

**REASON AND INTUITION IN INDIAN
THOUGHT - A CRITICAL APPRAISAL**

**THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF CALICUT
FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

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
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I, Dr. P.V. Unnikrishnan, do hereby certify that this Ph.D. thesis entitled, **Reason and Intuition in Indian Thought – A Critical Appraisal**, is the record of bonafide research work done in this University by **Sri.C.C.DAMODARAN**

under my supervision and guidance.

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DECLARATION

I do hereby declare that this thesis entitled, **Reason and Intuition in Indian Thought - A Critical Appraisal**, is the bonafide work of research done by me in this University under the guidance and supervision of Dr. P.V. Unnikrishnan, Reader, Department of Philosophy, University of Calicut. I also declare that the topic of this thesis does not form the research work of any other person in any form.

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C.C. Damodaran

To My
MOTHER AND FATHER
(The Sacred Sources of All Sublime Inspirations)

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INTRODUCTION

C.C Damodaran “Reason and intuition in Indian thought - A critical appraisal ”
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The sentient human being, at all times and at all places exhibited a tendency to know things which are near and far to him; and also those that are obscure and mysterious to him. The urge to know is universal and takes strong turns from crude physical manipulation to abstruse and abstract psychic elevation. From the primitive status to the most sophisticated mental make-ups, man's quest to know the world and the beings in it has been developed by two trends of thought, which we may now call the *scientific temper* and the *mystic or intuitional temper*. In the scientific temper the causal connection between the antecedent and consequent is explained by sensory and experimental methods, whereas in the other, the causal connection, eventhough is, traced to an empirical footing is not necessarily thought to be solely due to it. World-views, which we now call philosophies and sciences emerged by a spirit and urge motivated by any one or both of the trends.

The problem of this thesis is to critically analyse how these two divergent trends — the *rational* and the *intuitional* have been used by Indian

thinkers to develop a full-fledged method of world-view. Select cases of Western thought will also be attempted in this regard. The possibility of intermingling of these two methods and the resultant dominance achieved are also topics of concern. A critical approach is also attempted to point out the dominance of intuition as a method of study advocated by thinkers both orient and occident.

Turning to the panorama in Indian thought, it had its origin in a hoary antiquity, the period of the *vedās* — a period roughly running backwards to some three to five thousand years. The *vedās* as they are known, are source books of knowledge accumulated and developed by ancient men of thought. They deal as many topics as may now be called from physics to metaphysics; from common-sense observation to a discursive thinking and abstract formulations. These books are four in number, each falling into two sects as per their nature commonly referred to as the sect of action (*karma kāṇḍa*) and set of knowledge (*jnana kanda*). The *jñāna kāṇḍa* contains books that are called *Upaniṣads*, which are treatises on speculative metaphysics. The *upaniṣads* represent the speculative activity of the people of hoary tradition and they are the *darśanās* or philosophies which we have at present in the book-forms.

In India, philosophy has originated not merely out of wonder or curiosity as it was the case in the West. It started from an inner urge to know the real cause of the coming into being of the natural phenomena and also the meaning and status of the life of man in the background of these phenomena. Less sophisticated and undeveloped were his methods of inquiry that he very often stood aghast at their mystery. The initial crude explanations given to them were not satisfying and as a temporary last resort, the primitive men looked at them with awe. These phenomena were subsequently thought to be the working of some gods. Hence each phenomenon was deified and worshipped. Nature worship in its original form, was anthropomorphic as illustrated in the early vedic religion.¹

It was thought that, behind every phenomenon some mysterious and mighty agents were working. Those agents were thought to be divine in nature and different names were assigned to each of them. Thus we have Indra, Agni, Maruts, Varuna and the like. This is how early vedic gods originated.² The vedic gods were partly human and partly divine in their form and behaviour. They participated in the human activities and

¹ S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 1, pp.73-4.

Ibid ² Op. cit., pp.77-8.

possessed human feelings. The 'polytheistic anthropomorphic' cult of early vedic religion slowly gave way to a 'spiritual monotheism' through 'henotheism'.¹ We see certain persistent attempts to explain things that are phenomenal on *rational grounds* in Vedas. But those which could not be understood immediately were ascribed to the workings of the 'sky-ruling gods'.² Later on, this multitude of gods was replaced by *One Supreme*. "The real is one, the learned call it by various names, *Agni, Yama* and *Mātarīśan*".³ The riddle haunts us as the development of thought proceeds in the Vedas. The objectivity and concreteness attached to the mysteries of lives of man and the nature of the world gradually faded, though not lost and finally found expressions in such concepts like *niṣprapañcā Brahman* (Acosmic Brahman), *Nirguṇa Brahman* (Unqualified impersonal Brahman) and the like. This sort of extreme subjectivity and abstraction are the culmination of the thought development in the Vedas.

A consistent and continuous musings of the 'wonders' of the world outside and that within prompted the Vedic thinkers to hold that, an

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp.90-2.

² Homer, *The Odyssey*, p.269.

³ *Ekam sad vipra bahudā vadanti. Agni, Yaman mātarīśvanām ahuḥ*, Rk Veda, 1., 164.46.

ibid

apprehension of these realities could not be gained only by an empirical backing of rationality, else a great amount of profuse non-national thinking must be conjoined to it. This tendency gains ground when one advances in the study of Vedas. Mere intellectual conviction is not the only criterion of beholding things. A state of entering into them, or what may be called meeting them face to face is required. This is what they termed *anubhava* or integral experience. Comprehensive vision or *Saṁyag darśana*, higher wisdom (*prajñā*) are some other expressions occurring early in the Upaniṣads.

Attempts were made, even in the earlier periods to render a definite expression of what one perceived and also what he discerned. The direct expression was possible initially through bodily manipulations and also by verbalization. The verbalization assumed the form of either glorification, or mere description and even personal worship. This has been evidenced in the anthropomorphic and anthropocentric concepts of vedic gods. But all things of discernment cannot be thus verbalized. The difficulty of giving expressions to many acts of discernment found a solution in the act of sublimating to a sort of deep pondering or meditation. In the process of meditation, an appeal to the inner state of man became indispensable. The

appeal to the inner state of man is also an appeal to his inner essence. This inner essence was characterized as *Jīva* or self of man by the Upanisads. This rendering of Jīva is not the complete or final meaning of the Upanisadic concept of Jiva or self. This is an early beginning. Much ideas have been developed and incorporated in the meaning of Self, which we shall see later. The musings of the inner self, thus became an equally powerful but more difficult way of expressing. These two methods of apprehending factors of discernment in the evolutionary process of vedic thought are what may be called in modern phraseology, the rational and the intuitional methods. A description of the rational and the intuitional and their role in apprehending factors of discernment will be dealt in appropriate contexts, and for the time being we shall continue with the general trend in the vedas.

The hard task of popularizing the appeal to inner self as a means of expression of discernment to the interest of layman is achieved in India through epics like *Ramāyana* and *Mahābharata* and also through *Puranas* (books of lore and mythology) and scriptures like *Gīta* etc. These popular books have a prominent role in popularizing these two methods of thought even to the layman. The rational and meditative trends of thought gave

expression to a later well-developed systems of philosophy in India. The same strain of thought also existed in the Greek thinking, where Western philosophy has its origin. It thus becomes a universal phenomenon in every system of thought. Systems of Indian thought, both orthodox and heterodox are influenced either by rational or intuitional strains of thought.

With these preliminary moorings, the present work intends to critically examine the meaning and scope of reason and intuition as methods of philosophical inquiry; their significance in the contexts of Western and Indian thought processes. Also, it is intended to outline the dominance played by intuition on a rational background in the main systems of Indian thought. As a final conclusion, it is intended to point out the sway of intuition over reason as the general trend of Indian thought. Chapterization shall be made so as to suit these objectives.

Reason and Intuition - Their meaning and scope

Man lives in a composite environment, conducive to his growth and also hostile to his living. This mixed conditions necessitate him to develop an attitude of own and diown some factors in the world in which he lives. The attitude of owning is developed into his participation of the activities in

the world. This is how an individual tries to interact with the world. If the factors in the environment are conducive to his immediate physical and mental satisfaction, he is prone to develop an effective interaction. There are equipments, which help him in the effective interaction. They are principally his body and mind, specifically his sensory and motor organs and the rational faculty. It is only a matter of intellectual assumption that one's rational faculty is the sole factor in knowing his world. Knowledge of the world thus starts with reason.

'Intellect' or 'reason', generally means the capacity which helps man to know things around him and also within him. It is "the faculty of thinking and acquiring knowledge, especially of a higher order".¹ Here, 'higher order' is meant to designate that pertaining to the empirical sphere. The sense-organs are equipments directed towards the external world. They take in sensations or sense data and furnish them to the rational faculty of the mind. The mind analyses and synthesises these data and pronounce judgements on them. This is the basic step in acquiring knowledge of the external world or rational knowledge. Since the data

¹ David Yerks (ed.), *Websters Encyclopaedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language* (New York), 1989, p.738.

pertaining to it are necessarily of the world, rational knowledge must be necessarily empirical in nature.

how do you distinguish between empirical and rational knowledge? we don't put down?

The Different Ways of Knowing in Reason

Reason is the source by which man tries to apprehend the external world. The knowledge of the external world is primarily sensory in nature, it is based on the data furnished by the sense-organs. An analysis of the preliminary stages of knowing the external world reveals the following things. Rational or empirical knowledge by its first instance is by sensation or sense-experience. In its subsequent stage it is discursive or logical in nature.

Are Rational and empirical knowledge? Are one and the same?

Knowledge by Sensation

As pointed just now, it is the primary step in acquiring the ideas of the external world. The external world is a concrete entity with spatio-temporal framework and as such, the objects coming under it are material or concrete in nature. Concrete objects are open to others by virtue of their attributes, qualities and extension. As extension, they have size or shape. That is, they are bodily in some form or other, however subtle or gross that might be. They have qualities like colour, taste etc. They have properties

like motion, rest, inertia, change etc. Because of their properties they are subject to composition and hence decomposition. But how we come to know these properties of substances, which constitute human ways of knowing the external world. Every living being, with varied competence, has an inbuilt mechanism which helps them to draw impressions from the objects around and an inbuilt capacity to work on and interpret the ideas received. Unless beings are endowed with these capacities, they, including man, would have been mere spectators of the world.

The impressions of the objects outside must be received by some means, and living beings have organs for this purpose. Man has five developed sense-organs to receive impressions or stimuli from the external world. When sense-organs came into contact with the object, the stimuli fall on them. The impression received by each sense-organ is then called a sense-datum. Sense-organs exhibit selectivity in receiving stimuli and producing sense-data. Thus the eye is for seeing, the ear for hearing etc. The sense-data are furnished to the rational faculty where the analysis and synthesis on the data take place, thus completing a stage of human knowledge. This is the sensory-knowledge.

Discursive or logical thinking is the subsequent stage of the empirical

knowledge. A further analysis on the 'vague and woolly' ideas of this initial stage is carried out here. It thus becomes well-defined. This can be expressed in linguistic and logical (scientific) forms. When logically expressed it becomes propositions. From different propositions we can infer valid conclusions. The propositions are made either inductively or deductively. The clarity of the perceived or sense-bound objects can be made much more precise by artificial methods, as we do in science. All these give us knowledge of objects on a clearer and sharper perspectives. Through sensation and observation and the consequent experimentation and discursive thinking, an incredibly vast knowledge of the external world is open to us.

The vastness of the empirical knowledge baffles us, but the baffling nature is not without free from exaggeration, as when one is aware of the limitations of such a knowledge. As we have addressed to the scope of rational knowledge, one cannot help remaining indifferent to its limits. The reliability and trustworthiness of rational knowledge pose the serious threats to it. The empirical knowledge is reliable as long as the data furnished by the sense-organs are irrefutable. Now, it is a moment for one to ask a philosophical question. Are the data really irrefutable? We see

rational theories including the scientific ideas based on them change frequently. A moment's thought of the reason for change in stand is interesting. For long, a particular theory is held in high esteem. But, when recalcitrant instances come, it is dropped and a new one replaces it, not unlikely for a further change. The validity of the inference nobody is sure certain. Still from certain quarters, they are held to be the most certain. Aren't they sound paradoxical? Truth is sometimes paradoxical. On a broader perspective, these theories have only a relative validity. The uncertainty of the validity of scientific knowledge is mainly due to its origin, which is sensation or observation. Observation can be erroneous in two ways. In the first place, it can be a *non-observation*.

In non-observation, the observer fails to observe certain aspects of the objects perceived. This is a case of omission and the failure of observation is due to many reasons. When one observes something, immediately it becomes selective. Observation is not mere seeing. It is "keeping something before the mind".¹ The whole world cannot be kept before the mind. One must restrict the span of external world to keep it before the minds. Hence observation becomes essentially selective. It is true that

¹ Bolanth Roy, *Text Book of Indian Logic*, p.113.

scientific equipments extend the natural powers of observation. But that too, has only a selective scope. The equipment gives precise view of the specimen selected, but it cannot give the whole view. Partial views, eventhough complete in themselves cannot replace the whole view. Actually scientific methods purport to put the wholes into parts and analyse them systematically as carried out by its method of analysis. The augmentation of the results obtained by the analysis of parts are favourably summarized and presented for generalization. The generalization drawn from individual cases under conditions of identity is the *locus standi* of all empirical investigations. The flaw in the conclusion drawn as a result of non-observation is the first care in which human reason fails.

To think of a different situation. Assume that competent persons are performing the observation under different conditions. Many of the workings of man can be thought on mechanical lines. Still many do not fit into this category. The volitional activities of man are far from being capable of prediction. The cognitive, conative and volitional activities which constitute the organic behaviour, are different for different person under different and also under identical conditions. This points that man as an organic being cannot be taken for granted. But his interaction is

basically organic. This admits the possibility of untold amount of individual variations, particularly on the methods of doing and knowing. Think of the case of a man under emotional stress and strain, or a normal man vulnerable to emotional states. They cannot observe properly. Ordinary man, under normal conditions too is vulnerable to the flexibility of mind. This affects his mode of observation.

The psychologist would say that, a person can observe properly, only when he is set for the situation. That is, he must be organically prepared for such a situation. A person who is not set for the situation cannot observe properly, eventhough he is aided by sophsiticated scientific equipments. The wrong method of observation is called *mal-observation*. In mal-observation, the aspects of things are not left out as in non-observation, but they are observed in an improper manner. It is a case of commission in observation. Non-observation and mal-observation vitiate the first step of scientific thinking.

Let us turn our attention to the natural apparatus with which man gets idea of the external world. These natural apparatuses are the sense-organs. They furnish impressions of the world outside. The sense-organs are selective and competent in their respective functions. The eye, for

instance does not transmit the sense-data of hearing and their functions are not in the least fused or confused. Sense-organs is function-specific. As a rule, general set up does not give anything abnormal. They, therefore for our common purpose and immediate necessities of life give correct data. But the very same organs function in a misleading manner very often. This is another paradox worthy of comment. Factors of misleadings results pertaining to sense-organs are intended here.

Illusions, delusions and hallucinations of various types are coming as obstacles in our sensory ways of knowing. Optical illusions like mirage, rope-snake illusions, the Muller-Lyer illusion etc. are worthy of mention here. The eye, which is the most sensitive and important sense-organ, gives us wrong ideas of the objects perceived. A vast patch of dry sand is confused and seen as a river in mirage. An object is seen as something else as in rope-snake illusion. In illusions of these types there are objects, but they are perceived to be something different. This is an example of error. In a similar manner, the skin, another sense-organ gives us wrong information as when we touch two objects, one say wooden and the other metallic, as having different temperature. However, the temperature of

both is the same in the same surrounding. This is the case with all other senses too.

Now, take up the case of the mind. The waking or conscious state of the mind acts as the analyser of sense-data. Is the waking state of the mind fully alert or infallible? Psychological studies reveal that the waking state of the mind can at times fall into brief moments of mal-functioning. Just as illusions are due to the sense-organs, delusions and hallucinations are due to the disturbed states of the mind. Various are the nature of hallucinations ascribed to the weak or disturbed state of the mind. Hallucination, is a visual experience in the absence of a perceived object. That is, without any sensory-stimulation, the mind imposes an 'object'. Here sense-organ does not get any sense-datum from the external world. The mind, however, gives a seemingly true experience of the object. This type of hallucination is referred to as *positive hallucination* and is present in delirium, some sort of hysteria etc.

There is another type of hallucination, known as *negative hallucination*, where, eventhough adequate sensory stimuli are present, the mind does not give an experience of them. These hallucinations occur in the pathological or mrobid mental conditions. But, they can as well be created

artificially under experimental conditions. Such is the case in hypnosis. Here a temporary 'pathological' state (not in the strict sense of the term) is imposed on the mind. There are still other types of hallucinations where the mind itself falls into an inalert condition. It is frequent that one can have sensory experience (without any sensory stimulation) in the states between waking and sleeping and also between sleeping and waking. They are respectively known as *hypnopompic* and *hypnogopic* hallucinations. A few instances cited, point out that the conscious mind has natural tendencies of inalertness or it can be induced to have inalertness. In either case, it malfunctions. Hence cognitive statements of the conscious mind are not without flaws. The possibility of inalertness of the conscious part of the mind and the possible furnishing of the misleading data of the sense-organs are sufficient here to suggest that rational knowledge is not immune to errors and consequently sciences too. This does not purport to say that, the empirical knowledge *per se* is erroneous. It only means that they can be erroneous and as such indubitability and trustworthiness cannot be ascribed to them. The amorphous condition of the credibility of the criterion of valid knowledge tends one to think of an alternative and intuition is the best available alternative.

Intuition - its Meaning and Significance

The necessity for a credible knowledge prompted man to make a thorough investigation of the available potentialities in him. The investigation cannot be from outside, as it will inevitably end in rational thought. So a different approach is to be initiated. It cannot be a pre-emptive inquiry barring the reflective domain, for every act of mental investigation cannot but start from a rational domain. The question whether the possibility of a knowledge not expressed by logical and discursive idioms is addressed in this context. Thinkers everywhere tried to get a solution for this. Men of genius thought about the possibility of an immediate, non-propositional, yet trust-worthy knowledge. Many thinkers hold that, man, apart from his rational faculty, also possesses "a power more interior than intellect by which we become aware of the real in its innate individuality, and not merely in its superficial or discernible aspects".¹

This power, 'more interior than intellect' is his intuitive power. The

¹ S. Radhakrishnan, *An Idealist View of Life*, p.100.

etymological meaning of 'intuition' is judgement based on irrational ground or 'judgement without reasoning'. The amplification of this is that it represents a set of knowledge derivable not by rational or discursive processes, but by grounds other than reason and discursion. The judgement arrived at is neither due to induction or deduction. An empirically prone mind may probably think that how can a judgement be derived without recourse to logical methods. The enigma of intuitive pronouncements is partially due to the belief that it is non-rational. But, it being non-rational, does not mean it is anti-rational. It simply means that it is above logical inferences or it surpasses the limits of empiricity. Therefore intuition is a super-rational capacity in man to know things more intimately and comprehensively – an immediate and comprehensive method of apprehension. It is not the total negation of the rational, but the effulgence of the trans-empirical. It is the immediate cognition of the essences of a thing and a quick insight. Insight is an instance of intuition. However insight does not completely cover intuition, as its scope of application is limited when compared to intuition. In any discipline, particularly in philosophy, intuition has a special significance. Philosophers alone are not open to intuition. Any person endowed with

sound rational background and a deep insight into the problem to be investigated has moments of intuition.

Intuitive Instances in Sciences

The fact that intuition occurs only to a mind endowed with ripe rational backing is illustrated in certain cases of scientific discoveries in the West. To begin with, let us think of the case of Archimedes, who invented the Law of Floatation or Density. It was known that he was a man of ripe rational thinking and temperament. As per the anectode associated with him, it was believed that, one day he was directed to find out the veracity of a certain golden crown by a king. The urgency of the matter divested his mind of other pre-occupation. He was all the time intensely brooding over it, its scientific characteristics. Meanwhile he accidentally noticed the overflow of a certain quantity of water when he had his bath. He got himself immersed in a tub brim full of water, as was his custom. The quantity of water overflowed was an immediate instance to inspire his rationally ripe mind. It worked as a splinter to get ablaze an intuition of the necessary connection of the quantity of water to the weight of his body. From this intuition he was able to discover the Law of Floation. The crown

was consequently found to be impure in nature. We are interested in the case of intuition in this incident.

Another instance of similar intuition, as it is well-known, is in the case of Newton. The instance of falling down of apples was a sufficient ground for his intuition leading to the discovery of the law of gravity. Similar is the case of the chemist, Kekule, who under intellectual musings discovered the structure of Benzene ring. Descartes was also open to a similar state of intuition in his discovery of Analytical Geometry. Nothing short of intuition prompted de Broglie, the physicist to develop his theory of matter-waves. Heisenberg's *principle of uncertainty* is another case of intuitive discovery. Modern science has a lot to do with Einstein's celebrated *General Theory of Relativity*. He developed all this in a spell of mental musings of intuition. No men of consequence can question the rational potentialities of these men of Science and of their intuitive inspiration.

The Undercurrents of Reason and Intuition

The world we live in, gives a fertile ground for man to be active physically and mentally. The propensity of man is to employ his open

faculty of reason as a tool to execute his mental activity. Human sensibility and understanding are expressions of such rational employment. The psychic difference calls for a varied rational activities in myriad forms, which may lead to the individual variation in the modes of apprehension. The reason for the variation have been cited earlier. But, this, however calls for a systematization achievable through what is called the *principle of verifiability*. Thinkers clamour on this point and argue that unless statements are capable of empirical verification, they cease to be true. The criterion of empirical verifiability is consistent with all modes of rational thinking. But it opens a *Pandaro's Box*, the moment it is extended to all modes of thought. Further it would be a category mistake, if that which is applicable to one system is expected to hold good in other systems as well.

As different from conceptual knowledge, there is a particular type of knowledge emanating from the inner recesses of one's experience and understanding. It is rooted in understanding, but takes the whole experience. This type of knowledge is intuition. We traced intuition to the inner recesses or to the boundaries of consciousness. Characterized by his complete consciousness or the very *self* in him. This qualifies intuition to be the expression of the self. It is immediate or *aparoksa* because of the

intimacy of one's own self and the matter of knowledge. Therefore intuition is a capacity in man to know things more intimately and comprehensively. In Indian thought, intuition is known by various names, such as *anubhava* or integral experience in Advaita; *prajñā*, *Bōdhi*, *Śūnyata*, *talhata* etc. in Buddhism, *Kēvalajñāna* (absolute knowledge) in Jainism etc. All these represent intuition as the profoundest knowledge of human self. Thus intuition is the knowledge of self in Indian contexts.

The lack of this knowledge is believed to be the root cause of all suffering and suffering can be eliminated by proper knowledge or *Vidyā*. This is synonymous with intuition. In Indian thought, generally, immediacy of knowledge (*aparōkṣa*) is regarded a chief characteristic of its validity. The great illustrations, which we shall see later on, given by Indian thinkers regarding the nature of intuition is that, it is the knowledge of self. Self-knowledge is inseparable from self-existence. It is the pre-supposition of all other existence. Knowledge of self or intuition is the basis of the knowledge of all other existence. According to Advaita, self-knowledge, which is intuitive is beyond doubt, for "it is the essential nature of him who denies it".¹ Self-knowledge or intuition is the object of the very idea of the

¹ Śaṅkara, *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya* (ii 3.7 and i 1.4).

self, *asmat pratyaya viṣaya*. Hence an individual cannot question its validity on account of its immediate presentation. This points to the indubitable nature of intuition. All experiences – cognition, conation and volition – are implicit in intuition, as the self is the centre of all experiences. This leads to considering intuition as an integral experience.

Rational facts cannot reveal anything of the inner self. We require a science of self and intuition represents such a science. "If we wish to know the inner nature of reality, we must resort to the whole personality of which intellect is only a part".¹ But this part is very useful as we live on with this part. But, since we are not living with the whole personality, we tend to undermine its importance. The whole personality can be reflected only through an insight, a holistic expression of the self – the knowledge of the self. Various systems of Indian thought give prominence to knowledge of self as the supreme knowledge. This tendency is also not obscure in the West. A treatment of them will appear in appropriate contexts.

The world one lives in is as much real to him as an outside thing as it is a reality to him the inner self. They are structures of a more fundamental

¹ S. Radhakrishnan, *An Idealist View of Life*, p.113.

and inner world. A knowledge of this state is unavoidable. Power of the intellect cannot by itself enter in this domain. The knowledge of the self can be developed only by an inward-seeking, a method of 'ego-exploring technique'. "Our inner life cannot be described merely according to psychological laws. To define it analytically would be to limit it. We can speak of it only by the use of *intuition*, not by the use of scientific methods".¹

Subjectivity and Inward-seeking

The conviction of one's inner self is as much personal as its cognition is subjective. The cognition of self entails subjectivity as the criterion of inquiry. A matter of personal experience and conviction cannot be put to outside examination. The analytic methods give way to an inward seeking of the ego-exploring type. Systems of philosophy which developed science of self set great store on their being subjective in treatment. The Platonists, the Existentialists and the Bergsonians are upholders of subjectivity in the West. Almost all systems of Indian thought have overtones of subjectivity, inspite of their striking views of rationality and objectivity.

