructing the western metaphysical tradition. In his criticism of Realism, he invariably formulates his rejection of a thesis of Realism in terms of a counterposed thesis. He thus invariably ends up affirming a thesis that has the same logical form as a thesis, which the Realist affirms, but with one difference: a negative operation has been introduced into the counter close of the thesis. Rorty does not merely refuses to affirm what the Realist say, but ends up affirming an alternative answer to the realistic question. He ends up claiming that there is something we can not do or have which the Realist purports to offer an explication of some notion – such as objectivity, knowledge or representation. Rorty has no interest in the activity of constructive philosophizing; He often goes on to elaborate the outline of an alternative theory showing how we can make sense of our existing practices in the absence of seemingly indispensable notion. This inevitably involves him in the elaboration of further thesis as metaphysically contention as any

of those he sought to reject. Rorty thus ends up by enunciating what certainly appear to be worked-out metaphysical doctrine of his own doctrines. Rorty defines the desire for objectivity as the desire to describe oneself as standing in immediate relation to a non human reality. The thesis is that solidarity should replace objectivity. Rorty as a philosopher who has overcome the obsessions, in metaphysics and epistemology, that have been playing the discipline for centuries.

Rorty and ethnocentrism

Rorty uses the notion of ethnocentrism as a link between antirepresentationalism and political liberalism. Rorty argues that an antirepresentationalist view of inquiry leaves one without a skyhook with which to escape from the ethnocentrism produced by acculturation, but that the liberal culture of recent times has formed a strategy for avoiding the disadvantage of ethnocentrism. "This is to open up encounters with other actual and possible cultures, and to make this openness central to its self-image. This culture is an ethnos which prides itself on its suspicion of ethnocentrism – on its ability to increase the freedom and openness of encounters, rather than on its possession of truth."²²

The source of Rorty's ethnocentric view of knowledge runs deep in pragmatism, linking Dewey and Peirce to Hegel. Rorty makes explicit the implication that our only useful notion of 'true' and real and good are extrapolations from practices and belief. Rorty sees nothing objec-

tionable about ethnocentrism, when the ethnos at the center is a liberal democratic society that makes openness to other central to its own self image. According to Rorty there is nothing more to knowledge than the social justification of belief and the corollary that the conversation is the ultimate context within which knowledge is to be understood. For Rorty, knowledge is ethnocentrically justified belief which pragmatically entails its passing – for – true among the interlocutors, Rorty wants to claim that there is no point in trying to find a general synoptic way of “analyzing” the functions knowledge has in universal context of practical life and that cultural anthropology is all that we need.

Richard Rorty advocates a philosophical superficiality and light-mindedness which helps along the disenchantment of the world and which he believes, will make the world inhabitants more pragmatic, more tolerant, more liberal and more receptive to the appeal of instrumental rationality. Rorty used to think in this way on the basis of his assumption that meanings which we ascribe have been created by our own effort and we take it seriously.

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Chapter V

CONCLUSION

In the preceding four chapters, an attempt has been made to evaluate the question of indeterminacy of truth and meaning in the philosophy of Derrida, Lyotard and Rorty. As a result of the detailed enquiry into the above problem, it is found that with the question of indeterminacy of truth and meaning a new era begins in the history of philosophy.

Derrida with his first celebrated article 'Structure, sign and play' initiated a new political and cultural approach. Although many critics have failed to locate Derrida in the actual place and charged him of introducing a play theory, the fact remains contrary. Derridian approach towards truth and meaning remains not only a critique of structuralism and determinacy of meaning but also a new way of understanding the world. At the same time Lyotard shows the necessity to evolve paralogical means to counter the rising incredulity towards metanarratives. Derrida wants to realize the de-centred nature of the discourse. In the case of Rorty, we find radical critique of philosophy as such from an anti-foundational stand point.

This work analyses mainly Derridian deconstruction, Lyotard's incredulity towards metanarratives and Rorty's pragmatic contextualism. These three philosophical notions are one way or other related to postmodern developments.

For Rorty, the question is not about how to define words like “truth” or “rationality” or “knowledge” or “philosophy”; but about what self-image our society should have of itself. Lyotard distinguishes between the old constative criteria of truth and falsehood, and the present day stress on performativity, as a measure of practical effect. Rorty is also making similar point when he argues that philosophy has better set out to be interesting and relevant, rather than ‘true’ in some ultimate epistemological sense. For Derrida the entire problem stems from ‘the metaphysics of presence’ and he seeks a way out of this.

In the radical contextualism of Lyotard and Rorty, we get a kind of anti-foundational approach that criticizes the traditional faith in ultimate Truth. However, the radical contextualism itself thrives on a negative metaphysics, which ceaselessly circle around the metaphysical idealism which had always intended by the unconditioned, but which it had always failed to achieve.

First part of the introduction shows that the problems of meaning and truth is the basic and open issues in the various contemporary approaches to language in the twentieth century that characterizes a linguistic turn in philosophy. It is seen that there is no genuine solution to the problem of radical signification. Meaning is unsurpassably precursive. A rethinking in the area of meaning generation becomes inevitable, as the linguistic philosophers fails to transcend the traditional metaphysics. The latter part of the introduction concludes with

the rejections of unitary single principle. The attack on a monolithic way of interpretation and one-to-one mirror theory, evolve a radical way to link philosophy with various other disciplines. The beginning of the linguistic turn brought forth language-oriented approach while the later developments switched over to a wider approach.

Deconstruction is an entirely new method of philosophical criticism. It aims to attain unexpected results in philosophy and literary criticism. Derrida rejects almost all kinds of ideas in modern linguistic philosophy and he treats philosophy as just one kind of writing. Derrida provides us with explanatory acts of reading by inventing new techniques. He establishes that all thinking about language, philosophy and culture must be conceived within the context of a massively extended writing. He also rejects Superior truth claim. Deconstruction is a method, strategy and politics of demystification. He shows that there is nothing outside the text(horse-text). At the same time he does not deny the existence of an outside world. On the contrary his assertion is that by restoring to a particular text itself we can locate the problem. In addition to this he could successfully overcome the subjectivism. For Derrida, the philosophy of Subjectivity never characterized as monological or individual is one of the historical permutation of metaphysics, but it is never identified with it. His conclusion is that there can be no thinking back to origin and source, no escaping from the logic of supplementarity. In spite of his disagreements with Derrida,

Habermas agree with this notion of reality. Habermas advocates that philosophy of subjectivity was a false start and that its political uselessness became increasingly obvious in our century. In the history of western philosophy, over enthusiasm to seek a particular centre and truth always spoiled the real spirit of philosophy. For Derrida, the one-centred or subject centred approach leads to mere metaphysical position rather than finding truth for truth need not be hidden like that.

Poststructuralism ultimately criticises linguistic and structuralist theories by arguing that knowledge, truth and reality do not find its origin from experience, but in language. Accordingly, the grand narratives which has worked with modernity used to spread an idealistic position. Since science as a grand narrative marginalized other narratives it is as good as killing the quest for knowledge. For Lyotard the developments in modern science insolently possess the logic of marginalization, so poststructural and postmodern thinkers agree in one point threat the determinacy principle of modernity tried to estrange many truths to the margin of the centre of which it used to justify.

Derrida's powerful thinkings are devoted to the task of dismantling a concept of 'structure' that serves to immobilize the play of meaning in a text and reduce it to a manageable compass. Organizing principle of the structure would limit what we might call the 'play of structure'. Even today the notion of the structure with a specific centre de-

stroys the possibility of generation of meaning. Derrida says that any substitute does not substitute itself for anything, which has somehow existed before it. It is necessary to think that there is no centre or origin. Centre has no natural site, that it was not a fixed locus but a function. We find that by dismantling the center and origin, everything becomes a discourse. He formulates a decentred discourse and thereby opens up multicentered discourse. If the system is central signified and transcendental signified, it will never absolutely present outside the system of differance.