¹ F. Mayer, *A History of Modern Philosophy*, p.555.

The Revelatory Nature of Intuition

Revelations are expressions communicating to the external world by persons in their moments of supreme calmness and equi-pose borne of intuition. These are flashes of ideas occurring at rare intervals. The revelations burst forth spontaneously from such mind under states of eerie ecstasy and charm. They are, therefore, figuratively called "madness". In "madness" of this type, the person concerned forgets all about the surroundings as in the case of Sri Ramakrishna, Aurobindo and others. Archimedes, it is said, even forgot to wear his dress and ran about crying, *ureka!, eureka!* (I have discovered, discovered). Plato himself a genius had occasions of this type. According to him, the intuitive expressions are a sort of 'madness' imparted to men by gods, the purpose of which are known only to them and the person concerned. "We Greeks, owe our greatest blessings to heaven-sent madness. For the prophetess at Delphi and the Priestess at Dodona have in their moments of madness done great and glorious service to men and cities of Greece, but little or none in their sober mood".¹

¹ Plato *Phaedrus*, 244.

Platonic 'madness' cannot be created by artificial means, as claimed by Zaehner, in his *Mysticism, Sacred and Profane*. The eerie ecstasy derived from the experience and the total disregard with which such persons entertain the world, are superficially exhibited by men who are under the influence of 'drugs'. Zaehner, thought that these people also have some sort of strong experience and awareness and mysticism or insight can be artificially created.

Intuitive Experience - A State of Mysticism

In the exalted state of mental enlightenment intuitive expressions come forth and are termed as revelation. Though intuition is consciousness, the state into which the individual has changed is what is called a mystic state. In this way mysticism, revelation, intuition are all interconnected. The etymology of 'mysticism' is from the Greek root 'muw', meaning 'to close the sense-organs and passions'. Those who are capable of closing the tantalizing influences of the sense-organs and passions can be 'initiated' into the secrets of worldly existence and the reality underlying it. A person who is thus 'initiated' is called a 'mystes' (mystic). Eventhough mysticism is associated with 'mysterium' (secret), it has nothing to do with occultism, miracle-mongering, magical powers, witch-crafts, mesmerism

etc. Cryptaesthetic powers like clairvoyance, clairaudience, telepathy, precognition etc. must not be equated with mysticism, even though mystics might possess them. It is not the possession of powers that matters, but the consciousness which is the seat of all such powers is the point. The powers when used for personal gain or fame, make obstacles in the path of spiritual realization. According to the great mystics like Sri Ramakrishna, the *Siddhīs* (supernormal powers) are hindrances in the path of self-realization. "What shall I do with super human powers? Can one realize God through them? If God is not realized, then everything become false".¹

Again, mysticism is not to be identified with visions. It may be true that mystics have such visions and voices, but they are of secondary significance to be avoided. The *Siddhīs*, visions, voices and the like actually deflect one from his pursuit of self-realization. This is because, genuine mystical experience is non-sensuous and visions and voices are sensuous experiences. But the visions and auditions experienced by a mystic are indicative of a mystic experience to dawn. "Mysticism is the *intuitive experience* of the Divine Reality".² These mystic visions are therefore

¹ Quoted in K.P.S. Choudhary's, *Modern Indian Mysticism*, p.2.

² Op. cit., p.22.

emanating from intuition. "What we seen 'there is' is not the same as 'what there is', but at the same time 'what we say there is' is not altogether unconnected with what there is".¹

Immunity to Subject-Object Dichotomy

In all rational thinking, logical and scientific, the objects or things of sensation and the perceiver or the subject are different and their status are different. Objects exist outside of the perceiver and treat as entities entirely different from the perceiver. Their sensible forms alone are of interest to the perceiver. One gets data from them and there is no mental union. The data are communicated to the perceiver through a medium of sense-organs. The mediacy of the knower and known vitiates the intrinsic relation between them leading to an intellectual cleavage of subject and object. The things in their entirety are not revealed in a condition of mediation. This is not so in the case of intuition. It is immediate apprehension and the role of mediatory organs are considerably little. It is a direct apprehension of the things without the mediation of sense-organs. Hence the subject-object cleavage does not figure. In intuition, there is a

¹ T.M.P. Madhavan, "Contemporary Relevance of the Insights of Advaita" in *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, Series-11, p.128.

perfect union of object and the subject. It is direct and spontaneous. "Knowledge and being, the idea and reality, the reference and the identification are both here".¹ The immunity to subject-object dichotomy of intuition also saves it from being free of proof.

The necessity of verification is a rational-specific form of procedure, as it is due to the mediacy and variant nature of the data collected. In the absence of such a condition, the data may tend to conform different standard and unity is difficult and rational knowledge may tend to be fictitious or fanciful. Verification procedure is prescribed to overcome this ambiguity. As these conditions do not prevail in intuition, the verifiability principle is of no consequence to it.

Ethical Presuppositions

Intuition is the expression of the complete being and knows no segregated activities. Hence it cannot remain untouched by one's ethical status. That is why, it is said that a person who embarks on the pursuit of intuitional experiences must be essentially virtuous. It is one of the pre-conditions of such an aspirant. "It [intuition] is possible only when the

¹ S. Radhakrishnan, *An Idealist View of Life*, p.114.

individual is fully alive and balanced. We can see truly only when our inner being is harmonized. Intuition is the ultimate vision of our profoundest being".¹ A balanced individual is not one devoid of ethical qualities. This is sublimely exemplified in the Eight-fold limbs (*Aṣṭāṅga*) of Yoga and in the Eight-fold methods in Buddhism. All Indian systems of thought, which pursue the highest consciousness set the above *astangas* as their guidelines and unless they are fulfilled, the goal is impossible. For the realization of Truth, let it be God-realization, or Self-realization, a strict adherence to these methods is indispensable. *Śauca*, purity in mind and body, is to be met before entering the domain of intuition.

Intuition - Beyond Verbalization

Language, gestures, facial expression etc. are the common techniques which are employed to communicate things to other persons. Communication is possible only in the case of the expressible. The expressible are those that come within the purview of the empirical. Our knowledge of objects and their related data are easily communicable. Expression are expressive of the empirical and rational. Many of human

¹Op. cit., p.114.

experiences cannot be communicated and expressed. They do not come in the ambit of rationality. As intuitional expressions do not come within the framework of *nāma rūpa* (names and forms), a rational instantiation and verbalization cannot be thought of. Dumb silence or *mauna vākya* is the general technique in intuition. Negative language and methods like *nēti*, *nēti* (Not this, not that) and *Vitāṇḍa* (negative logical argumentation) are also followed to express the inexpressible. As these techniques deserve separate treatment ~~later~~, they are not discussed here. But the psychology of the expression of the inexpressible is that one wants to communicate, but the subject as it falls beyond the pale of verbalization cannot be communicated. It is better to communicate than not to communicate and language, gestures etc. are the only medium and this medium has been chosen for want of a better medium.

Language is only an empirical tool of communicating the mundane. Intuition is supra-mundane. So any attempt to verbalize it is firstly in itself a category mistake, as these two fall in two different categories. If language is used to explain intuition, we may fall into paradoxes. "The paradoxes arise because of what is perhaps the basic paradox of all, viz., although

what is given to our intellect is determinate or relative. We take it to be indeterminate and absolute".¹

Language cannot be thus used to explain intuition. This must be one of the reasons why the mystics or men of intuition follow the method of silence. When one experiences the "Bliss of solitude", one becomes silent as the beetle drones no more when it is fully honey-drunk. "In the state of mystic illumination, the mystic attains a state of living stillness (*Śāntaim*) marked by a deep peace, because the inward silence is the cessation of agitation (*cāñcalata*) of the mind".² Nagarjuna, the great Madhyamika dialectician, in his work, *Vigrahavyāvartani*, also cautions us against using language to explain the *Paramārtha* (Ultimate Reality). He is of the opinion that, even though intuitional experience is beyond the pale of verbalization, mystics sometimes use language to communicate the mystical. This is because, by keeping silence, one communicates nothing. If he uses languages he communicates in the wrong way. Since communication is necessary, the language is used.

¹ R. Sinari, "The Concept of Nothingness in Buddhism and Existentialism" in *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, Series-II, p.278.

² K.P.S. Choudhary, *Modern Indian Mysticism*, p.28.

We see, very often, the mystics use superlatives to explain their experience of intuition. The reason is that any amount of stress and qualification given by language cannot come nearer to the Reality, for it will be like, "attempting to measure the heat of the sun by the ordinary thermometer . . .".¹ In Advaita, the Ultimate Reality, Brahman is described as *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda* (eternal existence, eternal consciousness and bliss). The Ultimate Reality is "Super splendid, super-sublime, super everything that can be named".² The Ultimate Reality, according to the *Upaniṣads* is *mahatāḥ mahīyan* (greater than the greatest). Positive verbalization renders the cognizing of things in their names and forms. Intuitive experience cannot be thus verbalized.

Reason and Intuition are Not Antithetical

Both reason and intuition belong to the individual and his consciousness. The appeal is to his inner sentience or self. Reason is the first apparatus with which one interacts with the world. The world is variant and requires differentiation. The intellect is conditioned to accommodate it and to act in differentiation. The differential conditions require a

¹ S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p.663.

² S. Radhakrishnan, *Principal Upaniṣads*, p.327.

differentiating faculty and the intellect or reason is that faculty. The working of reason is therefore differential and individualistic. To coordinate and broaden the differential, a whole activity is required. The holistic function is carried out by intuition. Between part and whole there is no isolation, as they form a continuum." There is no break of continuity between intuition and intellect. In moving from intellect to intuition, we are not moving in the direction of unreason, but are getting into the deepest rationality of which human nature is capable".¹

Intuition gives us the object in itself, whereas the intellect depicts and details it in separate acts. Hence every intuition has at its bottom an intellectual purport. Intuition emanates from the background of reason, but tresspasses its limits. In this sense it is trans-rational, but not anti-rational. All metaphysicians are astute logicians in the first instance, as it implies that bereft of a rational framework, intuitive expressions seldom come. Great metaphysicians like Sankara and Socrates are unanimous in the view that intuitive certainty is reached only after a prolonged and sustained intellectual exercise. The necessity of a deep-seated intellectual pre-

¹ S. Radhakrishnan, *Op. cit.*, p.120.

meditation for the attainment of intuition is the common dictum for all Indian thinkers.

One can speak of the utilities of reason and intuition. Rational knowledge has the clear bearing of the world and so every human, who is essentially and basically worldly cannot get rid of the early influence of reason to which he is exposed and accustomed. His pragmatic world-view is moulded by reason. "Logical knowledge enables us to know the conditions of the world in which we live and to control them for our ends".¹ But the awareness of the world is no world-knowledge. This lacuna is met by intuition, which gives a vision of the profoundest nature of existence. The holistic vision of the nature of our own self is the greatest achievement one can think of and intuition is the awareness of such an expression. Discursive knowledge is more comprehensive than sensory knowledge. Intuition is more comprehensive than discursive knowledge. Hence it is said that, "intuition stands to intellect in somewhat the same relation as intellect stands to sense".² The *modus operandi* of intuition is the self, its

¹ S. Radhakrishnan, *An Idealist View of Life*, p.115.

² Ibid.

expression and exposition. The *Science of Self* is the science of intuition and this reserves some space of the discussion later.

Intuitive Perceptions as the First General Principle

The *weltanschauung* of any individual is determined by his sensibility and understanding. We also come across world-views governed by insights and intuition. Let us speak something about world-views, whose *motif* is reason. Take sciences themselves. All natural and empirical sciences, mathematics included, proceed from certain basic principles. These basic principles are initially postulates or generalized propositions, very often *a priori* in nature. They are thought to be self-evident first principle regarded as the conceptual foundations of scientific thought. They are presumed to be independent of and immune to proof or verifiability. These self-evident, self-proved first principles are euphemistically called as *axioms*. Axioms are the first premise of all empirical thought.

Every science has its own axioms. No scientist ever questioned their utility and applicability. Reason fails to rationalize their purport. It is true that we have influences of and sensibility of matter. Space and time are

part and parcel of our sensibility. But their very fundamental existence, we tend to axiomatize. The existence of space and time are axioms or fundamental postulates of all scientific thought. The ratio of any number to zero leads one to infinity is an empirically unverified principle in mathematics. It is an axiom. Mathematics employ so many axioms. In physics we think of the sum-total of a system, say, matter, force, energy, etc. is a constant. This is an axiomatic generalization, as we have no access to the totality of whole systems. The complete energy level in the cosmos is beyond the pale of empirical verification. The view that infinite number of galaxies remain in an infinite space is also beyond reckon. It is not a belief, but an accepted truth in physics. These are all axioms. The biologists accept that life has started from a primordial substance — material, mental or both — but cannot speak anything of its own origin. Any attempt to unfold the origin will put the whole thing in infinite regress on the appeal of the principles that, everything must have a cause and also *ex nihilo nihil fit* (out of nothing, nothing comes). The sole criterion of science, the reason, fails to rationalize the axioms. This shows the limit of reason and the rational methods.

People say that, there is unity and uniformity in the world. This

axiomatic generalization is based on the fixity and regularity with which certain observed phenomena take place. The law of *Uniformity of Nature* and the *Law of Universal Causations* are the axioms of our empirical understanding. Similar axioms are seen in subjective sciences as well. To be good is virtuous and rewarding. 'Honesty is the best policy'. Everybody wants to be happy. To be happy is our motto, even though means of happiness are divergent for individuals. But the principle 'to be happy' is a common dictum. All our attempts – corrupt or glorious – are in one way or other are vindicative of this aim. Everybody wants to pursue truth, beauty and goodness as per their own standards. But the subjective states like truth, beauty, goodness, happiness etc. are common and axiomatic. Nobody denies their status and role in the life of man. They are accepted to be present there.

Let us think what motivates man to stick on to universal principles or what may be called axioms in his objective (scientific) and subjective paths of life. Had rational faculty been the cause to uphold these principles, then they must have had a rational argumentation and proof. Reason fails to remove the riddle. In this case they must have been available to us in the world ready for verification. The enigma of the origin of axioms and our

compulsion to accept them are though the limitation of reason are at the some not the limitations of human knowledge as a whole. They point to a higher faculty in man, the faculty of intuition.

In place of much sound and fury, the mind accepts them in a calm and gentle manner, as if in a bliss of enlightenment. The possibility of our own being, our own self must be the cause of such beatitude. The axioms are the very demands of our own existence, not bodily, but psychic. The psychic demand is the demand of the self. These are the expressions of self, the knowledge of self; and knowledge of self is intuition. "If intuitive knowledge does not supply us with universal major premises, which we can neither question nor establish, our life will come to an end".¹ One cannot cast aside the general principles as wishful thinking. The ethical soundness, the moral authority, symmetry and pattern, unity and uniformity, harmony and consistency are all various basic assumptions of human thinking. Had these axioms been invalid, their opposites must have been valid. But every life instance is against this and speaks of symmetry and harmony and not chaos and disorder. These principles are neither

¹ S. Radhakrishnan, Op. cit., p.123.

acquired by observation and experimental verification nor inferred by rational thinking. But neither of them is possible in the absence of axioms. They are the substratum of all our perceptions and inferences — the intuitions of life, the first 'sensitivity' of our own self. "If we deny self-knowledge, if we make nothing evident of itself into man's self, we deny the possibility of all knowledge and life".¹

A little amount of reflection reveals that the demand for verifiability leads us to a vicious-vortex. Some factors are regarded as true on condition of other, which in turn on other and so on *ad infinitum*. Now there must be an ultimate ground to dispel all these skepticisms, otherwise every bit of knowledge cannot be free from skepticism and thereby no knowledge possible at all. The locus of indubitable knowledge is our own thought. It is the thought of our own self. When one thinks, he is thinking of self directly or indirectly. Self-knowledge gives the ideas that one thinks and he exists. This is what Descartes, meant, when he said, *Cogito ergo sum*. Self-knowledge is self-valid knowledge. It is indubitable knowledge. All other knowledge can be doubted. Intuition, which is knowledge of self and self-

¹ Loc. cit.

valid knowledge cannot be doubted on this ground. "It is not possible for thought to think what is not true".¹ Basic knowledge must be valid, or else remaining knowledge becomes invalid. To think validly is inherent in man.

¹ Ibid.

REASON AND INTUITION IN WESTERN THOUGHT - A FEW SELECT CASES

C.C Damodaran “Reason and intuition in Indian thought - A critical appraisal ”
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CHAPTER II

REASON AND INTUITION IN WESTERN THOUGHT - A FEW SELECT CASES

Prima facie, it may sound that, this topic would be an odd man in the subject matter of this work. Yet to bring home alien ideas of similar concern is the purport of this attempt. A few select cases have been identified for this purpose. The matters of unity and common concern are of interest in this context and this attempt is driven by such an idea that one can corroborate knowledge from any source. "Let knowledge come to us from all universe".¹

The acceptance of first principles, of which we alluded to in the previous chapter, has its significance in the Western Systems of philosophic thought as well. They have been regarded as the bases of human knowledge of the objective world and also the subjective conviction of his own self as systematic expression of intuition. To start with Heraclitus. Heraclitus is believed to be a man of dual interests, of reason and of intuition. Liberal and rational thinking are not the only strains of

¹ Rk Vēda.

discernible things in his philosophy. He is equally powerful of its intuitive expressions. Expressions bearing testimony to these two trends can be cited. The rationalist element in Heraclitus is evident, when he says, "the things that can be seen, heard and learned are what I prize the most".¹ Again, "this world which is the same for all, no one of gods or men has made; but it was ever, is now and ever shall be . . .".² The sentences refer to the empirical world with its sensibilia. One's intellect is the final authority to judge. The world that we perceive is not fictitious or imaginary and it can be fully cognized by the senses. There cannot be any polemic about this sense of his expressions. But very soon one can notice that the rationalistic tendency which was well defined in him, has its base in a higher plane of thought.

Only a mystic or a man of intuition could say, "every beast is driven to pasture with blows".³ The implicit idea of this expression of mysticism is that in order to direct inert and inactive being into light and glory, he must be castigated of his ignorance by some wilful purposes. It is a hard process

¹ B. Russel, *Mysticism and Logic*, p.20.

² Ibid.

³ Op. cit., p.21.

Ibid.

to remove one's mould, the intellectual mould of rationality and to initiate a domain of higher mould of enlightenment. Splendid indeed must be the beautiful combination of rationality and intuition in Heraclitus, as he says, "we step and do not step in the some rivers; we are and are not".¹ This argument can be explained from two viewpoints. As long as one sticks to sensibility and rationality, the world and the worldly things seem to him changing, a state of flux and determinates. There is nothing permanent in the world organizable by human reason. It is impermanent. But viewed from the other standpoint, the whole picture assumes a different purport. The flux is due to the flexibility of the senses and rational mode of apprehension. Eventhough the world is fast changing and evolving, the very principle of its coming into being is not flexible. This requires an intuition to apprehend. Though the world is changing and impermanent, the agents (sense_organ and reason) who give the idea of change and impermanence of the world themselves are transient and flexible.

The Socratic dictum, "Know Thyself" is the best exposition of the necessity to have a knowledge of the self. When Socrates said "knowledge is virtue", what he actually meant was to know the knowledge of self is the

¹ Op. cit., p.21.

ibid.

most virtuous of human qualities. Knowledge of self or intuition is the highest state achievable by knowledge and his concept of knowledge is not the mere spatio-temporal knowledge. Faith, opinion, etc. are trivial according to him. They come to the level of empiricity.

In his discourse to his disciples, Socrates wanted to place his arguments on first principles or axioms, which according to him are the 'gateway to intuition'. Deductive inference are for him the pass-time exercises. Observed facts and individual instances for him, have only a role to be links of a higher state of understanding. The higher state of understanding, he equates with the "inner voice", the intuitive revelations of Self and for Socrates such revelations counted more than external perceptions or logical thinking.

Plato's world-view is undoubtedly rooted in his intuitive insight of an abstract world, which he calls world of ideas or *universals*. Plato's universals are his intuitive apprehensions of a world of realities, where everything remains in a permanent and true form. They are purely abstract. For him, a little amount of concreteness even divests things of their essences and realities. The concrete world of objects which is sensibly and reasonably exist represents a false world devoid of substance. The

rational world of apprehension or the world of particulars, as he prefers to call them, have no status and validity, unless the world of ideas or universal are there. That is the intuitive state of the world of universals is the cause and condition of the rational world of particulars.

Plato's favourite expression of intuition is "Recollection". It is no recollection of the ordinary type, but higher state of consciousness or intuition, which is the substratum of all other particularized cognitions. Particularized cognitions are for him those pertaining to sensibility and reason. They are mere shadows of a fundamental substance of "Recollection". "Recollection is the basis of the logical process which consists in the discovery of ideas in which the particulars participate".¹ The idea of *Good* is the power of knowing to the knower and the reality of Good is made available to us by Recollection. The principle of 'Good' is the basis of all existence and value and it eludes the logical or discursive grasp. Good is a self-evident, self-proved first principle for Plato. Good is the expression of Recollection. This argument gives us great scope of upholding the contention that Plato also regarded axiom ('Good' for Plato) as the basic principle of all rationality and the basis of intuition.

¹ S. Radhakrishnan, *An Idealist View of Life*, p.125.

Plato's great disciple Aristotle is also a thinker coming in this line of thought. He replaced Plato's "Recollection" and "Good" by his concept of *Nous*. The axioms or the First Principles cannot be apprehended by reason, according to Aristotle as it is the case with Plato and all other great thinkers. He maintains that *Nous* (intuition) alone can comprehend them. All reasoning starts with *Nous*. There cannot be a science of First Principle, as they are self-evident and self-proved. "We become aware of them [the First Principles] by *Nous*, by direct intuition and not by demonstrative science".¹

Now, have a look at the Continental Rationalists. Descartes wanted to set philosophy on mathematical lines in order to get universally valid, clear and distinct principles. He also began to argue that all the knowledge arises from a clear and distinct, self-evident principle. Knowledge of self represented by *Cogito* gives the knowledge of object (existence). Self-knowledge must be self-evident, clear and axiomatic. The self-awareness (or self-knowledge) is axiomatic and so it must be self-existent and indubitable. *Cogito*, as self-knowledge cannot be empirically verified. *Cogito* is the source of all knowledge. Intuition is the basis of *Cogito*. "It is

¹ S. Radhakrishnan, *An Idealist View of Life*, p.125.

the intuition which an unclouded and attentive mind gives us so clearly and distinctly that we are wholly freed from doubt about that which we understand".¹

Spinoza, in his *Ethics*, speaks of intuition, *Scientia intuitiva*, as the restorer of what the world of science cannot achieve. He distinguishes intuition and reason. Reason, according to him, is in the form of opinions, meaning, that it is flexible like ordinary ideas. Reason can give us knowledge of sciences, but in intuition we get direct understanding of the object as such. Intuitive expressions are the expressions of human ego or self and they are not vulnerable to logical standards. They set criterion for other knowledge and not subject to a criterion from them.

The Critiques of Kant

The rational and intuitional domains of consciousness are not alien to the Kantian Critiques. The Critiques, especially, the *Critique of Pure Reason* is concerned with boundaries of human knowledge and the range of its application. One must guard against the German meaning of 'reason' and the English sense of it. 'Reason' for the German thinkers is *vernunft*, the like

¹ Op. cit., p.126.

of which we say intuition. The English sense of reason is communicated by the German expression of 'understanding', *verstand*. To avoid confusion, the German terms are ^{more} move suitable. Hence *verstant* and *vernunft* in Kant represent reason and intuition.

The world of empirical realities must be a world open to 'understanding' or *verstand*. The mind is equipped with certain aiding factors, which he calls 'Categories of Understanding'. Only with the help of 'categories' one is able to apprehend the world of phenomena. Naturally the sense-organs and the like are its initial factor to bring about the sensibility of 'understanding'. Categories can work only on materials supplied by the sense-organs. Our reason (not in the German sense) can work within the limits of the categories. It cannot give anything of a world *Noumenon* (or Reality). The world of *noumenon* is unknown and unknowable by the categories.

World of *noumenon* or 'thing-in-itself' is accessible by the methods of 'speculative reason' (which we call intuition). Categories cannot give any idea of speculative reason, as the former studies the phenomena and the latter, the noumena. The categorization of the entities into world of phenomena and world of noumena and their respective methods of

apprehension as categories of understanding and principles of speculative reason are on our considered lines of reason and intuition. Abstract and fundamental principles, particularly of the first order and axiomatic type such as morality, freedom, teleological judgements etc., are the subject matter with which speculative reason is concerned.

Categories of understanding can only give us partial knowledge of objects and world in a disorderly and disproportionate manner. But man has the capacity to have synthetic and comprehensive knowledge, as in the case of moral and teleological judgements. This field of completely integrated knowledge is possible by what are called '*Ideas of Reason*'. Hence Kant's '*Categories of Understanding*' represents the rational faculty in man and his '*Ideas of Reason*', the intuitional faculty. A deeper sense of ideas of reason is given by one's moral and ethical life. There is no empirical evidence to ascertain the moral governance. But people know intuitively that to be moral is good and happy. Categories of understanding cannot prove or disprove one's moral imperatives. They are deep-seated insights away and apart from the accessibility of the categories. The same is the case with the problems of Soul, God and the World in its entirety, but not

the world in its configuration of individualization (i.e. the spatio-temporal world).