“Differance’ which is prior to all determinate differences, collapses into absolute identity. Derrida’s argument is that free play of elements lead to undecidability within every system of communication. Writing is at once the source of all cultural activity. He puts forth a grammar of writing in order to overcome the phonocentric logic. For him, writing is totality of what makes it possible. Condition of truth is the possibility of writing rather than inscription. Truth is not a fixed phenomenon hidden beneath or behind a sign. On the other hand, truth is generated by the play of ‘Differance’, which is the process of deferring and differing simultaneously operating within the texts.

In the traditional approach from Plato to Husserl, meaning and truth were considered as immanent realities hidden behind the visible phenomenon. So they approached meaning and truth as some metaphysical phenomenon. Philosophical enquiry itself was directed to the

discovery of truth which other discourses could not reveal. Plato's idealism to Husserl's reductionism paved the way for such a thinking that philosophy is the only branch of knowledge dealing with truth. But Derrida by means of deconstructing various texts shows that the demarcation between philosophy and non philosophy itself is metaphysical. Derrida's attempt to read the story, 'Before the law' by Franz Kafka also intends to show that any text is a discourse and strictly speaking, Plato's *Republic* exhibits certain features owing to its metaphorical force. So, the question of genre and demarcation has been problematized by Derrida. After that he has wanted to show the decentred nature of the world and thereby the uselessness of metaphysical approach of the traditional western philosophy. There has indeed occurred a momentous shift in the relations of knowledge and power, such that the operative truth conditions of any given programme will be subjected to all manner of delayed effects and unlooked – for incidental 'profit'. At last, we find that Derrida would appear to be headed towards pragmatic conclusion.

Lyotard in his report on knowledge explains the plight of knowledge in the present world. Accordingly, the present postmodern condition brings forth a kind of irreducibility of knowledge as well as genuine quest for knowledge. So in the universities and other institutions real quest for knowledge and genuine research comes to exist. The managers of data bank decide what kind of information and data should be

made available and what not. In such a way truth and falsity evade the traditional measure and knowledge itself become mere discourse. Knowledge ceases to be an end in itself. Like Habermas, Lyotard also believes that the goal of knowledge is exchange.

Modern Science is legitimated because it always depends on one or another of the great narratives. Postmodern Science is able to transform the nature of knowledge and its function. The discourse, rules and validity of postmodern science is immanent in it.

As a postmodern thinker, Lyotard exhibits certain similarities with Foucault. For Lyotard, knowledge is a form of informational commodity indispensable to productive power. Similarly, Foucault introduces the concept of power as an explicit counter to semiological models of the sociologists. Foucault shows that the history of world is not a straight line phenomenon with progress as its only end. On the other hand, he shows that history is discontinuation rather than continuous. It is the relation of power and knowledge that plays determining role rather than relation between meaning and knowledge.

For Lyotard, the ideology of communicational 'transparency' which goes hand in hand with the commercialization of knowledge, will begin to perceive the state as the factor of opacity and 'noise'. The producers and users of knowledge have started to control the origin and dissemination of knowledge. In Lyotard's opinion, with the advent of postmodern techniques of knowledge and information the logic of un-

derstanding as such has undergone change. Knowledge loses its use value. Today the status of knowledge is unbalanced and its unity is broken. Lyotard's view is that, the right to decide what is true is not independent of the right to decide what is just. There is a strict inter linkage between the kind of language called science, ethics and politics.

Lyotard doubts the veracity of narratives in the present world. Late capitalism have developed a new incredulity towards precisely the narratives or rather metanarratives. Lyotard's exploration of the status of knowledge is not only linked to but framed and contextualized by the crisis of narratives. Narration is denotative prescriptive, descriptive and so on. However we do not necessarily establish stable language combinations. Metanarrative provides a framework in which all other cultural narratives find their grounds and acquire their meaning and legitimacy. We find that when grand narratives lose their credibility little narratives proliferate. With the development of technology, the breakdown of disciplinary boundaries happen and a new era begins. As the metanarratives loses its power to prescribe whatever is true and first new counter measures should evolve.