The Kantian pronouncement that an individual's life is to be governed by ideas of Reason and his moral duty, means that it is not to be guided by worldly affairs of narrow love, bias and propensities and by a higher thinking of perfection and harmony. The imperatives of moral law are to be intuitively apprehended by 'pure reason' — to use a Kantian phrase. Kant's Ideas of Reason deal with pure and abstract concepts like morality, free-will, duty, etc. But he seems to be inconsistent as he adds concrete ideas like one's conduct and behaviour in this group. Another point is that, even though he speaks of 'Ideas of Reason' (intuition) and its superiority over other type of knowledge, he bars humanbeings from attaining it, as they are, according to him, conditioned by the categories of understanding. These inconsistencies, which we seldom find in similar situations of Indian thought, may be due to the lack of self-conviction and rigorous moral training which their counterparts in India had through the *asramas*, four stages of life like the *brahmaçārya* (studentship), *gārhastya* (house-holder), *vānaprasta* (stage of mental concentration carried out in forests) and *samnyāsa* (the stage of a sage actively involved in social work

Sp-

and imparting of knowledge); the different methods of moral and physical development as coded in *Aṣṭāṅga Yōga* and *Aṣṭāṅga Mārga*.

Reason and Intuition in Henry Bergson

The philosophies of Heraclitus and Greek thinkers are pronouncements of the rational and intuitive trains of thought. They even foreshadowed these tendencies in the subsequent systems of thought in the West. However, in the Western circles, the rationalists, the empiricists, the agnostics and even the idealists only glorified the capacities of intellect, even though intuitive train of thought was implicit in them. But, Henry Bergson, after Heraclitus and the Greek thinkers, is the first Western thinker to admit the limits of reason and vouchsafe the supremacy of intuition over intellect in explicit terms. According to him, philosophy must recover "the awareness of the self and must become truly subjective. If it does, philosopher will obtain a more profound view of reality".¹ Bergson is against the objective and analytic methods of apprehending the intricacies of life and the world. They even though give a better grasp of phenomena in a coherent linguistic and scientific terms, cannot represent

¹ F. Mayer, *A History of Modern Philosophy*, p.555.

life in its entirety and its hidden capacities – the inner essence of reality.

Bergson vehemently attacks the scientists and philosophers who glorify and mystify rational thoughts. Great inventions in science and metaphysics, he maintains, are due to intuition and not due to mere intellectual exercise. Instances bearing testimony to this have been cited in earlier contexts, as in the case of Archimedes and others. The idea of reason and intuition, in Bergson assumes in his '*empirical knowledge*' and '*intuition*'. The empirical knowledge, which is reason according to him can give only an external and superficial account of reality. Intuition is more basic and comprehensive. Only through intuition, one can comprehend the essence of the universe. "The only way to understand and experience is to be part of it. In this manner we obtain a true insight and a genuine understanding".¹

Sciences employ reason as their method of analysis. This, however, does not communicate the inner construction of things and their inseparable connection with others. Only the causal relations and meanings are exposed. This is not, according to him, the clear exposition.

¹ Op. cit., p.554.

"Science, by its quantitative emphasis, necessarily depends on symbols and regards nature as being, subject to the laws of causality. Still, science cannot explain the inner construction of nature, which is in a constant process of movement and thus transcends mere analysis".¹ Though Bergson admits the powers of intellect, he regards that, "from the view point of metaphysics the intellect is inadequate, for it cannot obtain a knowledge of the inner essence of reality".²

Bergson criticizes the philosophic position of the idealists and the agnostics. The idealists speak of a static phenomenal state of the world. The agnostic, on the other hand believes that, there are unknowables in this world. Both of them speak only of the possibilities of reason, not pronouncing on intuition. It has become fashionable to think of philosophic propositions in terms of thesis and antithesis and the resulting process of synthesis. The dialectics, extends the scope of reason and the frontiers of empirical knowledge, yet does not add anything to his inner state of consciousness. The people who set great store on rational thinking, according to him, however do not think of the great breakthroughs in

9 | ¹ Loc. cit., p.554.

| ² Op. cit., p.555.

sciences thanks solely to intuition. "Intuition thus is the source of all real sciences, all real art and all real philosophy. Intuition provides a common meeting ground for philosophy and metaphysics. If followed faithfully, it would provide for infinite advancement in both fields, and it would remove the hostility which now exists between the proponents of metaphysics and those of positive science".¹

Human knowledge which is not a mere psycho-physical conglomerate, can on the same account be not explained on that line. To define and design, the ontic existence of man on sole empirical ground would be to limit it. Philosophy then must be a subjective enquiry. Existentialists are the immediate follower in this line of thought. If philosophy is a self-locussed and subjective enquiry, it would lead to profound views of reality. Bergson's contention is very clear. If knowledge is to be real and authentic one has to know his own self.

Intuition As Knowledge of Self

The stress that philosophy must be a subjective inquiry revealing the inner self of man to be authentic underlines the fact that truth, according to

¹ Op. cit., p.556.

Bergson is the knowledge of self and he regards that all philosophic enquiries must be channelized so as to get the self-conviction. According to him, intuition alone gives such a conviction, as it is the exposition of inner consciousness. Reality must be the nature of immediate awareness and the immediate awareness that one can have is that he has consciousness and existence. This consciousness is not a derived or inferred one. So it cannot be analytic or rational but intuitive. The first sign of intuition is the very fact that one has consciousness. The key to knowledge is self-awareness and it is known by intuition. Intuition is a spontaneous expression of self-revelation.

The self-revelation however does not generate from vacuum. There must be a sound basic infrastructure of reason. This strikes one of the necessity of reason as a precondition for intuition. Bergson is therefore against the alienation of reason from intuition. At a particular stage in the intellectual evolution, the rational clutches get slippery and one will be inevitably taken into the sphere of intuition. This occurs only in the higher stage of rational development. One cannot pinpoint the stage of change, as it is continuous in the evolutionary scale.

On the other hand, to try to dichotomize reason and intuition as two warring factions will be to disintegrate knowledge as a whole. Disharmony is antithetical to growth and development. "Intuition gives us a direct apprehension of reality and replaces analysis by direct insight . . . it is not directed *against* the intellectual view of looking at things; rather, it uses the intellect, builds upon it, and creates a new foundation".¹ The works of all geniuses are testimonials to the fact that, they are rooted in intuition. Unless this root is there, creativity is impossible.

The contradictions and antinomies in the empirical sciences and philosophies are not necessarily of the respective disciplines. They are essentially rooted in their rationalistic outlook. A harmony is to be established among different disciplines. The harmony can be achieved by a method common to both, a connecting link – the link of intuition. Bergson, therefore traces intuition to the root of all knowledge. It is the knowledge of self, which is the foundation of all our understanding. It provides a common link between reason and other ways of thinking. The highest expression of rationality is also an enfoldment of intuitive capacity. The western systems, which speak conspicuously of reason and intuition, give

¹ Op. cit., p.557.

us certain common features found in Indian contexts. Intuition is the supreme consciousness of a rationally developed individual. It is the basis of all thinking and identical with the knowledge of self. It is verily the self-knowledge itself. Without self-knowledge, no other knowledge is possible. Reason and intuition are not antithetical, even though their workings are on two lines. Intuition presupposes, a high degree of rational capacity. The origin and development of all sciences take from self-evident principles called axioms and axioms are the first expression of intuition in sciences. These all purport to mean the highest knowledge is the knowledge of one's own self.

THE VISION OF SELF IN THE UPANISADS

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CHAPTER III

THE VISION OF SELF IN THE UPANIṢADS

Prolegomenon

The *Vēdas* are supposed to be the oldest stock of philosophico-religious literature available in India. They are so antique in nature that they pass a period of 4500 BC¹ to a date at 1500 BC.² The stream of thought of *Vedas* can be broadly classified into the *Saṁhita* or Hymn period; the *Brāhmaṇa* or ritual period and the *Āraṇyaka* or the Forest Book period. The *Rk Veda* is the oldest of all vedas and the first available book in the world. It is largely ritualistic and devotional, containing hymns of monotheistic, philosophical type and also rationalistic, skeptical type. The spiritualistic and rationalistic tendencies are the under currents of the earliest available literature of Indian origin.

The *Upaniṣads*, the concluding portions of *Vēdas* are found only at the end of the *Āraṇyakās*. The *Āraṇyakās* or 'forest-books' were supposed to be studied in the quietude of the forest with a seriousness of its own, 'far from

¹ Tilak, *Bhagavad Gita*, (Orion, Poona), 1893.

² S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 1, p.67.

the madding crowd'. The *Upaniṣads* are studied posterior to the earlier parts of the Vedas viz., *Mantrās* the hymn parts and *Brāhmaṇās*, the ritualistic part, implying that the *Upaniṣads* must be studied only after a context of thorough mental preparation. The etymology of *Upaniṣad* is to sit attentively and closely to a well-versed teacher, so as to hear the secret teaching imparted by him. The psychology of 'secret-instruction' is that it must be imparted to the needy and it must not fall on the mischievous hands.

There is a divergence of opinion as to the roots of Upanisadic teaching. Thinkers like Narahari¹ and others hold that the *Upaniṣads* are deeply rooted in *Mantrās* and *Brāhmaṇās*. Deussen² and others argue that *Upaniṣads* are a reaction against the early ritualism of the Vedas. Whatever be the nature of controversy, it is clear that the *Upaniṣads* themselves do not impart ritualistic tendencies, but speak of the self in man. The nature of instructions imparted by the *Upaniṣads* is again a matter of controversy, as some hold that, it is dualistic while some others that it is non-dualistic. But

¹ Narahari, *Ātman in Pre-Upaniṣadic Vedic Philosophy*.

² P. Deussen, *Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, p 2ff, 10ff.

they all avowedly adhere to one principle that the *Upaniṣadic* teachings are purely of the self. The Upaniṣads are text books on *adhyātma vidya* (doctrine or knowledge of self).

Scholars differ among themselves as to the exact number of *Upaniṣads*. It was not an Indian practice, in those days to maintain a correct chronology of the works and persons. The *Vēdic* seers were so great in humility that they never wanted to give the authorship, obviously based on an indifference to personal fame and wordly achievement. The idea of the antique Indian that the contributin of any person was partially due to the environment, also might have prompted them to evade personal fame. Many books might have lost in course of time. It is also not unlikely that due to the oral transmission, as it was the wont in those days, many ideas might have dissolved or sidelined.

The total number of Upanisads were reckoned as 253 by Weber.¹ But the most common reckoning is 108.² Among the 108 *Upaniṣads* only ten or twelve have been considered as the Principal *Upaniṣads*. Samkara and many other *Achāryās* (great teachers) have commented only on ten

¹ Weber, *History o f Sanskrit Literature*, p.155.

² S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 1, p.141.

Upaniṣads. Modern thinkers also did the same. Therefore, it is a customary practice to limit the study of *Unpaniṣads* to the ten principal *Upaniṣads*.

The chief commentary on the *Upaniṣads* on earlier periods and done by Indians are those due to Gaudapada, the grand teacher of Saṅkara; Govindācārya, Śaṅkara's own teacher and Śaṅkara himself. To Śaṅkara and other teachers, the *Vedās* are *Śruti*, that has been heard and transmitted by a continuous and lengthy chain of preceptors and disciples (*Guru-Śiṣya Parampara*). A corollary of this, is that *Vedās* are thought to be *anāti*, no beginning or end and were eternally existent. But modern thinkers differ from this view-point. Beidler, for instance does not treat the *Upaniṣads* on the lines of *Śruti*, "but a critical one of developing in a coherent manner the concept of self to be found in the vast outsprings of the ten *Upaniṣads* chosen".¹ But all thinkers are unanimous of the view that the *Upaniṣads* are treatises on self.

The Upaniṣadic Concept of Self

Philosophy in India, is regarded as *darśana* or vision, a comprehensive view of life. It is not a mere compendium of rational views

¹ Willian Beidler, *The Vision of Self in Early Vedanta*, p.12.

unrelated to life and activity. It must be a science of intuition, i.e., applicable to everyday life and competent enough to transform an individual into the sublime planes of truth and values of life. It must be both pragmatic and spiritual. *Darsāna* is an insight into the whole of experience. To treat philosophy as a mere intellectual discipline is to make it irrelevant to life. Along with this one has to take special note that a non-logical side or an anti-rational beginning never takes one to philosophic heights. Philosophy in India is an intuitive expression of reality and mode of existence." The successful practice of intuition requires previous study and assimilation of a multitude of facts and laws. We may take it that great intuitions arise out of a matrix of rationality".¹

Darsāna is the comprehensive vision of a thinker to all modes of life, individual, world and the trans-empirical. That is why *darsana* in India covers such varied topics from atomism to *Ātman*, from *Kṣaṇikavāda* to *Vivartavāda* or any topic from reason to intuition. The *Upaniṣads*, the cream of *Vedic* thought, so, naturally must contain the crux of the above mentioned varied subjects. All our teachings centre round the individual and his consciousness. An application to the consciousness *per se* of the

¹ S. Radhakrishnan, *An Idealist View of Life*, p.139.

individual will be the cardinal attempt in this regard. The *Upaniṣads* make nothing short of such an attempt – to know the self. The world and its varied knowledge have no meaning if there is no one to know and experience them. The knower and the experient are not his physical part but that which gives life to them – the self of man.

The Self in Man

In *Kēna Upaniṣad*, it is mentioned that, that by which the mind is thought and that which one thinks not with the mind is the most supreme.¹ But this supreme state must be a faculty higher than the mind, for that faculty studies the mind. It must be a state of consciousness profound than that of the mind. States of affairs beyond mind cannot be explained but only experienced and intuited. It is this faculty which sustains all sensible and cognizable states of consciousness, the substratum of all sensation and reason. Its powers are infinite. In the line of intellect, it creates geniuses and men of wisdom, in the line of heart it gives supreme love. It is all-embracing and this faculty is our own self in its pure form. It is intuitive

¹ *Kena Upaniṣad*, 1.6.

consciousness. Nature and the empirical life are inert unless and until, they are vibrated by the self.

The *Upaniṣads*, in their varied stages of development refer to the self by three important connotations. The self as *puruṣa*, 2. the Self as *Ātman*, and 3. the self as *Brahman*. A closer scrutiny of these three demarcations of the self reveals the development in the concept of self from its early teachings to a final comprehensive stage. The demarcation, it seems, also implies a shifting away from a limited individuality to a wider and mature concept of abstract cosmic oneness of all beings. It points to a flight of thought from a mere concrete rational ground to an abstract state of intuitive consciousness. The oneness of the microcosm and macrocosm is one of the wonderful contributions of the *Upaniṣads*. The development of thought from a sort of individual-centred self to a paramount cosmic concept of self-Brahman, the Ultimate Reality, is the most sublime position of *Upaniṣadic* thought.

The Self as *Puruṣa*

The term *puruṣa* has been given different connotations in *R̥k Veda*. *Puruṣa* is regarded as the first principle. Elsewhere it is thought of as a

'man'.¹ A combination of these two concepts gives the idea of a cosmic man responsible for the first cause. "Purusa is viewed as a cosmic man, i.e., a personality. This concept of personality, in other words the individual, what we normally refer to a 'person', seems to be the root meaning found in all uses of 'puruṣa'"²

In this context, it is worthwhile to examine the *Gīta* concept of *Puruṣa*, as the *Gīta* is an amplification of the *Upaniṣadic* teaching. The *Gīta* regards *Puruṣa* with all its three levels: 1. The limited individual self under conditions of *avidya* (or ignorance) due to the attachment to adjuncts of mind, body and sense-organs. 2. Self prior to the knowledge of the Ultimate Reality, the *Atman*, and 3. The non-dual cosmic consciousness, the *Brahman*. The third meaning is the last and the most developed one. *Brahman* is the individual self after *Vidya* (or proper knowledge). *Puruṣa*, in its first definition is that of an individual, under condition of empiricity or what may be called in the framework of reason. The final stage is that of the individual itself, but after freedom from the empiricity. This represents an abstract sense of the self, where it is thought to be complete

¹ *Rk Veda*, X. 90.

² W. Beidler, *The Vision of Self in Early Vedanta*, p.16.

consciousness *Vidya*. Hence *Gita* concept of *Puruṣa* is both immanent and transcendent. Lord *Kṛṣṇa*, himself was referred to as *Puruṣōttama* (the best of *puruṣa*) to show that he is *Brahman* himself.

But the *Upaniṣads* give separate ideas of self as *puruṣa*, *Atman* and *Brahman*, they rather seem to limit *puruṣa* to the empirical individual. "The *Upaniṣads* seem more to limit '*puruṣa*' to the personal, individual sense of self".¹ It is not, however forgotten that in the higher level, the individual self (*puruṣa*) reaches the state of *Atman* and *Brahman*, the ultimate state of consciousness. The *Upaniṣads* here seem to suggest that what prevents *puruṣa* in not considering as *Brahman*, is its empirical framework or rationality, which, according to the *Upaniṣads* are causes of ignorance and bondage. This part of *Upaniṣadic* stream of thought, when surveyed in the light of the central teaching of *Upaniṣads*, lends impossible to make a permanent sharp demarcation of *Puruṣa* from *Brahman*. This stage of *puruṣa* is only a temporary state, a state of 'fallenness'.

The *Brahminical* portion of *Vedas* analyse man in terms of his senses. The *Kāṭha Upaniṣad* depicts human body as the abode of eleven gates.² The

¹ Op. cit., p.17.

² *Kāṭha Upaniṣad*, 5.1.

gates are the various openings in the head, navel and other parts of the body. The *Brahadāranyaka Upaniṣad* gives a five-fold analysis of man, comprising of mind (*manas*), speech, life (*prāṇa*), eye and ear.¹ These eleven-fold and five-fold analyses of man view him on bodily and sensory level. Hence some *Upaniṣads* as cited, regard *puruṣa* as a corporeal being. The concept of man is the concept of *puruṣa* and it is the concept of self under rationality, the self prior to enlightenment or intuition.

The *Taitirīya* and the *Kaṭha Upaniṣads* give another picture of *puruṣa*. This is the concept of *pañcamaya kōśa* (doctrine of five-fold sheaths).² This *Kōśa* theory is a dominant ontological concept of characterizing *puruṣa*. The doctrine of sheaths with its increasing step of gradation is as follows. *Annamaya kōśa* (food sheath). This represents the five gross elements and five subtle elements. *Prāṇamaya kōśa* (life sheath) representing power (*balam*), life (*prāṇa*) and strength (*vīryam*) *Manōmaya kōśa* (mind sheath). This represents *Indriyās* (sense-organs), *manas* (mental faculty), *śaṅkalpa* (imagination), *citta* (consciousness), *dhyāna* (meditation) etc. *Vijñānamaya kōśa* (sheath of insight or intuition); representing intuition and lastly

¹ *Brahadaranyaka Upaniṣad*, 1.4.17.

² *Taitirīya Upaniṣad*, 2.15 and *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, 2.6; 7.8.

Anandamayakōśā (sheath of bliss). This represents the final stage of enlightenment, an indescribable state of tranquility and equipoise.

From *annamayakōśā* to *mañomayakōśā*, the stage of a man is that of an empirical being capable of all the functioning aided by sense organs and reason. This represents a rational being. But *Vijñānamayakōśā* represents the higher state of intuition. The *anandamayakōśā* is the ultimate stage of complete consciousness and liberation (*mukti*).

All *ācāryās* are unanimous in holding that the *Kōśā* theory is an analysis of the different level of reality of *puruṣa* in an ascending manner. Each higher category controls the lower ones till one reaches the 'sheath of bliss' which is the supreme position of *puruṣa*. The *kōśa* theory has a double purpose. Firstly it gives an ontological explanation of the levels of existence of *puruṣa* and secondly it gives the meaning of *Brahman*, as *anna*, *prāṇa*, *manas*, *vijñāna* and lastly as *ananda*. Here one understands that the real nature of *Brahman* is *ānandaṁ*, even though *Brahman* subsumes all other preceding categories.

In the *Kōśā* theory of *Puruṣa*, we have noted that *anna* or food is the first expression of *puruṣa* and *ānanda* or bliss is its final expression. This

argument does not mean that other levels of existences are unimportant. In *Chandōgya Upaniṣad*, *Brahadarānya Upaniṣad*, *Praśna Upaniṣad*, etc. *prāṇa* or life-force is given important positions.¹ This also, however does not mean that *prāṇa* is a more complete expression of *puruṣa*, than other levels. It only means that *prāṇa* is more 'basic' to bodily existence. Without life or *prāṇa*, the other faculties cannot function.

The *Kōśa* theory not only throws light on the levels of existence of *Puruṣa*, but also on the three levels of man's ordinary consciousness, namely waking (*Jagrat*), dream (*Swapna*) and deep-sleep (*Suṣupti*). In the waking state, *puruṣa* shows its existence through the senses and food sheath. In this state *puruṣa* does actions (good and bad) and accrue their merits and demerits. *Puruṣa* is the *Karta* (doer) and *bhōkta* (enjoyer). The dream state is a transitory state from the world of material things and the world of death or 'this world' and the 'other world'.² In deep sleep, *Puruṣa* retires in the world of *Brahman*.³ The *Upaniṣads* point out the positive character of the deep sleep state. It is not a negative state as contemplated by modern

¹ *Chandōgya Upaniṣad*, 5.1, 6.16; *Brahadārānyaka Upaniṣad*, 6.1; 7-13 and *Praśna Upaniṣad*, 2, 2-4.

² *Brahadārānya Upaniṣad*, 4. 3.9.

³ W. Beidler, Op. cit., p.25.

psychology. The *Upaniṣads* give various remarks as to point out its positive nature. "In sleep, *puruṣa* dwells within itself".¹ "It takes on the nature of bliss".² Again, in *Brahadāraṇyaka* (4,3.6) and in *Prasna Upaniṣads* (4.6), it is said that in deep sleep state the *puruṣa* becomes self-illuminated, effulgent in light of self. Here the *puruṣa* dwells, it seems, in its own nature in bliss, effulgence and at rest, "the subject-object state of waking and dream states have been dropped".³

The self (*puruṣa* or *Brahman*) relates to the *manas* in the dream state.⁴ When this idea is translated into the *Kōśa* theory, it means that *puruṣa* withdraws, itself from the *annamayakōśa* to the *prāṇamayakōśa* in the dream state. In this state *manas* is the enjoyer of the dream and *manas* performs all actions through the agency of *prāṇa*. In the deep sleep state, *puruṣa* enters the *vijñānamayakōśa* and finally into *ānandamayakōśa* and "leaving *prāṇa* to keep watch in the sleeping city".⁵ In the deep sleep state thus *puruṣa*

¹ *Brahadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 43, 19, 23 and *Prasna Upaniṣad*, 46.

² *Brahadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 4.3, 17.

³ W. Beilder, Op. cit., p.26.

⁴ *Māndukya Upaniṣad*, 4; *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, 6.16; *Brahadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 2.1,19; 4.3; 10-4.

⁵ *Prasna Upaniṣad*, 4.3.

becomes the nature of bliss. "The *kōśa* analysis interprets this literally as a retiring from the *manas-vijnana* level into the *ananda* or bliss *kosa*, its own 'nature', and truly so being the highest ontological level and so most complete in its expression of *purusa*".¹ Sri Aurobindo has also made a similar account of the self retiring to its own nature of bliss.² Śaṅkara eventhough thinks of a blissful state of self, does not bring the correlation of *Kōśa* theory in this context.

The Self as Atman and Brahman

The term, *Atman*, is very ancient occurring in *Rk Veda* and in many other *Vēdas* and means 'breath' or 'vital force'.³ *Atman* is very often translated into 'self' or 'soul'. But this identification is not fully exhaustive and coherent. Deussen's classification of *Atman* seems to be one of the right views held in this regard.⁴ According to him *Atman* could mean three things: 1. The corporal self, i.e., the individual endowed with body and other physical parts. This is referred to as *Sarīra Atman*. This is basically

¹ W. Beidler, *Op.cit.*, p.27.

² Sri Aurobindo, *Life Divine*, p.238.

³ *Rk Veda*, X.

⁴ P. Deussen, *Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, p.94.

thought of as an ordinary human being with all volitions and desires. In this state, he is an empirical ego, fully determined by the conditions of *indriyās* (senses) and *manas* (Here it means, the limited faculty corresponding to reason). He is the agent and enjoyer of all actions and is in a continuous chain of the preceding life, with all the residual *karmās* (actions) transmitted. The individual takes part in action and undergoes pleasure and pain. This represents the unenlightened state of the individual. But the individual as *Sarīra Atman*, does not stop short at this stage. It has the capacity to enter the higher stage of *Atman*.

The next stage is that of the individual without the bodily influence. It has overcome the limitation of the lower categories like body, sense-organs etc. The individual in this stage even though lives and participates in the worldly affairs, is however not tainted by them the least. He is a detached and disinterested being. The senses no longer bind him to the world, nor the world tantalizes him. He is a *Stitaprajña*, having complete control over him and steadfast in intelligence. He is not moved by pairs of opposites like pleasure and pain, love and hatred etc. But the individual soul is the subject and knower. Deussen calls this stage as the *Individual Self*.

The last stage is that of the *Supreme Self*. The supreme soul or self is the reality into which the corporeal self and the individual self merge. This is the higher stage of self and its reality. There is no subject-object dichotomy here. This is a state of intuition and enlightenment. The bodily accompaniments have no influence on the individual and the self is the master, at this stage, of his destiny. The account given just now is the Deussen's view of the self and Atman. But *Atman* and *Brahman* are translatable terms according to the *Upaniṣads* and Śāṅkara.

The principal *Upaniṣads* view *Brahman* and *Atman* as one state of consciousness. *Brahman* is *Atman*.¹ Hence they are not different and whatever is applicable to *Atman* is true of *Brahman*. The *Upaniṣads*, even though speak of the various states of consciousness, do not identify the self with body or anything corporeal. The self is intangible and non-sensible and cannot be subject to the conditions of rationality. "The soul which is not this, nor that, nor anything else, is intangible, for it cannot be taken into hold of".² *Atman* is the base of all fundamental consciousness. It is the base

¹ *Tatiriyā Upaniṣad*, 1. 5.

² *Bṛahadaranyaka Upaniṣad*, iii. 7.3.

of the presupposition of self and even not self. It is the centre of all there in the world.

The self, according to the *Mandukya Upanisad* has three stages of consciousness, culminating in a final and fourth stage, where all the preceding three merge.¹ They are the waking (*Jagrat*), dreaming (*Swapna*), Sleeping (*Suṣṭi*) and *turiya* the fourth. In the first condition, the self is within the empirical framework, conditioned by its scope and also limits, where it enjoys the gross (*stūla*) things. The self is body-dependent. It is an empirical being under rational framework. The second stage is that of dreaming. Here the self enjoys the *Sūṣma* (subtle) things. What are transmitted in the waking state are of the materials of action for the self under dream condition. The spirit, in this stage is free from the bondage of body. The third stage is characterized by a condition of sound sleep *suṣṭi*, where the self enjoys neither empirical things nor dreams. In this stage, the *Upaniṣads* say, the self is in temporary union with *Brahman*. In deep sleep, one is lifted from all empirical limitations. But this is not a state of absence

¹ *Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad*, i, 2.7.

of consciousness, as is evident from the fact that one remembers his sound sleep. It is a state of objectless knowing.¹

In the *Jagrat* and *Swapna* state of the self there is subject-object dichotomy. But in *Susupti* this dichotomy disappears and enjoys a brief moments of bliss. In order that, one must not confuse it as the highest state and it is a state of sheer non-consciousness, the *Upaniṣads* say that there is a fourth higher state, called the *turīya* state, a pure state of intuitional consciousness. The *turīya* state, therefore represents the supreme consciousness or intuition. It is the highest state of enlightenment and the final development of the self. This state represents the real self, Atman or Brahman. Hence the *Upaniṣads* speak of Self as Brahman, as the highest state of enlightenment (intuition). To be in intuition is the final expression of individual self. The three conditions of the self in waking, dream and deep-sleep are called the *Viśva*, the *Taijasa* and the *Prajña* states. The fourth and the final state of intuition of self is referred to as the *Turīya*. Thus *turiya* is the state of intuition of self.

¹ *Brahadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, ii, 1.

Now, what is the state of affair in *turiya*. The Upaniṣads say that it is impossible to describe it by waking state means of communication, i.e., by rational and linguistic means. But an attempt can be made so as to make it in the possible sense. It is *sat*, *cit* and *ananda* (eternal existence, consciousness and bliss). The linguistic rendering of them is inefficient and improper. But there is no other means. "The discerning see by their superior knowledge the Atman which shines all bliss and immortality".¹ The state of Brahman as the highest expression of self, the subject-object difference is completely merged. "This identity of subject and object is not a vague hypothesis, but the necessary implication of all relevant thinking, feeling and willing".² The highest expression of self is Brahman or Atman as *anandaṁ* (bliss) in the *turiya* state of intuition.

The Purport of *Mahāvakyās*

Given the ambivalence of knowledge, the reason and intuition, the *Upaniṣads* do not belittle either, though the complete expression, they say, is possible by intuition. The *Upaniṣadic* classification of the individual self under *Viśva* and *Taijasa* represents his rational faculty and that in *turiya* as

¹ *Mundaka Upaniṣad*, ii, 8.

² S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 1, p.170.

the *ananda* state of intuition or Brahman. There is no demarcation of the self in the sense that, these two are distinct entities. But they represent the same self under different conditions. This points out the fact that reason and intuitions are two aspects of the same thing, but one the lower and the other the higher, of self. The full nature and status of the Self is however not revealed in its empirical framework (*Viśva* and *Taijasa*), but in the intuitional level (*turīya*). The *Upanisads* thus make the idea in very clear tones. As the *Upanisads* say the self is Brahman, as pointed out earlier, they, without any shadow of a doubt reiterate that intuition is the highest stage of self and the pinnacle of knowledge to be attained by individuals. A survey of the *mahāvākya*s (great sayings) in the *Upanisads* further amplify this central message of the *Upanisads*.

1. *Tattvamasi* ('That Thou Art')

In the *mahāvākya*, *tattvamasi*, it is pointed out that the self of an individual is the reality in its state of full development attainable in the final stage of *turīya*. Every individual, who attains this state would know that he is Brahman or reality. The fact that he is reality or his own self is reality dawns to him only in the state of *turīya* or intuition. The search for supreme outside of him, ends in a futile attempt. *Tattvamasi* is not an

empirical statement or inference drawn from premisses, worthy of verification. It is the statement of a fact in simple and plain truth. It is the state of affair of the individual. It is truth-in-itself. There is nothing outside it, of which it can be subjected to.

Ahaṁ Brahmāsmi

The *mahāvākya*, *ahaṁ Brahmāsmi*, reveals the non-duality of the individual self and his ultimate nature of consciousness. Here the individual self is identified as intuition, which is the highest reality to be attained. The knowledge that 'I am Brahman', is the basis of all knowledge and consequently all modes of existence. This *mahāvākya* expresses the perfect identity between the knower and knowledge. *Ahaṁ Brahmāsmi*¹ points out the fact that there is nothing other than the knowledge of self to be thought of as fundamental reality. The conviction of one's own self as reality is revealed to an individual only in the plane of intuition (*turīya* and the *ānanda* state of self). The self-conviction is the basic principle of the recognition of all realities, including that otherselves are also *Brahman*, and the seeming variety of 'otherselves' is due to the lower conditions of self,

¹ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 1.4.10.

such as when it is conditioned by *vsiva* and *taijasa*, the rational and empirical factors and adjuncts. Only a person who has self-conviction of Brahman, *Ahaṁ Brahmāsmi*, can intuit that otherselves are also Brahman (*Tattoamasi*). This is the reason why Uddalaka, the great teacher, who has *Brahmajñāna* (intuitive experience of Brahman) says, ". . . That which is the subtlest that is the self, that is all this, the truth, that self Thou Art, O Svetaketu".¹

Prajñānaṁ Brahma

This *mahāvākya*, points to the fact that intuition is *Brahman* and we know that Brahman is the individual self in its highest state of enlightenment (*turiya*). This is a reiteration of the idea that knowledge of Self is the supreme knowledge and that knowledge is the greatest reality that is possible. Hence it is possible to infer that highest reality is not rational or material, it is intuitional. Here *prajnanam* is *vidya* (state of wisdom free from all limitations – intuition) and *vidya* is real. Reality, that is Brahman is no different from intuition and it is the intuition of self. Hence, it follows, from this *mahāvākya*, that *adhyātma vidya* or Self

¹ *Chandōgya Upaniṣad*, VI.10.

knowledge is *Vidya* or the right knowledge. One cannot attain this as long as he is under the adjuncts of *avidya* (ignorance). Everything that conceals the true nature of self is *avidya*. Therefore sense-organs, reasons etc. are factors of ignorance or *avidya*.

Ayamātma Brahma

True knowledge must be very immediate and direct as pointed out by this *mahāvākya*. Truth is the knowledge of Brahman and it is immediately equated as the very self. There is no mediacy or time to know it. Nor any discursive reflections or inferences required for it. It is as simple and immediate as one's own self and existence. Given the status of one's existence, it is only a matter of recognition or awareness.

Sarvaṁ Khalidam Brahma

Everything is endowed with reality. The variety that one notices in this world has actually their foundation in the reality of Brahman. Hence they must be taken as non-different from Brahman, even though Brahman is not the variety. It is like different suns seen by the reflection of water in various rivers. The sun is only one, but seems to be many. Even though the empirical world is not in itself reality, it cannot be treated as mere

nothingness. "The Upanisads do not maintain that the intellect is a useless guide. The account of reality given by it is not false. It fails only when it attempts to grasp the reality in its fulness".¹

The purpose of the *mahāvākyas*, is to point out that supreme knowledge is the knowledge of self, which is Brahman and it is a matter of *vidya* or intuition. This is a state of experience or *anubhūti*. In the enlightened state, there is no difference between the selves of various persons. Actually the feelings of multiplicity of individual selves itself gets removed. The knowledge that 'I am Brahman' is as relevant as 'you are Brahman' and 'everything is Brahman'. All these trace to the final point that intuition or *prajñānam* itself is Brahman. Knowledge of self is Brahman and it is the reality. This knowledge gives all other knowledge and no other knowledge is worthy of knowledge in its absence. This is the lesson one gets from the *mahāvākyas* of the *upaniṣads*.

Upaniṣadic Truth - Its Nature

The perennial truth, according to the *Upaniṣads* is, as pointed out in various contexts, *Brahman* or self-knowledge untainted by the previous.

¹ S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 1, p.179.

states of the individual, such as waking, dreaming and sleeping. Waking state experiences are sublated (or contradicted) in subsequent experiences of the same state or by the dream state. Dream state experience is sublated by the waking-state experience. All these states of experiences are contradicted when Brahma-Knowledge is realized. The criterion of truth is thus non-contradiction (*Abhādita*). A knowledge acquired can be considered as true as long as it remain non-contradicted. "Thus the knowledge of the world appearance is true now, but not true absolutely".¹ It must be *sat*, or that which eternally is. The *turiya* state of self alone admits of unoblatability. Non-contradiction as criterion of truth is applicable only to this state of consciousness of self, the intuitive state.

When the *Upaniṣad* says, 'The Absolute is',² all it means is that the self exists not as a category in space and time, but as an indeterminate possibility of existence as one's own self. This is to be regained by an intuitive method of self-realization. Truth in the highest sense, can neither be received nor presented. Positive rendering and verbal expression imply concreteness. Hence, the method of description is impossible. But how can

¹ S. Das Gupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 1, p.482.

² *Kāṭha Upaniṣad*, II.6.

the experience of Brahman be exposed. The *Upaniṣadic* seers resort to a negative method of verbalization. By saying Brahman is not anything like the empirical discernibles such as *neti, neti* (not this, not that) they are trying to communicate its essential nature that Brahman cannot be positively verbalized. If one remains, completely uncommunicative, the purpose is not served. On the other hand if he communicates, he cannot use positive language. Hence the available method for communication is negative verbalization. "*Neti, Neti* does not deny the reality of existence, it denies all the empirical characterization of reality".¹ The highest state of consciousness is far beyond the clutch of the finite or determinate knowledge. The empirical effableness of the self is pointed out by the *Upaniṣad*. "The Atman is not this, it is not this. It is unseizable . . . , indestructible . . . , it is unbound, it does not tremble, it is not injured".² The *Upaniṣad* stresses the need for intuitive insight to know Brahman. "Brahman is open to the immediacy of intuition. It transcends all knowledge though it is knowledge. It is the essence of cognition, without being the cognitive process. Brahman is illumination".³

¹ M. Sircar, *Hindu Mysticism*, p.59.

² *Brahadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, IV.4.22.

³ *Brahadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, iii.4.1; iii.5.1.

REASON AND INTUITION IN ADVAITA VEDANTA

C.C Damodaran “Reason and intuition in Indian thought - A critical appraisal ”
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CHAPTER IV

REASON AND INTUITION IN ADVAITA VEDANTA

Śaṅkarācārya, the exponent of Advaita, started his mission of exploring the meaning of Vedic teaching by a thorough-going interpretation (*bhāṣya*) of the *Brahmasūtras* (Aphorisms of the knowledge of Brahman, the universal self), the *daśōpaniṣads*¹ (ten principal *upaniṣads*) and the *Bhagavad Gita*. These according to him amplify the *Upaniṣadic* teaching. The *bhāṣya* method is deeply logical and profoundly intuitional.

The whole of advaitic teaching can be summed up in the celebrated dictum of Śaṅkara, *Brahma Satyaṁ, Jaganmitya, Jivōbrahmaiva napara* (Brahman alone is real, the world is only seemingly real or it is unreal from the stand-point of Brahman, the individual self is nothing other than Brahman). This dictum proves the non-difference of the individual and Brahman, the ultimate reality. In this treatise, the interest is limited to the rational and intuitional elements in *Advaita*, and not the full exposition of *advaita*. So, the study will be narrowed down to the epistemology and

¹ *Isā, Kena, Kaṭah, Praśna, Mundāka, Māṇḍukya, Aitereya, Taitiriya, Brahadāranyaka and Chandōgya.*

metaphysics. It is well-known that the determination of knowledge, falls into two categories the empirical and the trans-empirical. Sankara makes a three-fold classification of realities. The *prātibhasika*, the seemingly-real or the apparent as the 'rope' in the rope-snake illusion, *Vyāvaharika*, the empirically real, as in the case of things in the world and worldly affairs and *Pāramartha* the fundamentally real, that which satisfies the criterion of truth namely non-contradiction. *Brahman* alone is the reality of this type. But the first two can be reduced to one, viz., the *Vyavahāra* or the empirical reality of rational understanding. Now, we have two categories, the *Vyavahāra* and the *paramārtha*, the rational and the intuitional levels of realities.

Of the above levels of realities, valid knowledge (*prama*), is *Paramartha*. There are ^e methods of getting valid knowldege, *pramāna* which shall be discussed shortly. Samkara regards knowledge of Brahman or self alone comes under *Paramartha*, all else being coming under *Vyavahāra*. But the knowledge of self, *Brahman*, cannot start from vacuum. A rigorous rational and moral training are its pre-condition. Only by getting convinced of the inadequacies of rational method, one can think of a higher method of knowledge. Further, to pursue, supreme knowledge (*parāvidya*)

one must, in addition to rationality, conform to rigorous moral and physical training.

1. Necessity for Ethical Discipline

One of the inherent qualities of a man of sanity is his inner urge for order, both physical and moral. This urge assumes various forms in his activities. Inconsistent things do not fit into human mental framework. The same is the case with moral or ethical inconsistency, eventhough hedonism and epicurianism pay for sometime, but meet with inherent contradiction of their own. His demand for, moral and physical order is not altogether different from a wider concept of the worldly order, that nature loves symmetry. Think of the case of *Rta* (order) propounded in the *upaniṣads*. It means two things to us. A world order and moral governance. The meaning of world order, as per *rta* is that there is unity and uniformity in the world. Days and nights come and go regularly. So also climatic changes and the like. Noboy can after them. The second meaning is the necessity of a moral governance. Unless an ethical or moral order and harmony is there, life itself will be confusing. This is required for the continued sustenance of all human beings. The absence of which leads to chaos. Sometimes, man's ethical life is regarded as the outcome of the

harmony of his inner life. The inner life or self is harmonious, though outside things seem to be tumultous. Probably the study of self thus makes an early ethical training imperative.

The qualification necessary for a person to pursue the study of self is that he must undergo the four-fold characteristics, *Sadhana catustaya*. These qualifications are: 1. *nityānityavastuviveka*, capacity to discriminate things that are eternal and transient. One must be able to know, what is real, that which is never subject to decay or change. Or that which never gets refuted or contradicted, internal and external. 2. *Ihamutraphala-bhogavirāga*, disinclination to enjoy the fruits of one's action here and everywhere. In order to develop, a tendency of disinterest towards the fruits of actions, one must have a sense of service and dedication coupled with a sense of *tyāga* or renunciation. A fellow-feeling and sincere dedication to social service alone give rise to such a deep sense of renunciation. A *tyāgi* (one who renounces for the good of others) alone can be a *snehi* (lover of mankind). 3. *Samadamātisādhanasam̐pat*, development of such personal virtues like peace, self-restraint, renunciation, patience, deep-concentration and faith derived from inner conviction and understanding. The significance attached to the cultivation of personal qualities or virtues is

that, one's study will be proper and truthful, so that it never becomes corruptive and communicated only in the right manner. Good things on bad hands spoil things as much as bad things would spoil good hands. 4. *Mumukṣutoa*: It is an ardent desire to get freedom. The goal is *mōkṣa* or complete freedom. Unless the goal is not striven, its attainment will be delayed or lost. So one must have a sincere interest and desire for its achievement. Freedom is freedom from *avidya* or ignorance. If, once the mental bondage of ignorance is removed, it is believed, that it removes all other bondages thereby. For this *vidya* is required, that is knowledge of self through intuition. The act of freedom or free-will is by intuition or *vidya* by an early moral training. "It is an act of *intellectual intuition*, which is itself an act of free will, we become conscious of the law of duty, or the universal purpose, which demands us to be free persons, to free ourselves from the determinism of nature, to refuse to be mere links in a causal chain."¹

Eventhough the ideas of morality and free-will can only be discerned by intuition, as a preparatory for self-relalization, the exercise of them can be executed in this world, the world of empirical realities cognizable by reason. The awareness of the law of duty and freedom of will germinated

¹ F. Thilly, *A History of Philosophy*, p.456.

from intuition presupposes a background of its action - a ground of world and reason. This suggests that the world and reason are the grounds where one is to be stationed. The sojourn in the empiricity and rationality enables one to understand the world as a means for a higher purpose, the purpose of freedom attainable through intuition, through self-realization. "Now it becomes clear that our ordinary knowledge gained by sense perception is a practical instrument for achieving freedom, it presents us with the resistance needed for the exercise of will: we cannot become free without putting forth effort, hence we need a world to struggle against and to overcome."¹ Apart from the moral achievement of *Sāddhanačatuṣṭaya*, Yogic practices like *Yama*, *niyama*, *āsana* etc. (Restraints, observances, rules and regulations, bodily postures etc.) are also prescribed. The *Aṣṭāṅg Yōga*² (the eight fold practices in Yōga) is a method of training prescribed by Advaita for self-realization. "Yoga method is a practical discipline point out the road to this realization."³

¹ Ibid.

² This part will be discussed separately.

³ S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol.1, p.176.

Pramāṇas in Advaita

The Indian thinkers speak of *pramanas* or method of getting valid knowledge, as a means of proving or disproving a thesis. The *Advaitin* makes a sharp demarcation of *pramāṇa*, as to those which are applicable to the determinate (*Vyavahāra*, rational or empirical) and to the *indeterminate* (*Paramārtha*, knowledge of Brahman). Perception (*Pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*) and logical argumentation (*tarka*) are the chief *pramāṇas* of the first type (relating to the rational sphere) and *Sabda* or verbal testimony of the scriptures is the main *pramana* relating to *paramārtha*.

Knowledge of the Determinate

The empirical world is the one that looms large in front of us. To get to know is by the use of the primary methods of understanding, sensation and observation. Perception is a method of knowing the observable things. In perception there is the participation of *indriyas* (senses) and *manas* (a lower faculty of mind). A *pramāṇa* is valid as long as it does not give contradictory views or not contradicted by other *pramāṇas*. But in the case of *pratyakṣa* contradiction in itself is possible as in the case of a rope-snake illusion. The rope is mistaken as a snake, not by all, but by a few. But

everyone is not disinclined to such illusion. The *pratyakṣa* of a 'snake' in the 'rope-snake' is contradicted by subsequent experiences. This is the case with all matters of *Pratyakṣa* at one time or other. A theory which suffers one contradiction itself is enough to argue that it is not a theory of vindication.

Now let us think, whether perception can be used to know self. We are perceiving individuals. One can argue on that line that by perceiving an individual one understands his essential characteristics, his self. When perceiving an individual, one is perceiving only his visible attributes like shape, structure, colour, movements etc. In this, "the object of perceptual experience is the apparent self, ie., the self in association with its limiting adjuncts (mind)."¹ By knowing the products of clay one cannot know clay. But by knowing clay one can know all products of clay. Only an object of knowledge can be known by perception and not knowledge by itself. Since the self as the substratum of consciousness cannot be an object of knowledge, it cannot be known by perception.

¹ K Satchidananda Murty, *Revelation and Reason in Advaita Vedanta*, p.123.

Inference (*Anumāna*)

Advaita, like many other systems of thought takes up *anumana* as a *pramāna*, but its scope is restricted to the sphere of empiricalities, as it is based on perceptible facts. *Anumāna* eventhough is mental and abstract in its derivation of the conclusion drawn, is basically a method of perception. *Anumāna* is based on the logical concomittance and invariable relation, *Vyāpti*, between the things to be inferred and the ground (*hētu*) from which the conclusion is drawn. The results come only from the condition of *Vyāpti*. Unless the *Vyāpti* is there, the inference is impossible. But how are we sure of the *Vyāpti*, which is logically understood by observation on external factors. The *Advaitin* is critical of *anumāna* as a *pramāṇa*. The inferences are only probabilities (*yuktis*) and not indubitable conclusions. They are conditional of such and such things when prevail give rise to such and such conclusion' pattern. Conditional statements and proofs are conditional and not final. Since *Brahman* is not conditional and has no *hētu* or *vyāpti*, inference cannot be used as a *pramāṇa* of self-realization.

'Tarka' As Reason in Advaita

'*Tarka*' or logical argumentation is a type of reasoning referred to in

the *upaniṣads*. It includes with in itself *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*. All these are tantamount to the acquisition of empirical or determinate things falling in an object-subject relation. They cannot function in a pure subject situation. They being relational (in the sense of subject-object dichotomy) and provisional (applicable to worldly things) are not *pramāṇas* by themselves but can form an addendum to a valid *pramāṇa*. In the *upaniṣads*, it is mentioned that the self (or *Atman*) is the illuminator of everything, including provisional knowledge. *Atman* illumines the *antahkaraṇa*, internal organs, like *manas* (mind), *Buddhi* lower consciousness etc. The *antahkaraṇa* undergoes a modification *vr̥tti*, when illuminated. There are four *vr̥ttis* of the *antahkaraṇa*. They are *Saiṃśaya* (indetermination), *niścāya* (determination), *smaraṇa* (remembrance) and *garva* (Self-consciousness). When the *antahkarana vr̥tti* is *saiṃśaya*, it is called the *manas*; when the *vr̥tti* is *niścāya*, it is called the *buddhi*, (intellect). It is called *citta*, when the *antahkarana vr̥tti* is *smaraṇa* and *aḥamkāra* (Self-sense) when the *vr̥tti* is *garva*.

Rational knowledge is obtained by the *antahkaraṇan vr̥tti*. The *vr̥tti* *jñāna* or empirical knowledge constitutes *tarka* or logical argumentation. A point to be specially stressed is that in empirical knowledge, the *vr̥tti* of the *antahkaraṇa* is important, but in real *jñāna* (intuition, the *nirōdha* (denial) of

the *antaḥkaraṇan vṛtti* is required, so that Brahman, the *Sākṣi caitanya* (witnessing-consciousness) is revealed. "It is present always and it is impossible to think it away. It is the light of all our seeing and does not cease to be even in deep sleep."¹

According to Śaṅkara, *tarka* is reason governed by *antaḥkarana vṛtti*. Since *antaḥkaraṇan vṛtti* is object-based, it cannot function as an independent *pramāṇa* and as such cannot reveal the knowledge of Brahman. It is like an *Ūha* or probable hypothesis, which is to be further vindicated. *Tarka* stands roughly like a scientific hypothesis, affording a tentative generalization of a principle to be determined by confirmatory methods. The *Advaitins* regard *tarka* as useful in establishing the authority of *vedas*. "So (the Advaita school says) *tarka* is needed (i) to ascertain the purport of scriptural passages, (ii) to remove doubts (*Saiṃśaya*) and contrary beliefs (*Viparyāsa*), and (iii) to convince us of the probability of existence of what is to be known, i.e., Brahman (*prameya saṁbhava niścaya*)."²

The *Advaitin* is however, very much aware of the limitations of *tarka*. It cannot by itself establish a proof. It must work in unison with some other

¹ M. Hirayanna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, p.344.

² S. Murty, *Op.cit.*, pp.149-50.

pramāṇa for valid knowledge. *Tarka* is very often used for negative purposes. That is for refuting the rival viewpoints and thereby paving way for one's proof. The Advaitins and other thinkers use various forms of philosophic debates. *Vāda*, *Jalpa* and *Vitaṇḍa* are the three forms of debates accepted by Indian logicians. In *vāda*, truth is established by logical means. In *Jalpa*, the drive for victory is paramount. It uses even foul means for this. In *Vitaṇḍa* or negative argumentation, one is concerned only with the refutation of the opponent. According to Advaitins and *Mādhyamaka* Buddhists, refutation of wrong views is tantamount to the establishment of truth and hence they accept *vitaṇḍa* as a method.