We no longer have recourse to the grand narrative. We have seen that, the little narratives remains quite essential form of imaginative invention, most particularly in science. Little or counter narratives arise as a result of paralogical interventions. This paralogy which begins to act in the contemporary world. Local determinism have been

understood by others as interpretive communities made up of both producers and consumers of particular kind of knowledge, of text, often operating within a particular institutional context within particular divisions of cultural labour or within particular places. Action can be conceived of and decided only within the confines of some local determinism.

Knowledge is produced and constituted at the particular sites, where the localized power discourse prevails. For Lyotard, our incredulity is now such that we no longer expect salvation to rise from these inconsistencies. He says, consensus is a horizon that is never reached. Consensus has become an outmoded and suspect value. Lyotard gave importance to the idea and practice of justice that is not linked to that of consensus. Like Rorty, he thinks justice as a value is neither outmoded nor suspect.

Lyotard argues for using language game with minimum relation required for society to exist. Language games exist only in social bonds. The language game of legitimation does not belong to the realm of politics, but philosophy. Lyotard argues that, the criteria for regulating the truth claims of knowledge, derives from discrete, context-dependent language game and not from absolute rules or standards.

The State must abandon the idealist and humanist narratives of legitimation in order to justify the new goal in the discourse today. The only credible goal is power. Scientists, technicians and instrumen-

talists are purchased not find truth but power. "Force" appears to belong exclusively to the last game. The worker or producer does not look for the pre-established principle for their works, and they cannot be judged according to a determined judgment, by applying familiar categories to the texts or to the work. Here the work itself is the rule rather than any pre established rule or low-governed act.

Lyotard rejects consensus as it acts as the variation of power. He wants paralogism as the local counter measure to overcome the incredulity of the metanarratives. The ultimate vision of science and knowledge today as a search not for consensus, but very precisely for instabilities as a practice of paralogism. Lyotard has used the language game method by his current thought of paralogism. Paralogy is the hallmark of postmodern sciences.

Lyotard is not interested in merely playing off a language theory, he seeks, instead, the space of differences within their opposition and out where by the figural may emerges.

Foucault is primarily concerned with the implication of the ultimate arbitrariness of the criteria of truth in relation to the view of human science. Lyotard is much more concerned with the repercussion on philosophy itself. Lyotard considers theory, by which he understands less individual sciences than philosophical discourse claiming to provide an apodictic universal, and systematic foundation for knowledge as a form of fiction which denies its own fictive status.

Lyotard's initial task is to reveal the structural peculiarities of libidinal investment which characterizes theory. Foucault is claiming truth for his historical theories, while insisting on an immanent connection between truth and power. Lyotard appreciates that a pluralist ontology of forces cannot claim to be true, except at the cost of self contradiction, but can rather only be affirmed.

So both Foucault and Lyotard evades the problem of political power as that which exist as concrete reality. Lyotard's conclusion is that no one can master them all.

In the underlining themes of Rorty's view, we know that he is not aiming at the ultimate truth but rather solving problems. He claims that every kind of representation of something in the objective world is a dangerous illusion. Rorty's proposal is that we should give up the idea that there is any such thing as "objectivity". There is doubt that his own version of pragmatism is superior to every previous philosophical position.

Rorty challenges radically a variety of semantic notion as well as the internal influence of empiricist thought, and he may therefore seems to be supporting claim in literary criticism, about the death of the subject and about meaning as indeterminate. As a commonsense pragmatist Rorty mistrust all grand theories. Like Lyotard, Rorty also rejects the grand narratives. He equates narration with story telling in order to show their performative role in society.