Tarka, takes the role of a catalyst, when working in unison with a valid *pramāṇa* like *śabda* or scriptural testimony of *upaniṣads*. The *upaniṣads* also endorse *tarka* and its logical offshoot, *vitanda* prior to and sometimes along with *śabda* for the establishment of Brahman. The *tarka*, then is called *anvaya-vyatireka tarka* (reasoning based on the presence and absence of connection).

Anvaya-vyatireka Tarka

Advaita employs this method of logical argumentation to support

and amplify the accepted *Veda-pramāṇa*. *Anvaya-vyatireka tarka* uses the available links to expound a theory and missing links are reasonably argued to exist by hypothesis or inferences. For example, "Atman should be heard of, meditated upon and contemplated," is worthy of this sort of logical argumentation. Sankara took up this *Veda pramāṇa* to explain the self. When the *Upaniṣad* says, 'Atman should be heard of,' it refers to 'Sroṇa, that one must hear the teachings of the *upaniṣads* from a well-informed preceptor (*guru*). When it says, 'it must be meditated up on', it means the teaching must be subject to reflection or *manana*. One can use all possible valid means to ease one's understanding. When the *upaniṣad* says, 'Atman should be contemplated,' it means that the well-thought idea must be subjected to further thinking for personal conviction. Here the application of *tarka* is along and in line with *śabda* or verbal testimony of the *Vedās*. The elaboration, of which we are familiar, is derived in this manner by Śaṅkara.

All *mahāvakyās* (great sayings) in the *upaniṣads* are also explained by the combined use of *śabda pramāṇa* and *anvaya-vyatireka tarka*. The negative method of argumentation and elimination help us to derive the self from the individual *jiva*. Brahman is not the body, nor is it the sense-organs. It is

neither his expression or movement. It is also not his word and thought. It is thus not anything of his sensible and cognizable thing. It must, at last, then be the basis of all these, the abode of everything, the supreme consciousness, which is self or *Brahman*. This method of elimination from concreteness to abstraction, by the method of negative argumentation alone helps along with *śabda* to speak *I am Brahman (Ahaṁ Brahmāsmi)*, *tattvamasi* (You† Are That) etc.

The *anvaya-vyatireka tarka* has the following methods of elimination and argumentation.

1. Any type of object of cognition cannot be *Atman*. The body, *manas*, *indriyās* the physical objects of cognition etc. are all eliminated or 'bracketed out'. The result is that these eliminated things cannot be *Atman*.
2. Anything which has a dependent or manifested existence by other cannot be *Atman*. Under this analysis, days and nights, material substances (*jada*), relations, conditions etc. are eliminated. The result is that anything of this type cannot be *Atman*.
3. Whatever is mutable cannot be *Atman*. Under this anything which

has origin or decay has been eliminated. Hence all causally connected things cannot be *Atman*.

4. Anything which undergoes inherent or subsequent contradiction cannot be *Atman*. All waking, and dream experiences are thus eliminated. They then cannot be *Atman*.

Now what state of affair is left out without elimination. Then apply *Vedapramāṇa*. *Turiya* state or the fourth state of consciousness is free from contradiction. Neither empirical nor dream state experiences come here. *Turiya* is a state of unalloyed bliss, *anandaṃ* and consciousness (intuition). Hence an intuitive state of *turiya* alone is the highest state. The self assumes full expression in this state. This is *Brahman* or *Atman*, the self with supreme consciousness or intuition. Thus *anvaya-vyatireka tarka* is by itself cannot prove the existence of self, the Brahman but along with *sabda pramāṇa* it can do wonders. The Advaitin, after the use of *tarka* does not think of its having any intrinsic value. *Tarka* as *tarka* is only *śuṣka-tarka* (dry argumentation), incapable of yielding any substantial result. Sankara, therefore approves the role of *tarka* as long as it is *śrutyānugrahātarka*, argument supported and based on scriptures.

Brahmānubhava As Intuition in Advaita

With the rational faculties intact, one can start with the world of experience and explore its domains. Knowledge of all sensible and demonstrative types come within its ambit. Advaita, though not accepting all these rational means of knowledge as ultimately valid, does not however belittle their role nor altogether rejects them either. Some of them, particularly the *tarka* and *vitanda* can even act as catalysts, though as backburners in realizing the ultimate truth, clubbed with the *vedapramāna* in the knowledge of Brahman. The truth, which Advaita, points is the truth of Brahman and the means of knowing this is the *Śabda pramāna* of the *upanishads*. *Śabda*, here means the scriptural authority of the *vedas*, which treat non-sensuous and super-sensuous things. *Śabda pramāna* is used under two conditions. 1. When other methods of knowing fail to establish the truth and 2. The *tātparya* (purport) of the truth is not contradicted by any of these methods. Thus *Sabda* makes the investigation on a firm footing.

This is all about the background of accepting *śabda* as a *pramāna* in knowing *Brahman*. Further, since *Vedaś* are *apauruṣeya* (impersonal), there is little chance of their *vākyās* (sayings) getting tainted by personal factors and

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since they deal not directly with brute material or sensible things, there is little chance of their going into conflict with everyday experience of man. These features give *Veda-vakyās* an immunity to individual-specific and empirical-specific limitations.

The belief that *vedas* are *apauruṣeya* and their subject-matter free from empirical contradictions give them an axiomatic status that they ever existed. A statement can be either contradictory and non-contradictory. A reliable and trust-worthy person, *āpta*, cannot give a contradictory statement, as it works against his very own integration. He then ceases to be an *āpta*. Besides the consistency, an *āpta* must have complete command and control over his field of inquiry. In this sense, no man of ordinary intelligence can be an *āpta*. This also suggests that the validity of knowledge is also based on its consistency or non-contradiction and also the source from which it comes. The source and also the immediacy of the source are equally important. Mediation from the source can vitiate the knowledge coming from the source. Now, along with non-contradiction and source, the factor of immediacy also constitute valid knowledge. The simplest type of immediate knowledge is that, one thinks or one has consciousness. But when he thinks of an outside object, then there is a

dualism of object and subject. Hence knowledge of the outside objects cannot be the most simple and immediate. It, then must be a subjective consciousness of one's own self. Nobody is skeptical of his own awareness, if he has an awareness. It does not require a proof. The knowledge that one has consciousness, i.e., his self-consciousness is a self-evident, self-proved, non-contradictory knowledge. But this is not complete. It requires a higher abstraction and insight. The full exposition of self-consciousness is achieved through *vidya* or intuition and intuitive knowledge of self is Brahman.

The experience of Brahman (or *Brahmānubhava*) is the basis truth. Dream state experiences are contradicted daily and number of times; but waking state experience is contradicted one for all and that happens when the intuition of Brahman is dawned. "This is the highest, since there is no other knowledge that can contradict it."¹ *Tarka* or logical argumentation by itself cannot reveal the self. Reality can be apprehended only by an 'ego-exploring technique' in which the false accomponiments of the *jiva* (individual self) are successfully eliminated. This is possible only by knowing *Brahman*. Knowing *Brahman* means to be *Brahman*. 'To be'

¹ S. Radhakrishnan, Op.cit., p.501.

Brahman is not an external acquisition, but only the recognition of one's own 'paradise-lost.'

Man has a tendency to open a discussion only on an existent thing or on a thing likely to be existent. No serious and sincere discussion is opened on a self-contradictory thing. No man of any consequence tries to wage a war on rhetoric of the existence of a barren woman's son or such non-entities like a hane's horn. In the same way, if one comes across the word 'Brahman' discussed at length and seriousness by men of no less understanding, it is not unlikely that it has some meaning. Brahman is described as *sat cit* and *ananda*. That is why, "then, therefore the desire to know Brahman."¹

The possibility of Brahman, as supreme reality, warranted by commonsense and also by the *mahāvakyās* of the *upaniṣads* makes it worthy of pursuit. Hence the discussion of Brahman starts. As pointed out, a discussion is possible only on an existent or on a thought-to-be-existent thing (*pratipanna vastu*). A *pratipannavastu* alone admits of *vicara* (discussion). To support that Brahman is not an obscure thing, we have to

¹ Sankara, *Brahmasutra Bhasya*.

take up the *mahāvākya*, *Ayam ātma Brahman*, this very individual self is Brahman. Nobody doubts his own existence. Now, the other question. If Brahman is the self of each person and each person is self-evident of it, then why enter into a discussion. The answer is that, though everyone is aware of his existence and consciousness, it has two defects. Firstly it is understood in the wrong way and secondly the knowledge is not complete also. Everyone is aware of his existence by the sensible part and by rational methods. Both are misleading and incomplete. Sensibility and rationality do not take one to the essence, instead put in the periphery. Peripheral knowledge is no knowledge. Again consciousness of self does not allow empirical formulations and an attempt in this line takes us nowhere. Hence, "though the *upaniṣads* tell us about Brahman, inquiry is necessary in order to refute contrary views and dispel doubts."¹

The Upaniṣadic Definition of Brahman

In *Taitīrya upaniṣad*, Brahman is described as *sat*, *cit* and *ananda* (Reality, consciousness and bliss). This definition of the *upaniṣad* is to be clarified. When one consistently calls something by a special name, it

¹ Bharatitirata Vidyanaraya, *Vivarnaprimeyasamgraha*, p.55.

means that, it has to be distinguished from other way of using it. Here *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda* are thought to be the very essence of *Brahman* and they are placed in adjacent positions independent of the other. To speak of the existence of *Brahman* is to speak of its own special nature, namely it is different from other existence. The existence of *Brahman* never undergoes change or mutation. Can one think of an existence of this type? It is impossible. No categories of sensible entities come in this status. Hence the *sat* of *Brahman* is unique. It is unique in the sense that it is eternal without any change.

The next idea, *cit* is to further clarify that the eternal existence, referred to is not of a dead inert thing, but of a fathomless cognitive type and the third essentiality, *anadam*, refers to the state of such a combination of eternal existence and infinite consciousness. It is a state of unalloyed bliss, not empirical or verbal, but intuitive and hence indescribable.

Mahavakyas Directly Give Brahmanubhava

Sankara is of the view that the *mahavakyas* like *Aham Brahmasmi*, *Tattoamasi*, *Prajñānam Brahma*, *Sarvaṁkhalidam Brahma* etc. directly lead to intuition and *Brahmānubhava* (the experience of *Brahman*). According to

him the *upaniṣads* in their essence do not speak anything other than the knowledge of the non-difference of the individual self and Brahman as a means to attain *mōkṣa* (liberation). The knowledge arising from the *mahāvākya* is competent to dispel the ignorance of the limiting adjunct of body, mind and sense-organs. They are also competent to dispel the impressions and memories created by them for ever. This attainment leads one into the initiation of the intuition of *Brahman*. Sincere adherence to the practice of the *mahāvākya* is the sole criterion of such an initiation. "So, Sankara says, the memories of false notions die out and 'the train of remembrance of the knowledge of the non-dual nature of the self is firmly implanted."¹

Suresvara's view

The argument of Sankara is further corroborated by Suresvara in his *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*. According to him, the *mahāvākyas* themselves are *pramanas* and do not require *prasamkhyāna* (serious meditation) for the intuition of Brahman. Thinkers like Mandana hold that *prasamkhyāna* is the chief *kāraṇa* (cause) of the intuition of Brahman and *mahāvākyas* themselves

¹ S. Murty, Op.cit. p.103.

cannot give an immediate insight. Suresvara refutes the view of the upholders of *prasaṅkhyāna*, that any extent of it alone cannot give rise to intuition, unless *mahāvākyas* themselves do not give rise to the intuition of Brahman. Hence *prasaṅkhyāna* is superfluous and redundant in the case of *mahāvākyas*." If the sentence, 'That Thou Art' cannot generate certain knowledge about the self, nothing else can; for it is a *pramāṇa* which is in no need of confirmation by other *pramāṇas*.¹ But like Sankara, Suresvara also hold that those who cannot be initiated into the intuition of Brahman by *mahāvākyas* alone can rely on *anvaya-vyatirekatarka* and *vitaṇḍa* as auxiliary techniques. But these by themselves, they say, yield nothing of Brahman. Ultimately, *mahāvākyas* alone lead to liberation.²

The view of Sankara and Suresvara that *mahāvākyas* alone give the intuition of Brahman is further validated by thinkers like Madhusudana and Padmapada. According to Madhusudana, the meaning of the *mahāvākyas* is to be understood by itself and nothing outside of it can amplify it. But, for the intellectual luggards, some amount of *vicāra* (Serious thinking) is useful to remove the *pratibandha* (Obstacle). The function of

1 Op.cit. p.105.

2 Suresvara, *Naishkarmyasiddhi*, ii, 6, 9.

vicara is only to remove the abstacle, "and when there are no obstacles it is the *mahāvākyas* alone which remove ignorance and lead to liberation."¹ The *vivarna* school of advaita advocated by Padmapada holds a similar view. One who hears the *mahāvākyas* from a preceptor directly gets the intuition of Brahman. According to *vivarna* school, *vedanta vakyās* do not give mediate knowledge, but only immediate knowledge (*paroksa jnana*) of Brahman. Vidyaranya also holds that *mahāvākyas* alone cause the intuition of Brahman. *Vedantaśabdasya brahmaparokṣāvagati hetutvaṁ*.²

It is a fact that all the great Advaitic thinkers led by Sankara hold that *mahāvākyas* alone give rise to the intuition of *Brahman*. But one must not be misled by the extreme that mere reading or hearing of them renders the *annubhūti* (experience) of *Brahman*. The intuition, as pointed out in different contexts, presupposes a great amount of rationality and moral training. Intuition occurs only to a mind conducive to that. As pointed out in earlier contexts, moral training like *Yogic* methods and initiation into *Sādhana catuṣṭaya* are essential to steer clear of *pratibandhās* like false belief and ignorance. The formidable impediments are removed by an initial training

¹ S. Murthy, Op.cit. p.106.

² Vidyaranya, *Vivarnaprameya Saṅgraha*, p.128.

in *Śravaṇa* (formal study), *manana*, (reflection) and *nididhyāsana* (personal conviction obtainable by thorough concentration and contemplation). These quality a person to have an insight into the *mahāvākyas*. The *mahāvākyas* with *Śabda pramāṇa* and if necessary *anvaya-vyatireka tarka* give the final intuition of *Brahman*.

Anubhava, The nature of intuition of Brahman

Brahmānubhava (or the experience of *Brahman*), is not an abstract thing cut alot from the individual. It is the individual self who has to know and experience it. It is not mere omniscience (or *cit*). It is *sat* as well. The *sat* (eternal existence) of the individual as non-different from the cosmic existents is the insight of *Brahman*. Knowledge of *Brahman*, is the intergal experience of being *Brahman*, *Brahmānubhava*. The *anubhūti* or *anubhava* is the same as its knowledge, for all this points to the individual self alone. *Anubhava* of *Brahman* means, the realization of one's self as *Brahman*, i.e. *Brahmānubhava*. *Brahmātmaabhāvāsya śāstrāṇi antereṇa anavagamyamanatvat*¹ meaning *Brahman* as one's own self is not known by any other means except from the scriptures. The *Veda-vākyās* alone can teach the non-difference between the individual self and *Brahman*.

¹ Śaṅkara, *Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya*, 1, 1.4.

Brahmānubhava and *mōkṣa* (liberation) are synonymous terms. The *avidya*, which is the root cause of bondage is lost for ever and it is the psycho-physical adjuncts (cause of *avidya*) that attach one to the world of *samsāra* (bondage). *Mōkṣa* is the recognition of the non-connection of one's self to the world of appearances and *Brahmānubhava* is a *fait accompli* of this. The intuition of Brahman and *moksai* are instantaneous. There is no time-lag between them. Ordinary action takes some time to materialize into fruits, but in the case of *Brahmānubhava*, the result is the instantaneous release (*mōkṣa*). *Anubhavārudham eva vidya phalam; anubhavārudham tu jñāna phalam.*¹ Hence Sankara says that *Brahmajnana* (intuition of Brahman) is the sole thing worthy of worship and pursuit.

The intuition of a *Brahman* is indubitable and self evident as it is a matter of personal experience (*anubhava*). *Brahmānubhava* is part and parcel of one's own consciousness and experience. Had it been not an experience, then instances of mediacy and doubt can be posited on it. But the *anubhava* of it, even bars such a remote possibility. *Mōkṣa*, which is intuitive must also be intelligible. This pre-supposes that truth cannot be inconsistent with everyday reality and commonsense. Truth is and must be consistent with

¹ Sankara, *Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya*, iii, 4-5 and ii, 3-35.

all levels of understanding, the rational and the intuitional. *Brahmānubhava*, according to Śaṅkara convinces one, that he is not an agent or enjoyer and all actions and sins (*durita*) are lost for ever when liberation is attained. *Brahmānubhava*, as a *duritanivāraṇa mārga* (means of eradicating binding actions and sufferings) is also cogent with our day-to-day rational thought.

The fruits of actions done in the forms of *sukṛta* (virtue) and *duṣkṛta* (vice) do not bear any further effect after liberation. The *annubhava* dissolves and destroys all actions previously imagined to have done. From the moment of *brahmānubhava*, one ceases to be the agent and enjoyer of actions. Hence there is no question of subsequent *karmās* binding him as he could do only *niṣkāma-karma* (non-binding action). If this is not so, one cannot think of the cessation of transmigration in the case of a *brahmajñāni*, the *mukta* (liberated person). But past actions which have already started producing their fruits (in good or bad forms) must fall on the individual, as long as his corporeal body continues to exist. This is like a fly-wheel set in motion. It continues to rotate for some time, even after the energy supplied to it is cut off. This is a sort of inertia peculiar to physical bodies. *Brahmānubhava*, thus is the intuition of Brahman, the final truth and it is a state of complete freedom, *mōkṣa*.

The Bliss of Brahman

The *upaniṣads* proclaim that self-consciousness is the highest consciousness and that is *Brahman*. It is a state of unalloyed bliss. *Anandaṁ Brahmaṁ*¹ Brahman is *ananda* (bliss). The unalloyed bliss referred to here is a state of indescribable peace and delight borne after attaining the fulness, the fulness of consciousness. Hence it can never be sensual. It is the delight of being *pūrṇa* (complete). Perfection can only be lasting if it pertains to consciousness. All other perfections, eventhough admitted, can be reduced to imperfection by a single act of thought, And, if the thought emanates from the full consciouness, the imperfection knows no bound. Hence it is logical to believe that perfection pertains to consciousness and only to the supreme consciousness (*cit*). The delight of bliss is not expressible in extravaganza and linguistic extremes, as they are products of lower consciousness. Had it been linguistically possible, it would have set a limit to the bliss. It, then, turns out to be a relative bliss of empirical footing, which is not the case. It is expressed in *mauna vākya* (dumb silence). It is not the helpless state of a mute person, but is the helplessness of its being inexpressible to others. Basically it is the inefficiency of all means of

¹ *Tatiriyā upaniṣad*, ii, 7.

communication. The solemn silence, *mauna vākya*, is the expression of the inexpressible. 'Where of one cannot speak of, there of one must be silent.'¹

Being is bliss and is the expressionless state of the highest expression of self. One cannot think of varieties of bliss, as each would be a contradictory to other and a limit to the total bliss. perfection is complete and holistic. The being is the self and its intrinsic nature is bliss. Bliss cannot be assigned any values, as it is beyond value-judgements. It is the bliss of existence and supreme state of freedom." Anandan is then not the value of being, it is being It is delight without rise or fall, it is delight without ebb and flow."² *Brahman*, thus is an intuitive state of the supreme consciousness of self. An indescribable state of *sat cit* and *anandaṁ*.

¹ Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus*.

² Sircar, *Hindu Mysticism*, p.69.

REASON AND INTUITION IN OTHER ORTHODOX SYSTEMS OF THOUGHT

C.C Damodaran “Reason and intuition in Indian thought - A critical appraisal ”
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CHAPTER V
REASON AND INTUITION IN OTHER ORTHODOX
SYSTEMS OF THOUGHT

All systems of Indian thought are in one way or other connected with the *Vedās*, the 'reservoirs of knowledge'. Some systems though accept their authority and general spirit have independent world-views. Some other systems are detached from them and they developed systems opposed to the general spirit of *Vedās*. Thus, to suit the modern divisions of philosophy, we have *astika* and *nāstika darsanās* (orthodox and heterodox systems of philosophy), *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika*, *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* and *Mimāṃsā* are the orthodox systems and Jainism, Buddhism and lokayata are the heterodox ones. In this chapter we shall outline the epistemological views, pertaining to reason and intuition, of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya-Yōga.

These systems draw ideas from the *Vedās* and alter them so as to suit their demands. But certain things are common to all. The acceptance of *Vedās*, the role of reason and intuition in the epistemologies in the system and methods of inference, even though they are different, etc. are of indispensable concern. The difference between lower consciousness and

higher consciousness is a pertinent topic of discussion to all systems. Even though, orthodox and heterodox systems are different in their world-view and general spirit, they have certain points of common interest. All of them, regard that, the world that we see and experience is not all. The central meaning of existence must be traced to a state not easily cognizable by ordinary mode of understanding. Secondly each system is concerned with the emancipation of the individual. All of them regard that man's ultimate goal is to liberate himself from all ills of life and to know what is fundamentally real. All of them believe that the means of emancipation is not merely rational, but something more than that, the supra-rational or intuitional. These are dominant elements in all Indian thought.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Epistemology - Its Appeal to Reason and Intuition

The rational and intuitive aspects are equally stressed in systems like *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* and *Sāṃkhya-Yōga*. In *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, the rational side of philosophy is as important as the speculative side. The philosophical views prior to the *Brāhminical* systems were not very much concerned with the rational aspects. In the pre-systematic period (i.e., prior to the systems), philosophy was *atmavidya*, and it was pre-eminently speculative. "A rationalistic defence of philosophic systems could not have been very

congenial to the conservative mind".¹ But this outlook slowly withered away. In the age of the systems, speculative philosophy is being supported by reason. That is reason and intuition no longer remained isolated. "Atmavidya or philosophy is now supported by *Anvikṣiki* or the science of inquiry".²

Vatsyayana, the proponent of *Nyāya* philosophy regards *anvikṣiki* as the science of logic and reason.³ But *Nyāya*, according to him is both a science of reason and metaphysics. He is of the opinion that eventhough *Nyāyavidya* is identical with *Anvikṣiki*, the two must be distinguished. *Nyāyavidya* cannot be taken as a science of logic alone nor that of metaphysics alone. It is a rational science on metaphysical goals. In the logical side, the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* are free of *Vedic* influence, for they advocate both realism and pluralism. The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, due to their identical world views are taken together, both having identical logical and metaphysical aspects. However, "the acceptance of *Veda* is a practical

¹ S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p.18.

² Ibid.

³ Vatsyayana, *Nyāya-Sūtra*, i. 1-1.

admission that spiritual experience is a greater light in these matters than intellectual reason".¹

The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* is mainly a combined system of physics and metaphysics, reason and intuition, *anvikṣiki* and *atmavidya*. Four kinds of valid knowledge are admitted by the system. They are perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), remembrance (*smṛti*) and intuition (*āṛṣajñāna*). Of these perception and inference relate to reason and *āṛṣajñāna* relates to intuition. Intuition according to this system, is a special type of knowledge possessed by persons like yogic seers who have a complete mastery of things. "*Āṛṣajñāna* is the insight of seers . . . and if intuitive wisdom is brought under perception, we have, according to the *Vaiśeṣika*, only two sources of knowledge, intuition and inference".²

Any philosophy, which employs reason has to analyse the world outside and the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* analysis of the world on rational ground is its doctrine of categories, *padārthas*. *Padārtha*, literally means the meaning of a word. Later on, by '*padārtha*', one has to mean, any object or thing that can be empirically named or thought. That is, *padārtha* covers all objects of

¹ S. Radhakrishnan, Op. cit., p.281.

² Op. cit., p.182.

experience of discursive thinking. The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* doctrine of categories and the resulting atomism, *aṇusidhanta*, are its theory of knowledge, coming under reason.

The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* accept altogether seven categories, even though six was reckoned earlier. They are *dravya* (substance), *guṇa* (quality), *karma* (action), *samānya* (generality), *viśeṣa* (particularity), *samavāya* (inherence) and *abhāva* (non-existence). Any object in this world is a *padārtha*, and it exists by virtue of its qualities. The *padarthās*, quality and action cannot exist apart from a substance. Qualities and action do not have an independent isolated existence. They, both assume a substratum for their subsistence. In the same manner, generality and particularity are also object-bound. There is an inseparable relation between particularity and generality and this is *samavāya*. All categories are in this way related to the substance.

Hence substance alone suffices our analysis. The category substance is nine in number. They are classified as the earth (*pṛthvi*), water (*āp*), fire (*tejas*), air (*vāyu*), ether (*akāśa*), time (*kāla*), space (*dik*), self (*atman*) and mind (*manas*). The above nine substances, with their properties and relations explain the physical world. Of the nine substances, only four are atomic. They are earth, water, air and fire. The remainings are not atomic.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Atomism

The seven-fold classifications of things in the world and the resulting atomism derived from the category of *padārtha* are clear-cut demonstration of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* world-view based on reason and logical methods. One of the major contributions of the *naiyayikas* is their atomic theory. The composite objects, according to the *Vaiśeṣika* are atomic in nature. They can be split up into smaller and smaller units, until, a limit of splitting is reached. The limit shows the terminus of division and the final point is what is called *anu* or atom. It is a fact that the *Jainas* also have an atomic theory. But they are different in certain essential aspects, which we shall see later on.