Rorty agrees with Davidson in some ideas but he disagrees with his truth claim and world of causation or about the relation of language and thought. Rorty thinks that there is no such thing as language. In his view the world is just a shadow of our discourse. Rorty's opinion is that knowledge has to be true of course, but there is no justificatory practical belief. True does not have the same logical meaning as justified. Rorty has shown that nothing counts as justification unless by reference to what we already accept. Justification functions as a social phenomenon, rather than a transaction between knowing subject and reality. For Rorty knowledge is ethnocentrically justified belief which pragmatically entails its passing-for-true among the interlocutors. Rorty gave importance to social justification of belief. This social justification of belief is not a matter of special relation between ideas and objects, but of conversation of social practice. This conversation is said to be the ultimate context within which knowledge is to be understood.

As an antirepresentationalist Rorty rejected correspondence theory. In this regard Habermas is closely related to him. Both of them says that correspondence theory is merely an objective illusion. Rorty's justification is only applied into that context. As a radical contextualist Rorty believes everything is applicable in a given context. As a pragmatist, Rorty thinks that belief are habits of action rather than attempt to correspond to reality. Rorty start an anti representationalist account of the relation between natural science and the rest of culture, arguing

that science is a matter of discovering a true objective reality independent of mind and language but for copying with reality independent of mind and language. As a thorough going pragmatist Rorty rejects the principle of reason and argues that knowledge can only be assessed according to its practical or performative effects. However critics doubt how far Rorty could overcome the limitation of William James and C.S. Peirce in his attempt to formulate a theory of contextualism.

As a neo-pragmatist, Rorty upholds a materialistic world-view, that typically forms the background of contemporary liberal-self consciousness. Rorty does indeed himself as an opponent of the scientification of culture, yet the normativity of culture does not in his view, pose any chronic problem. Rorty's pragmatism denies the possibility of getting beyond.

Rorty's aims of ethnocentrism as a link between antirepresentationalism and political liberalism. His ethnocentric view of knowledge runs deep in pragmatism. He advocates that we will make the world inhabitants, more pragmatic and more liberal. Rorty envisages that all we should do is point out the practical advantages of liberal institutions in allowing individuals and cultures to get along together without intruding on each others privacy, without meddling with each others conventions of the good. We saw that Rorty's culture of liberal democracies as still providing a lot of opportunities for self-criticism and reforms.

With postmetaphysical philosopher like Rorty, deconstruction has come to figure as a handy cover-term for everything, that points beyond the old dispensation of reason, knowledge and truth. Rorty argues that we should give up the thinking of philosophy as in any sense a specialized activity of thought; we should think of it rather as just another voice in the ongoing cultural conversation of mankind. Derrida provides that all basic concepts and categories of philosophy are in fact nothing more than optional items in some purely contingent final vocabulary.

Habermass says that analytic philosophy and structuralism, failed to create new methodological foundation. Foucault and Habermas react to the theme of the end of metaphysics by elaborating each in their own way, a politics which is consciously developed as a response to the end of metaphysics. All of them, in their own representation have created a postmetaphysical political philosophy. Like modern critiques Habermass also rejects the rationality of the empirical science. Rorty and Habermass reject the correspondence theory of truth. Like Rorty Habermass also argued for contextualism and pragmatism.

Habermass shows that there is within the philosophical discourse of modernity a continuous critical anti-metaphysical tradition which is very concerned with the same topics as postmodern theory today.

In conclusion we find that the post metaphysical turn in language philosophy dismantles the 'aura' around philosophical truths and 'meaning'. In other words Lyotard Derrida and Rorty develops new links with philosophy and other disciplines by on the one hand criticizing the limitation of traditional philosophy and on the other hand establishing the possibilities inherent in language or rather language game. So in a world where the fixed, stable subjectivizing is facing disintegrators the theoretical implication of postmetaphysical findings have positive role to play. Indeed the world as a whole nowadays look for such schemes of understanding.

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