The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* is pre-Jainistic and so its atomism is a pioneer in this regard. Both the systems, however postulate the existence of atoms to explain the physical world. Atoms are indivisible and invisible units of matter. They cannot be further divided. Earth, water, fire and air are atomic in nature. The objects that we see in the physical world, are only composites of these atoms. The composites cease to be so, when the atomic combination changes. They are, therefore non-eternal.

The non-eternal matter has no meaning apart from the eternal elements. The atoms, like the *akasa*, space and time are eternal. But the matter as such is not eternal. That means a matter, according to this theory, can be destroyed only upto its atoms. No further destruction or division is possible. In this sense, the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* doctrine is not materialistic. "If matter were infinitely divisible, then we should have to reduce it to nothing, and admit the paradoxical position that magnitudes are built up of what has no magnitude, bodies out of the bodyless".¹

The atoms are the material causes of the effects. Effect means, something coming into existence from something else. Effects are due to the modification or combination of atoms. Atoms are classified based on the quality produced by the concenred corporate body. It is not based on the structure, shape etc. of the body. The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* thinks of four types of *paramāṇus*. These are based on the four-fold classification of substances, which are atomic. These *paramāṇus* are the earth atoms, water atoms, fire atoms and air atoms. Each atom is specific in its quality. That is water atom is different from other atoms, say earth atom or air atom.

¹ Op. cit., p.195.

The difference of Jaina atomism is that, the Jainas regard every atom as having identical qualities. No atom is specific in its own nature. The *Vaiśeṣika*, on the other hand, holds that each is different. The earth atoms are specific in having their smell which no other type of atoms have. The water atoms have taste, the fire atoms are having colour and air atoms have touch. No class of atoms are thus confused.

The combination of atoms, does not take place at random, but as per the moral principle of the world, which the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* calls *adr̥ṣṭa*. So according to *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, even though atoms themselves are inert, the product created by them have some purpose to serve, as they have been produced by *adr̥ṣṭa* to comply with the effects of past *karma*. Now, there is a scheme, for the combination of atoms. Two atoms combine to form a diad or a *dvayāṇuka*. Three diads produce a triad or *triāṇuka*. A triad is the minimum visible entity. It is the mote that we see in the sun-beam. The combination of atoms does not create a bundle of object, but in an orderly manner to get a compact object. There is again design and purpose in the creation of things. The rationalistic picture of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* is thus based on their world-view. Even though, it is atomic and logically accountable, the atomism admits of purpose and design and also the law of

karma. The acceptance of souls and God in addition, makes the system non-materialistic. "The vaishesika atomism is not materialistic, because the vaishesika school admits the reality of the spiritual substances".¹

Pratyakṣa – Laukika (Rational) and Alaukika (intuitional)

The *Nyāya* and the *Vaiśeṣika* were originally independent views,² but similar epistemological and metaphysical world-views united them, as evidenced in the works of the exponents themselves. Annambhatta³ and Viswanatha⁴ are of the view that, on account of the complete harmony of views, they can be treated almost as one system. The *prācīna* (ancient) works of *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, treating it as a philosophy of *anvikṣiki* and *atmavidya* are contained in works of such persons like Gautama⁵ and Vatsyanana⁶. The modern phase (*navya*) phase of the system starts with Gangesas monumental work, *Tattvacintāmaṇi*.

¹ C. Sharma, *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy*, p.184.

² S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p.177.

³ See his *Tarkasamgraha*.

⁴ Viswanatha, *Bhaṣaparicceda*.

⁵ *Nyāya-Sūtra*.

⁶ *Nyāya-Sūtra Bhāṣya*.

One of the prominent contributions of the system is its theory of *pratyakṣa* (perception). The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* theory of perception is to be distinguished from other theories of perception in this regard. The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* theory of perception has two forms of different nature, though not opposed to each other. But they are entirely different in the sense that one variety pictures the rational elements in perception and the other, though using the same term characterizes entirely a different faculty, of intuition. Two separate terms are used to designate the difference. One is *laukika* (ordinary), *pratyakṣa* and the other is *alaukika* (or transcendental) *pratyakṣa*.

According to Gautama perception is "non-erroneous cognition produced by the contact of sense-organs with the objects".¹ Viswanatha, on the other hand thinks of perception as a direct and immediate cognition which is not derived through the functioning of any other cognition.² These two stream of thought of the exponents clearly demonstrate that perception, eventhough, the word is the same, represents reason and intuition. Gautama's definition of perception is pertaining to the ordinary (*lauka*) type, where the sense-organs come into contact with the objects concerned,

¹ Gautama, *Nyāya-Sūtra*, 1.1.4.

² Viswanatha, *Bhaṣāparicceda*, "*jñānakaraṇakam jñānam pratyakṣam*".

giving rise to perceptual knowledge. Ordinary perception presupposes the *indriyās*, the objects, the *manas*, the self and their contact. All the factors involved here are purely of the empirical type. No extra ordinary type of knowledge comes in *laukika pratyakṣa*.

But Gautama's definition of *pratyakṣa* has an implicit sense too. Perception is also "*avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasayātmakam pratyakṣam*".¹ Perception can be a cognition which cannot be well-defined. It can be inexpressible (*avyapadeśyam*). A closer analysis of Gautama's own definition gives two streams of thought in it. One, of the ordinary or *laukika* as pointed earlier and the second, of the intuitional or inexpressible. Now we have to read the second version of Gautama's definition and Viswanatha's definition together. This gives rise to *alaukika pratyakṣa* or intuitional or transcendental perception. ✓

Alaukika pratyakṣa (Transcendental or Intuitional Consciousness)

As has been pointed out earlier, perception is possible by the contact of the sense-organs with the objects concerned. But the contact (*sannikarṣa*)

¹ Gautama, *Nyāya Sūtra*, I,1.4.

need not always be empirical. According to Gangesa¹ and Viswanatha² perception is possible through extra-ordinary or transcendental contact (*alaukika sannikarṣa*). Here, the sense-organs need not co-operate and the knowledge arrived at is not mediated by reason and the discursive processes.

The *alaukika pratyakṣa* has three varieties. They are *Samānyalakṣaṇa*, *Jñāna lakṣaṇa* and *Yogocadharmalakṣaṇa*. These varieties of *alaukika pratyakṣa* is possible only for those persons who have higher order of consciousness, *pratibha* or intuition. *Samānyalakṣaṇa* is the perception of universals. According to the Nyaya-Vaisesika, universals have a real and distinct status of existence, but not open to ordinary perceptions. Like Plato's universal, the Nyaya universals are also real. The universal inheres in each particulars and to cognize the universal by perceiving a particular is achieved by the intuitional method of the *Samānyalakṣaṇa* variety of *alaukika pratyakṣa*. In the cognition of the universals, there is no participation of sense-organs and there is no mediation. It is an immediate intuition. The *Samanyalaksana* variety of *alaukika pratyakṣa*, besides giving an insight into

¹ Gangesa, *Tattvacintamani*, pp.538-46.

² Viswanatha, *Bhaṣāparicceda*, Sec. 3.

universals, is also capable of discerning different types of particulars that existed, existing and will be existing. This, then is a cognition coming to the status of complete consciousness. Hence *Samanyalaksana* is a perception of all times and all existences. "Through the knowledge of the generic nature of an individual, we are able to know all other individuals at all times and all places, possessed of the *Same* generic nature".¹ This, we may say, is nothing short of omniscience.

The second variety of *alaukika pratyakṣa* is *jñānalakṣaṇa*. It is also transcendental. There is no direct involvement of the senses or reason in deriving *jñānalakṣaṇa*, but it is based on an indirect and initial sensation. The senses firstly furnish certain data of an object. From these data, a different, non-perceptual type conclusion is derived immediately. For example, if we see an object, say, a rose, we are aware of its colour, shape, etc. The visual aspects are given by sensation. But due to the association of *Smṛtijñāna* (memory knowledge), we are also able to cognize its fragrance, which is not given. Other examples of *jñānalakṣaṇa* are the 'ice looks cold', 'stone looks heavy' etc. In *jñānalakṣaṇa*, the transcendental contact of the *Smṛtijñāna* is responsible for the transcendental awareness.

¹ S. Radhakrishnan, Op. cit., p.69.

The third variety of the *alaukikapratyaksa* is *yogacadharmalakṣaṇa*. As the name suggests, it is a type of yogic perception, derived from yogic concentration. "*Yogacadharmalakṣaṇa* is that which is born of meditation".¹ Due to yogic intuition, one can perceive super-sensuous objects like atoms, *dharma* (merit) etc. They are otherwise imperceptible. They acquire this by a rigorous training in the concentration and control of the mind. The knowledge obtained is so vivid and certain that it is beyond empirical verification. Yogic perception is the intuitive awareness of all objects, past, present and future. Clairvoyance, clairaudience, telepathy are some of its explicit characteristics.

Reason and Intuition in Sāṃkhya-Yōga

Sāṃkhya and Yōga together constitute the theoretical and practical side of a holistic system. But there is one difference. Sāṃkhya does not accept God as a reality and removes it from its category. But Yoga accepts all the twenty-four categories of Samkhya and adds one more, namely God. Thus totalling the categories into twenty-five. Except for this, they are identical in all respects. The Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosophy must be a very

¹ C. Sharma, Op. cit., p.197.

ancient one, as the mention of which occur in almost all ancient books. The mention of this occurs in the Upanisads¹ and Bhagavad Gita.² Badarayana speaks of Samkhya and does not regard it as the teaching of the Upanisads.³ Śāṅkara also thinks of Sāṅkhya-Yoga as not the real teaching of the *Upanisads* as they establish dualism.⁴ Buddhism also does not accept the dualism of Samkhya-Yoga and their theory of *guṇās* is alien to Buddhism.

In the Sāṅkhya-Yōga epistemology, one can notice the streams of thought initiated by reason or intellect and intuition. The Samkhya-Yoga theory of perception is related to knowledge of reason and their concept of *Kaivalya* is the theory of intuition. In order to explain, perception, we have to look into the Samkhya Concept of *Prakṛti* (nature or matter) and *puruṣa* (the sentient being) and the evolution.

Samkhya-Yoga accept the dualism of *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa*. *Prakṛti* is *acetanam*, insentient, but active, whereas *puruṣa* is *Sacetanam*, sentient, but

¹ *Chandogya Upaniṣad*, VI.4.1; *Prasna up.*, VI.1; *Kaṭha*, 1.3.

² *Bhagavad Gita*, ii. 39; iii. 42; V.4-5; vi.15.16.

³ Badarayana, *Brahma Sūtra*, 1, 1.5-11.

⁴ Śāṅkara, *Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya*, 1, 1.5-10.

inactive. *Prakṛti* is the root cause of the world and is regarded as the first principle (*pradhānaīm*). It is the unmanifest state of all the evolutes and in this sense it is *avyaktam*. Since it is the insentient, and uncaused cause, it is known as *jadam*. It is imperceptible due to its extremely subtle form, but its influence are only felt and *prakṛti* is known only by inference. In this state it is called *anumānam*. It is the very constituent of *Satva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. These *triguṇās* give matter the positive characteristics, dynamism and inertia. The nature of a thing is determined by the supremacy of one *guṇa* over the other, and the difference to among things is determined by the different combination of the *guṇās*. When the *guṇās* are held in a state of equilibrium, then it is the *prakṛti* as a potential force ready for evolution (*Sarga*). *Prakṛti* in its unmanifest form is in equilibrium (*Samyāvastha*) of the *guṇas*. The presence of *puruṣa* (*puruṣa sannidhya mātram*) disturbs the equilibrium and due to the imbalance of *gunas*, *guṇakṣōbha* takes place. Certain *guṇa* dominates over the others and the resulting process is a chain of evolution.

The predominance of *Satva*, generates *Mahat* (or cosmic intellect) as the first evolute. From *mahat*, *ahaṁkāra* or self is derived. This in turn gives rise to *manas* (mind). It is followed by *Jñānedriyās* (sense-organs) and *karmēdriyas* (motor organs), each five in number. Then five *tanmātras* (subtle

elements) and five *bhūtas* (gross elements). This represents the primary evolution. It is followed by secondary evolution, where composite bodies like trees, mountain, river etc. are produced. When the evolution is complete, the evolutes return to *prakṛti*, which is called *pralaya* or dissolution. Since *prakṛti* cannot remain inactive for a single moment, evolution and dissolution continue *ad infinitum*.¹

Sensibility of Reason in Sāṃkhya-Yōga

It is seen that *Mahat* is the first evolute. It is the cosmic counterpart of the individual knowledge, namely *buddhi*. It as such in these systems, is not conscious by itself. But requires an illuminator. *Puruṣa* is the cosmic principle of supreme consciousness (*cit*). When *jñānedriyas* come into contact with *buddhi*, they feed the sense-data to it. *Buddhi* conveys them to *puruṣa*. It is *buddhi* (the individual consciousness), which experiences and does everything for and on behalf of *puruṣa*. "All other organs function for the intellect (Buddhi), which works directly for the *puruṣa*, . . ."² *Buddhi*, though a product of *prakṛti* and so insentient, appears to be intelligent

¹ Isvara Kṛṣṇa, *Samkhya-Karika* (*Purusasya darsanartham . . . samyogat tatkrtan sargah*), 21.

² S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p.267.

because of its association with *purusa*. *Purusa*, however does not transfer its characteristics to *buddhi*. *Buddhi*, by its very nature is *Sāttoika*, but in different persons, it is *rājasika* and *tāmasika*, according to the influences of past *karma*. "Buddhi, spread over the whole body, contains the impression (*Samskāras*) and tendencies (*Vāsanās*) of past lives, which are revived under suitable conditions".¹ When *buddhi* is dominated by *Sattva*, it gives rise to right knowledge; by *rajas*, to desire; and by *tamas* to false knowledge, illusion etc.

In every act of knowledge, three factors are involved. The object known, the knowing subject and the process of knowledge. *Purusa* is the knowing subject. Experience belongs to *purusa*. *Buddhi*, *ahamkara*, *manas* and *jñānedriyas* constitute the apparatus with which *purusa* knows the external world. *Mahat* or cosmic intellect is particularized and individualized when it is transmitted to *buddhi*. This limited intelligence functions as rationality. When a sense-organ comes into contact with an object, it is excited. The *manas* takes up the sense-data. At first stage, there is only a vague idea of the object. This is, because, the mind does not analyse

¹ Op. cit., p.294.

or synthesize the data. This unanalysed whole becomes the source of indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpa pratyakṣa*).

The mind, in the next moment analyses and synthesises, the data furnished by the sense-organs. As a result, the initial unanalysed whole becomes well-defined. "At the second moment, through the exercise of mental analysis (*Vikalpa*) and synthesis (*Samkalpa*) the object is perceived as possessing a definite nature, and we have determinate perception".¹ This well-defined percept of the *manas* is what is known as *Savikalpa pratyakṣa* (determinate perception), *Ahaṁkāra* and *buddhi* convert the concepts into percepts. *Buddhi* undergoes a modification during this time. *Buddhi*, reflects this modification in *puruṣa*. This reflection in *puruṣa* is simultaneous with the modification and lasts as long as the modification persists. This reflection of *puruṣa* and *buddhi* is called knowledge. "The *puruṣa* can know itself only through its reflection in the *buddhi*, modified into the form of the object".² Thus we get knowledge of the external world by the modification of *buddhi*, the modification becomes a conscious knowledge. Thus *Savikalpa*

¹ Op.cit., p.298.

² Op. cit., p.299.

and *nirvikalpa pratyakṣa*, with the participation of *Jñānedriyas*, *buddhi* and *manas* represent the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* concept of rational knowledge.

Kaivalya - An Intuitive State of Liberation

Puruṣa in *Sāṃkhya-Yōga* is the pure transcendental consciousness. *Śuddha Caitanyaṁ* (pure consciousness) is its essence, and the substratum of all knowledge. It is beyond space and time, uncaused and self-evident. Hence, it is the first principle and the fundamental reality. It is the postulate of all knowledge and support of everything.¹ Along with *prakṛti*, it forms the duo in *Sāṃkhya-Yōga*. *Puruṣa* is reflected in the *buddhi* and it illumines the individual when it comes to *Puruṣa*.

When *Puruṣa* associates with body, *indriyās*, *manas* and *buddhi*, it represents a false identification. The *puruṣa* is actually beyond all these. It is not touched by three kinds of sufferings.² The *puruṣa* gets entangled with *prakṛti* and it is said to be in bondage. "It is only when it mistakes its reflection in the *buddhi* for itself and identifies itself wrongly with the internal organ – the intellect, the ego and the mind, that it is said to be

¹ *Īśvara Kṛṣṇa, Sāṃkhya-Kārika, 19.*

² *Adhyātmika, adhibhautika and adhidaivika.*

bound".¹ Man is *puruṣa* in bondage or *puruṣa* entangled in *prakṛti*. The psychophysical accompaniments of *prakṛti* conceal or 'suppress' the true nature of *puruṣa*, which is pure consciousness and instead impose on it the limitations of empirical knowledge or *buddhi*. *Buddhi* is governed by *sattva-raja-tamo-guṇas*, whereas *puruṣa* is beyond the *guṇās*.

Intuition, or pure consciousness is the essence of *puruṣa* and to remain in this state is what is known as *kaivalya* ('aloofness') or liberation. Literally *puruṣa* remaining unaffected by or away from *prakṛti*. Here *puruṣa* the pure self identifies itself with the non-self. This false identity is the cause of bondage and bondage can be removed, only by right knowledge. *Jñānena chapavargo viparyayād iṣyate bandhah*² Discrimination (right knowledge) between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* is *kaivalya*. That is pure consciousness not being contaminated by ignorance borne of non-self parts like *prakṛti*, sense-organs, *buddhi* and the like. The individual or *jīva* is a blend of *puruṣa* and *non-puruṣa*. The *non-puruṣa* aspects are his psychophysical characteristics. They have tendency to associate themselves with ignorance or worldly knowledge. They identify themselves with *puruṣa*, the

¹ Chandradhar Sharma, *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy*, p.163.

² Īśvara Kṛṣṇa, *Sāṅkhya Kārika*, 44.

sentient or intuitive aspect in man. Now the intuition part (i.e. *puruṣa*) must remain disconnected from the non-*puruṣa* part. This is *kaivalya*. Hence *Kaivalya* is a state of enlightenment or intuition (pure consciousness).

The discriminative or *viveka* state of *puruṣa* is sometimes erroneously compared to that of *Brahman* in Advaita. Actually they have only one similarity. Like *Brahman*, *Puruṣa* is also a state of supreme consciousness, *cit* or intuition. But *Brahman* is one only (*eka evam*), whereas there are innumerable *puruṣas*. "Their essence is consciousness".¹ The *Sāṅkhya puruṣas* are like the *Jivas* of Jainism, the souls of Ramanuja, and the monads of Leibniz. The essential nature of *puruṣa* is *caitanyaṁ* (pure consciousness), *prakṛti* conceals the real nature of *puruṣa* and so it has to be free from the concealment. As *kaivalya* (a state of restoring enlightenment) is the supreme goal of *puruṣa* in *Sāṅkhya*, it is to be noted that the restoration of the state of pure consciousness (intuition) is the *Summum bonum* of *Sāṅkhya* philosophy.

Intuition, The Purport of Yōga Philosophy

The Yōga philosophy, like the *Sāṅkhya* regards the *Viyōga*

¹ C. Sharma, Op. cit., p.157.

(separation) between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* as means of liberation. But with regard to other concept of *Puruṣa*, the Yōga differs from Sāṅkhya in certain respects. Again the teleology behind evolution is viewed separately by these two schools. Both believe in innumerable *puruṣas*. But Yoga accepts a supreme *Puruṣa*, *Īśvara*, who is perfectly untouched by the influence of *Prakṛti*. Hence *Īśvara*, in Yōga must be an embodiment of cit or intuition. The purpose of evolution is to render all *Puruṣas* a chance to get liberation. But the evolution is not due to the mere presence of *Puruṣa*, as held by Sāṅkhya, but it is purely owing to the will of *Īśvara*. The different *Puruṣas* can remain aloof from *Prakṛti* if they put sincere efforts of spiritual practice in them.

"Yoga, according to Patanjali, is a methodical effort to attain perfection, through the control of the different elements of human nature, physical and psychical. the physical body, the active will and the understanding mind are to be brought under control".¹ Yōga believes *Īśvara* as the highest *puruṣa* and hence the Yoga is designated as *Sēśvara Sāṅkhya* (theistic sāṅkhya).

¹ S. Radhakrishnan, Op. cit., p.338.

The *Gita* concept of Yoga is slightly different from that held by Patanjali. The difference is only in methods in the sense that *Gita* concept of Yoga has a wider connotation. However, the result of Yogic practice, according to both is the same, viz., one's identification with the supreme self. According to the *Gita*, capacity to keep the balance of the mind in the pairs of extremes is viewed as *Yōga*. Equilibrium is verily *Yōga*.¹ In another context, selfless work is regarded as *Yōga*. Work done to perfection is *Yōga*.² A *Yōgi* moves among objects of experience, but senses under control and free from attraction and aversion.³ It is also stated that, he who is able to resist the impulse of desire and anger even here before he quits his body, he is a *Yogi*, he is a happy man.⁴ The place given to *Yōgi* is very superior in the *Gita*. A *Yōgi* is superior to an ascetic (*tapasi*) and a man of wisdom (*jñāni*). Hence a *Yōgi* is regarded as a liberated person and he is a transcendental self. In *Vedānta*, *yoga* is viewed as a spiritual union of the individual self with the cosmic self.

¹ *Bhagavad Gita*, ii-48.

² *Ibid.*, ii-50.

³ *Op. cit.*, ii-64.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, V.23.

The *Yoga* accepts all the twenty-five principles of Sāṅkhya, and adds one more, namely God, thus totalling into twenty-six. The *Yoga* slightly modifies the evolutionary theory of Sāṅkhya in order to suit, the additional category of God. The *buddhi* of the Sāṅkhya has been replaced by *Citta* (mind-stuff) in *Yoga*. The *Citta* undergoes modification (*Vṛtti*) when it is affected by *indriyas*. Actually *Yoga* concept of *Citta* is a combination of the *buddhi*, *ahaṁkāra*, *manas* and the *antaḥkaraṇas* (internal organs). The modification of *Citta* is five-fold. It is *pramāṇa* (valid knowledge), *viparyaya* (wrong knowledge), *vikalpa* (imagination), *nidra* (absence of cognition), *smṛti* (memory). The cessation of the modification is the aim of *Yoga*.¹

The multifarious things in the universe are derived from *prakṛti*. The *jivas* as such are pure and immutable. *Prakṛti* is modified into two separate lines, one into the mental and the other, the material. The modification is caused by *avidya* (ignorance). God regulates the blind modification caused by *avidya* so as to suit the goals of *Puruṣa*. *Puruṣa*, when it associates with the world gets entangled in pleasure and pain and so loses its supreme qualities. *Cittavṛtti* is the cause of bondage. The *Vṛttis* of *Citta* are to be stopped (*Citta-vṛtti nirōdha*) to get freedom from the worldly ties. This state

¹ *Yogāścittavṛtti nirōdhaḥ*.

is intuition culminating into *Samādhi* (absorptive concentration). The conjunction of the *puruṣa* with the worldly ties must be destroyed and "the destruction of this conjunction is the escape and perfect insight is the means of escape".¹ The means of escape is aloofness of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* (*kaivalya*). This aloofness leads to intuition and can be achieved by a rigorous moral and mental training explained in the *aṣṭāṅga yōga* (eight-fold methods in yoga).

Aṣṭāṅga Yōga

Yoga advocates the absolute control, but never destruction, of body, mind and sense-organs. As in other systems of Indian thought, here also the discipline consisting of bodily, moral and mental training. Before embarking upon the *aṣṭāṅga* method, one must satisfy the prerequisites of cultivating *vairagya* (detachment) and *atmasakṣatkāra* (self-purification). It is by eliminating *rāga* (narrow love) and *dveṣa* (hatred). The Yoga thinkers, however, do not set aside the legitimate role of body and *manas*. They offer the temporary substratum for the self. The restoration of the true nature of self, which is essentially pure consciousness or intuition is achieved by,

¹ S. Radhakrishnan, Op. cit., p.344.

then practicing the Yoga. They are *Yama* (restraints), *Niyama* (observances), *Asana* (bodily postures), *Prāṇayāma* (death-control), *Pratyāhāra* (withdrawal of the sense-organs from the external objects), *dhāraṇa* (fixation of attention), *dhyāna* (meditation) and *samādhi* (absorptive concentration). The first five is external in nature and is known as *bahiranga sādhana* and the remaining three are internal aids (*antaranga sādhana*).

The first two gives a preliminary moral training and ascetic preparation. *Yama* consists of *Satya* (truth-speaking), *ahimsa* (non-violence), *asteya* (abstention from stealing and coveting other's property), *aparigraha* (disowning of possessions) and *brahmacarya* (celibacy). *Niyama* consists of certain observances like *Sauca* (purity), *Samtosa* (contentment), *Svādhyāya* (study), *Īśvara prāṇidhāna* (devotion to God) and *tapas* (fortitude). The chief of these is *ahimsa* and all others are rooted in it in one way or other. *Yama* and *niyama* give the ethical study and training to the individual. "A practice of these two favours the development of *Vairāgya* or passionlessness or freedom from desire, either for things of the world or the pleasures of heaven".¹

¹ Op. cit., p.354.

The third stage is physical training or *asana*. The Yoga system does not belittle the role of a healthy body in the formation of a healthy mind, and it regards it as conducive to wisdom. "Asana is posture, is a physical help to concentration".¹ *Āsana* is followed by *prāṇayāma* (or breath control) and *pratyāhāra*. These three aim to control *citta* from the physical side. Man, by practice and custom has been adjusted towards the empirical way of living and his methods of knowing are world-oriented and in this interaction, he lost sight of his supreme sentience and Yoga is a method of readjusting his mode of life and restoring the already existing pure sentience.

The third and final stage of *astanga* comprises of *dhāraṇa*, *dhyāna* and *samādhi*. These three aim at controlling *Citta* directly. *Samādhi*, which directly leads to the intuitive state of liberation, (*Kaivalya*) is divided into two. *Saṁparajñatā samādhi* (conscious absorptive concentration) and *asamprajñata samādhi* (Superconscious absorptive concentration). The latter is the goal and the former is the stepping stone. In both, there is the highest power of concentration. "The first is a state in which the buddhi continues to function All sources of distractions are eradicated here and the

¹ Ibid.

buddhi shines forth with its sattva element in the ascendentant".¹

This stage is followed by the final stage of *asamprajñatasamādhi*. In this there is no mental mode (*Citta-vṛtti*). It is the highest form of consciousness, perfect intuition, ecstasy, indescribable. It is the highest kind of intuitive knowledge, which simultaneously embraces the past, present and future, with all their states in one whole, it leads us to final perfection".² Again, "It is", thought of as, "the mystical state which occurs as a sequel to intense concentration".³ One cannot describe it, but only experience. "Even those who attain it cannot retain it longer. Immediately or after very short time, the body breaks and they obtain complete liberation".⁴ *Asamprajñata samādhi* represents a state beyond normal psychical life. It is like the state of *nirguṇa Brahman* in Advaita or the *Śūnyata* in Buddhism. "We pass in it to the realm of mysticism".⁵ Thus *asamprajñata samādhi* in Yoga system represents the highest degree of intuition and it is regarded as the end of the empirical self.

¹ M. Hirayana, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, p.296.

² S. Radhakrishnan, *Op. cit.*, p.360.

³ *Op. cit.*, p.362.

⁴ C. Sharma, *Op.cit.*, p.173.

⁵ M. Hiriyanna, *Op. cit.*, p.297.

REASON AND INTUITION IN JAINISM AND BUDDHISM

C.C Damodaran “Reason and intuition in Indian thought - A critical appraisal ”
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CHAPTER VI

REASON AND INTUITION IN JAINISM AND BUDDHISM

Jainism and Buddhism, the two principal heterodox cults in Indian thought had their origin as a reaction against the authority of *Vedās* and its alleged priestly dominance. These systems, however do not entertain much hostility to the *Vedas*, but they are indifferent to them. Eventhough the initial and middle stages of these systems showed marked instances of antipathy to the *Vedas*, the culmination of their thoughts and central teachings are not alien to the *Vedas*. In Jainism, the ultimate goal of man, kevala jñāna (omniscience) is viewed as the restoration of the initial state of the individual self, where it has infinite knowledge and bliss. One is reminded of the Upanisadic concept of *jiva* and Brahman, to strike a deep-core, but glaring similarity. But multiplicity of selves is not approved by the *Upaniṣads* as real.

In Buddhism, the final stage, to which man is moving is an indescribable state of ontological region, which is beyond the pale of reason, termed by *śūnya*. As both the systems proclaim that the ultimate aim is to know this state of *kevalajñāna* and *śūnyata*, the resonance is a clear

indication that it is the highest consciousness (intuition), that is of paramount importance. One is inclined to think that eventhough these two systems rebel against the *upaniṣads*, they also obey them. Buddhism is more rebellious than Jainism, but it is more related to the *upaniṣads*, especially in its *sūnyavāda* (doctrine of nothingness).

JAINISM - MATI JÑĀNA TO KEVAL-JÑĀNA - A Transition From Reason to Intuition

Jaina epistemology reveals a systematic transition in its analysis of commonsense experience and the nature and status of human self. The analysis of commonsense experience gives the system the primacy of empirical knowledge. But this tendency does not limit the system to endorse the same pattern of thought to the enquiry into the nature of men. The two types of knowledge, which are relevant in the context of Jainism, are *Parōkṣa* (indirect) and *pratyakṣa* (direct) types of knowledge. The *paroksa* to the modern phraseology of our term is the empirical or rational type of knowledge and the *pratyakṣa* represents the higher or the intuitive type.

Parōkṣa Jñāna

The Jaina philosophy is heterodox in the sense that, it does not

subscribe to the non-dualistic absolutism of the *Upaniṣads* and its disinclination to ordinary modes of life as hindrances to emancipation. It is also against the ^dworld-view of the Buddhists in the sense that, its contention of the momentariness and flux of the world is not accepted by the Jains as well. The Jains accept a middle way of these two extremes. The Jaina world view is a middle way between the absolutism of the *upaniṣads* and the flux of the Buddhists, "for both these represent two extreme views and are contrary to experience."¹

The Jainas therefore advocate the doctrine of relative pluralism (*anekāntavāda*) and the doctrine of *Nayās* (Standpoint). *Syādvāda* (doctrine of probability or 'May be') and *saptabhaṅgi naya* (seven-fold, judgements) are the logical corollaries of the Jaina metaphysics. One's standpoint cannot be an absolute affirmation or negation. If one regards one's view as absolutely valid that will lead to a mistake in stand-point, (*Nayabhāsa*), "for each stand point represents only one of the many points of view from which a thing can be looked at."²

¹ S. Das Gupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol.1, p.174.

² Op.cit. p.178.

The Jainas classify knowledge into two categories, which they say, are means of knowledge or *pramāṇa*. They are *parōkṣa* (indirect) and *pratyakṣa* immediate or direct.¹ *Parōkṣa jñāna* indirect knowledge is again classified in to two, namely *mati*, and *sruti*. *Pratyakṣa jñāna* is three-fold. They are *avadhi*, *manaḥparyāya* and *kevala*.

Knowledge by Reason - Parōkṣa jñāna

The knowledge (*jñāna*) obtained by sense-organs and mind, according to the Jainas are indirect (*parokṣa*) and distinct and is called empirical knowledge . *Mati* and *Śruti* come under this category. *Mati* is either knowledge obtained through sense-organs (*idriyanimitta*), or even sometimes without the direct aid of sense-organs (*anandriyanimitta*). The perceptible knowledge is subsequently analysed by the mind to get a clear understanding. This well-defined perceptible knowledge, after reflection of the mind is called *monovrtti* (or reflective knowledge). They very same perceptible knowledge need not be a reflective type. It can be an undifferentiated whole and is called *ogha-jñāna*.² *Mati jñāna* is known by different names, such as *smṛti*, *samjñā*, *cinta*, *abhinibhota* etc. *Mati* is ordinary

¹ Umasvami, *Tattvādīgama sūtra*, I. 11, 12.

² Umasvami, *Tattvādīgama sūtra*, 1, 14.

perception and includes recognition *samjñā* or *pratyabhinjñā*, remembrance (*smṛti*), logical argumentation (*tarka*) and inference (*anumāna*). Hence *mati* is taken as mediate knowledge of rational understanding. Perceptual knowledge, eventhough is ordinarily thought of as immediate, cannot be philosophically and psychologically admitted. They include sensations and analysis and synthesis of the faculties of the mind on the sense-data. They are thus mediate knowledge, eventhough the furnishing of the sense-data is immediate.

Sruti is knowledge derived through signs, symbols and language. It is, therefore dependent and mediate. *Sruti* knowledge is pertaining to objects of all time. That is, it is not restricted to the immediate time-span. It is more pure (*viśudhataram*) than *mati*. *Mati* is knowledge by perception, but *śruti* is knowledge by description. Both are, however, dependent on the sense-organs in one way or other. They are therefore experiences of the waking state of the mind. They are alike mediate and hence taken as knowledge by reason.

Knowledge By Intuition

Of the five types of knowledge pointed out by the Jainas, the last

three, viz., *avadhi*, *manahparyāya* and *kevala* are immediate type of knowledge. They yield direct knowledge of the real nature of the self (*Jivas*). The Jainas hold that the *Jivas* has intrinsic qualities of infinite faith, infinite knowledge and infinite bliss and power. In the original state the self or *jiva* is endowed with omniscience (*Kevalajñāna*) or intuition. Liberation, according to Jainism is the restoration of the *Jivas* to their initial state of wisdom. This is the final goal to which all individual beings are working. This restoration is possible by sincerely following the *triratnas* (three jewels) as it is called and which comprises of right knowledge *Samyag jñāna*, right faith *samyag darsana* and right conduct *samyag cāritra*.¹

Avadhi, *manahparyāya* and *kevala* are direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa jñāna*). *Avadhi* is knowledge of things even at a distance of time and space. It can extend to the whole universe. It is a sort of telepathy. *Manahparyāya* is direct knowledge of the thought of others. This is thought-reading or clairvoyance. *Kevala* is the climax of all immediate knowledge. It is omniscience or intuition as such. *Kevalajñāna* is described as *paripūrṇam*, *samagrām nirapekṣam*, *visudham*, *sarva-bhāva jñāpakam* and *anantaparyayin*.²

¹ Umasvami, *Tattvarthasūtra*, *Samyag darsana jñāna-caritrani mokṣamārgaḥ*

² Umasvami, *Tattvarthasūtra* 1.30.

(That is, *Kevala* is omniscience perfect, complete, unique, absolute, pure all-comprehensive and infinite). *Kevala* is thus intuitional consciousness, unlimited by spatio-temporal frame work. The *Jainas* regard that every *jiva* must attain *kevala* as the final end. *Kevala* is not verbally articulated and is attainable in the state of liberation. That is attainment of *kevala jñāna* is *mōkṣa*.

Mōkṣa and Intuition are Synonymous in Jainism

The Jaina philosophy is a dualism between two types of entities, the *jiva* and the *ajiva* (in the case of Samkhya it is *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* respectively). *Jivas* (They are innumerable in number) have sentience and *ajivas* are insentient. Every *jiva* in the beginning is essentially *omniscient and blissful*. It has no limitations. But the contact with the empirical world causes its being influenced by subtle forms of matter called *karma*. The initial state of consciousness of the *Jiva* is omniscience *par excellence*, *Kevala jñāna*. A human being is a *jiva* and naturally, he is also endowed with the intrinsic capacity of omniscience. But in the course of time, due to worldly contact, *karmas* influx into the *jiva* (which is called *aśrava*) and obscure its capacity of omniscience. Hence matter or material influence was originally thought as the cause of bondage.

The *āsrava* of *karma* into the soul is due to passions and desires. They are caused by ignorance. Hence, ignorance is the root cause of bondage. Ignorance can be removed only by right knowledge (*saṁyag jñāna*). Right knowledge tears away bondage, which is liberation.¹ To get rid of *jivas* from *karma*, two things are prescribed. Firstly, the new entry of further *karma* must be checked. This is the *karma-check* or *saṁvāra*. Then the already existing *karmic* influences must be removed. This is the shedding of *karma*, known as *nirjara*. These two can be possible by what are known as *tri-ratnas* ('three-jewels'). The *tri-ratnas* include right faith (*Samyag darśana*), right knowledge (*Samyag jñāna*) and right conduct (*Samyag cāritra*). Right knowledge is produced by right faith in the teaching of the *Tirthankaras* (the omniscient path-founders) and also by right conduct. Moral and virtuous living are pre-conditions for attaining knowledge. Mere theory is not enough, practice is equally important. Hence right conduct, *Samyag caritra* is stressed. "Right knowledge dawns when all the karma's are destroyed by right conduct. Hence right faith, right conduct and knowledge all the three

¹ Umasvami, *Tattvartha sūtra*, (*Samyag darśana-jñānacāritraṇi mōkṣamārgah*).

together form the path of liberation which is the joined effect of these three."¹

The Jaina view that the *jiva* is having all omniscience and this has been eclipsed by *karma*. Right knowledge alone can redeem it in restoring its initial state. This closely resembles the *Upaniṣadic* and *Advaitic* tenet of *jiva*, that, it is Brahman (*cit*) under *avidya*. If *avidya* is removed by proper knowledge (*vidya*), the *jiva* becomes *Brahman*, the reality. The Jaina concept of *kevala jnana* and the Advaitic view of *Brahman* are, in this sense, a close pattern of the same source. In Advaita also, the empirical ego or *jiva* is a complex of pure consciousness (*Brahman*) and ignorance (*avidya*). Psycho-physical adjuncts like *manas*, sense-organs, body and the like constitute the impediment called *avidya*. The removal of this impediment by right knowledge, leads one to *mōkṣa* (liberation). The individual is itself Brahman (*Ahaṁ Brahmāsmi*).

The Advaitins, however think of one and only one reality, *Brahman*, whereas the Jainas think of innumerable *jivas*. In any case, pure consciousness is thought of as the very essence of *jiva* or the individual in

¹ C. Sharma, Op.cit., p.66.

both cases. The *kevala jñāna* of the *jīva* in Jainism is the same as its capacity of intuition. The *jīva* can have its infinite knowledge only when it regains its original state. The regaining of the omniscience of the *jīva* is *mōkṣa*. Therefore, in Jainism, *mōkṣa* and intuition are synonymous. In the state of liberation, the individual *jīva* eventhough continuing as such is omniscient. *Kevala jāna* is designated as *mukhya pratyakṣa* (perception par excellence) and it is trans-empirical and super-normal.

A paradoxical thing is that, Jainism started by revolting against the *Upaniṣadic* non-dualism and its supremacy of assigning *jīva* as non-different from reality. The Jainas also advocate *kevala jñāna* of the *jīva* as the reality. That is *jīva* itself is the reality. The limit is ignorance. Advaita also says the limit is ignorance. Hence means of *mōkṣa* must be the removal of ignorance for both. But, as pointed out earlier, in order not to endorse the *upaniṣads* directly, the Jainas speak of pluralism of *jīvas*, which the *Advaitins* never do. But, "The conception of *kevala jñāna* or absolute knowledge is a half-hearted confession of Absolutism made by Jainism inspite of its *syādvada*."¹ *Kevala jñāna* is immediate and unaided. It does not require any outside teaching or instruction. The self has all this capacity. It has total and pure intuitional

¹ Chandradhar Sharma, *A critical survey of Indian Philosophy*, p.59.

consciousness. "The highest kind of knowledge is called *Kevala jnana*. . . As it is held to be perfect and intuitive omniscience, it is supra empirical, absolute and transcendental. This is certainly an admission of absolutism."¹

Eventhough, the Jainas do not distinguish between the empirical and the transcendent, the distinction is very clear in their epistemology and metaphysics. In *pramanas*, they draw a clear-cut distinction between *paroksa* and *pratyaksa* type of knowledge. *Mati* and *Sruti* are empirical knowledge, (*parōkṣa jñāna*). *Avadhi*, *manahparyāya* and *kevala jñāna* are *pratyakṣa* or immediate (*aparoksa*) type of knowledge. The former is knowledge by reason and the latter three comes under omniscience or intuition. *Kevala jñāna* subsumes *avadhi* and *manahparyāya* in it. So it is sufficient to speak of *Kevala jñāna* as intuition. Eventhough, the Jainas reject absolutism in their system, they cannot exorcise its haunt in its cardinal doctrines. The reason for such a dogmatic and obstimate stand is either due to a "prejudice against Absolutism or eagerness to stick to 'common belief."²

The 'ghost' of Absolutism haunts not only the metaphysical tenet of the system, its logic too is not free of its presence. The *kevala jñāna* as

¹ Ibid.

² M. Hirayanna, Op.cit, p.173.

omniscience consumes everything in it and leaves no room for epistemological pluralism. "The jaina logic leads us to a monistic idealism and so far as the Jainas shrink from it they are untrue to their own logic . . . The theory of relativity cannot be logically sustained without the hypothesis of an absolute. . . A careful consideration of *kevala jnana*, or the knowledge possessed by the free, will tell us that, the Jaina theory by implication accepts the method of intuition and the philosophy of absolutism . . . the distinctions are due to an element which does not persist, and what persists is the soul whose nature is consciousness. The jainas cannot logically support a theory of pluralism."¹

We shall draw obvious conclusions from the above discussions. The Jaina concept of *parōkṣa jñāna* represents its rational view of knowledge. It along with its logical offshoot *syādvāda* illumines the empirical. *Kevala jñāna* is its concept of intuition and is the reality. *Kevala jñāna* represents the element of absolutism in Jainism, its avowed claim for pluralism notwithstanding.

¹ S. Radhakrishnana, *Indian Philosophy*, vol.I, p.305, 307, 308.

Buddhism - Prativityasamutpāda and Sūnyavāda

Buddha, one of the greatest world-teachers (*Jagatguru*) was quite uninterested in metaphysical speculations and argumentation. He devoted himself for the greatest mission of removing the greatest evil in the visible world, namely suffering (*duhkkam*). As he was an ethical teacher and a social reformer par excellence, he could not find enough time to disseminate epistemological principles. But of his many-sided teaching, one can find two patterns in it. One for the man living in the world and the other for his transcendental world. Buddha devoted his life-time for the propagation of the first, for it was of immediate help to the ordinary man (*prthak jana*). The latter part pertaining to reality was much later developed by such great thinkers like Asvaghosa, Nagajuna and others. *Prativityasamutpāda* (dependent origination) is the state of affair of the empirical world and it forms the *samvṛti satya* (empirical truth). The philosophy, pertaining to reality, of Buddha as developed by Asvaghosa and Nagarjuna into the doctrines of *talhata* ('Suchness') and *Sūnyata* (Nothingness) forms the *paramārtha*, (the absolutely real).

Pratityasamutpāda (Theory of Dependent Origination)

The world according to Buddha is full of suffering.¹ Life, birth, disease, decay, death etc. are painful. All are connected in one way or other. They have related or dependent origination (*pratitya samutpāda*). The world is a world-process, 'a continual coming to be and passing away.' Everything is in a flux. One cannot attribute any permanence in the series. Certain conditions provide, the beginning of a system, it lasts as long as the conditions continue. This has been illustrated by the Buddha in the example of the flame series. Oil, wick, air etc. are conditions. All of them help to start the flame series. But any one of them, if not cooperating, causes the cessation of the series. This has been explained in the causal formula, which is also true of all empirical things. From the arising of that, this arises. That being present, this becomes. That being absent this does not become. From the cessation of that this ceases. The causal connection and the relativity and the impermanence are features characteristic of *samvṛti* (the empirical).

Our knowledge of the empirical reality or the *pratityasamutpāda* of the

¹ *Sarvaṃ dhukkum., Nikaya*

samvṛti satya are based on the *nāma* (names) *rūpa* (forms) pattern. *Rūpa* depicts the gross and *nāma* the subtle things that are material. It is due to the fact that the *indriyas* (senses) and rational mind can cognize, things in the world only in this form. The names and forms spring from the rational faculty of man. Mind and senses can apprehend things only in the pattern of *nāma rūpa*. But this is not all. But this serves one's practical needs. Buddha reserved his views on the inadequacies of empirical knowledge to grasp the real nature of things to a later context. From this context Asvaghosa and Nagarjuna started their philosophy.

The immediacy of teaching, according to Buddha is all about suffering and its eradication. This he expressed in his celebrated *Four Noble Truths* (*Ārya Satya*) and Eight-fold path (*Aṣṭāṅga mārga*). There is suffering in the world. Suffering has a cause. It can be stopped and there is a way to stop suffering. Suffering is due to desire and desire originates from ignorance. The root cause is here also ignorance. Ignorance can be removed by adhering to the *aṣṭāṅgamārga* sincerely. The final state is enlightenment or *nirvāṇa*.

Individuals involved in the vortex of world (*samsāra*) find difficult to know the aspects of the empirical world, like the principle of causality, the

chain of causation etc. and also the means to liberate from the world like extinction of desire, passions etc.. The blind involvement in the world is harmful in two ways. Firstly it does not help us to know the world and secondly it does not open a chance for us to relieve from the world. The dependent (*pratitya*) and momentary (*kṣaṇika*) nature of the world must not, however deflect one in evaluating the cardinal viens of Buddha and the essential spirit of Buddhism. Buddha himself pointed out that these are that of the world and have no meaning with regard to its essential nature.

Suffering is the empirical reality (*saṃsāra*) and the cessation of suffering is the ultimate reality (*Nirvāṇa*). Hence by pointing out the nature of world as dependent and momentary and it is full of suffering what Buddha did was to depict the empirical reality. The solution to this is possible only through its stoppage, which is *nirvāṇa*. Therefore, empirical reality must be a means to attain the ultimate reality. The mission of Buddha is to take all beings into this status. The status of ultimate reality i.e., *Nirvāṇa*. "*Pratitya samutpāda*, viewed from the empirical stand-point is *saṃsāra*. The very same when viewed from the stand point of reality is *nirvāṇa*."¹ "Nagarjuna salutes Buddha as the best among the teaches, who

¹ Chandradhar Sharma, *A critical Survey of Indian Philosophy*, p.73.

taught the blessed doctrine of pratitya samutpada which leads to the cessation of plurality and to bliss."¹

Śūnya and Nirvāṇa - States of Intuition

The traditional view of Buddhism itself can be broadly classified as falling into two patterns. One starting from the *Theravāda* (doctrine of Elders) Buddhism with *Vaibhāṣika*, *Sautrāntika* and *Yogācara* contributions and the other from the Madhyamika school, particularly of Asvaghosa and Nagarjuna. It is said that, what Sankara is to the *Upaniṣads*, Nagarjuna is to *Buddha vacāna* (Sayings of the Buddha).

As a living being of the world, man has impressions and sensations of the world. Our ideas of the empirical world are our 'fabrications' or *saṃskāras* of the world. They are essentially sense-bound and rational. The *saṃskāras* are the complex of desire, passions and deed and the aggregate of the five *skandhās* namely physical form, the perceptions, the sensations, the mental activity and the consciousness. These 'fabrications' must be removed to get the real knowledge.

¹ Loc. cit.

The *samskaras* are further enveloped by *moha*. It is a sort of error and Chandrakirti, in his commentary on Nagarjuna's, *Madhyamika sastra* designates *mōha* as the 'primordial cause which sets in motion the world-process.' *Mōha* and *samskāra* together form the *avidya* in Buddhism. *Avidya* is the cause of *samsāra* and its cessation is *nirvāṇa* or intuition or enlightenment. As per the *Samyutta nikaya*, *nirvana* is the destruction of all types of desire, hatred and particularly the *moha* or ignorance. That is the removal of ignorance. In the *Sutta nipata*, *nirvana* is stated as the 'abandonment of desire.' Desire originates from ignorance. The root cause of *samsāra*, the opposite of *nirvāṇa* is ignorance and the removal of ignorance, as in all Indian systems of thought, is the sole condition for *nirvāṇa* or enlightenment.

Nagarjuna maintains that *nirvāṇa* is nothing but *dhukkanirodhah* (cessations of suffering). In such a stage, the individual is left with his forms and structures. *Nirvāṇa* has two forms. The first is *sōpadhiśeṣa nirvāṇa* and the other *nirupadhiśeṣa nirvāṇa*. The ontological significance of *Nirvāṇa* is that, it is a state beyond *Samsāra*. Traditional works on Buddhism speak of *Nirvāṇa* as infinite and inaccessible to discursive

intellect.¹ Nirvana is *abyakata* and *appamana*² (beyond conceptualization and so is infinite). The word *nibbāna* (Pali for *Nirvāṇa*) occur only once in *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*. Here *nibbāna* is described as positive, non-temporal. it can very well be experienced, but not described. "Theravāda, thus throughout its long history, consistently held *Nibbāna* to be positive, experienceable, indescribable and supreme - the most worthwhile."³

The *Vaibhāṣikas* regard, *nirvāṇa* as eternal (*nitya*). The *sautrantikās* take only the negative aspect of *nirvana* that it cannot be explained. But they believe in the "survival of a subtle consciousness merged in the plane of complete quiescence."⁴ The *Yogācāras* consider it as a pure state of consciousness. For the *mādhyamikas* it is the cessation of suffering in the empirical life.

Nirvāṇa is thus the ultimate stage of reality.⁵ *Sq̄nsāra* and *nirvāṇa* are not two different things. One is the rational view of reality (and so is

¹ See *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* (ed.), Bapat and Vadekar, Poona, 1940.

² Op. cit.

³ Govind Chandra Pande, *Studies in the Origins of Buddhism*, p.445.

⁴ Op.cit. p.447.

⁵ *Paramārtha pariniṣpanna lakṣaṇa*

unsubstantial and wrong) and the other, the intuitional (hence the highest and ultimate). From a rational place we tend to name and categorize things and from the higher plane such categorization becomes impossible. Then *Samsāra* and *Nirvāṇa* fall in two levels of reality, the rational and the intuitional. In Buddhism this dichotomy is known as *Saṃvṛti* (empirical) and *paramārtha* (the fundamentally real).

***Tathata* and *Śūnya* – The Expressions of Intuition**

The dualism between the *Samsāra* and *nirvāṇa* leads one to the rational and the intuitional. Great *Mādhyamika* thinkers like *Āsvaghōṣa* and *Nagārjuna* had developed the rational versus the intuitive aspect of *samsāra* and *nirvāṇa* to the culmination of *prajñā* and *śūnya*. The *tathata* 'suchness' doctrine of *Āsvaghōṣa* and the *śūnyavāda* of *Nagārjuna* are the expressions of the intuitive aspects of *nirvāṇa*.

Tathata (Suchness)

The great *mādhyamika* philosopher *Āsvaghōṣa* in his monumental work, *Mahāyāna Śradhōtpāda Śāstra* (which has been translated into *The Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana* by D.T. Suzuki), maintains that only very few persons could understand the real teaching of Buddha. The real spirit

of the Buddha was to point out that the phenomenal world was a state of flux and impermanence, but behind these fleeting sensations, there existed a fundamental state of consciousness which could not be apprehended by ordinary mode of understanding. This is the state of enlightenment or *nirvāṇa*. It is Āśvaghōṣa and Nāgārjuna who took up and developed the 'appearance' and 'reality' of Buddha into an explicit system of thought.

According to Āśvaghōṣa there are two levels of experiences. One is the ordinary and the phenomenal and the other is higher and fundamental. The phenomenal is empirical (*samvṛti*) and governed by reason. The higher is intuitional and he calls it *tathata* ('suchness'). Reality is *tathata*. It is the knowledge of the very essence of human consciousness. As the ultimate existence, it is called *bhūta-tathata*; as pure spirit, it is called *bōdhi* or *prajñā* or *Alayavijñāna*. Viewed from rational viewpoint it is *Samsāra* and from the ultimate stand of intuition, it is *nirvāṇa*. It is known by different names based on the way in which it is comprehended. *Tathata* is infinite existence, and infinite bliss. "Suchness is not in the world of senses, nor is it an idea created by logical conventions. It is something unthinkable, unrepresentable, unnameable, indescribable. For this reason when the

prajñāparamita begins to talk about it, it is full of contradictions and negations".¹

Tathata of *Āsvaghōṣa* is then obviously a fundamental state of existence. It is also the highest state of intuition or supreme consciousness and a unique state of peace as in *Nirvāna*. These features altogether represent *tathata*, a state non-different from that of Advaitic *Brahman*. That too is *sat*, *cit* and *ananda*. *Tathata*, according to *Asvaghosa* is the only reality, all else being illusion. *Āsvaghōṣa*, does not, however reject the empirical world as mere illusion. It, according to him is the rational way of apprehending reality. Since reason cannot depict reality, its way (i.e., *Samsāra*) is also erroneous. "*Āsvaghōṣa* repudiates intellect and explains it as a finite manifestation of suchness".²

Prajñā (supreme consciousness, intuition) is the only ground with which *tathata* can be apprehended. "To comprehend it is to be enlightened".³ Although, *tathata* is the reality, we perceive it as the world of

¹ Beatrice Lane Suzuki, *Mahayāna Buddhism*, p.39.

² R. Sinari, "The Experience of Nothingness in Buddhism and Existentialism", in *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, Series-II, p.276.

³ *Ibid.*

experience due to ignorance borne of empirical framework and reason. "The purpose of human life is to intuit the source of the very phenomenon of 'isness', and it is in our grasp of *tathata* that the disclosure of this source lies".¹ According to *Āsvaghōṣa*, when we have true enlightenment or intuition (*prajñā* or *bōdhi*), the multiplicity vanishes and pure essence or 'suchness' remains. "When true knowledge dawns we realize that we are no more finite beings but Absolute suchness itself".² *Tathata*, according to *Āsvaghōṣa* is a positive fundamental state of existence. The eternal existence, with *prajñā* and it is possible in this state. "Therefore Asvaghosha is a confirmed philosopher of Being".³

Śūnya (Nothingness)

Narāg̃juna also inherited the same legacy of the Buddha and approached the problem, more or less in the same manner like *Āsvaghōṣa*. But there is a fundamental difference. Nagārjuna strips the positive characterization of the fundamental reality, which according to him eludes the empirical grasp. Through name and form (*nāma, rūpa*) ultimate reality

¹ R. Sinari, Op. cit., p.276.

² C. Sharma, Op. cit., p.485.

³ R. Sinari, Op. cit., p.277.

cannot be apprehended. *Prajñāparamita* or intuition is the only mode open to the real state, *Nirvāṇa*. Nagarjuna argues that the link of man is the empirical world, but his real and ultimate state is an 'undecipherable' ontological region, which he calls *Śūnya* (the predicateless Absolute).

The *Prajñāparamita* literature of Nagārjuna reveals an important fact. The *prajñā* must be viewed in two stages, the earlier and the final. In the earlier stage, eventhough *prajñā* as such is a higher order of knowledge allows discursive and analytic thinking. This shows that intuition cannot be existent in an unintellectual mind. *Prajñā* is thought in three degrees, viz., *Śruti*, *Cinta* and *Bhāvana*. Here *Sruti* means the initial stage of learning the Buddhist literature, more or less like the *Upaniṣadic* concept of *Sravaṇa*. The second degree of *prajñā* is *Cinta*. Here one has to reflect upon the teachings of Buddha (*Budha vacāna*) and this corresponds to *manana* in the *upaniṣads*. The last mode of *prajñā* is *bhāvana*, where one has to get the learning and understanding of the *Agamās* (scriptures) convinced. This part corresponds to the *nidhidyāsana* in the *upaniṣads*. This early stages of *prajñā* gives a final insight into the *prajñāparamita* or the consciousness supreme. Thus Nagarjuna uses *prajñā* in two senses. One, *prajñā* as a preparatory for the direct experience of the ultimate and secondly as *prajñāparamita* as pure

consciousness or intuition. But *prajñā* and *prajñāparamita* are used alike, as they represent intuition.

"The development of the *paramitās* must come about gradually. Again and again one must apply one's *prajñā* to the facts of experience and tradition".¹ This statement means that one's development of *prajñā* starts from the world of experience (*Samvṛti*). Our knowledge of the world is based on *vikalpa* (wrong apprehension), *vikalpa* is the root cause of the *prapañca-jāla* (series of world-processes) and this *avidya* or ignorance can only be removed by *prajñā-paramita* (intuition). The task of *prajñā* is to steer clear of the *vikalpās* and to focus on the basic fact that the *vikalpās* are due to *avidya* and the *jāla* of *prapañca* is empty (*Śūnya*). "This is achieved by bringing to light that *asti* and *nasti* hypostatized by the activities of *vikalpa* do not appertain to reality (*tattva*)".²

The observations of things in the world as having a dependent origination (*pratityasamutpāda*), the lack of their essence (*nissvabhavata*), the rational and the intuitional levels of knowledge inspired Nagarjuna to think

¹ Lindtner, *Nagarjuniana, Studies in the Writings and Philosophy of Nagarjuna*, Vol. II, p.261.

² Op. cit., p.271.

of the doctrine of *Satyadvaya* (dual truths), the *Samvṛti Satya* and *paramārtha satya*, the empirical and the ultimate truths respectively. In order to attain *nirvāṇa*, one must know *paramārtha*. The empirical world is insubstantial and void. It has no meaning apart from *nirvāṇa*.

Like *Asvaghōṣa*, *Nagārjuna* also gives a phenomenal status to the world. The *Samsara* is conditional and causal. It is *pratitya* (dependent). Absolute reality is *prajñāparamita*, which cannot be verbally explained. It is the basis of all cognitions of the world and of individuals. It is incomprehensible to the rational mode of understanding. So it turns out to be a predicateless ontological existence. It can only be designated by a negative epithet, as *Śūnya* ('Nothingness'). *Śūnya* is the reality. It is a state of intuition. *Prajñā* is the only ground with which *Śūnya* can be apprehended. "As a matter of fact, *Śūnyata* and *Prajñā* are two aspects of the same thing, one is ontological and the other ontic".¹

The *tathata* of *Asvaghosa* and *Śūnya* of *Nagarjuna* are one and the same thing. One is a positive rendering of the fundamental reality and the other its negative. Both are states of supreme wisdom, *prajñāparamita*.

¹ R. Sinari, Op. cit., p.281.

Tathata and *Śūnyata* are beyond empirical characterization and they represent the reality. *Prajñā* is intuition and comprehensive vision. Therefore, "it is through *prajñā* . . . that one can realize *Śūnyata*".

Many western thinkers have committed the mistake of regarding *Śūnya* as only an abstraction of negations. "By an explicable and deplorable eccentricity, the system promises men as a reward for their moral efforts the bottomless gulf of annihilation".¹ This is the view held by a prominent thinker like Bishop Bigandet. According to Mrs. Rhys Davids, "the nirvāṇa of Buddhism is simply extinction".² Oldenberg also holds such a misleading view.³ Stcherbatsky also commits the same mistake by calling *Śūnyavāda* as a doctrine of relativity.⁴ The reason for such a gross mistake might be due to the temperament of the Western mind to think everything in terms of cause and effect pattern. The transcendental relevance is overlooked in such a situation. Hence it is patently wrong to think *Śūnyavāda* as a doctrine of nihilism and *Śūnya* as an abstraction of negations.

¹ S. Radhakrishnan, *Op. cit.*, p.452.

² *Op. cit.*, p.452.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ J. Prasad, *History of Indian Epistemology*, p.63.

Like, all fundamental states of experience, *Sunyata* also, when verbalized turns out to be paradoxical. The reason of the paradox is that language is a tool of communication of the empirical. *Śūnyata* which is empirically elusive cannot be described. *Śūnyata* belongs to the *paramārtha* level, where *prajñā* or intuition is the mode of apprehension. We can teach anything only in an empirical realm. In the intuitional realm, nothing needs to be taught. It is all consciousness or *Samyag jnana*. To speak of the *paramārtha*, language is inadequate. Then one has to keep silence and he communicates nothing. If he uses language, he communicates in the inadequate way. Since communication is necessary language is used, though it has the said disadvantage. The paradox is due to the medium, and the medium has been chosen for want of another medium. "Intellect which is essentially analytic and rational involves itself in contradictions".¹ The Absolute or *Śūnya* is Being (world and individuals) from the empirical stand (*Samvṛti*) and Indescribable absolute or *Sunya per se* from the transcendent stand (intuition, *paramārtha*). The transcendental stand is the real and ultimate.

¹ C. Sharma, Op. cit., p.87.

CONCLUSION

C.C Damodaran “Reason and intuition in Indian thought - A critical appraisal ”
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CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

The history of civilized people, everywhere in the world is pregnant with views pertaining to their lives and also of the world in which they lived. The developed form of such thoughts is the account of their world-views and philosophies. Some of such thoughts are inspiring to the preceding generations. An examination of such things in Indian context is worth considering. The civilization has its known origin from *Vedas*, even though a very dominant set up was existent much earlier. Since the consideration starts from *Vedic* literature onwards, the prior case is not considered here. A prominent feature of the early *Vedic* people was their enquiring mind. They thought that, behind every worldly thing, there must be some mighty agents working. This is a crude but important scientific temperament. To think events in terms of cause and effect. This is the expression of rationality submerged in the depth of mind. Many things could not be explained. Yet they tried. Those things which were perplexing to them, were assigned to the functioning of some mysterious mighty beings. Later they were deified and worshipped.

Thus we have in early *Vedic* literature, anthropomorphic accounts of gods. The rational spirit finding expression in crude nature worship, was not stagnant. It grew as the time passed by. Starting from the crude, yet rational base of a nature-worship, there emerged polytheistic and monotheistic tendencies to more sophisticated and abstract monistic and non-dualistic position. The grip of rationality is slowly getting sidelined by a higher thought of abstraction. The skeptical attitude of rationality became so daring that in one of the *Vedas*, we see a question posed, "To what God shall we offer oblations?"¹

It soon became clear to the *Vedic* people that everything could not be explained by reason alone. A higher plane of thinking must be required for the explanation of many things of the world and particularly of his life and its status. The rational approach in the causal connection of worldly things gave way to the intuitional mode of apprehension as in the doctrine of self in the *Upaniṣads*. By this time two prominent streams of thought as the basis of explanation have been moulded into a rigid pattern, the rational

¹ B.K. Matilal, "Logical Illumination of Indian Mysticism", in *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, Series-II, p.34.

and the intuitional. Every developed thought process are set in lines of any of them or a combination of them.

The rational beginning in the *Vedas*, though not lost its significance has been superstructured by intuition in their development. All the orthodox and heterodox systems of thought, barring *carvaka darsana* (with its available literature) give prominence to intuition.

All of them start with rational thinking and end in a higher plane of consciousness, the intuitive plain. In no cases, however, the rational ground has been fully rejected. These systems tend to dichotomize knowledge into reason and intuition and believe that reason is applicable only to an empirical sphere and the meaning of that sphere is complete if and only if when the nature of the person who cognizes it is understood. That is his essence is understood. The essence of man is his self. The state of supreme consciousness. Thus knowledge of self is indispensable for knowledge of outside world. Knowledge of self is understood by a different plane of thought, Intuition. Hence, intuition is the basis of all knowledge.

The rampant skepticism of rationality compels man to have a peep

into his own inner recesses, to his own self. Intuition is the expression of such an inward-seeking. Human mind is not satisfied with the given things in the world and he thinks of a possible breakthrough of reason – a cognitive state of total and comprehensive view of reality. The limitations of reason and its failure to understand the very nature of human consciousness prompted men to turn their thinking inwards – towards his self. Now the scope of thought changes. It becomes immediate and self-evident. The certainty of one's own thinking and existence is self-evident. This self-evident first principle is one's own consciousness.

Various are the names given to such a state of the mind. The *Upaniṣads* speak of Brahman and Atman. *Prajñā, pratibha, kevalajñāna* by other systems. *Tathata* and *nirvāṇa* and *Śūnyata* by Buddhism etc. The states of higher knowledge (intuition) is a matter of direct and immediate experience to all. It is *anubhava* or integral experience and is always thought of as a state of enlightenment. All systems of Indian thought equate the state of enlightenment with liberation or complete freedom from all bondage. *Moksa* in the *Upaniṣads*, *Kaivalya* and *Samādhi* in Samkhya-Yoga, *Nirvana* in Buddhism etc. are expressions of liberation due to enlightenment.

No systems, however, think intuition as a separate faculty disconnected from reason. All of them uphold that intuition is prone only to a rational mind. Hence *prajñā*, *śūnyata*, *Brahmanubhava*, *Kevalajñāna*, *Samādhi*, *Kaivalya* etc. are different names of the same indescribable reality, the ontological region of the undecipherable reality.

The most unique characteristic of human reality is its 'volatile' state in the world. "Man is a self-surpassing being". The reason for his 'volatile' nature is his ambivalence — of his reason and intuition. He is primarily a being endowed with reason and the world is accessible to him in this line. But he cannot understand himself with this method. The knowledge of self is the basis of all knowledge. Self-knowledge, whether it be *Brahman* or *Kevalajana* or *tathata* or *Śūnya* or *nirvāṇa* or by whatever name it is known is the greatest of all knowledge. It is absolutely for this purpose that all philosophic inquiries have been made in India.

Reason cannot initiate one into the knowledge of self. Higher knowledge or *parā vidya* is required. *Parā vidya* or intuition occurs only to a mind who has rigorous moral and mental training conducive to a virtuous and harmonious life. Rational competence is a pre-condition to the intuitive state. That is why all great men of intuitions are astute logicians

and rigorous dialecticians. Hence reason and intuition are not contradictory, but one lower and the other higher. Man has an irresistible urge to pass from the rational to the intuitional plane. He is both an empirical and an ontological being. He has a real part and an unreal part. The real part is eclipsed by the ignorance due to the unreal part. The unreal in him is due to his body, sense-organs and modifications of the mind. The moment he is freed from their influences, he shines forth with his omniscience. He is reality, *Ahaṁ Brahmāsmi*.

The primacy of reason makes man as a being in the world, but the supremacy of intuition makes him an ontological being. From this, it follows that, the ontological existence of man is supreme and it is to be achieved through intuition, by a total breakthrough of his rational capacities. The ontological or the fundamental state of man cannot be verbally articulated. Medium of communication fails to express this state. A state of unalloyed bliss or *anandaṁ* is the only visible expression. Intuition is an ineffable state of experience and it is "the ultimate vision of the profoundest being". The visions are revealed through negative expressions like *neti, neti* or by complete silence (*mauna vākya*). The former we see in the

Upaniṣads and the latter in Buddha. Both are the same, expressions of the inexpressible.

In the preceding sections, a critical appraisal of the role of reason and intuition in various systems of Indian thought has been attempted. Man's urge to know the physical and the metaphysical has assumed these two modes of human thought. The rational has been employed to know the world outside. But the rational plane is not accessible to the transcendental. In the early *Vedās*, it has been noted that rational has been the initial motive of *Vedic* men. Their interpretation of phenomena was largely empirical and observational. The concrete way of thinking gradually sidelined to a much more fundamental and abstract way of thought. The thought process instead of directing outwards was diverted into an inward seeking. This inward-seeking technique is the origin of all intuitional thought. The subject-matter of study has been shifted from natural phenomena to the knowledge of self. Self-knowledge is considered to be the cream of all human understanding.

In the final parts of the *Vedas*, i.e., in the *Upaniṣads*, one finds knowledge of self or *adhyatma vidya* as the sole subject of inquiry. Elaborate and abstruse *pramāṇas* have been prescribed for the inquirer. He has to

undergo moral and physical training to qualify himself for the study. *Mahāvākyās* have been enunciated by great thinkers to amplify the central teaching of the *Upaniṣads*. The ontological status of individual self has been traced to the cosmic concept of Brahman, which is one-without a second. The cosmic self, the Brahman is finally said to be the individual self itself (*Tattvamasi*). ✓

In the context of different systems of Indian thought, we have made it explicit that, a few of them, particularly the *Vaiśeṣika* and *Sāṃkhya*, give equal importance to the rational and the intuitive domains of consciousness in their world view, but the majority of them give dominance to the higher wisdom, *parāvidya*, over the rational (*vyavahāra*, *saṃvṛti* etc.). They also consider it absolutely necessary that in order to have an initiation into the higher faculties of supreme consciousness, one must undergo a rigorous moral and mental training.

The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* philosophy considers reason and intuition as both having equally prominent roles. Their realistic and pluralistic attitude, and their theory of atomism etc. are explicit evidences of their acceptance of knowledge by reason. Their spiritual outlook is due to their acceptance of the authority of *Vedas*. These systems also approve the transcendental

method leading to intuition as evidenced in the case of their concept of *Alaukika pratyakṣa*. The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* thinkers, even though explicit advocates of rationality are not lethargic to endorse the supremacy of intuition over intellect. That is clear when the system speaks of *laukika pratyakṣa* as equatable to omniscience. And all other types of knowing, including rational can be subsumed under it.

The *Sāṃkhya-Yōga* are sisterly disciplines having identical world views. They fully expose the role of reason in their epistemology as is clear in the theory of evolution. But Samkhya theory of evolution is not a solitary concept. It has relevance only in the proximity of consciousness (*purusa*). Actually it is *puruṣa* who is solely responsible for starting the evolutionary process. The Samkhya lays great store on the discriminatory role of *Purusa*. It must keep away from or not to be wrongly identified itself to the evolutes. In no unclear terms, the Samkhya proclaims that *purusa* remaining aloof from *prakṛti* is its final position and it is the position of enlightenment and release *Kaivalya*. The theory of evolution and the final aim of *Kaivalya* are explicit formulations of Sāṃkhya that, both reason and intuition are equally acceptable. *Kaivalya* being the final aim, it underlines the supremacy of intuition. *Yōga*, accepts the Samkhya evolution, but

advocates its own doctrine of liberation leading to an absolute state of intuition, *Samādhi*. Yoga system though accepts evolution, thinks it to be relevant in a secondary level of mundane experience. It is absolutely concerned with the knowledge of the higher type. Other systems also take up the yogic methods, *Aṣṭāṅga Yōga*, as a means of getting self-realization. The ultimate aim of an individual must, according to the *Yōga* be to attain *Samādhi*, one can say that *Yōga* is avowedly intuitional in its outlook.

Advaita, in its zest to emphasize the sole reality of *Brahman*, gives little importance to other levels of experiences. The highest type of knowledge (*parāvidya*) is only one. It is the knowledge of *Brahman* or the self. Self-realization is the end of all searches, thinking and otherwise. The rational footing, though is necessary before attaining intuition, is of no avail to it afterwards. Hence, reason is only a pre-requisite and nothing more to Advaita. The multiplicity and the relevance of the world are only due to the rational framework of the mind and they get sublated, the moment when higher knowledge is dawned.

Advaita, however does not outrightly reject the empirical knowledge, but points to its insignificance from a higher perspective. Viewed from the *paramārtha* state, it regards *Brahman*, the superconsciousness, alone as real,

the world and the encompassing reason turn out to be *tucca* (negligible). But, for a person rounded up by mundane frameworks, the empirical knowledge is significant. The world is relevant for such a person. Just as the dream is real as long as one is in the dreaming state and it turns out to be only a dream when one comes to the waking state, so also one regards knowledge by reason and the empirical world as real as long as one is in the *Vyvahāra* level.

The two heterodox systems, which we discussed, in their essential spirit also depict the significance of reason on the one level and intuition on the other. Jainism with its atomism and *Syādvada* is characteristic in its rational outlook. One cannot belittle, however the spirit of intuition immanent in its world-view. The *Jiva* is considered essentially as endowed with *Kevalajñāna*, in its original state. All attempts, including rational, are only to restore this capacity of man. Kevala jñāna as intuition is the goal of *Jiva* and the means to restore it is the practice of *tri-ratnas*. Jainism is thus intuitionalistic in its outlook.

Buddhism must be taken up in its entirety as Buddha's teachings developed by later thinkers like *Āsvaghōṣa* and *Nagarjuna*. The none can say that Buddhism maintains the relevance of *Satya-dvaya*. As a result, one

can think of two levels of realities. The *Samvṛti Sattya* and the *Paramārtha*. The reality when viewed from a rational plane is *Samsāra* or the world. It has *duhkka* (suffering). Viewed from the intuitional plane, the reality is an indescribable state of supreme consciousness (*Śūnya*) or *talhata* (suchness).

The Buddhists think of reality in the same way as the Advaitins do. After, Advaita, it is perhaps Buddhism which represents the *Upanisadic* teaching more closely, though it looks paradoxical. *Brahman* as *nirguṇa* of Advaita and reality [of consciousness (of self)] as *Śūnya* are renderings from the same plane.

As cited earlier, Buddhism has two streams of thought. One stressing the *Samvṛti Satya* and the other *paramārtha*. Early Buddhism, which is developed along the first stream of thought of the Buddha, speaks of the momentariness and impermanence of the world. Buddha's doctrines of *Kṣaṇikavāda* (momentariness) and *pratityasamutpāda* (dependent origination) are expressive of this. *Nairatmyavāda* (doctrine of no-self) simply means that, the self is not an entity to be cognized empirically. One requires a higher insight or intuition to know the depth of one's consciousness.

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How can one come to this state? The second stream of thought of the Buddha developed by Nagarjuna *et al.* gives an answer to it. The awareness of the *Aryasatya* (noble truths) and the *astāngamārgas* (eight fold path) lead to the development of the supreme consciousness, *prajñā*. The state of supreme consciousness is *Śūnya* or *Nirvāṇa* or *talhata*. These are but different formulations of the one and same state of enlightenment, intuition. *Prajñā*, according to Nagarjuna is the only ground with which *Śūnya* can be cognized. *Śūnya* is an indescribable and ineffable state of consciousness. *Prajñā* is ontic and *Śūnya* is the ontological. Thus both are two aspects of the same consciousness, intuition.

The conclusions tendered by a critical appraisal on the systems and pointed out in the preceding, make some generalizations on them inevitable. All systems of Indian thought, with the exception of *Carvaka* (with its given available source of literature), are explicit in their supremacy of intuition over reason. Rational trends though dominant in all of them are only subservient to the final aim. In no systems, these two lines of thought are regarded as contradictory or opposed. They act as if complementaries. Reason is the necessary and inevitable background of the intuitional. All the systems have a common aim of raising man into the highest state of

knowledge. The highest state of 'knowledge' is not rational, but trans-
rational and is the source of all rationality also. All systems speak of this as
the knowledge of one's own self. But some in clear tones and others in
implicit sense. The aim is the same. To elevate man into a realm of his own
capacity in full. The zenith of his consciousness, which is the knowledge of
his self and that leads to the final aim of liberation or complete freedom,
mōkṣa.

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